HEIDEGGER, GERMAN IDEALISM, & NEO-KANTIANISM

edited by

TOM ROCKMORE

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Humanity Books

an imprint of Prometheus Books
59 John Glenn Drive, Amherst, New York 14228-2197

Published 2000 by Humanity Books, an imprint of Prometheus Books

Inquiries should be addressed to
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59 John Glenn Drive
Amherst, New York 14228–2197
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FAX: 716–564–2711

04 03 02 01 00 5 4 3 2 1

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Heidegger, German idealism, and neo-Kantianism / [edited by]
Tom Rockmore.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 1–57392–737–6 (cloth. : alk. paper)
1. Heidegger, Martin, 1889–1976. 2. Kant, Immanuel, 1724–1804—Influence. I. Rockmore, Tom, 1942–

B3279.H49 H35222 2000
193—dc21 99–058576
CIP

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Tom Rockmore

This volume collects a group of fresh essays centered on the general theme of Martin Heidegger and German philosophy, especially German idealism and German neo-Kantianism. The authors are all philosophers known for their writings on various aspects of German idealism, particularly Kant and Hegel, on Heidegger's philosophy, or on both. The contributors to this volume represent a wide range of views running from those who follow Heidegger very closely to those who are deeply critical of his theories. As might be expected, the respective readings and evaluation of Heidegger's writings differ greatly.

Heidegger's place in the contemporary philosophical debate is becom-

ing clearer every day as the new century begins. His influence is enormous throughout the philosophical discussion, and far beyond it. He has influenced, often strongly, a representative cross-section of some of the most important later philosophers, including Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jacques Derrida, surely his most important conceptual epigones, as well as Herbert Marcuse, Hannah Arendt, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, and Paul Ricoeur, and more distantly Jürgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel, Hans Jonas, and many lesser known figures.

Merely in terms of influence, even Heidegger's philosophical foes acknowledge that he is arguably the most important philosopher of the century. There can be few philosophers whose work has ever attracted the sustained attention generated by Heidegger's since he almost instantaneously became widely known through the 1927 publication of *Being and Time*. Yet there is a difference between acknowledging the importance of a philosophical theory, which is measured by the attention it attracts, and evaluating its contribution.

What is an important philosopher? As a general rule, it seems safe to say that any philosopher who has anything important to say displaces the standards in vigor at the time and transforms the discussion under way. It follows that although it is perhaps possible to recognize that a given philosopher is important in close temporal proximity, the process of coming to grips with that person's philosophical theories is likely to be a lengthy one. For the few great philosophers, this process is arguably always underway, since it can never be brought to a close. We are still learning how to read Plato and Kant, Aristotle and Hegel; and they are read differently in every succeeding generation.

The conceptual jury is still out about Heidegger. It is still too early to know if Heidegger will later be ranked among the small handful of the greatest philosophers, or as Gadamer thinks, as a *kleiner Meister*, his place lies among the very important figures of lesser rank, or whether, after a period of continued discussion, he will later recede into the history of the philosophical tradition, which is replete with examples of philosophers who exerted important influence in their day, but who were later largely or even wholly forgotten.

The importance of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* was widely and nearly instantaneously recognized. Kant's star has never paled. Interest in the crit-

ical philosophy is nearly as high today as it was when the work appeared in the fourth quarter of the eighteenth century. Since then the work has been read by generations of students engaged in the difficult, perhaps endless task of mining the conceptual veins of his critical philosophy.

Yet mere attention is not itself a guarantee of intrinsic philosophical importance, or even of continued presence near the front of the philosophical stage. In Kant's wake, many, including Fichte (whose claim was accepted by the young Schelling and Hegel) claimed to be the only person really to understand Kant. Fichte's claim was further advanced by an obscure contemporary, K. L. Reinhold.

Reinhold has a special place as the one who, already in the late 1780s, as the ink of the second edition of Kant's classic was still drying, suggested that the critical philosophy, which claimed that any philosophy worthy of the name must be formulated in systematic form, needed itself to be reformulated according to this criterion. Reinhold was widely read and influential at the time. Fichte went to Jena as Reinhold's successor in the most important German university of the day. Fichte's philosophy arose out of his reaction to Reinhold's reading of Kant.

It is fair to say that through his effort to reconstruct the critical philosophy Reinhold began post-Kantian German idealism. He continues to influence the discussion through the continued reaction to the great figures of German idealism. Yet he quickly receded into the history of the philosophical tradition, where his name is today practically unknown, except to a few specialists, most of whom have probably not read him.

We do not know whether Heidegger's influence in the future will continue on anything like the same scale as in the past. We do not know if Heidegger will turn out to be like Reinhold, whose importance does not depend on the intrinsic value of his theories, but on their effect on others, or whether, like Kant, he will continue to be regarded as singularly important for his theories as well as for their effect on other important philosophers. We do know that Heidegger studies have been changing dramatically in recent years, for political as well as other reasons.

Heidegger was known mainly as a brilliant teacher; according to Hannah Arendt, hardly a disinterested spectator, as a hidden king, when, after *Being and Time* appeared, he was suddenly thrust into enormous philosophical prominence. The typical reaction to important philosophers

is bipolar, in that some deny that they are important or worth taking seriously, while others affirm the value of their views. The main difference with respect to important philosophers is how this reaction develops.

In this light, Heidegger is both typical and atypical, since there are a number of special factors operative in the reception of his position. The bipolar reaction governing the reception of his philosophical theories was set in motion by Rudolf Carnap's early attack on his claims, from a linguistic perspective, as essentially meaningless. Carnap's attack quickly mobilized Heidegger's defenders and critics in a sharply polarized discussion. This discussion featured analytic thinkers among his critics, as well as Husserlians (disappointed by Heidegger's efforts to distance himself from Husserl) and others, who see little or no redeeming value in his writings. His defenders, the Heideggerians, sometimes attach an almost mystical value to his writings. Not untypically, Henri Birault, a French Heideggerian, recommended Heidegger's theory as helping us to avoid despair by returning to God.[1]

The sharply bipolar attitude, which has continued to shape the response to Heidegger's writings, was prolonged and deepened by Heidegger's political turning toward National Socialism in the early 1930s. This embrace of socialism is now well known and simply cannot be denied. The problem it poses is that we need to interpret Heidegger's theories knowing that their author may or may not have turned to Nazism in virtue of them. Heidegger's interest in National Socialism developed surprisingly early, earlier than for most other German intellectuals: he was one of the very first German philosophers to turn to Nazism. Yet, despite much discussion, much about Heidegger's Nazism, including its significance for an understanding of his theories or even its duration, has not yet been well understood.

This political element has created a supplementary difficulty in understanding his philosophical theories that has led to very different reactions in the Heidegger discussion. It is natural that his followers have consistently sought to stifle any effort to judge his philosophy by his politics, seeking in general to deny what could be denied, and to explain away what they could, whereas his opponents have often sought to discredit his philosophical theories through attention to his politics. In rallying to Nazism, indeed the only German intellectual of the first rank to do so,

Heidegger presents an unusual case. Although since Plato philosophers have routinely claimed that what they do is indispensable for the good life, philosophers since Socrates have usually shunned political involvement.

Hence, this political element, unusual for a philosopher, is one factor that in practice has made it difficult to evaluate Heidegger's philosophical contribution. Since Heidegger's political involvement became known in the 1930s, much energy has been spent in fending off its political consequences. The angry polemic that arose in the late 1980s after the publication of Victor Farías's study of Heidegger's Nazism reveals how much the protagonists in the debate think is at stake.

Another main obstacle in evaluating Heidegger's theories are the series of hints Heidegger throws out about his own understanding of his position. In claiming initially to return to early Greek philosophy, or later even to the pre-Socratics, Heidegger suggests that philosophy since early Greece has been on the wrong path. There is a clear inference in his writings that he eschews any positive relation to the modern philosophical tradition, which, as he claims, needs to be destroyed in order to let the authentic philosophical questions emerge, hence to begin to think in authentic fashion.

In fact, his own relation to modern philosophy, particularly German idealism, which seems not to have attracted the attention it deserves, is complex and important, both for the formulation of his theories and for their evaluation. For present purposes, we can understand German idealism to include Kant and the three main post-Kantian German idealists: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.

Kant is a strategic figure for understanding Heidegger for at least three reasons. First, Heidegger was deeply interested in Kant during the mysterious, so-called turning in his thought. Second, the reformulation of Kant's position is the guiding impulse in post-Kantian German idealism, all of whose main figures interested Heidegger to varying degrees. Third, the return to Kant leading to German neo-Kantianism provided an important part of the intellectual climate in which Heidegger formulated his own position.

Heidegger's relation to Kant is well known and has often been discussed, although perhaps never with the thoroughness it demands. We know that at the same time as he was preparing *Being and Time*, Heidegger

was also preparing *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, which appeared in 1929. There are hints in the latter book that he regarded his own philosophy as an effort to carry the main insights of the critical philosophy beyond Kant. These hints link him to the post-Kantian German idealists. An effort to carry the critical philosophy beyond the stage it attained in Kant's writings, more precisely to develop it according to its intrinsic spirit while if necessary neglecting its letter, was central to post-Kantian German idealism. It was central as well to German neo-Kantianism that arose after the return to Kant in the middle of the nineteenth century.

The idea that the proper approach to Kant lies in reconstructing the critical philosophy provides an interesting insight into Heidegger's theories. Certainly, Heidegger's unusual ontological reading of Kant, not as an epistemologist, but rather as a predecessor of his own concern with being, separates him from other neo-Kantians. Yet if, as Heidegger suggests, a main concern motivating his position is the effort to take Kant's insights beyond the critical philosophy, then Heidegger's own philosophy could be regarded as an atypical form of neo-Kantianism.

Heidegger's view of Kant, which is well known, both because of the Kant book as well as his public discussions with Cassirer at Davos, Switzerland, has received attention, especially in the French Heidegger discussion. Heidegger's relation to Fichte has not so far been studied in detail, in part because his lecture course on Fichte has only just appeared.

Heidegger's relation to Schelling is better understood. We know that, after the so-called turning in his thought, he became increasingly interested in Schelling's position. In part, the Heideggerian view of Schelling has been known for many years through the efforts of Walter Schulz, a German Schelling specialist who was a Heidegger student. Schulz's suggestion that German idealism reaches its peak in the writings of the later Schelling is a variation on Heidegger's view that the later Schelling, particularly the *Freiheitsschrift*, is centrally important; more important, say, than the widely known Young Hegelian claim that this movement peaks in Hegel's thought.

Heidegger's relation to Hegel is more complex, more difficult to describe. This relation is important for several reasons, including Hegel's philosophical significance, Heidegger's repeated attention to Hegel's texts, and because *Being and Time* is routinely described as the most ambitious philosophical treatise since Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

Hegel is understood differently in different languages and literatures. In Germany, it has long been usual to approach Hegel's position through the *Science of Logic*. We know that early in his career, Heidegger tried but evidently failed to grasp the central insights in Hegel's *Logic*. From his letters to Karl Jaspers, we know that Heidegger wrestled unsuccessfully with that work in the early 1920s. He later returned to Hegel in his lectures at several points in his career, particularly to the *Phenomenology*. Although he prepared a number of texts on aspects of Hegel's thought, he seems finally not to have made much progess toward understanding Hegel's position as a whole. It is not even clear how much of Hegel's texts he read. Although we possess his lecture notes on the *Phenomenology*, it is striking that there are no references in it that reach beyond the fourth chapter. It is as if Heidegger had never been able to read the entire book, never been able to come to grips with the theories of a philosopher whose dialectical form of thought was so different from and finally inimical to his own.

Heidegger's relation to German neo-Kantianism is perhaps better known, but still insufficiently studied. Several aspects of the relation can be briefly evoked. In virtue of his unusual ontological reading of Kant, Heidegger rejects the standard epistemological line of interpretation developed by Cohen and a whole series of later neo-Kantians. His public controversy with Ernst Cassirer, Cohen's student, who represented that tendency, is well known to scholars. Among the German neo-Kantians, the foreword to Heidegger's dissertation contains a friendly remark about Heinrich Rickert, whom Heidegger later sharply opposed. Among German neo-Kantians, Heidegger's most positive relation is perhaps to Emil Lask, an unusual figure, who, before his early death, influenced Heidegger; Hungarian Marxist philosopher Georg Lukács; and Richard Kroner, an important German historian of philosophy. The foreword to Heidegger's *Habilitationsschrift* contains a deeply appreciative remark about Lask who appears to have influenced Heidegger's phenomenology of life, including his conception of *Ereignis*.

The essays collected in this volume represent an effort by different hands to study the little known but crucial link between Heidegger's theories and his readings of German philosophy, especially German idealism and German neo-Kantianism. Jean-Marie Vaysse provides a wide overview, very faithful to Heidegger's position, of the Heideggerian interpretation of

German idealism. His chapter is then followed by three more critical accounts of Heidegger's reading of Kant, each of which is very different. Pierre Kerszberg offers a comparatively wider discussion centered on the broad outline of Heidegger's ontological, antiepistemological rereading of Kant that emerges in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* as well as in the public disputation with Ernst Cassirer. Kerszberg is concerned with testing Heidegger's reading of Kant against Kant. In a wide-ranging paper, Rudolf Makkreel concentrates on the idea of so-called authentic interpretation in Georg Friedrich Meier and Kant (as well as Gadamer and Dilthey), and then the differences, as concerns this theme, between the positions of Kant and Heidegger. In a more specialized study, Veronica Vasterling takes up Heidegger's critical reading of the Kantian view of time in *Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*, which is volume 21 of the *Collected Works*. Vasterling finds Heidegger's treatment to harbor certain unexplained difficulties.

The discussion of Heidegger's take on post-Kantian idealism begins with two accounts of his understanding of Fichte's theories. Alfred Denker provides a careful discussion of the impact of Fichte on Heidegger's initial lecture series. He argues convincingly that there is a strong, but as yet unacknowledged, Fichtean component in Heidegger's early position. Claudius Strube, who edited Heidegger's lecture series on Fichte, discusses these texts in some detail. He makes us aware of the extent of Heidegger's acquaintance with Fichte's writings and precisely what he thought of them.

Schelling is someone to whom Heidegger turns only later, after the mysterious turning (*Kehre*) in his thought that may or may not be related to his enthusiasm for National Socialism. Douglas Hedley, who analyzes Heidegger's relation to the Romantics, particularly as concerns his reading of Schelling in his later writings against the background of the mystical tradition, stresses the mystical, even romantic side of Heidegger's later position.

Hegel is an important test case in Heidegger's efforts to dialogue with the great philosophers on their own level. Through consideration of the crucial distinction between the conceptions of worldview and so-called worldview philosophy, Tom Rockmore argues that Heidegger falls short of his goal in his abortive dialogue with Hegel.

Heidegger's relation to neo-Kantian philosophers is addressed by Claude Piché, Marion Heinz, and Theodore Kisiel. Piché provides a thorough review of Heidegger's ontological interpretation of Kant as a reaction to Hermann Cohen's more standard, but highly influential epistemological reading of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which was of fundamental importance for the Marburg School. In the process, he carefully tests aspects of Heidegger's view of Kant against various facets of Cohen's work. Heinz provides an equally detailed account of the genesis of Heidegger's conception of philosophy as the consequence of his critical reaction to the Baden school of neo-Kantianism, with special attention to the theories of Heinrich Rickert.

Although Heidegger quickly broke in his initial lecture series with the Southwestern Neokantian School in which he had been brought up, he never broke with Lask, Rickert's most brilliant student, who continued to receive positive treatment in his later writings. Kisiel presents a detailed discussion of Emil Lask's crucial influence on Heidegger's early thought. In the process, he uncovers an interesting link between Heidegger and Fichte's further thinking about the *Wissenschaftslehre* after he had left Jena.

The volume concludes with Ben Vedder's interesting discussion of the link between Heidegger and Dilthey. Vedder shows the dependency of Heidegger's theory of authentic history on his effort to radicalize Dilthey's position through Count Yorck's criticism of it.

NOTES

1. See Henri Birault, "Existence et vérité d'après Heidegger," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 56 (January–March 1951): 87.

1

HEIDEGGER AND GERMAN IDEALISM

Jean-Marie Vaysse

Heidegger's relationship to German idealism, particularly to its three main thinkers, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, is obviously complex. There is certainly something of Fichte tinged with Plato in the Rector of Freiburg, as well as some Hegel in the thinker on the history of philosophy, while Schelling allows him to distinguish himself from Hegelian panlogism. On a deeper level, however, Heidegger's relationship first to Kant, and then to Hölderlin and Nietzsche doubtless brings together all these influences in a way that determines his understanding of speculative idealism and suggests a return to the Presocratics.

HEIDEGGER'S APPROACH TO KANT

Heidegger's reading of Kant and phenomenological interpretation are surely decisive in determining his strategy in tackling speculative idealism. In the 1968 Le Thor seminar Heidegger cites a famous passage of the *Critique of Pure Reason*:

> The unconditioned necessity, which we require as the last support of all things, is the true abyss of human reason. Eternity itself, however terrible and sublime it may have been depicted by Haller, is far from producing the same giddy impression, for it only *measures* the duration of things, but does not *support* them. We cannot put off the thought, nor can we support it, that a Being, which we represent to ourselves as the highest among all possible beings, should say to himself, I am from eternity to eternity, there is nothing beside me, except that which is something through my will,—*but whence am I?* Here all sinks away from under us, and the highest perfection, like the smallest, passes without support before the eyes of speculative reason, which finds no difficulty in making the one as well as the other to disappear without the slightest impediment.[1]

These lines, in which God seems to enter into the discussion about himself, is in the chapter that deals with the impossibility of a cosmological proof of the existence of God or of the system. Speculative reason can find no fixed basis upon which to develop a system, which thus remains only an idea. Heidegger, however, points out that everything was overturned during Kant's own lifetime as he "looked on with dread at what was beginning to break to the surface with Fichte." And he adds that "Fichte and Hegel are in search of a *Grund* where for Kant there could only be *Abgrund*." While for Kant the origin digs itself down and hides away in an abyss, for his successors, with the well-known exception of Schelling, the origin must reveal itself as a ground upon which speculative reason may then build to become the productive activity of the system.

The fate of modern thought is characterized by the system inasmuch as the world becomes "conceived . . . as picture," as Heidegger puts it in his lecture "The Age of the World Picture." That means that any entity

(*Seiende*) in its totality is taken in such a way that it is an entity only insofar as man sets it in representation and production with the result of a unity of structure that unfolds out of the plan of the objectivity of the entity. The Cartesian process of the determination of the meaning of being as subjectivity and of the essence of truth as certainty is decisive here. That is why Cartesian thought was not in any way overcome by German thought since Leibniz and the modifications it wrought. These modifications "simply expand its metaphysical scope and create the presuppositions of the nineteenth century, still the most obscure of all the centuries of the modern age up to now."[2]

Heidegger can even add the following:

> The uniqueness of the systematic in Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Schelling—a uniqueness that is inherently diverse—is still not grasped. The greatness of the systematic in these thinkers lies in the fact that it unfolds not as in Descartes out of the subject as *ego* and *substantia finita*, but either as in Leibniz out of the monad, or as in Kant out of the transcendental essence of finite understanding rooted in the imagination, or as in Fichte out of the infinite I, or as in Hegel out of Spirit as absolute knowledge, or as in Schelling out of freedom as the necessity of every particular being which, as such being, remains determined through the distinction between ground and existence.[3]

The enigmatic character of German idealism thus does not derive from its origin, which one can clearly locate in the fundamental Cartesian metaphysical position, but from its relationship to Kant, from the equivocality in principle of the critical philosophy which, on the one hand, hinders the system, but on the other, lays the groundwork for its possibility. Two points should be noted here:

(1) In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant was able to rediscover the Greek sense of essential finitude, perceiving at its root the commencement of the a priori link between the presence of things and the irruption of man. In the interplay between transcendental idealism and empirical realism, according to which "the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of

experience" (A158, B197), he rediscovered the Parmenidian identity of the *noien* and the *einai*. Now, we know that Heidegger's reading of Kant revolves around the status of transcendental imagination: if knowledge is nothing but our own activity, the world of phenomena becomes like the poem of the transcendental imagination, since we only find in things what we put into them ourselves, what we produce or "poetize." So, in his courses on Nietzsche, Heidegger states

> [i]t is Kant who for the first time discerns the "poieticizing" character of reason, and who meditated on it in the doctrine of transcendental imagination. The conception of the essence of absolute reason, developed in the metaphysics of German idealism by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel is totally based on the Kantian understanding of the essence of reason as an imaginative "poeiticizing" force.[4]

This comment helps us better to understand the ambiguity of critical philosophy. On the one hand, Kant reveals imagination as the very root of finite reason, going as far back as the Greek commencement, saying something about the essence of reason that could not be said on the grounds of modern metaphysics. On the other hand, however, he also makes possible the "absolutization" of this same metaphysics in German idealism. In fact, inasmuch as modern reason is nothing other than subjectivity as a representation—that is certain of itself—of the entity in its being understood as objectivity, it is also nothing other than the faculty which imagines, which shapes for itself, that which is the entity. Thus the hindering of the system about which we have just spoken is also that upon which its possibility is founded.

(2) Kant, now, conceives of reason as the higher faculty of Ideas resulting from the systematization of acts of understanding. From this standpoint reason is the faculty of systematic unity, and the meaning that the *Critique of Judgment* confers on critical philosophy as a whole is the form of systematicity. If reason is first of all finite human reason, it becomes knowledge of itself and of its realm; and if philosophy is *teleologia rationis humanae*, that is, the determination of the essence of man, it is because reason has become the object of philosophical knowledge in view of its

architectonic unity in accordance with the Ideas that carry finality and unity into the coherence of a system. We can understand why this same Heidegger, who says in the Le Thor seminar that Kant blocks the system, can also say in his course on Schelling that "the *Critique of Judgment* is understood as the battle for *the system*."[5] Note that he is not dealing with an actual system here but with a battle about the system. Kant thus does not follow things through to the end and even challenges in advance the enterprise of his successors who will abandon the thing in itself and convert the *Reflektierende* into a determinant. With Kant the system remains eminently problematic in the sense that it is the appropriate problem for speculative reason. It thus seems that the critique cannot lay the groundwork for itself inasmuch as Kant, while he does indeed define the essence of knowledge as experience, does not lay a basis for this knowledge as it might culminate as critique. It consequently appears, says Heidegger, that "such a task could lead into endlessness and, thus, into groundlessness so that 'critique' in Kant's sense would not be possible at all."[6] The abyss can thus appear as the absence of foundation, and so it is to this demand for foundation-laying that German idealism will respond.

Kant the Greek is thus also Kant the Modern who points toward the ultimate accomplishment of the metaphysics of the subject. In its very tensions, pinpointed so well by J. Taminiaux,[7] the *Critique of Judgment*, by laying a suprasensory substratum which allows for the articulation of the Aesthetic Idea and the Idea of Reason, lets it be understood that the suprasensory is the common denominator of sensory phenomena and a priori faculties, so that there exists an identity of the subject and the object. The analytic of finitude can thus give way to a metaphysics of absolute subjectivity.

THE ENIGMA AND THE SYSTEM

It is thus from this point that we should measure the enigmatic nature of German idealism as Heidegger conceives it. While the source of German idealism lies in the metaphysics of Descartes, the principle of its possibility is found in the metaphysics of Leibniz and in transcendental philosophy, insofar as they both shift the emphasis of a certain number of issues.

(1)

Critical philosophy provides the framework in which reason can be understood as a poetizing imaginative force. The *Einbildungskraft* thus becomes the faculty of *Bildung*, of formation in every sense of the word, but only as it functions to mediate between contradictory and heterogeneous terms, producing an image that is not a copy but an *exhibitio originaria*. Consequently, in Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre*, the infinity of Self is nothing other than the infinite activity of imagination, namely the process of *Bildung*, of infinite formation which acts so as to make schematism possible only through an *Anstoß*, a clash that limits the activity of the Self, which can then lay claim to being both finite and infinite, since in limiting itself it discovers that it is infinite in its power of limitation. The infinite then becomes this perpetual plan of surpassing itself on the part of the finitude whose structure is time and whose principle imagination. However, Fichte sets out the Absolute in that way only in order better to reaffirm the split in it and to deny passage from the finite to the infinite. So Schelling will take as his point of departure an absolute Self, prior to any split, in order effectively to overcome the Kantian otherness, to challenge any passage from the infinite to the finite, to affirm the possibility of a passage from the finite to the infinite through an intellectual intuition which is the power of seeing the general in the particular, the infinite in the finite. If the philosophy of Identity then goes back to the concept of imagination, it does so in order to make it the principle of a genesis and individuation of the Absolute: As a principle of passing from darkness to light within the Absolute, imagination is the power of the production of Ideas; it is the informing (*Einbildung*) of the real with the ideal, of the form with the essence. The question of transcendental imagination as developed by Kant thus leads to a problematic of *Bildung*. But while for Fichte imagination remains tied to finitude and to the project of an infinite praxis, for Schelling imagination invests the Absolute to such an extent that it becomes the principle of its genesis and even provides a basis for a philosophy of art as the counter image to a theogony. In any case, imagination became crucial to the absolutization of modern reason and to the unfolding of its sense of immanence. It is upon this point that absolutized subjectivity will be able to lead to the positing of its own problematic and to that of the metaphysical foundations of modernity.

(2)

Leibniz's metaphysics, by conceiving substance as force, allows for the unification of "subjecticity" and subjectivity. That is why, after Kant and strengthened by his conquests, the thinkers of German idealism will also turn back to Leibniz who, in his own way, heralds what will come into full flower in *Hegel's Science of Logic.* Heidegger can thus say: To take upon himself this preparation of the completion of modern metaphysics, and thus everywhere to rule this history of completion, is the determination of the history of Being of that thinking accomplished by Leibniz.[8]

With Leibniz, the overturning of the *hupokeimenon* into subjectivity is accomplished. The determination of essence as *conatus* or *vis activa* and of existence as perfection implies the unification of the substratum of judgment and of "egoity," a unification that will be fundamental to the entire destiny of German idealism and whose fallout will even be discernible in Nietzsche's thought. It is thus Leibniz who governs German idealist and modern metaphysical thought throughout, right up to their point of exhaustion with Schelling and then to Nietzsche.

Heidegger's strategy in this regard is very complex. The strength of the "kick-off" is attributed to Descartes, while, at the same time, the Descartes-Leibniz dialogue is once more picked up in order to elicit from it the conditions of possibility of German Idealism in accordance with the mediation of Kant. German idealism owes more to Leibniz than to Descartes, since Leibniz "designates the real turning point from preceding metaphysics to that of German Idealism."[9] He was the first to posit the identity of substance and subject. From this standpoint, transcendental philosophy can then be understood as a retrogression, although the critical mutilation of modern reason at the same time becomes the condition of possibility for the development of speculative idealism. Kant, in fact, opens up the possibility for that which he himself blocked, namely access to the Absolute and the understanding of reason as intellectual intuition, in order to resolve the problem of systematic unity that he himself posed. However, it could not be a matter simply of returning to the dogmatism of rational metaphysics as knowledge through pure concepts of the absolute. Kant made possible the realization of the mathematical system of reason, which could then be achieved by transgressing the Kantian prohi-

bitions, so that the system might become the absolute system of reason; that is, grounded in reason on an absolute self-consciousness capable of embracing totality. Absolute knowledge has nothing to do with encyclopedic omniscience but is knowledge that is unconditioned and certain of itself, in accordance with the mathematical character of modern reason which decides in advance on the inclusion of the entity, as subjectivity, in the order of truth conceived as certainty. It is consequently possible to recast the entire history of philosophy as the odyssey of the system, each moment of this history representing a draft of the absolute system. "Only now," Heidegger tells us, "does an inner articulation and a characteristic of its central age with regard to its systematic character enter the history of philosophy itself."[10] A history of philosophy that is understood in metaphysical terms becomes possible, and Hegel plays a central role in it.

HEGEL, SCHELLING, NIETZSCHE

For Hegel philosophy as the self-unfolding of Spirit until it reaches absolute knowledge is identical to the history of philosophy, which must be considered in metaphysical terms. In his lecture on Hegel and the Greeks, Heidegger maintains that no philosopher before him "arrived a conception of philosophy which makes it possible and demands that philosophy has its own history that is also philosophy itself."[11] In other words, Hegel was the first to perceive the problem of historicity and to understand the essence of philosophy as the West's mode of thought which was launched in Greece. However, if Hegel understands history as destiny, he interprets destiny on the basis of absolute subjectivity as dialectical movement, this being "the process of the production of the subjectivity of the absolute subject and as such its necesssary action."[12] That is why, according to Hegel, the Greek philosophers are the poorest of all, the Greek commencement being only the objective in its pure state. Because he understands history on the basis of absolute subjectivity, Hegel does not have access to the fundamental source of *dlétheia.* For him, Greek thought remains in the realm of the "not yet," of abstraction in the objective which is not accomplished. That is why it must be said of the "not yet" that it is "the 'not yet' of the unthought, not a 'not again' that does not satisfy us,

but a 'not yet' for which it is us who are not satisfied and are far from being satisfied."[13]

Hegel thus marks the moment when absolute self-consciousness becomes the principle of thought and, from this standpoint, he accomplishes the essence of the metaphysics of German idealism, showing in which way, while overtaking Kant in the direction of absolute knowledge, it can only start from the point of no return to which Kant led philosophy and proceed to the unconditioned development of transcendental philosophy. From this standpoint, speculative construction returns to what Kant thought of as mathematical knowledge by the construction of concepts in the forms of intuition. In point of fact, construction is the presentation of a concept in intuition, the presentation of the concept of beingness in terms of the pure intuition of Being.("Intellectual intuition" is intuition purely reflected in itself.)[14]

Once it is accepted that time is the presence of the Concept, the principle of construction becomes the Absolute in accordance with the mathematical character of modern reason and with the unfolding of its sense of immanence. What is thus constructed is the idea conceived as possibility, while actuality is the unconditioned. It is in this sense that Hegel's thought carries modern reason through to its completion:

> The completion of metaphysics begins with Hegel's metaphysics of absolute knowledge as the Spirit of will. . . . In spite of the superficial talk about the breakdown of Hegelian philosophy, one thing remains true: Only this philosophy determined reality in the nineteenth century, although not in the external form of a doctrine followed, but rather as metaphysics, as the dominance of beingness in the sense of certainty.[15]

Hegel's philosophy is this becoming-world of metaphysics that allows one to recapture the whole of philosophy throughout its history while maintaining that the entirety of actuality is nothing but the movement of the unfolding of rationality. However, Heidegger confronts Hegel simultaneously with Schelling and with Nietzsche in accordance with a complex strategy.

1. *Hegel and Schelling*

Schelling does indeed seem to occupy a very special place parallel to Hegel in German idealism, a place in which it becomes possible to challenge and to problematize this thought. In his course on Schelling, Heidegger maintains that the treatise of 1809 "shatters Hegel's *Logic* before it was even published"[16] and destroys the possibility of the system by conceiving freedom as the freedom for good and evil. By conceiving of Being as will Schelling returns to Leibniz in order better to refute Spinoza. There is here a radicalization of subjectivity that implies its extension to the whole of the entity. But if Schelling at the same time accords such importance to Spinoza's thought, it is because it allows him to challenge the metaphysics of the Absolute Subject by showing why modern metaphysics is unable to take on the requirement of laying the groundwork for itself that it demands.[17] Schelling thus leads metaphysics to the extreme limit where its essence may be problematized, at the very point at which "egoity" and substance can no longer unite. In point of fact, the dissociation of substance and existence, of "subjecticity" and subjectivity, allows for a dissociation of foundation and reason as the principle of reason is itself challenged. Once the ground is understood as an unconscious and blind desire, going back toward it no longer means finding a foundation of rationality, but giving an account of an insurrection of ipseity the result of which is precisely the hegemony of the principle of reason in the form of the will to knowledge and of the hegemony of a modern state that claims to be the fulfilment of reasonable will. The whole Hegelian project is indeed shattered. It then is a matter of becoming involved in an experience of thought in which freedom is no longer conceived in terms of causality, but as the serenity of nothingness in relation to which the will is nothing but *via negationis*. It thus becomes possible to contemplate a phenomenological dimension of freedom which one may properly "liberate in man" and which is freed of all determination through cogitation and will.

While Hegel thus considers the essence of modern metaphysics by undertaking its completion and becoming-world, Schelling sets out the problematic of the foundations of this same metaphysics. Schelling, like Nietzsche, thus points toward a surpassing of metaphysics by distinguishing ground from existence: "Schelling's 'distinction' signifies an

opposition (strife) which structures and rules all essence (beings in their beingness), all this always based upon subjectivity."[18]

Schelling, though continuing to rely upon subjectivity, has however pointed himself in a direction opposite that of Hegel, by digging in the heart of this subjectivity a dark unconscious basis, that "savagery of the divine" of which the *Weltalter* will speak. That is without doubt what Heidegger is driving at when he notes that "Schelling attempts to grasp the sensuous in terms of will and drive."[19] This would secretly link him to Leibniz upstream and to Nietzsche downstream.

2. Nietzsche

In *Holzwege* Heidegger writes about *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*:

> Only when some future thought is brought into the situation of thinking this "Book for All and None" together with Schelling's *Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom* (1809)—and that means at the same time also with Hegel's *Phenomenomology of Spirit* (1807), and also with the *Monadology* (1714) of Leibniz—and only when it is brought into the situation of thinking these works not only metaphysically, but from out of the essence of metaphysics will there be established the right and duty as well as the foundation and horizon for an explication.[20]

While Nietzsche's word means that the suprasensory has become unreal, it is nonetheless true that Nietzsche, for want of an ontohistoric understanding of metaphysics, does not really know what relation the figure of Zarathustra bears to metaphysics. It should be noted that Heidegger is not so much considering post-Kantian speculative idealism *stricto sensu*, but rather German thought from Leibniz to Nietzsche. By letting loose an understanding of the possible as force, so that the reason of the strongest is the best and the actual is that which is best because it is at once that which has the greatest force and that which is better than nothing, and by simultaneously unifying *substantia* and *cogitatio*, Leibniz makes a hermeneutic decision that will govern all of the subsequent destiny of metaphysics up until the Nietzschean doctrine of the will to power by way of the problematizations of force and life in speculative idealism. By

understanding the monad as the unity of perception and appetition, he prepares that which Schelling, Hegel, and then Nietzsche would think of as will. Now, Schelling only parts ways with Hegel here in order better to point toward Nietzsche.

In his courses on Nietzsche Heidegger distinguishes him from Hegel in the following manner:

> The essence of man always enters into these two forms of absolute subjectivity in a way that is different in each case. The essence of man is universally and consistently established throughout the history of metaphysics as *animal rationale*. In Hegel's metaphysics, a speculatively dialectically understood *rationalitas* becomes determinative for subjectivity; in Nietzsche's metaphysics, *animalitas* is taken as the guide. Seen in their essential historical unity, both bring *rationalitas* and *animalitas* to absolute validity.[21]

While Hegel conceives subjectivity as reason or reasonable will, Nietzsche thus understands it as will to power, that is as the subjectivity of drives and affects. The essence of absolutized subjectivity must then unfold as the *brutalitas* of *bestialitas* in accordance with the figure of the "blond brute." In inverting Platonism, Nietzsche also inverts German idealism.

Now, all this only serves to increase the difficulty, even if one leaves aside the delicate problem of the status of Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche. German idealism refers us back in one direction toward Leibniz and in the other toward Nietzsche. However, the essential point seems to reside in the manner in which German idealism undertakes the debarment of the rights of the finitude that Kant discovered. The interpretation of German thought allows Heidegger to draw out two fundamental problems.

On the one hand, there is the manner in which the infinitization of Kantian finitude allows one to grasp the metaphysical foundations of modernity by making it possible to recover philosophy through the whole course of its history. Hegel then marks the most perfect accomplishment of modern metaphysics going right down to its secret relation to the Greeks. And Nietzsche allows one in an even more radical fashion to consider this metaphysics as Platonism, the subordination of the sensory to the suprasensory, while at the same time sanctioning the possibility of its inversion.

On the other hand, Kant allows one, insofar as he gets back to the Greek finitude, to return to the Greeks who came after Plato. It thus appears that Kant, or at least a certain Kant, marks a kind of interruption in the historical process that leads from Leibniz to Hegel, and indeed Nietzsche. From this standpoint, the mediation of Hölderlin takes on considerable importance.

HÖLDERLIN AND THE CHALLENGE TO SPECULATIVE METAPHYSICS

Hölderlin was the first to question the foundations of German idealism inasmuch as he understood subjectivity as the meaning of Being. He challenged the enterprise which seeks to reconstruct the distinction on the basis of subjectivity. For Hölderlin as for Hegel, it is indeed a matter of pondering what Greece signifies for thought by following the road opened up by Kant. Basically he is the thinker of wandering and exile, the Moses who at the same time points to the promised land of *hen kai pan*. Now, by positing the primacy of transcendental consciousness, Kantian criticism instituted the reign of the split. Far from being the opening of presence, truth is only objectivity that is constituted by the transcendental subject. Hegel was the one who undertook to consider the systematic unity of homeland and exile, in accordance with an ontotheology that is at the same time a philosophy of history. From this standpoint, Greece is never anything but a nonmediated immediacy, an objective moment of beauty which has not yet been reflected in the Being-for-self of subjectivity.

Now, it was Hölderlin who strayed from this speculative path. Hence, from this standpoint, the reading that Heidegger undertakes of Hölderlin is quite essential to grasping what he understands as the enigmatic character of German idealism. In his commentary on the poem *Andenken*, he refers to the letter to Böhlendorf which contrasts the clarity of exposition that is natural to us to the fire of heaven which is distinctive of the Greeks. Beyond the mere memory of his trip to Bordeaux, the poet also wants to say that "the trip abroad is essential to his return to his country, a return which makes him enter into the particular law of his poetic song."[22] It is by this feeling of foreignness that the Moderns would be able to attain

their distinctiveness by taking the opposite road to the Greeks. Heidegger then cites lines written for, but not included in, *Brot und Wein*:

> nemlich zu Hauß ist der Geist
> nicht im Anfang, nicht an der Quell. Ihn zehret die Heimath.
>
> Kolonie liebt, und tapfer vergessen der Geist.
> Unsere Blumen erfreun und die Schatten unserer Wälder
>
> Den Verschmachteten. Fast wär der Beseeler verbrandt.

Heidegger then makes the following comment:

> To what extent the law of historicity that is poetically stated in these lines can be derived from the principle of unconditioned subjectivity of the absolute German metaphysics of Schelling and Hegel, according to whose teaching the Being-in-itself of the mind requires first of all the return to itself, which in its turn demands Being-outside-itself, to what extent then such a reference to metaphysics, even if it discovers "historically correct" relationships, does not obscure the poetic law rather more than it casts light on it, is all we submit for consideration. On the other hand, it is important to see that the question of Hölderlin's "Western turning" which is much dealt with in studies on the poet (whether this be a turning towards Christianity accompanied by a turning away from Hellenism or a change in orientation towards both of them), that this question is already too short as a question and remains hanging on the facade of "historical" appearances. For Hölderlin did indeed change, but he did not turn. In changing he only found that which was his own and to which he had always been turned. With his change, there changes generally knowledge of the truth of Hellenism and of Christianity and of the Orient. The usual historical divisions of areas and epochs become untenable.[23]

Hölderlin thus makes problematic not only German idealism but the whole of Western history. His point of departure is the same as Hegel's: Greece is the homeland where Being burst forth in its appearance. However, while Hegel will take to the road of absolute metaphysics, Hölderlin points toward ontological difference. Consequently, if the spirit is not at

home when it is at home and if it thus needs to endure the ordeal of the foreigner, it is because the origin only rises as it closes itself off:

> For in the first instance the origin shows itself in its rising. The fellow of this rising is, however, that which has risen up from it. The origin has released this from itself in such a way indeed that it does not show itself in that which has risen up from it, but hides and withdraws behind its appearance. The nearest home is still not the vicinity of the homeland.[24]

Taking on the ordeal of "gallant forgetting" (*tapfer Vergessen*) thus amounts to enduring the withdrawal from the origin, into that darkness of the world which it would fall to Nietzsche to think of as nihilism as the fulfilment of metaphysics. *Andenken* is thus not merely the memory of what was, but "the memory of what is coming."[25] While for Hegel it is a matter of getting beyond nostalgia for Greece by appropriating the origin in order to register it in the circularity of absolute knowledge in which the very destiny of philosophy is effected, for Hölderlin it is a matter of metamorphosing this same nostalgia into the recollection of an origin which is in continuously coming about.

For Heidegger, Hölderlin thus provides access to a Greece more ancient than Plato's, namely to that of the Presocratics and of the understanding of truth as *dlétheia*, an understanding that, despite everything, somehow lasts right up to Hegel, so that Heidegger can maintain that "in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, *dlétheia* is present though transformed."[26]

In his reading of German idealism Heidegger seems to accord signal favor to Hegel, "the only thinker in the West who had a thinking experience of the history of thought," and discovered the convertibility of Being and History authentically understood as *Gewesenes*, having-been, as a gathering of a past that abides. History can thus be understood as the dialogue of dusk with dawn. However, for Heidegger, the Hegelian concept of time is still the same crude one that originated with Aristotle, and history cannot be the unfolding of reason. While the Idea of an eschatology as the final gathering of the historical in the becoming-world of metaphysics does make one think of Hegelian Absolute Knowledge, the *Gewesenes* is nonetheless not, as with Hegel, the product of history, but an absolute inaugural, in the sense that the "inaugural never passes away, is never some-

thing past."[27] History must then be understood as destiny in the sense of the destination testifying to the great power of an inaugural that has never been overtaken. History is thus not governed by reason, but is the realm of a destinal necessity in which the being-been governs the future. As Michel Haar notes, "the later Heidegger renounced making the future the fundamental dimension of . . . time."[28] Giving priority to the inaugural in this way implies a conception of thought as faithfulness and memory, *Andenken*, in relation to which the Hegelian movement of rationality is nothing more than the process of nihilism as Nietzsche has one think it and which must then be conceived as the forgetfulness of being. The History of Being conceived as the growing forgetfulness of being consequently modifies the meaning of the notion of epoch. While in the Hegelian sense the epoch is a moment of the Spirit, it is, in the Heideggerian sense, *époché*, the restraint and withdrawal of Being, so that the History of Being is no longer the movement of a metahistorical rational necessity but a "free consequence." One can thus read in *The Principle of Reason*:

> The epochs can never be derived from one another much less placed on the track of an ongoing process. Nevertheless, there is a legacy from epoch to epoch. But it does not run between the epochs like a band linking them; rather, the legacy always comes from what is concealed in the *Geschick*, just as if from one source various streamlets arise that feed a stream that is everywhere and nowhere.[29]

It is thus not a ground that we should be looking for, because Being has no ground, and "it is as if it were without limit that it plays the game that frees us, in playing, being and reason." Where Hegel identified essence and ground, one must meditate the play of *Wesen* and *Abgrund*, the play that constantly begins again of the *Gewesenes*. Doubtless there lies the abyss that Kant had perceived, that Schelling endeavored to rediscover to counter Hegel and that Hölderlin tested by another route.

NOTES

1. AK III, A613, B641; *Critique of Pure Reason,* F. Max Müller, trans., (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966), p. 409.

2. Martin Heidegger, *The Age of the World Picture, in the Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays,* William Lovitt, trans. (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 139–40.

3. Ibid., pp. 141–42.

4. Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche,* vol. II, P. Klossowski, trans. (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), p. 453.

5. Martin Heidegger, *Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom,* Joan Stambaugh, trans. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985), p. 39.

6. Ibid., p. 41.

7. "Les tensions internes de la *Critique de Jugement,*" in *La nostalgie de la Grèce à l'aube de l'idéalisme allemand* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1967).

8. "Metaphysics as History of Being," in *The End of Philosophy,* trans. by Joan Stambaugh (New York, 1973),p. 31.

9. Heidegger, *Schelling's Treatise,* p. 182.

10. Ibid., p. 48.

11. Martin Heidegger, *Hegel et les Grecs,* J. Beaufret and D. Janicaud, trans. in *Questions,* vol. 2 (Paris: Gallimard, 1968), p. 47.

12. Ibid., p. 49.

13. Ibid., p. 68.

14. Heidegger, *Schelling's Treatise,* p. 194.

15. "Overcoming Metaphysics," in Stambaugh, *The End of Philosophy,* p. 89.

16. Heidegger, *Schelling's Treatise,* p. 97.

17. See on this Jean-Marie Vaysse, *Totalité et Subjectivité,* (Paris: Vrin, 1994), pp. 228 ff.

18. "Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics" in Stambaugh *The End of Philosophy,* p. 72.

19. Heidegger, *Schelling's Treatise,* p. 11.

20. "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God Is Dead' " in *The Question of Technology and Other Essays,* William Lovitt, trans. (New York: Harper, 1977), pp. 97–98.

21. *Nietzsche, Volume IV: Nihilism,* Frank A. Capuzzi, trans. (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1982), pp. 147–48.

22. *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung,* 2d ed. (Frankfurt, 1962), p. 79; cf. French trans., J. Launay, *Approche de Hölderlin* (Paris: Gallimard, 1973), p. 105.

23. *Erläuterungen*, pp. 85–86; Launay, *Approche*, pp. 114–15. The French version of the lines of poetry are given as follows:

Car l'esprit n'est pas chez lui au commencement
Il n'est pas à la source. Il est en proie à la patrie.
L'esprit aime la colonie et l'oubli vaillant.
Nos fleurs et l'ombre de nos forêts se réjouissent
Lui accablé. Celui qui donne l'âme se serait presque consommé.

24. *Erläuterungen*, p. 88; Launay, *Approche*, p. 117.

25. *Erläuterungen*, p. 110; Launay, *Approche*, p. 149.

26. A. Préau, trans., *Essais et Conférences* (Paris: Gallimard, 1958, 1980), p. 221.

27. P. Klossowski, trans., *Nietzsche,* vols. 1 and 2 (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), p. 391.

28. Michel Haar, *The Song of the Earth*, Reginald Lilly, trans. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 71.

29. Martin Heidegger, *The Principle of Reason*, Reginald Lilly, trans. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 91.

2

BEING AS AN IDEA OF REASON

HEIDEGGER'S ONTOLOGICAL READING OF KANT

Pierre Kerszberg

Heidegger seems to have accepted without reservation Hegel's verdict on Kant, according to which critical philosophy wants simultaneously to reach the absolute and to get by without *the* Absolute. Thus, reflecting on Hegel, he writes about Kant's overall project, "The seemingly critical fear of rash error is really the uncritical evasion of the truth which is already gathered there."[1] But what if the Kantian critique were actually an evasion, which is all the more enormous because it can accept no truth (in particular, the truth of Being) which is always already deployed in some way before us?

Basing himself on the data of his own existential analytic, Heidegger

gives a systematic interpretation of Kant's critical philosophy in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. In this interpretation, Kant is credited with the merit of having discovered and articulated a wholly original concept of pure temporality, namely, pure temporality as pure imagination. Even though Kant himself was not able to carry out the ultimate implications of his discovery, Heidegger asks us to accept the idea that imagination conceals the secret of time and being. Thus, contrary to what a superficial reading of the *Critique of Pure Reason* might lead us to believe, imagination is not a mere mediation between the higher and the lower faculties of reason. The temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) of *Dasein* makes it historical. What Heidegger needs to find in Kant is a concept of transcendental subjectivity that is itself timelike, by contrast with Kant's own claim that the transcendental subject constitutes time but is not itself temporal. Heidegger argues that transcendental imagination is, in fact, the deepest root of the critical theory of knowledge. Intuition and understanding are presented as two separate faculties. The former accounts for the presence of beings in space and time, for the fact that being is positing. The latter for the fact that we can understand these beings by means of certain mind-dependent structures (categories of understanding). Are presence and structure two different senses of being? Is there not a deeper level at which these two senses merge into one sense of being? The transcendental theory of the schematism, in which Kant articulates his doctrine of imagination, is interpreted by Heidegger as Kant's attempt to unite what was originally separated. Thanks to the transcendental imagination, the structure is given a spatio-temporal content. Transcendental imagination is the representation in time of that which is intellectual. Thus, there would be a more originary place of being than either the subject or the object. This place is indicated in Kant's theory of imagination as original time (*Urzeit*).

Could we represent to ourselves what Kant's response to this interpretation could or should have been? Cassirer tried to do something like that. In his objections to Heidegger's reading of Kant, Cassirer observes that if indeed the knowledge of phenomena is determined temporally, the free causality of the beings which we are owes nothing to a temporal condition; when reason gives the practical law to itself, it does so directly, without the mediation of the temporal schemata of imagination. Therefore, when we become aware of our freedom, we are lifted beyond our-

selves even though we remain entirely in ourselves. The connection between the within and the beyond is so peculiar because when they are brought together, finitude and its beyond occur simultaneously, even though in its essence the connection itself is no more than a matter of principle.[2] Viewed from this angle, the allegedly monistic character of imagination gives way to the irreducible duality between what is and what ought to be; Heidegger's notion of transcendence, which Heidegger equates with time itself, and according to which *Dasein* moves beyond itself while remaining confined within its own finitude, could not be drawn from the critical philosophy. Heidegger would reply that the simultaneity involved here cannot be consistent with the temporality of *Dasein's* inner temporality, which, in turn, compels us to cast doubt upon the transcendental validity of a life according to atemporal principles. Are we bound to accept an impossible tension between being and freedom, or shall we throw overboard, for once and for all, the duality of Kantian absolutes? Kant would now protest and say "Reason aims at the unconditioned, but deploying in time (through a regressive synthesis) the movement whereby the unconditioned is approached amounts to transforming this unconditioned into an Idea of Reason." Being in Heidegger's sense is an Idea of Reason, which cannot pass the hurdle of necessary illusion because, as Kant argues in the Transcendental Dialectic, this illusion remains ever after it has been detected by critical means. Now, Kant had drawn three Ideas of this kind from the old *metaphysica specialis:* the soul, the world, and God. Shall we learn anything philosophically by enlarging the frame of the Transcendental Dialectic as Kant had originally cast it? What shall we gain by admitting Being among the Ideas of Reason?

Kant explicitly rejects any sense of hierarchy for being. For the relative subordination of the elements of knowledge (intuition and concept), he wants to substitute a difference of origin, that is, an absolute heterogeneity.[3] Whereas Heidegger invites us to think in terms of a questioning (*fragend-denken*) that takes us back to the point of contact with the single source of being,[4] Kant asks us to follow the path from one order of being to the other, from the sensible to the intelligible, or from the intellectual to the moral, though the two can never be combined. This path is littered with obstacles, for we will never be certain of having definitively recognized the order of freedom with the full clarity we seek. Indeed, the most general

mode of opposition is that of truth versus illusion. At first, the two elements of knowledge stand on an absolutely equal footing, since every knowledge results from their harmonious and natural union.[5] However, dissymmetry appears in the case of forced separation, since thoughts without content are empty, whereas intuitions without concepts are blind. Thus, an empty thought is non-sensical, but an intuition deprived of the support provided by the concept preserves a sense, albeit a very peculiar one: for it is not only blind, but also has the power of blinding, as in the case of the transcendental illusion. The dialectical appearance is altogether the contrary of a thought that comes to nothing. It results from a subreption by which what carries sense in the subjective part of knowledge forces itself upon reason as being objective.[6] Kant traces the source of such a mistaken objectification of the conditions for the possibility of knowledge back to an unobserved influence of sensibility over the understanding.[7] The influence is certainly not arbitrary, since Kant conceives of it as inevitable inasmuch as it gives rise to dialectical reasonings—a type of experience which reflects the desire for completeness proper to reason. Consequently, the transition from the empirical to the transempirical employment of our concepts is not effected from without. Rather, it is secured by the categories themselves, which *seem* to bear on noumena because they *seem* to have more meaning and content than can be exhausted by their merely empirical use.[8] The categories, which are a priori empty forms of thought, withdraw from the course of phenomena in order to serve as their ground; as for the Ideas of Reason, they twist this withdrawal into a transgression, and they do so in accordance with the same transcendental necessity that accounts for the possibility of experiencing the world in terms of categories. In other words, in the withdrawal, the transgression is already foreshadowed.

Heidegger's attack on the neo-Kantians is based on the recognition of an impossible tension in the relation of what is to what ought to be. But there is a duality of absolutes in Kant that is more original than the separation of what is from what ought to be, or time from what is outside time: such is the withdrawal of categorial thought from the world of intuited appearances, which becomes transgression beyond the limits of intuition when the strength of intuition on the categories goes out of control. On this basis, a more authentically phenomenological reading of the Transcendental Dialectic might become possible.

Indeed, a prejudice shared by commentators of the dialectic is well reflected in Cassirer's interpretation. The transition from the concepts of understanding to the concepts of reason, from the Transcendental Analytic to the Transcendental Dialectic, is such that the latter concepts, as he puts it, "never refer immediately to intuition but rather pertain to the use of the understanding itself, to which they intend to give the greatest systematic unity."[9] If the sense of the unconditioned aimed at by reason were already fixed by the limits of objectivity constitutive of the understanding in its empirical employment, then reason would have nothing to learn from its own indirect relation to intuition. But if this indirect relation resulted from reason's ability to neutralize the action of the understanding in certain well-definable circumstances, and put it out of play, then the nonimmediacy of its relation to intuition would be the vision of the otherwise concealed essence of the appearance. When the understanding comprehends something which is given immediately in intuition, Kant tells us in the Analytic, it recognizes, that is, it sees itself at work in the ordering of the immediately given manifold. When I know something, I also know myself in this something inasmuch as a trace of my own intellectual activity is visible in it. Thus, the essence of the appearance, or the appearance *as appearance* and no more than appearance, is concealed at all times, precisely because it can only be re-cognized. Our mental appropriation of the appearance has the effect of splitting the cognitive powers into pure sensibility and pure understanding, whereas we still would like (this *is* the natural desire of reason) the appearance to be redoubled (i.e., to appear as appearance) so that the world itself could teach us how to make sure that it is what it is. As we move to the dialectic, we get into the field of illusion; reason begins a discourse about things without even noticing that it speaks about unknowable things in themselves. But how can we pretend to see what cannot be seen, let alone speak about it? We are led to suspect that the nonimmediate relation to intuition is another kind of concealment, a postponement of immediacy which enables us to see the appearance as if we were in it, without any need for self-recognition. There is a *phenomenality of the world* at work right from the outset in the Transcendental Aesthetics, namely, the spatio-temporal level of immediately given experience which gives objects their prior phenomenal character; but any attempt to capture the appearance as no more than

appearing only leads to a new phenomenality, just as irreducible as the first. This is the transcendantal appearance, understood as spontaneous production of thought. On balance, a meaningful dialogue between thought and the world is possible only through the intermediary of a play of illusions proper to the *phenomenality of thought* itself, since Kant names as "principles of *intuition*" those regulative (dynamical) principles of reason which (unlike the mathematical principles) fail to be constitutive.[10]

Contemporary phenomenology as a whole seems to have passed over this promise of phenomenology contained in Kant's Transcendental Dialectic. A glaring example is Merleau-Ponty. To be sure, Merleau-Ponty no longer confines Kant's ought-to-be to morality, since he expands this notion to include primarily what the very idea of knowledge requires.[11] But against the critical philosophy, he levels the charge that it takes no account of the "resistance offered by passivity," failing to notice that the unobserved influence of sensibility might be the matrix for the more general theory that Merleau-Ponty calls for. (Such a theory would include more than perception, since it would involve the entire "cultural apparatus with which my education, my previous efforts, my personal history, have provided me.)

As far as Heidegger is concerned, by privileging the *faculty* of imagination at the expense of intuition and concept as two irreducible poles, his interpretation leads to the unacceptable view according to which the "phenomenon," whether an *Erscheinung* or *Schein*, finally appears in the same way. Instead of interpreting any regressive movement toward ultimate conditions of possibility as an opening toward a more originary domain, we will have to interrogate the regression as if it were an originary domain to itself.

As a matter of fact, from the outset of the existential analytic in *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger wrestles with the ultimate implications of the Idea of Reason in Kant's sense. As soon as he has identified the modes of being characteristic of everyday *Dasein* insofar as it is confused with others, Heidegger finds that the primordial condition of *Dasein* is to lose itself in others, or not yet to have found itself among them. Thus combining all the extremes within itself, the *Dasein* that eludes itself in the omnipresence of the "they" (*Man-selbst*) starts off as the subject which contains the most reality, an "*ens realissimum*."[12] In the Transcendantal Dialectic of the *Critique*

of Pure Reason, the *ens realissimum* is the highest Idea, i.e., the transcendental ideal that provides the prototype for all ideas.[13] The transition from general to transcendental logic is worked out in such a way that what counts as infinite judgment in the former becomes the category of limitation in the latter.[14] Only one concept is able to make contact with the infinite without loss: this is the concept of *ens realissimum*, which is the universal concept of reality in general. Kant argues that this concept cannot be divided because it includes all predicates both *under it* (which is what we expect from a concept) and *in it* (which is the case for a pure intuition). From the standpoint of the concept of the highest reality, of the being of all beings, any limitation cannot but seem an outright negation.[15] *Being and Time* proceeds as if the highest Idea were degraded to the lowest level, as if there were thus a sort of dissymmetry between the *Critique* and *Sein und Zeit*. But the existential analytic has as its task to trace the steps leading back to the authentic self. This it does by means of a necessary illusion shared by *Dasein* and Being: from the outset, the ontological interpretation of the state of Being in its everydayness is itself bound to miss itself and to cover itself up.[16]

Dasein's interpretation of the meaning of being is not arbitrary. Rather, it is the manifestation of the meaning of being itself. The temporality of *Dasein*, which is described in *Being and Time* in terms of fundamental ontology, should thus allow us to take up ontology, i.e., to think the meaning of Being as time. But in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger comes up against an intermediary step separating fundamental ontology from ontology: the dialectic of *Dasein*, which corresponds to Kant's own Transcendental Dialectic. Between Being and time as they must appear in a philosophy that has overcome metaphysics, on the one hand, and *Dasein*'s temporality as it appears in the existential analytic, we have Being and time as they are thought in metaphysics itself. Why does *Dasein*'s temporality (as pre-understanding of Being) not deploy itself *immediately* in an authentic comprehension of the meaning of being? Kant's dialectic is preoccupied with the following theme: inasmuch as reason is capable of truth, it also produces illusions which are not arbitrary (the illusions are not outright mistakes that can be corrected), but reflect the manner in which the withdrawal of thought from worldly appearances necessarily borders on the transgression of the actual limits of any possible

human relation to the whole of being. In the same way, in the years that followed the Kant book, more particularly in the essay "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit," Heidegger developed a metaphysics of *Dasein*, in which to the essence of truth is now coupled nontruth as *Unwesen*, nonessence. The revealing (*Entbergung*) of Being is concomitant with its concealment (*Verbergung*) or being covered-over (*Un-entborgenheit*). Given the rather special and pejorative sense that Heidegger ascribes to metaphysics, what he actually means is that the *Un/Wesen* of truth does not issue from the insistence/existence of *Dasein*, but that the latter responds to this *Un/Wesen*. The intense focus on *Dasein* in *Being and Time* has really been abandoned. Between the analytic of *Dasein* and the authentic apprehension of Being, we have the history of truth in which the truth of Being manifests itself by masking itself.

At the time of the Kant book, Heidegger has not yet developed his notion of essential untruth. Does that mean that his stepping back before Kant's dialectic can be excused and explained because the issue is taken up later? Certainly not. The inauthentic thought of Being is neither an error nor an illusion, as a transcendental mistake is for Kant, but errancy, responding to being's unconcealment. In terms of Kant's dialectic, however, the point of errancy would be no more than a half-measure. The dialectical illusions indicate a division inherent in the totality of reason's system, the marks of which can be identified thanks to the rigor of transcendantal logic. Of course, this is not to say that Heidegger does not interpret Kant's dialectic because he cannot do so in terms of his own concepts. More seriously, in examining the transcendental logic of illusion as Kant thematizes it, we will find that any attempt to ascribe illusion to the work of the faculty of originary imagination is explicitly discarded by Kant. Kant bases his conclusions on either a transcendental principle of waiting—the postponing of reason's fulfillment in being—or a displacement of this fulfillment. Neither the world, as an Idea of Reason, nor the divine understanding, as a projection of our own understanding beyond its capacities, finds its roots in imagination as unlimited power of revelation.

The divine understanding is the case of the displacement or the dislocation of reason's ultimate aim. Kant argues that our discursive understanding can assert itself in the manner of an intuitive understanding only inasmuch as a restraint is placed on the imagination that allows us to think

ourselves otherwise than we are. This results from what Kant calls the "peculiarity" of our understanding, thanks to which the whole as reality can at least be *presented*. Even though it cannot know a higher understanding, our understanding cannot but try to mimic the higher understanding as the latter proceeds from the whole to the parts. It does so by foregoing the temporal synthesis which characterizes the employment of imagination. *Space* remains the sole means whereby our discursive understanding can think in the manner of the intuitive understanding: "Space . . . resembles the basis we are seeking inasmuch as no part in space can be determined except in relation to the whole."[17]

As for the idea of worldly totality, what bothers Heidegger is that Kant's metaphysics of man is an intermediary step that lasts forever. This worry must have something to do with the steadiness of Being itself. The task of understanding that Heidegger has bequeathed us is spelled out by Heidegger himself in the last two pages of the Kant book.[18] The content of the Transcendental Dialectic cannot be purely negative, as if Kant merely wanted to destroy past dogmatic systems by applying the results of his new position articulated in the Transcendental Aesthetics and the Transcendental Analytic. But then, if a positive problematic can be extracted from the dialectic, shall we not have to develop this problematic in accordance with some presupposed infinitude?

The point is not so much to try to resolve the tension between the two absolutes of being and freedom in Kant's philosophy (Hegel and Nietzsche have already tried to do just that) as to see what we lose when Kant's project is interpreted in terms of a tension between these two absolutes. In Heidegger's interpretation as we find it in his *Kantbuch*, we begin with a false problem the tortuous solution of which then yields us a needlessly artificial insight into Kant's real problem in the Transcendental Dialectic. Following Kant's own plan, Heidegger's argument progresses from pure intuition to the understanding. The grounding function of imagination is then assigned to each of these two faculties. Heidegger goes on to ask whether the faculty of pure reason could also be reduced to imagination. This seems at first impossible, since pure reason (just like pure understanding) is, as Heidegger says, "generally" and "simply" identified by Kant with pure spontaneity, whereas imagination is a mix of spontaneity and receptivity.[19] From there on, Heidegger's task is to show that, in virtue of

its intrinsic relationship to intuition, *any* thought is necessarily a mix of spontaneity and receptivity. He begins by identifying pure reason and pure thought, thereby tacitly passing over the fact that all the principles of reason are explicitly identified by Kant with the principle of intuition. He writes, "thinking . . . must be sharply distinguished from all intuition."[20] But doesn't being finite consist in receiving what is given, and doesn't the capacity for pure receptivity consist in spontaneously giving oneself what is given? What remains to be done is thus to locate the origin of pure thought in imagination by showing that it is the common agency which unites thought and intuition (despite of themselves, as it were).

Kant never really explicitly justifies his theory of necessary illusion, according to which the unobserved influence of sensibility over the understanding is the principle of error. Why is it not the other way around—an influence of some special type exerted by the understanding upon sensibility, such that the otherwise regular determination of sensibility by understanding is disrupted? In the Transcendental Deduction of the categories, Kant shows that no a priori knowledge is available to us, except if it relates to objects of possible experience; but, significantly enough, the categories are not limited *in thought* by the conditions of our sensible intuition. The categories have an unlimited field for themselves when they are taken in isolation from the actual content of experience.[21] Therefore, it is certainly not true that the innermost essence of the understanding is its "dependency upon intuition."[22] If this were so, then the transcendental illusion should have been the disruption of this dependency. Why is this unlimited field not responsible for the illusion proper to pure reason, which is the domain "which recognises no limits of demarcation"?[23] Is not the action of something otherwise passive *less* natural than an uncontrolled release of concatenated mental energy accumulated in the understanding? How could this seemingly unnatural action have the character of necessity that is bestowed upon the transcendental illusion? Introducing such a paradox is not the least of the enigmas of the *Critique*, a paradox that must itself account for a paradoxical knowledge—that with which reason enacts judgments about things that cannot be sensed in any way.

Kant's decision to ascribe illusion to the influence of sensibility over the understanding receives a modicum of justification if we start by

looking at some of its implications. The rejection of some dysfunction in the application of categories to sensibility implies that any transcendental sense of categories (which would make them operate within the understanding as their own field) is already non-sense, and this non-sense is *not* that of the rational ideas. It would be impossible to sever this non-sense at its source if we had a faculty of *originary imagination* producing an object of an entirely "new quality that does not allow of being given in experience."[24] As an example of such an empty figment of the mind, Kant cites the mechanism of an attractive force without contact, something that Newton himself had already discarded.

The first effect of Kant's theory of the unobserved influence of sensibility over the understanding is thus to put out of play a faculty of originary imagination that would move freely in the unlimited sphere of pure thinking. To what extent, then, is the unobserved influence dependent upon what could be called an "originary reason"? Pure thought cannot be simply blind to its own meaning. We recall that intuitions without concepts are blind to their own meaning, whereas concepts without intuitions are empty. Sensibility is the seat of sense. A bare concept is thus more than blind to its sense: it is completely senseless; it does not even have a meaning that remains withdrawn.[25] Indeed, if the forms of thought happened to lose a reference to sensible intuition, "they [would] have *even less* meaning than the pure sensible forms" through which an object is given; as for the combination of the manifold of intuition in the understanding, it would now operate emptily, and so would signify "*nothing* at all."[26] The function of the concept is to throw light upon the sense concealed within intuition, but by itself the concept is deprived of sense. Kant goes on to argue that conversely, besides the categories, there must exist pure concepts of reason (the ideas) which, when taken independently of sensible conditions, cannot be different from these categories. But the action of sensibility over the understanding has no equivalent in the ideas, because the special property of the ideas is that they are *never* empty. If there is anything like an *originary* unity between thought and intuition, it is exhibited in the ideas and their play of illusions, not in the categories.

Indeed, even if they soar far above the teachings of experience, the ideas continue to move within a horizon of experience that is constitutive of them. When Kant specifies the kind of intuition that is required in

order to demonstrate the objective reality of the categories, he indicates that "we need, not merely intuitions, but intuitions that are in all cases *outer intuitions.*"[27] But this outerness is *always naturally* available in the ideas. They seem to have objective reality, because the transcendental appearance never ceases, even after it has been detected critically in accordance with the innerness of self-examination. As an example Kant refers to the moon, which appears larger at rising; an appearance that the astronomer cannot prevent even though he is not deceived by it.[28] In this way, no pure thinking can relate to itself only. It *has* to relate to an appearance, but because this outward relation is independent of whether or not an appearance is given, the essence of the relation between thinking and appearing lies in the dialectial appearance. Thus, the identity between the category and the idea rests on the fiction that consists in sundering thought from sensibility, but the fiction is itself suggested by the idea inasmuch as the idea alone never lacks a *visible* reference to outer intuition. The categories do have a reference to outer intuition, but the connection does not become visible until sensible intuition has bestowed a sense upon the forms of thought. If we tried to annihilate the appearances produced by reason, we would fall into the following trap: they would have been annihilated only in accordance with the very illusion of reason that produces them. Thus, the invisible influence of sensibility over reason is the condition of absolute visibility of the objects that result from this influence. Thinking the absence of a transcendental appearance can only be done by doubling that very same appearance. This logic of illusion defines the phenomenality of thought, which is more originary than pure thought itself.

The difference between understanding and reason in terms of the horizon of sense attached to each of them initiates a movement of thought which will culminate in Kant's assertion that reason is actually the touchstone of the truth contained in the rules of the understanding: "the hypothetical employment of reason has . . . as its aim the systematic unity of the knowledge of understanding, and this unity is the *criterion of the truth* of its rules."[29] The pure concepts emanate from the understanding, which alone is capable of producing them.[30] But by means of such a production the understanding still fails to open itself up to its own infinite field, and thus does not manifest its freedom, since it is hampered by the "unavoidable limitations of possible experience." Reason does not generate any

concept, but it bestows freedom upon the understanding by preserving at all times a *relation* to the empirical, even though the empirical sphere itself may be overstepped. How does this relation get around the alleged necessity of the object in the idea?

Instead of eliminating the transcendental appearance, we could see what happens if the unobserved influence of sensibility were to be controlled in some way and become conscious of itself. Would not the ideas, then, be totally indistinguishable from the categories in their empirical employment? The reference of categories of understanding to the outer intuition that bestows sense upon them becomes visible, because a transcendental deduction of these categories is possible. Thus, the categories "do not represent the conditions under which objects are given in intuition. Objects may . . . appear to us without their being under the necessity of being related to the functions of understanding."[31] Taken by itself, an appearance does not need the support of the functions of thought: it is free-floating, suspended nowhere, pent in the free play of pure appearing. The aim of the deduction is to eliminate this free play by connecting the appearance with the fixed subjective conditions of knowledge. But the moving field of pure appearing always exceeds the steadiness imposed by the understanding, because it is indifferent to whether or not an appearing appears, whether or not it exists, or whether or not it is merely illusory. The categories regulate the field where the question as to whether an object is something or nothing is decided: "As the categories are the only concepts which refer to objects in general, the distinguishing of an object, whether it is something or nothing, will proceed according to the order and under the guidance of the categories."[32] We could say that the appearing of something is an appearance. But the original field of appearing, in which something is not distinguishable from nothing, always exceeds the field of appearances. The ideas remind us of this fact, because they take up again the field of pure appearing at the point where the understanding took leave of it. The objects in the ideas, considered in their relation to the categories, are pure appearances, i.e., appearances of *nothing*—whereas the understanding is always concerned with appearances of something = X. Since reason compels the understanding to divide up into an empirical and a transcendental employment, it follows that the necessarily antinomic conflict of reason with itself expresses the gap

between something and nothing: the understanding makes nothing of the transcendental employment of its own categories.

A certain necessity is now attached to the fictitious moment that allowed us to identify, in the absence of any sensible condition, the categories with the ideas. Only the understanding in its empirical employment achieves a balance between thought and intuition that does not favor one over the other; when the pure appearing is something, the encounter between thought and intuition is also fully conscious of itself. This balance achieved by the understanding is expressed in *rules*, which are defined as the understanding's power to subsume appearances under a unity. Reason, then, is the power to subsume the rules of the understanding under a unity of appearing and appearance; this unity is achieved by means of *principles*. A rule orders disparate individuals as they fall under a universal, whereas a principle never quite loses sight of the continuity between instances of a universal because it *derives* a particular from a universal. A rule deals with propositions of the sort "X is a case of A," whereas a principle deals with inferences of syllogisms ("X is A" because it is B, and all B's are A's). Heidegger, on the other hand, reduces his account of the ideas to the mere "representation of the rule."[33] Now, *any* mode of intuition pertaining to human sensibility is itself derived (*intuitus derivativus*), not original,[34] simply because we ourselves are dependent beings as far as existence is concerned. As a result, the reasonings of reason are themselves a certain mode of intuition, in the sense that they express what is most eminently human in the manner whereby we intuit. Reason is concerned with objects indirectly, inasmuch as it deals directly with what is essentially human in the mode of our intuition.

If the complete synthesis of appearances, which is aimed at by the faculty of reason, depended on transcendental imagination, the idea of absolute completeness would require an impossible feat on the part of the imagination, namely, an absolute synthesis of conditions. In imagination, an object can be "there" in representation, even though it is not given.[35] But in the regressive synthesis we have the inverse situation, which gives rise to the following problem: how can a conditioned appearance be given, even though it is not "there"? In order for a nonintuitable object to pass off as an object of intuition, that in which all intuition is given (space and time as pure a priori forms of sensibility) must be a spontaneity equivalent

to that of thinking. Thus the connection between a given conditioned and its condition must occur by means of pure forms of intuition only, without transcendenral imagination. This connection is *not* an empty intuition without object, because this kind of intuition is one of Kant's concepts of nothing, not a dialectical appearance: "the mere form of intuition, without substance, is in itself no object, but the merely formal condition of an object (as appearance), as pure space and pure time (*ens imaginarium*). These are indeed something, as forms of intuition, but are not themselves objects which are intuited."[36] What is the synthesis that will lead to a new given conditioned, which is the combined object formed out of a given conditioned and its condition? The answer is provided by Kant: "in conformity with the idea of reason past time, as condition of the *given* moment, is necessarily *thought* as being given in its entirety."[37] The transcendental illusion lies in this constitution of appearances as appearances of appearances. Our receptive faculty, time, gives more than it could ever give in the case of the knowledge of appearances because it gives all that thinking gives. Consequently, the given conditioned is expanded (like the moon that appears larger) so as to still impress the senses, even though the intellect has already synthesized it in the appropriate manner (the astronomer is not deceived by this appearance). Whether or not it can be satisfied, reason's demand for absolute completeness passes the test of imagination, thanks to the subterfuge of the regressive synthesis which, against imagination and its alternations of presence and nonpresence of the object, and by means of an expansion of the given conditioned, seeks to retrieve an *uninterrupted* union of object and thought.

The transcendental appearance, which is the ultimate object aimed at in this synthesis, thus plays the part of what has become known as the *world-horizon* in terms of contemporary phenomenology. According to Husserl, the all-inclusive open horizon of experience is inseparable from the experience of objects, but it provides an unnoticed restriction (an apparently unchangeable "style" for every given experience) because it is the *pre*-condition for ever continuable experiences in which whatever is able to be experienced emerges. As a result, if this horizon is to become itself thematic, i.e., if we are to become aware of this restriction, the faculty of imagination is needed in order to make it intelligible: any actuality must now be treated as a possibility among pure possibilities; we are then

driven into Husserl's "pure fantasy-world" without which the *eidos* (unconditioned) of pure factuality could never be brought to light for its own sake.[38] By contrast, Kant's unconditioned is not the always-already-there that has to be clarified by becoming thematic in imagination. The always-already-there is the transcendental object = X, which can never become thematic because transcendental schematism sensibilizes our categories *without* providing them with any image whatsoever—not even an image of the X.[39] But the duplication of appearance (i.e., the constitution of transcendental appearance as appearance of appearance) takes time. This is not the time of representation, which is always affected by the immediate interplay of presence and absence in the object. Rather, in the transition to transcendental appearance, the time of the regressive synthesis is closest to the enduring time of our own lives. Because the synthesis keeps moving away from the immediately given object, only to draw nearer to an absolute origin, this is a time of lesser or greater density, not straight phases of presence or absence, that cannot be represented at all.

Imagination is the ability to represent an object in intuition, even in its absence, provided that the object has been present at least once in the past. Thus, if the absolute completeness of appearances were itself possible in appearance, no transcendental schematism would be needed in order to synthesize this manifold. Perhaps, then, the incomplete synthesis of imagination is still at work, which is why the absolute completeness turns out to be impossible in appearance. According to Kant, however, it is the other way around. Imagination is reduced to silence by the idea, which is always at one with itself, not affected by a limitation or an internal division, because it is "independently alike of the possibility or of the impossibility of our connecting with it any adequate empirical concepts."[40]

According to Heidegger, the ground of Kant's system of reason remains ultimately obscure. Kant has not shown the origin of the ideas, that is, the ground of the system.[41] A hiatus crops up between the total system of reason (the ideas) and beings as a whole because, as he puts it, the ideas "do not present what is meant in them." Their function being regulative rather than constitutive, they "are only directions for finding, but themselves are not found." But if the ideas do not generate any concept, this is precisely because they are closest to the originary relationship of thought to intuition. The specific difficulty of Kant's dialectic is that the

ideas help us to see the generation of meaning without any new concept being thereby generated. What differentiates an idea from a category is that, in the case of the former, the ground of appearance provided by thinking has withdrawn so completely from the world of appearance that the withdrawal has been *totally* transformed into transgression.

We reach here the point of highest contention regarding the destiny of the entire critical work. When Heidegger argues that the whole of reason is characterized in terms of one global dialectical structure, and when he goes on to discover that this structure cannot stay in place because it gives only a general direction (the whole of being does not ground the system), he echoes the tendency to associate critical philosophy with what has become known as "nihilism." The tendency has become quite common, ever since Jacobi expressed his reservations concerning Kant's critical philosophy in a famous letter to Fichte of 1799. When the self posits itself as identical to itself by excluding the primary relationship to the whole (Copernican Revolution), and when later, in the dialectic, the self can then only attempt desperately to reconnect itself to the whole, this attempt is, of course, doomed to fail. The dice are loaded; the rupture with being is, so to speak, consummated in advance. In his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger expresses this negativity by saying that, as Kant goes from the analytic to the dialectic, "Kant himself undermines the floor upon which he initially placed the Critique."[42] Indeed, the concept of pure reason and the unity of a pure, sensible reason become *problems*; they lead us to *darkness*. This conclusion is true only as long as the dialectic follows literally the analytic. If, from a phenomenological perspective, the dialectic opens up the whole critical project, then the darkness of the idea of reason is merely a consequence of the very close proximity that it brings about between thought and intuition. When Heidegger goes on to accuse Kant of "falling back before the ground which he himself unveiled," he interprets this falling-back as "that movement of philosophizing which makes manifest the breaking-open of the foundation." Heidegger does not see that the paradox of the *Critique* is that the ruin of the foundation follows only in the act of encircling this foundation. The dialectic is not the undermining of a previously established foundation; it only enables us to reflect, more directly than anywhere else, upon the problematical foundation which guides the critical enterprise from the beginning.

Thanks to these prolegomena to a phenomenological reading of Kant's dialectic, we can now take up Heidegger's project at its source, in the opening of the existential analytic, and interpret it as an effect of the transcendental illusion rather than as a supposed extension of the Dialectic that had remained hidden to Kant.

Primordially, the constitution of *Dasein's* being remains concealed to it. We shall never really overcome this, for the analytic of *Dasein* is destined to remain incomplete and provisional, as can be seen in the necessity of starting from temporality as the horizon for the understanding of Being.[43] Heidegger says that Kant was the first to open up the dimension of temporality and wants to show why the real dimension of this area had to remain closed off to him.[44] Kant runs up against the obscurity of the terrain he uncovered. As a result of this claim, is not *Being and Time* bound to encounter the ultimate form of a transcendental illusion that *no* philosophy since Kant can really domesticate? In critical philosophy, the cosmological antinomies of pure reason represent the first moment of an opening of subjectivity to the world through a conflictual dialogue. Even though it does not come to grips explicitly with the antinomies, the progression of Heidegger's argument is remarkably similar.

The starting point of the existential analytic is the recognition that the entity *Dasein* "has in each case mineness,"[45] from which are derived the two modes of authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) and inauthenticity. This immediately raises the issue of the relationship between this being and the common world in which it dwells.[46] Now, before the existential analytic of *Dasein* actually begins, the ontic and ontological priority of the question of Being leads to this fundamental equation that will characterize the entire analytic: what for *Dasein* is ontically closest to itself is simultaneously the farthest from an ontological point of view.[47] (In the marginal notes to his own working copy of *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger emphasized that the understanding of being as a determination of *Dasein's* being is not restricted to human being, conceived as existence; rather, it is a question of "being as a whole.") But where Heidegger would see only an "ontological reflection" (*ontologische Rückstrahlung*) between the closest and the farthest, we must ask whether this "farthest" is not ultimately so removed that Heidegger cannot avoid falling into the trap of transcendental illusion. In fact, as the fundamental theme, being carries with it a degree of uni-

versality that always places it above the categories of genus and species, such that it can be characterized as "the *transcendens* pure and simple."[48] This universality implies a leap, or passing-over (*überspringen*), that Heidegger defines as disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*) of being, which is "that basic character of Dasein according to which it *is* its 'there.' "[49] The *Erschlossenheit* is supposed to open us up to being, though without withdrawal (*aletheia*), that is, without perception of the limits we overstep in order to open ourselves up to what is other than ourselves. In terms of the image Kant uses to describe all forms of dogmatism at the beginning of the *Critique of Pure Reason*,[50] the movement implied in disclosedness is very much like the dove that is so light it does not feel the resistance of the air in its flight. The leap Heidegger speaks of is supposed to spare us the trouble of the regressive synthesis toward the unconditioned. We must avoid "bridg[ing]"[51] the cleavage between the temporal and the supratemporal. But can this really be avoided, since the primary task is to gain access to the genuine phenomena by means of a "*passage* [*Durchgang*] through whatever is prevalently covering it up?"[52] The passage seems to take us back to the regressive synthesis, which in fact is well defined by Heidegger himself as a decomposition of the compound expression "being-in-the-world."[53] The deviation is subtle in the extreme, for it has already surfaced in the revision of the formal concept of phenomenon. In the tradition, which is principally Kantian, "the non-manifest gets thought as something that is essentially *never* manifest."[54] Heidegger contrasts this notion with that of an explicit exhibition that will make us see "something that proximally and *for the most part* does *not* show itself at all."[55]

Beginning with the description of Being-In and its fundamental characteristics, Heidegger finds that all its modes have the kind of being of care (*Sorge*). We gain access to the existential structure of Being-In only privatively, by rejecting the naive images of spatial reference borrowed from the categorial characteristics of *Dasein*.[56] This is the existential function of the notion of world; it allows us to understand that, *before* the unconcealment of *Dasein's* being, *Dasein necessarily goes astray* for the reason that it begins from beings it itself is not.[57] It is because *Dasein* for the most part misunderstands itself that it has to deal with a world. One of the tasks Heidegger sets himself in *Being and Time* is to trace this errancy back to its source, to show that *Dasein's* understanding of its being was first led astray but can be

corrected. (Kant is much more radical because his original sense of being led astray in transcendental illusion is never corrigible.) Heidegger implies that the production of presence-at-hand is a complete success in everyday life, but then goes on to show that in fact it fails once the real ontological constitution of *Dasein* is taken into account.

Worldhood allows us to correct *Dasein's* misunderstanding of itself. So long as *Dasein's* constitution through Being-in-the-world is missed, the phenomenon of worldhood has been *leapt over*. This must be prevented[58] for, once the leap has been accomplished, Being-in-the-world will have given rise to something ready-to-hand in which *Dasein* will alienate itself. The leap had led us *beyond* what is ready-to-hand in our concern (*Besorgen*).[59]

How can this leap be checked? An item of equipment (*Zeug*) must be called to our attention by becoming difficult or even impossible to use, thus becoming obstinate, conspicuous or obtrusive. Through this disturbance the being-character of the ready-to-hand reveals itself to be involvement (*Bewandtnis*). With every usable being there is connected a system of references (hammer-hammering-fastening-sheltering, etc.) But is not this system in each case arbitrary? Can we find any necessity in it? Heidegger gives the answer: "Whenever something ready-to-hand has an involvement with it, *what* involvement this is, has in each case been outlined in advance in terms of the totality of such involvements."[60] The transition to worldhood is thus realized at the moment when a totality of involvements becomes preeminent with respect to each of its terms. At that moment, the involvement dissolves itself. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the moment at which this self-dissolution occurs remains arbitrary within certain limits. For example, in the case of the hammer, the regression stops at the workshop. But doesn't restricting the series to the workshop amount to the "holding-oneself-back"[61] that Heidegger uses as the condition of possibility for theoretical knowledge only? (We go from acting to knowing merely by abstaining from all activity, which places concern in the mode of being of perception pure and simple.) Why is it that worldhood can only appear on the basis of a certain unease, while *theoria* offsets the deficiency of action through the addition of "a tranquil tarrying alongside"?[62] Heidegger can prevent the leap into what is ready-to-hand only by keeping it within limits that are always more or less arbitrary.[63]

Going back over the ontological problems that the tradition had left in suspense,[64] Heidegger poses a series of questions that he will attempt to answer in following the guiding thread of his own existential analytic. He first asks why, at the beginning of the tradition, was the phenomenon of world passed over? Heidegger next asks why this phenomenon, once leapt over, was immediately replaced by intraworldly being as the primary ontological phenomenon, to which Kant would respond that the essence of transcendental subreption brings it about that, in its dogmatic haste, reason cannot keep from seeing outside itself what is eminently proper to it, namely, the subjective aspect of the constitution of the world. To Heidegger's third question—why is it in nature that this being is located?—Kant would respond that it is because the existential analytic itself could not distinguish between abstention (condition of the theoretical view) and a refusal of the leap into something ready-to-hand (condition of the ontological view). To Heidegger's fourth question—why does such an ontology of the world have recourse to the phenomenon of value as its complement?—Kant would respond that the leap is not at all to be stopped by force, as it were, since of itself it never really succeeds. It succeeds only by toppling into another order of being, namely, being moral.

Two fundamental consequences can be drawn from the Heideggerian attempt to prevent the leap and to show how worldhood emerges from this: the spatiality of the ready-to-hand and being-with. We will examine each in turn in order to show how much the existential analytic remains attached to a positive reading of Kant's dialectic that Heidegger does not recognize. Each moment represents the Heideggerian way of dealing with either one of the two above-mentioned principles whereby reason aims at the unconditioned—postponing it or displacing it.

As far as spatiality is concerned, it can be characterized by de-severance (*Ent-fernung*) and directionality (*Ausrichtung*). Through de-severing one estimates a distance before measuring it explicitly; such an estimation has a definiteness of its own, which cannot be reduced to computation and which in fact precedes any such computation.[65] Interestingly, Heidegger rehearses in his own terms Kant's argument according to which an *aesthetic* estimation of a magnitude is a prerequisite for its measure, because such an estimation provides the absolute units without which the explicit comparison between magnitudes would not be possible.[66] Likewise, *Dasein* can

never coincide with its de-severance, which is like its shadow, inasmuch as it defines an absolute and indivisible unity. But for Kant, the experience of aesthetic estimation is a painful one: in order to comprehend a multiplicity in one single instant, not in accordance with the temporal succession proper to objective measuring, the imagination "does violence to the inner sense"; in fact, the violence and pain increase in proportion to the greatness of the quantum that has to be comprehended in one intuition.[67] On the other hand, the issue of directionality directly echoes Kant's answer to the question of orientation. When Kant addresses the question of what it means to orient ourselves in thought, his answer is preceded by an analysis of orientation in space. His aim is to reach a more lucid understanding of the nature of subjectivity involved in the principle of orientation. He asks how I can orient myself in a dark room that is familiar to me. No conceptual relation will be of any help to me; in order to find my way, I can only rely on a lived experience of some kind. This is the left/right distinction, because this distinction is rooted in a subjective feeling that owes nothing to the logic of a concept. However, in order for the feeling to be awakened in the first place, Kant adds that all I need is to be able to seize on a single object whose position is present to my memory.[68] Against Kant, Heidegger argues that in this situation memory only serves the purpose of reminding us of our being already in-the-world, which is therefore more primordially constitutive for the possibility of orientation than the feeling for right and left.[69] Has Kant been really oblivious of the world viewed as such a fundamental premise? He states quite explicitly that the dark room is known to me, just like the familiar streets of a town at night in which I walk and make the proper turns even though I am not able to see distinctly any single house. Is not the dark room, then, a case of violence to outer sense exerted by the sensible world of day and night, whereas in the case of the aesthetic estimation of magnitude the violence was inflicted to inner sense by our own imagination? In a dark room, is not the strangeness of the situation due to the fact that I am *simultaneously* in and out of my own world? Have I not suddenly *lost* my world (the world of reassuring daylight) even though I am still physically in it? If only for that reason, the object in the dark certainly loses its property of being objective, so that my memory will be of no help. My memory now has the perplexing effect of propelling me into another

world, another order of being, at least temporarily—this is the world of impenetrable darkness, that can be compared with the immeasurable supersensible space in which the Ideas of Reason reside. But Kant's example shows that this other order of being is not automatically or immediately a projection into the world of practical law.

From this lack of attention to Kant's actual project follow some disconcerting consequences. After sketching out the constitutive ontological role of worldhood for the possibility of orientation, Heidegger investigates how *pure* spatial relations can be derived from the ontological possibility of access to space. This is accomplished in a series of stages (*Stufenfolgen*),[70] even though a *leap* had been indicated. It seems that *Dasein*'s spatiality can fill the void the leap implies. Will this allow us to take the measure of the void and avoid it? Paradoxically, if one proceeds (in the opposite direction) from the extended thing (Descartes), one never really reestablishes contact with worldhood. That is, if one begins with exact science, constituted dogmatically in its premises, one preserves the leap. In other words, one can prevent the leap only by turning one's back, from the start, on the world of theoretical thinking; the argument for a bridge is definitely hopeless.

In "being-with," the issue is now to keep the other from becoming simply a duplicate of the self;[71] the duplication would make the self lose itself in the "they." What allows one really to be oneself is the "existentiell modification of the 'they'" (the 'they' being an essential existentiale).[72] Where and how does this modification originate? It occurs, Heidegger tells us, in sudden changes of mood which are all variations on the theme of *Befindlichkeit. Dasein* suddenly becomes a burden: the flight of the dove that cleaves the air is brought to a halt. In these moments, however brief and evanescent they may be, *Dasein* is brought face to face with the enigma of its existence. Heidegger wants to avoid conceiving the state-of-mind of mood in terms of recognition or misrecognition: "In an *ontico*-existentiell sense, Dasein for the most part evades the Being which is disclosed in the mood. In an *ontologico*-existential sense, this means that even in that to which such a mood pays no attention, Dasein is unveiled in its Being-delivered-over to the 'there.' In the evasion itself the 'there' *is* something disclosed."[73] Heidegger argues here as if the existential analytic were going to provide us with a catalogue of moods. In order to discover the ontologico-existential dimension of *Dasein*, it would suffice to compile a list of

the moods *Dasein* evades. It is as if Heidegger could not avoid making the ontic and the ontological two orders of being that are totally separate from one another, one being simply a way of being of the other (rather than a mere subjective appropriation). Indeed, a mood assails us in the same way that totality overwhelms us: "the mood has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole."[74] It is precisely this disclosure that makes it possible for a state-of-mind to be a self-direction in the existential sense, so that having a mood is for a state-of-mind that which makes it participate in the *Erschossenheit* of the world. Heidegger adds that nothing threatening can be discovered in a "pure beholding (*ein reines Anschauen*), even if it were to penetrate to the innermost core of the Being of something present-at-hand."[75] But in the example of the dark, yet familiar, room, we have seen how one of the innermost feelings can slip, through the mediation of everyday experience, into pure intuition. We never begin in comforting praxis and then tranquilly raise ourselves up into theory or ontology. It is the violence of the everyday world in its alternation between day and night that forces outer sense into another world. And it is the violence of the aesthetic absolute that reduces inner sense to silence. Something that occurs *outside me* always assails me *within myself.*

NOTES

1. M. Heidegger, *Hegel's Concept of Experience*, K. R. Dove, trans. (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 37.

2. E. Cassirer, "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics," in *Kant: Disputed Questions,* M. S. Gram, trans. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), pp. 146–47.

3. I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, N. Kemp Smith, trans. (New York: Macmillan, 1929), A844/B872.

4. M. Heidegger, "Wer ist Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, Pfulingen: Günther Neske, 1985.

5. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A51/B75.

6. Ibid., A792/B820.

7. Ibid., A293f/B349f.

8. See I. Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, J. Ellington, trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985), p. 58.

9. Cassirer, "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics," p. 142.
10. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A664/B692.
11. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, C. Smith, trans. (London: Routledge, 1962), p. 61.
12. M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, trans. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 166.
13. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A569/B597.
14. Ibid., A71–72/B97; A80/B106.
15. Ibid., A578/B606.
16. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 168.
17. I. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, W. Pluhar, trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), p. 293.
18. The critical starting-point for any evaluation of the role of Kant's dialectic in relation to Heidegger is provided by H. Declève, *Heidegger et Kant* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 331–70.
19. M. Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 4th ed. R. Taft, trans. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 105.
20. Ibid., p. 101.
21. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B166 n.
22. Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, p. 101.
23. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A296/B352.
24. Ibid., A770/B798.
25. Ibid., A240/B299.
26. Ibid., B305–306, emphasis added.
27. Ibid., B291.
28. Ibid., A297/B353–54.
29. Ibid., A647/B675.
30. Ibid., A408–409/B435.
31. Ibid., A89/B122.
32. Ibid., A290/B346.
33. Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, p. 106.
34. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B72.
35. Ibid., B151.
36. Ibid., A291/B347.
37. Ibid., A412/B439, emphasis added.
38. See, among many possible primary sources, E. Husserl, *Phenomenological Psychology*, J. Scanlon, trans. (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1977), p. 55.

39. In the chapter on schematism of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant writes: "the schema of a *pure* concept of understanding can never be brought into any image whatsoever" (ibid., A142/B181).

40. Ibid., A417/B444.

41. M. Heidegger, *Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom*, J. Stambaugh (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985), p. 41.

42. Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, p. 146.

43. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 39.

44. Ibid., p. 45.

45. Ibid., p. 68.

46. Ibid., p. 92.

47. Ibid., p. 37.

48. Ibid., p. 62.

49. Ibid., p. 263.

50. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A5/B8.

51. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 39.

52. Ibid., p. 61.

53. Ibid., p. 78.

54. Ibid., p. 53.

55. Ibid., p. 59 (first emphasis added).

56. Ibid., p. 79.

57. Ibid., p. 85.

58. Ibid., p. 94.

59. Ibid., p. 101.

60. Ibid., p. 116.

61. Ibid., p. 89.

62. Ibid., p. 177.

63. Levinas's critique of Heidegger reminds us of this arbitrariness: "Is practical significance the primordial domain of being? . . . Qua practical, signification . . . is thus derived from a term that is of itself an end. . . . The process from which beings would derive their meaning would not only in fact be finite, but as a finality it would *by essence* consist in proceeding to a term, in coming to an end" (*Totality and Infinity*, A. Lingis, trans. [Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969], p. 94). Henri Bergson expresses the same kind of reservation: "It is . . . the essence of our actual perception, inasmuch as it is extended, to be always only a *content* in relation to a vaster, even an unlimited, experience which contains it" (*Matter and Memory*, N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer, trans. [New York: Zone Books, 1991], p. 144).

64. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 133.
65. Ibid., p. 140.
66. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, p. 104.
67. Ibid., p. 116.
68. I. Kant, "What is Orientation in Thinking?" L. W. Beck, trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 294–96.
69. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 144.
70. Ibid., p. 147.
71. Ibid., p. 162.
72. Ibid., p. 168.
73. Ibid., pp. 173–74.
74. Ibid., p. 176.
75. Ibid., p. 177.

3

FROM AUTHENTIC INTERPRETATION TO AUTHENTIC DISCLOSURE

BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN KANT AND HEIDEGGER

Rudolf A. Makkreel

We tend to think of authenticity as an attribute prized by twentieth-century existential thinkers for whom human existence is authentic when it is resolute. An authentic deed is one that properly expresses the uniqueness of the doer. The word, however, has a long history going back to the Greek *authentikos*, designating mastery and authority in less idiosyncratic terms. In this essay I want to explore the term's hermeneutical usage by going back to the more exegetical ideas of authentic interpretation in Georg Friedrich Meier and Immanuel Kant in the eighteenth century, and then relating it to the more life-oriented and existential hermeneutical positions of Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger. As we

examine the development of the idea of the authentic we will confront a variety of efforts to mediate between what is subjectively meaningful and what is objectively true. My main emphasis will be on Kant and Heidegger. For both authenticity is self-validating, but only in Kant is the capacity for critical judgment engaged.

1. AUTHENTIC INTERPRETATION AND MEIER'S AESTHETICS

Meier's importance derives from the fact that he mediates between the aesthetics of Baumgarten and Kant. For us he is of interest because of the close link that he created between hermeneutics and aesthetics and because he is the most likely starting point for Kant's own reflections on authentic interpretation. In 1757 Meier published his *Versuch einer allgemeinen Auslegungskunst* (Attempt at a General Art of Interpretation) where the aesthetic nature of hermeneutics is explicated by claiming that interpretation must aim at clear rather than distinct knowledge of the meaning of sensible signs. Hermeneutics is needed to help understand language that evokes the rich and lively representations said to be the hallmarks of aesthetic clarity. In an attempt to establish some stability within this sphere of the suggestive, Meier appeals to authorial intention. He defines the true meaning of a sign as "the intention or purpose for which the author of the sign uses it."[1] The common usage of a linguistic sign can leave open several literal senses, only one of which is proper (*eigentlich*) given the specific context. However, an interpretation is authentic (*eigen, authentisch*)[2] only if it brings out the main purpose of the author.

The true meaning of a word is usually one of the literal senses according to Meier and may even be the proper sense, but it need not be if the speaker misspoke. Although the author of a text is not infallible, in the sense that God is, Meier claims that there is initially "sufficient ground" to follow the author's self-interpretation, which alone can be authentic. Not to follow an authentic interpretation would be "unfair [*unbillig*], because it would presuppose that the author either spoke or wrote without using his intellect or has not understood himself."[3] Whereas the natural signs found in a divinely created world can be rationally cog-

nized, artificial signs may be assumed to have been reasonably chosen. Accordingly, Meier argues for a principle of reasonableness and fairness (*Billigkeit*) in interpretation that involves more than Quine's principle of charity because it allows the author's intentions to be the primary determinant of a text's meaning. Although Meier can be said to commit what we now call the intentionalist fallacy, he does admit that someone other than the author may be better in seeing the text's implications. He also acknowledges that authors can subsequently deceive us about their original purpose. If evidence for that can be found we can make a counter-determination about the real meaning of a text.

Meier's aesthetics led him to characterize authenticity in terms of the individual subjective perspective of an author. When we move to Kant we will find authenticity less directly tied to the privacy of the individual subject. Authenticity is still conceived subjectively, but cannot be defined without reference to others.

2. AUTHENTIC INTERPRETATION AND KANT'S REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT

Kant first speaks of authentic interpretation in his 1791 essay "On the Failure of All Attempted Philosophical Theodicies." Here an authentic (*authentische*) interpretation is the self-interpretation not just of any author, but of God conceived as a legislator establishing decrees. Kant asserts that "all theodicy should really be the interpretation (*Auslegung*) of nature insofar as God manifests the *intention of his will* through it."[4] Originally, an authentic theodicy might seem to rest exclusively on the authority of God's self-interpretation as the author of the world. But Kant insists that insofar as we conceive God rationally as a moral and wise Being, it is "*through our reason itself* that God becomes the interpreter of his will as proclaimed in his creation."[5] Authentic moral interpretations reconcile divine and human volitional perspectives through the intersubjective medium of practical reason, just as reflective aesthetic judgments reconcile the feelings of self and others by reference to a *sensus communis*.[6]

The comparison of authentic interpretation and reflective aesthetic judgment is relevant because we will see that Kant appeals not just to our

moral reason, but also to the life of our feelings. Previous philosophical theodicies have failed because they were doctrinal and attempted to give a general theoretical justification of everything, including suffering, in this world. Kant points to the biblical character Job as having rejected the doctrinal interpretations of his afflictions given by friends who assumed that the tribulations represent God's punishment for unknown past sins and who advised him to plead for God's forgiveness.[7] Job refuses to feign contrition for sins he is not aware of and stands as the exemplar of Kant's theory of authentic interpretation. We find in the Job story an authentic theodicy because it provides a felt acceptance of suffering that at the same time preserves personal dignity. What matters here is "the uprightness of the heart" in making sense of this life, and "the shunning of feigned convictions that one does not really feel."[8] Only a genuinely felt moral interpretation of life can be authentic. Like a reflective judgment, an authentic interpretation does not claim to provide objectively valid knowledge or *Wissen* of the meaning of life. Rather, it is an intersubjectively valid mode of cognition (*Erkenntnis*) "for us (human beings as such)."[9] Accordingly, an authentic theodicy is not epistemic, but cognitive in the way that Kant is willing to allow for "symbolic cognition (*Erkenntnis*)" of God based on aesthetic analogies.[10] Kant suggests a distinction between strictly epistemic knowing (*Wissen*) and a mere reflective cognition (*Erkenntnis*) in §§90–91 of the *Critique of Judgment*, where he examines how it is possible to hold God's existence to be true (*Fürwahrhalten*) without being able to prove the truth (*Wahrheit*) of this claim theoretically. If religious *Fürwahrhalten* is morally grounded and proceeds by reflective analogies it can generate a cognitive assent that constitutes a middle ground between certain knowledge (*Wissen*) and mere opinion (*Meinung*).[11] Similarly, an authentic theodicy can be said to reside in this intermediary sphere of reflective *Fürwahrhalten*.

Kant further develops the project of authentic interpretation in his *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* where he again contrasts it to that of doctrinal interpretation. Now he is not addressing the task of making sense of history—whether of world history or of a life history—but the more specific task of finding meaning in the biblical corpus. As a philosopher, Kant aims for interpretations of the Bible that bring out its moral *spirit* and is less concerned with interpretations that test the *letter* of the

Bible for its authority. The first kind of interpretation expounds Scriptures on the basis of a religion of reason, the second is based on historical scholarship. Although Kant clearly favors the moral perspective of the former, he does not reject the latter. He calls the moral kind of interpretation "authentic" and the historical kind "doctrinal."[12] In a perfect world we would only need one authentic moral interpretation, but in a world relying on institutional authority doctrinal interpretations are needed to provide "a given people at a given time . . . a determinate [*bestimmtes*] and enduring system"[13] of ecclesiastical faith. Doctrinal interpretations of a text provide "historical certification of its authority through the tracing back of its origin."[14] The historical origins sought by doctrinal interpretation are multiple, whereas one authentic interpretation is claimed to be "valid for the whole world."[15] Authenticity projects something more encompassing than ecclesiastical faith, namely, a rational faith rooted in feeling, yet valid for the world community.

In the case of theodicy, doctrinal interpretation was found deficient because it was too speculative or general; in the case of the biblical corpus, doctrinal interpretation was downgraded because it was too particularistic. Authentic interpretation seems to hold a middle communal ground.

Although philologists call the scholarship involved in the process of historical certification "authentic criticism"—ascertaining genuine originals—Kant's thoughts can be developed into what might be called an ideal of "authentic critique" for philosophical interpretation. Only a moral principle of reading the Bible can be authentic in the sense of being self-validating. Philology provides authentication based on authority; philosophy aims at authenticity based on autonomy.

In his prize-essay on the history of hermeneutics entitled *Schleiermacher's Hermeneutical System in Relation to Earlier Protestant Hermeneutics*, Dilthey claims that "Kant deserves an epoch-making place in the history of hermeneutics, not as the founder of the unhappily named 'moralistic interpretation,' but as the one who revitalized it"[16] and pushed it to a more profound level that encompasses a symbolic "surplus" of meaning which is not explicable purely in terms of the moral law and anticipates later views of "the Bible as mythology."[17] Dilthey sees Kant as "developing the first fundamentally new conception"[18] of biblical hermeneutics according to which "all Scripture will be explained as the expression of a single,

omnipresent spirit pervading the whole."[19] In light of what we said earlier, it is because of Kant's conception of authentic interpretation and its capacity to integrate feeling and reason into a reflective response that he represents an important step in the long history of hermeneutics.

However, Dilthey sees this history of hermeneutics differently than Kant. It is not simply a process of replacing historical scholarship with philosophical reflection. The doctrinal interpretations of the Bible provided by the Church may be recognized as historical in retrospect, but they were presented as absolutely valid at the time. Protestantism raised the problem of how to read the Bible without institutional direction and accelerated the process whereby theological constraints would be replaced by philological, historical, and philosophical considerations. Instead of opposing a philosophical use of interpretation to philological and historical approaches as Kant did, Dilthey regards them as interdependent. The philosophical reading of a text can never dispense with historical self-reflection because we can never be as sure as Kant thought we could about outgrowing our historical prejudices.

In Kant's defense it can be said that his main concern was to overcome "superstition," which he calls "the greatest prejudice."[20] Gadamer's *Truth and Method* gives us a history of hermeneutics in which Kant represents an unfortunate influence because he failed to understand the ways in which custom and tradition can be the source of useful prejudices that can guide our interpretations in beneficial ways. Accusing Enlightenment figures such as Kant of manifesting a prejudice against prejudice, Gadamer discerns here the beginning of an overly methodological approach to hermeneutics that culminates in Dilthey's attempt to make hermeneutics the method of the human sciences.

In fact, Kant himself warned against having a prejudice against prejudice in his lectures on logic.[21] He acknowledges that prejudices can be the repository of truths although they must be reflected on if their truth value is to be mined. Following Heidegger, Gadamer considered the role of reflection in Kant merely in relation to disinterested aesthetic judgments, which suspend the question of truth, and concludes from this that the Kantian approach to hermeneutics as developed by Friedrich Schleiermacher and Dilthey is overly subjective and removed from the reality of the historical world.

If we consider Kant's overall theory of judgment we see that he distinguishes not only transcendentally justified claims, whether they be epistemically determinate judgments or nonepistemic reflective judgments of taste; he also makes room for prejudices (*Vorurteile*) and preliminary or provisional judgments (*vorläufige Urteile*)[22] that betray our historical origins and fall in the less exalted region of belief. When it comes to prejudices the task of reflection is to suspend judgment and neutralize their belief-content into preliminary judgments that can then be tested for their truth. In light of a more inclusive understanding of Kant's theory of judgment we can say that Kantian reflection is not always purely transcendental, but can also play a critical role in relation to our historical beliefs. Accordingly, authentic interpretations can exhibit not only the indeterminate, felt systematic import of a reflective judgment, but also the provisionality that reflection imports into prejudices to render them preliminary empirical judgments. We will return to this attribute of provisionality (*Vorläufigkeit*) characteristic of interpretation when discussing Heidegger.

Even transcendental reflection as displayed in aesthetic judgment is not as far removed from the world as Hans-Georg Gadamer would have us believe. A reflective judgment of taste is a comparative evaluation made by a subject participating in a community—even if the participation is sometimes only indirect, as I will argue later. Based on the *sensus communis*, an aesthetic judgment presupposes a being situated in the world and can be contrasted to the remote objective stance of determinant judgment as defined in the first two critiques. The transcendental principle of reflective judgment does not ground reality from an absolutely neutral perspective, but rather orients me within a communal world in which I find myself as an individual person.

What links reflective judgment and the search for authenticity is a felt sense of a whole or a unifying spirit. Whereas doctrinal interpretations are scholarly, even narrowly scholastic (*schulmäßig*), authentic interpretations are aimed at the whole human world. When we philosophize in the latter vein we do not theorize according to any standard school (*Schulbegriff*), but seek a more elusive wisdom in accordance with a communal world-concept (*Weltbegriff*).[23] Another reason why Kant rejects doctrinal interpretations about human history is that they tend to be pedantic. One could say that they offer pseudodeterminant epistemic judgments about things we

can only cognize reflectively. An authentic interpretation by contrast is one that orients us within a human community or world and stands as the model for Kant's cosmopolitan historical projects.

3. DILTHEY AND AUTHENTIC POESIS

Dilthey does not use the word "authenticity" often, but he does shift its relevance from the realm of religion to that of poetry. He writes in his *Poetics* that because religion has lost the support of metaphysical arguments for the existence of God, human beings are increasingly turning to art and literature for insight into the meaning of life. Thus poetry has become "pervaded by the feeling that it itself must furnish the authentic interpretation (*authentische Interpretation*) of life."[24] This authentic interpretation of poetry is still very much in the spirit of Kant's conception of religious interpretation, for Kant was the one who had struck the death-blow against metaphysical or doctrinal proofs of God's existence. An authentic interpretation of the religious or poetic meaning of life is not intended to demonstrate its truth (*Wahrheit*), but does vouch for its "truthfulness (*Wahrhaftigkeit*)," [25] to introduce a word that Dilthey in effect substitutes for authenticity. Dilthey chides naturalists like Émile Zola for seeking truth from literature, which leads them to present reality in the raw. Instead, great poets create a view of the world that is mediated by feeling, yet is truthful. This truthfulness of poetic worldviews is characterized by a "disinterestedness," according to Dilthey, which again recalls Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment. Dilthey writes, "Disinterestedness, together with the deep reflection stemming from it, for which everything becomes lived experience, and which hovers over its objects with a calm and contemplative eye, forms a more ideal reality that evokes belief and simultaneously satisfies both the heart and the head: these are the characteristics of the poet."[26]

Whereas Kant looked for a special, disinterested feeling that is aesthetic and formal, Dilthey considered it the genius of poets to be able to take ordinary interested feelings and emotions and to transform them into a disinterested attitude to life. Poets do not merely express their emotions, they articulate them into something that assumes a life of its own. The creation

of the poet is not to be judged as true or false, accurate or deceptive: "it intends to say nothing whatever about its author. Truthful in itself, it stands fixed, visible, permanent. . . . Thus, in the confines between knowing and doing, a sphere arises in which life is disclosed at a depth not open to observation, reflection and theory."[27]

For Dilthey, then, an authentic interpretation of life establishes an imaginary sphere whereby the world as a whole is illuminated in a special way. This sphere is disinterested and truthful and could be said to articulate a worldview. It seems that we have moved even further from Meier's subjective authorial standpoint. The disinterestedness that Dilthey has in mind is not just intersubjective and communal, as in Kant, but impersonal. Thus in the *Fragments for a Poetics* (1907–1908), which contains notes for a revised *Poetics*, Dilthey writes, "Disinterested means impersonal. . . . Disinterestedness is . . . not only a property of the aesthetic impression, but also of the lived experience of the creative artist. Thus Kant stands corrected."[28]

Dilthey's more radical conception of disinterestedness derives not from the aesthetic distance involved in the spectator attitude, but from the specific medium in which the creative artist works. Whereas a composer's lived experience of the world is in terms of inherited tonal conventions, a poet experiences the world through the patterns of meaning that words have acquired. This being absorbed in the historical world of language releases poets from themselves. It liberates "the imaginative process from contingency," which "is also its liberation from the personal."[29]

An artistic interpretation of reality is only authentic if it transforms the contingency attached to ordinary experience into what Dilthey calls a sense of *Sosein-Müssen* (having-to-be-thus). This aesthetic *Sosein-Müssen* is illustrated by a description of musical development: "Note follows upon note and aligns itself according to the laws of our tonal system. . . . An earlier bar [of a melody] conditions a subsequent one, but at the same time the first bar of a rising melody, in a work of Handel, for instance, is grounded in the last. . . . Nowhere in all this conditioning is there any necessity. . . . The having-to-be-thus (*Sosein-Müssen*) is not necessity (*Notwendigkeit*), but is the realization of an aesthetic value."[30] The "having to be" or "must" involved here falls short of the determinate necessity demanded by either logical or causal explanations. The outcome of a

musical composition cannot be deduced or predicted and yet we often have a sense once it has ended that this is the way it should have ended. *Sosein-Müssen* exhibits a sense of appropriateness, of rightness, or of what is fitting. Between the indeterminate contingency of ordinary experience and the determinacy of scientific experience stands the indeterminate determinacy of aesthetic and historical experience.

Whereas Kant's authentic-reflective interpretations were indeterminate, Dilthey proposes that an authentic worldview interpretation can be determinate-indeterminate. The creative power of the artist lies in the ability to articulate an indeterminate sphere of experience by focusing our attention on some determinate point of impression that typifies this whole sphere. We could call this the authenticity of a determinate-indeterminate typicality.

4. HEIDEGGER: AUTHENTICITY AS OWNNESS

So far we have shown a development in the idea of authenticity whereby the personal authority of the author (Meier) was broadened into an intersubjective, communal conception of authentic interpretation (Kant) and then into an even more impersonal idea of an authentic worldview (Dilthey). When we turn to Heidegger's views on authenticity there seems to be a reversal. In a world that is experienced as impersonal, Heidegger seeks authenticity in a personal response. Living in an age when our historical heritage has become overwhelming, we readily lapse into an inauthentic mode of existence where we allow the ways of the "they" to control our life. Instead of being absorbed by the public sphere and blindly dispersed into its various routines, authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) seeks a mode of existence that is distinctively its own (*eigen*). We find ourselves back with the terms of Meier's hermeneutics, but with an important difference. Ownness does not involve the search for a selfhood that can stand on its own. We cannot fully detach ourselves from our worldly context. Nor can we deny our thrownness into the world and pretend that we are a distinct source. What is distinctive about us is not something that separates us from our situation, but lies in how we resolve to appropriate our situation.

The inauthentic interpretation of life provided by the "they" allows one to evade the anxiety of existence. But the resistance to this "they" achieved through authentic existence does not entail a rejection of the public context as such. Charles Guignon goes so far as to claim that "authenticity can be nothing other than a fuller and richer form of participation in the public context."[31] Authenticity differs from inauthenticity in making possible a more focused and resolute involvement in our situation based on having faced our finitude or future death.

Death is a possibility that we can anticipate (*vorlaufen*) abstractly and indeterminately as to when and how it will occur. This would correspond to how Kant conceived the provisionality of preliminary (*vorläufige*) judgments. However, Heidegger projects an existential anticipation (*Vorlaufen*) that must literally run ahead (*vor-laufen*) of itself in ways that can be concretely determined. Death must be anticipated as my "ownmost possibility, which is non-relational, not to be outstripped, and certain."[32] Here anticipatory interpretation becomes "anticipatory disclosure (*vorlaufendes Erschließen*)."[33] The authentic disclosure of death gains the subjective *determinacy* of certainty and transforms the objective *indeterminacy* of its actual occurrence into a pervasive sense of impending *terminacy*. *Sorge* and *Angst* are not just indeterminate moods but project what could be called a "determinate-terminate" ontological trajectory. They disclose the "de-terminacy" of our ownmost death or nothingness.

The authentic disclosure of finitude requires a resolute existential engagement that Heidegger characterizes not in terms of choosing as such, but in terms of choosing one's fate. He writes in *Sein und Zeit*: "Resoluteness involves handing oneself over (*Sichüberliefern*) to the 'there' of the moment of vision; and this anticipatory handing over we call 'fate.' "[34] This fate is more explicity disclosed through the process of "retrieval (*Wiederholung*)," whereby we recognize how our possibilities are "tied to the heritage that has come down to us (*das überkommene Erbe*)."[35] Ultimately, resoluteness involves handing ourselves over (*Sichüberliefern*) to that which is handed over to us by our tradition (*Überlieferung*).

The authentic mode of existence for Heidegger requires not severing my *Dasein* from my coexistence or *Mitsein* with others, but finding myself explicitly in that relation. Authentic understanding is realizing what my existence means for me, but not in isolation from others. What is sugges-

tive about Heidegger's way of orienting my existence in the world is his capacity to locate my place in a present spatial horizon as well as my temporal relation to my past and future. By recognizing my own mortality and using the disclosure of finitude to hand myself over to my tradition I certainly do deepen the meaning of my existence. But whether this focused authentic understanding will always lead to a "fuller and richer form of participation" in public life as suggested by Guignon may be questioned. If I now understand what I do when I become absorbed in the busy-ness of the they-mode of existence, shouldn't I stand back and consider whether all these ways of being involved are equally important? Shouldn't I attempt to set some priorities in my life and choose to redirect my activities more selectively? By transforming the theoretical understanding of possibilities into the authentic understanding of my own possibilities, isn't there a desirable process of self-limitation which should reflect itself in my practical life?

Heidegger's blanket appeal to resoluteness seems merely to require me to hand myself over to what has already been handed over to me. Is this another form of Nietzsche's *amor fati*? Does resoluteness merely allow me to willfully affirm everything that happens to me? The voluntarism implicit in the idea of resoluteness does not necessarily express itself in activism and certainly not, as Heidegger's own political applications of it in the 1930s indicate, into a generally acceptable mode of practice. It is this embarrassing shortcoming that may have led Heidegger to reconceive authenticity in terms of *Gelassenheit* or a release from will. But as Michael Zimmerman points out, "the differences between the voluntarism of early Heidegger and the 'letting be' of later Heidegger . . . should not obscure their shared belief that 'authenticity' . . . involves becoming the nothingness that we already are, such that we are open for and responsive to the phenomena that show up moment by moment in everyday life."[36]

The idea of becoming authentically what we already are is again reminiscent of Nietzsche's conception of being fated. Prizing our ontological rootedness in the world, Heidegger dismisses the spectator perspective of Kant's aesthetics. But there is a price to be paid for Heidegger's authentic engagement in the world. It does not leave room for the reflective distance necessary for judging our situation and critically assessing it.

Heidegger's distrust of judgment is evident already in his 1922 draft

"Phenomenologische Interpretationen zur Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation)" where he examines the three ways in which Aristotle's *nous* can be explicated: (1) by *sophia*, which he translates as *eigentliches Verstehen* (authentic understanding); (2) by *phronesis*, which he equates with *Umsicht* or circumspection; and (3) by *epistémé* or *bestimmendes Verstehen* (determinant understanding).[37] Concerning these three ways that *nous* is explicated, *sophia* and *phronesis* are considered the highest because they capture the movement of life: *sophia* gives insight into its where-from-ness, *phronesis* prepares us to cope with its where-to-ness. Qua mode of insight, *sophia* or authentic understanding is superior to *epistémé* or determinant understanding because it is receptive and prejudgmental. Authentic understanding preserves the broad suggestiveness of the interpretive 'as' before narrowing it into a judgmental 'is' of determinant understanding. Again authenticity is associated with truth but not reducible to it, for authentic understanding involves an ontological "safe-keeping (*Verwahrung*)" of things in their being as a condition for the determination of judgmental "truth (*Wahrheit*)."[38] Although we saw that authenticity has its own projective de-terminacy, it is not to be confused with the determinacy of the present-at-hand that the epistemic judgment fixes on.

5. SOME CRITICAL REFLECTIONS

Heidegger's attack on epistemic judgment seems to be a rejection of judgment per se. However, the *phronesis* that he values is also a mode of judgment, although it involves an art of judging that cannot be defined in terms of determinate rules. In Kantian terms, *phronesis* involves reflective judgment rather than determinant judgment. Kant's determinant judgments "subsume" particulars under already accepted universals. His reflective judgments proceed in the opposite direction, i.e., from particulars to universals whose validity can only be "presumed."[39] Because determinant judgment proceeds subsumptively, I regard its function as explanative; reflective judgment by contrast proceeds presumptively and I consider its function interpretive. Kant's determinant judgments are scientific and derive from a pure transcendental ego that stands apart from the world—it could be called the view from nowhere. Kant's reflective judgments stem from human egos

which, as we saw before, are located in the world and must learn to orient themselves in it. As in the case of aesthetic judgments, reflection cannot be separated from the life and feelings of individual subjects.

Given the kinship of reflective judgments with *phronesis* and their interpretive status, there is no reason for Heidegger to be critical of that kind of judgment. Moreover, if my efforts elsewhere[40] to relate reflection, aesthetic discrimination, and orientation are correct, then Kant's theory of reflective judgment has prepared the ground for Heidegger's own being-in-the-world stance. Indeed, it is strange that Heidegger never examined Kant's theory of reflective judgment in any detail.

We saw that Kant, Dilthey, and Heidegger move away from Meier's concept of authenticity, which made the individual subject an authentic source of meaning. Kant roots authentic interpretation in a rational faith and in the aesthetic and moral feelings of the subject, but it must strive to be valid for the whole world-community. What can relate the feelings of the individual to the world is the *sensus communis*. Heidegger's authentic understanding of existence in turn demands that individual *Dasein* distinguish itself from the consensus of the "they" only to discover a deeper *Mit-sein* or being-with that binds it to others in its being-in-the-world. By comparing Kant's *sensus communis* and Heidegger's *Mitsein* I hope to show why Kant's appeal to authenticity is more conducive to a critical hermeneutics than Heidegger's.

Heidegger follows Dilthey in claiming that I cannot base my understanding of the other merely on the feeling of empathy, whereby I project my sense of myself into the other. Through empathy the other is reduced to the mere double of myself. As a mode of being-in-the-world, my *Dasein* is already a *Mitsein* with others. The other is coconstituted with my own sense of self-transcendence. The other also partakes in something larger than myself. This shows itself in Heidegger's views on communication. I can communicate (*mitteilen*) with others, not because something from within me is transported to the other, but because we both display an initial partaking (*Teilnahme*) in a larger world.[41] Communication involves sharing (*teilen*) in a cosituatedness (*Mitbefindlichkeit*) relative to Being.[42]

This is communication where things are already understood before anything is uttered. Communication need not effect any change in me or others, but serves to confirm a primordial *Mitsein*. Kant's theory of the

sensus communis also deals with the preconditions of communication, but in a way that seems more conducive to mutual enrichment. The *sensus communis* is defined in the *Critique of Judgment* as "the idea of a sense common to all, i.e., a faculty of judgment which, in its reflection, takes account (a priori) of the mode of representation of all other men."[43] By its use we can learn to "enlarge our way of thinking" by putting ourselves in place of others. This requires comparing our judgment "with the possible rather than the actual judgment of others."[44] It seems that now the understanding of the other is dependent on a prior enlargement of one's own thought based on imagining possibilities that are not merely variations of the self. This requires me to place my own point of view, not only in relation to the actual perspective of another, but also in relation to a range of possible standpoints in which both our positions can be evaluated. The *sensus communis* and its maxim of enlarged thought makes it possible to conceive of communication as a way of refining our reflective judgment. It can thus be linked to Kant's discussions of public reason in the cosmopolitan arena where the exchange of ideas serves to test their worth.

Just as Dilthey and Heidegger reject empathy as an adequate model for human communication, Kant rejects simple sympathy. Kant's attitude toward sympathy is somewhat complex. He is well known for having dismissed the moral worth of the good deeds of those who are "sympathetically inclined (*teilnehmend gestimmt*)"[45] in the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*. It is less known that later in the *Metaphysics of Morals* Kant is willing to attribute moral worth to the cultivation of a *sympathia moralis* that is not passive and based on inclination, but actively communicative. The first or passive kind of sympathy is now called *Mitleidenschaft* or compassion.[46] The second, active kind of sympathy that is to be cultivated is reconceived as *Teilnehmung* or the capacity to participate in the projects of others.[47] Analogously, the *sensus communis* as the ground of communication in Kant can be conceived as the basis for communal participation.

Like Heidegger, Kant is less concerned with communication as the transfer of content from one to another and more with the conditions of communicability. According to Heidegger the transfer of content involved in empathy presupposes a prior *Teilnahme* in *Mitbefindlichkeit* which relates us to Being. In Kant the transfer of content involved in sympathy presupposes a more active *Teilnehmung* in the projects of practical reason. Because

Teilnahme or partaking in Heidegger's sense provides a fated historical context for the process of *mitteilen* (communing), it finds only a derivative place for the process of *urteilen* (judging) and what I would call the *erteilen* (imparting) of other standpoints. I find Kant's concept of *Teilnehmung* or participation to be more suggestive because it is compatible with the taking of a stand involved in judgment and with the reflective consideration of other standpoints. Orientation for Kant is not merely a matter of partaking in a horizon that has been provided, but it involves participating in the human project of transforming that horizon. We may not be as hopeful as Kant that transformation will result in progress, but it is important to recognize our responsibility to strive for improvements.

Heidegger and Gadamer attack Kantian aesthetic spectators for their inability to partake in the ontological dimension disclosed in the artwork. What they fail to see is that Kant's spectator can be a participant in the human historical project. Even Hannah Arendt, who explored the political implications of Kant's aesthetic judgment for public discourse, did not see the continuum between Kant's views on spectatorship and participation. Although Arendt is more sympathetic to Kant's aesthetic-moral perspective than Heidegger, she still shares his assumption that a spectator is necessarily impartial and unengaged. However, Kant speaks of himself and other Germans as spectators of the French Revolution who at the same time display a partisanship for its republican goals.[48] Thus between neutral spectators of the French Revolution and its direct participants there may also exist spectators who are legitimately partial. This is Kant's own intermediate position and might be said to involve the response of the "indirect participant."[49]

I would like to argue that the perspectives of Kant's aesthetic spectator and of his authentic interpreter allow us to orient ourselves to the world as reflective participants in it. Thus instead of defining authenticity passively as handing myself over to what the historical past hands down to me in a moment of vision or disclosure, I propose to redefine it more in line with Kant's conception of authentic interpretation. Such authenticity would involve the more active project of expanding the perspective of the self to include whatever can be legitimately shared through a cosmopolitan human perspective.

In §8 of the *Critique of Judgment* Kant indicates that reflective aesthetic

judgments possess a *Gemeingültigkeit* (common or communal validity) rather than the *Allgemeingültigkeit* (universal validity) of determinant epistemic judgments.[50] Kant does not develop this distinction, but it could easily be applied to the distinction between authentic and doctrinal interpretation. Whereas authenticity links the felt core of individual experience to the larger community or human cosmos in a kind of part-whole relation, doctrinal thought measures the particulars of sense by universal concepts and rules. We have here a possible basis for distinguishing between the cosmopolitan and the universal perspectives as a further way of differentiating the subjective universality of reflective judgment (what is valid for us humans) and the objective universality of determinant judgment (what is valid for all finite rational beings). Even though we can only presume that aesthetic pleasure is sharable by the human community, Kant justifies the legitimacy of aesthetic judgments by relating them, if only indirectly, to the universal epistemic and moral claims valid for all finite rational beings. Thus Kant ends up conflating the generality of the cosmopolitan (which is that of the human world at large) with the universality of pure theory and this has given his account of the human cosmos an abstract character.

By correlating those features that are shared by reflective judgment, authentic interpretation, and the public discourse involved in the cosmopolitan project, we can bring out what distinguishes the search for communal consensus from the theoretical universality expected among scientific experts. In matters of taste, religious belief and political conviction we cannot expect determinate criteria whereby differences will be settled. What we can and do need to develop is the capacity of reflective judgment to enlarge our own perspective, to explore the possibility that despite obvious disagreements we may nevertheless be able to arrive at partially overlapping viewpoints. The importance of authentic interpretation lies in its efforts to be responsive to what may at first seem alien.

We started with the existential idea of authenticity as the genuineness of an individual deed. Authentic interpretation for Meier similarly requires the reader to respect the authority of the author to decide the meaning of his or her text. It is through Kant's reflective judgment that authentic interpretation becomes more than a mere acceptance of authority, namely, a response that attempts a thoughtful and felt accommodation between the

self and the other. Meier believes that unless an interpretation is determined by the authority of the author's intention, there will always be something provisional (*vorläufig*) about it. Unwilling to accept this kind of authority, Kant's authentic interpretation must content itself with a certain indeterminacy. Prejudices introduce a premature determinacy into our viewpoints that reflection must then transform into indeterminate preliminary judgments. If *Vorläufigkeit* in Kant stands for the capacity to live with indeterminacy, in Heidegger it engenders a leaping ahead that produces what we called a new "de-terminacy." Between these two alternatives we located Dilthey, for whom the interpretation of life lies in the articulation of a worldview that is both determinate and indeterminate. A literary interpretation of our historical life is authentic if it is subjectively meaningful, yet truthful in a disinterested way. This disinterestedness can also transform interpretation into disclosure. However, the disclosure involved here is not an ontological revelation of being or nothingness, but points to an ontic-ontological process of historical individuation that does not exclude the role of reflective judgment. In the last analysis it is the task of reflective judgment to decide what can be made determinate and what must be left indeterminate.

The ability to accept a measure of indeterminacy in one's life is part of what it means to live and interpret it authentically. Authentic actions are thought of as being decisively one's own. However, once doing becomes intertwined with the self-interpretation of one's life it may become more appropriate to redefine authenticity in terms of responsiveness. To be responsive is not just a matter of acting, but of being receptive to one's situation. In this sense living authentically requires both taking moral responsibility for one's actions and reflecting about their significance in the larger scheme of things. Relating morality to the interpretation of life requires applying reflective judgment so that we are not forced into an exclusive choice between the two phases of Heidegger's thought: those of voluntarism and letting be. To live one's live authentically means being able to judge when to assert oneself and when to acquiesce to larger forces. This mode of cognition, which can also be called wisdom, is never a fully determinate thing and always subject to revision. As in many instances of judgment it involves something more like a sense capable of critical reevaluation than a procedure controlled by determinate rules.

NOTES

1. Georg Friedrich Meier, *Versuch einer allgemeinen Auslegungskunst* (Halle, 1755; Hildesheim: Olms, 1976), p. 9.

2. Ibid., p. 52.

3. Ibid., p. 75.

4. Immanuel Kant, *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, herausgegeben von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, vol. 8 (Berlin, 1902–1983), p. 264.

5. Ibid., p. 264.

6. See Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, J. H. Bernard, trans. (New York: Hafner Press, 1974), §40.

7. Kant, *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 8, p. 265.

8. Ibid., pp. 266ff.

9. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §90, p. 314 (translation altered); Kant, *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 8, p. 462.

10. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §59, p. 198; Kant, *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 5, p. 353.

11. See Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §91, p. 322; Kant, *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 5, p. 470: Kant speaks of an *Erkenntnis* that is neither *Wissen* nor *Meinung*.

12. Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 105.

13. Ibid., p. 105; Kant, *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 4, p. 114.

14. Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, p. 103.

15. Ibid., p. 105.

16. Wilhelm Dilthey, *Hermeneutics and the Study of History, Selected Works*, vol. 4, Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 91.

17. Ibid., p. 93.

18. Ibid., p. 91.

19. Ibid.

20. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §40, p. 137.

21. See, for example, Kant, *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 24, p. 169.

22. See ibid., pp. 737ff.

23. See Kant, *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 9, pp. 23ff.

24. Wilhelm Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 20 vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck

& Ruprecht, 1914-1990), vol. 6, p. 237; Wilhelm Dilthey, *Poetry and Experience, Selected Works*, vol. 5, Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 169.

25. Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 7, p. 206.

26. Dilthey, *Poety and Experience*, vol. 5, p. 129.

27. Wilhelm Dilthey, "The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Expressions of Life," in *Descriptive Psychology and Human Understanding* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 125.

28. Dilthey, *Poety and Experience*, vol. 5, p. 227.

29. Ibid., p. 227.

30. Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 7, p. 221.

31. Charles Guignon, "Authenticity, Moral Values and Psychotherapy," in the *Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, Guignon, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 228.

32. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen, Germany: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1967), p. 263.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., p. 386.

35. Ibid.

36. Michael Zimmerman, "Heidegger, Buddhism, and Deep Ecology," in the *Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, p. 256.

37. See Martin Heidegger, "Aristoteles-Einleitung," in *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), vol. 6, p. 255. Here *phronesis* is not equated with *Verstehen* as is sometimes claimed for *Being and Time*. See John D. Caputo, *Radical Hermeneutics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 89.

38. See Heidegger, "Aristoteles-Einleitung," p. 256.

39. Kant, *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 9, p. 133.

40. Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the "Critique of Judgment"* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), ch. 8.

41. See Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 168.

42. Ibid., p. 162.

43. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §40, p. 136; Kant, *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 5, p. 293.

44. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §40, p. 136; Kant, *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 5, p. 293.

45. Kant, Foundation of *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Lewis White Beck, trans. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril, 1959), p. 14; Kant, *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 4, p. 398.

46. Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 250; Kant, *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 6, p. 456.

47. Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 251; Kant, *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 6, p. 457.

48. Kant, *Conflict of the Faculties*, trans. Mary Gregor and Robert E. Anchor (New York: Abaris Press, 1979), p. 154.

49. See Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant*, pp. 150ff.

50. See Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §8, p. 49 (translation altered); Kant, *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 5, pp. 214f.

4

THE PROBLEM OF TIME

HEIDEGGER'S DECONSTRUCTIVE READING OF KANT IN VOLUME 21

Veronica Vasterling

The problem of time is one of Heidegger's main concerns in the work of the 1920s. The unfinished project of *Being and Time* (*BT*) however, attests to the fact that the elaboration of the problem of time raised questions that were difficult to answer. In a conversation with David Krell in 1976, Heidegger himself admitted that he began to have serious doubts about being able to complete the third division of *BT* (part 1), i.e., the division entitled "Time and Being," as early as 1925 or 1926.[1] While still working on the manuscript, Heidegger apparently began to have doubts about his account of time in *BT*. Indirectly, this state of affairs is confirmed by the account of time Heidegger gives in *Logik. Die Frage nach der*

Wahrheit (vol. 21),[2] an account which is quite at odds with the one of *BT*. This is partly due to the context. Whereas in *BT*, Heidegger develops a conception of time which diverges from and is opposed to the traditional conception, in volume 21 he appears to be concerned with the deconstruction of the traditional Kantian conception of time, exposing the blind spot, the 'unthought' (*das Ungedachte*) on which it relies. But the divergence of the two accounts also has something to do with the questions raised by *BT*. What is remarkable about the account in volume 21 is that it seems to offer the beginning of a solution to two unsolved problems with respect to time in *BT*.

In *BT* Heidegger distinguishes between primordial time and now-time, the former referring to his own conception of ecstatico-horizonal time and the latter to the traditional conception of time as linear succession of now-points, moving from the not-anymore-now (the past) through the now (the present) to the not-yet-now (the future). Heidegger characterizes now-time as derivative, suggesting that ecstatico-horizonal time is the origin or foundation of now-time.[3] Now-time is derivative in that it is founded, ultimately, in a temporalization of ecstatico-horizonal time.[4] The foundational connection between ecstatico-horizonal time and now-time raises aporetic questions: if now-time is founded in ecstatico-horizonal time, doesn't that entail a temporal interval or delay within time?

Or are we dealing with two different times? But what does that mean: two different times? The notion of foundation or origination implies that "something" is first, i.e., ecstatico-horizonal time, upon which "something else" follows, i.e., now-time, resulting in the paradoxical effect of either an intratemporal time difference, or of two different and somehow successive times. Even though it is clear that the connection between primordial time and now-time is not meant to be understood in terms of "earlier" and "later," i.e., in terms of the traditional conception of time, still the question remains how we should understand it. As the notion of foundation or origination presupposes the traditional conception of now-time—since Aristotle the conception of time as a linear succession is the necessary condition of all thinking in terms of origin, ground, and cause and effect—the real problem here, it seems to me, lies in the *foundational* connection between primordial time and now-time.

The second question raised by the account of time in *BT* concerns the

relation of time and *Dasein*. Heidegger's explication of this relation is quite ambiguous. On the one hand, he says that primordial time temporalizes the horizonal ecstasies of future, past, and present which in turn make possible the various modes of Being of *Dasein*.[5] On the other hand, he states that it is *Dasein* itself that temporalizes: "In so far as Dasein temporalizes itself, a world *is* too. In temporalizing itself with regard to its Being as temporality, Dasein *is* essentially 'in a world,' by reason of the ecstatico-horizonal constitution of that temporality."[6] Although Heidegger does not say that *Dasein's* temporalizations make possible its modes of Being here, its Being-in-the-world, the ambiguity with respect to the temporalizations raises several questions pertaining, again, to the notion of foundation, this time in the specific sense of constitution. What enables *Dasein's* modes of Being, *Dasein's* temporalizations or the temporalizations of ecstatico-horizonal time itself? If it is the former, does that imply that *Dasein's* Being itself constitutes ecstatico-horizonal time? And if it is the latter, does that imply that ecstatico-horizonal time constitutes *Dasein's* (temporal) Being? Or, as both possibilities don't sound quite right, are ecstatico-horizonal time and *Dasein* equiprimordial? And if they are equiprimordial, what does equiprimordiality entail with respect to the rather perplexing question of constitution?

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE INTERPRETATION

The interpretation I am going to outline is based on a rather selective reading of Heidegger's texts. The reading is selective because, first and foremost, my concern is to reformulate and reinterpret the above-mentioned problems in such a way that a solution becomes conceivable. Apart from this direct concern, however, the selectiveness of my reading is tied to more general presuppositions with respect to Heidegger's early work on the issue of time. In my opinion, the unfinished or even inconclusive character of Heidegger's account of time is due to two methodological impediments—taking "methodological" in a very wide sense—i.e., the phenomenological and the foundational method. I will start with the discussion of the former.

One of the main characteristics of the traditional conception of time is that it is based on the priority of the present. The three dimensions of time refer to three modalities of the present: the now (the present), the not-anymore-now (the past), and the not-yet-now (the future). The reduction of past and future to derivations of the present corresponds with the everyday conception, that is, experience, of past and future as that which can be made present through, respectively, recollection and expectation. As such, the traditional conception precludes any notion of past and future as *absence*, that is, as that which is not and cannot be made present. Heidegger's conception of ecstatico-horizonal time, however, undermines the priority of the present in two ways. First, instead of the present, the future—in connection with the past—is designated as the prior dimension of time. The present is described as issuing from "the future which is in the process of having been" (*gewesende Zukunft*).[7] Second, the future and the past do not, at least not primarily, refer to the present anymore. It is only in inauthentic existence that the future is something that can be expected and the past something that can be remembered or forgotten.[8] Though not explicitly stated, Heidegger's consistent repudiation of the traditional conception of time as derivative, non-original, or inauthentic, suggests that, within the context of ecstatico-horizonal time, future and past should be conceived as absence rather than (potential) presence.[9]

If it is correct to infer that one of the aims of the project of ecstatico-horizonal time was to undo the traditional domination of the present, then, as a consequence, one might infer that Heidegger's commitment to the phenomenological method is more of an impediment than a help in realizing this aim. As the explication of phenomena, i.e., that which—ultimately—shows itself,[10] phenomenology ineluctably is tied to the present: that which shows itself is always present in some way. Heidegger's commitment to the phenomenological method deeply influences not only the way the question of time and Being is conceptualized in *BT*, but also the conception of ecstatico-horizonal time itself. In both cases the phenomenological-hermeneutical notion of horizon plays a central role. Phenomenologically, horizon refers to a field of presence which, hermeneutically, functions as the context of understanding. Heidegger posits time as the horizon for all understanding of Being,[11] that is, the meaning of Being is to be grasped from what the horizon of time presents. The positing of

time as the horizon of the understanding of Being is consistent with the conception of the temporal ecstasies as horizons or, more precisely, horizonal schemes.[12] Yet, it is difficult to see how the meaning of Being can be grasped from the horizonal schemes of past and future *without* reducing both to that which can be presented.[13]

Because of these doubts concerning the phenomenological aspect of the notion of horizon, that is, the horizonal scheme, I will try to interpret the project of ecstatico-horizonal time in such a way that its reliance on this notion is circumvented while at the same time giving full weight to its aim of undoing the predominance of the present.

The second aspect of Heidegger's thought which, in my opinion, impedes the elaboration of his conception of time is its adherence to the foundational method or, more in general, foundational thinking. My understanding of foundational thinking is derived from the critical conception of metaphysics Heidegger introduces in his later work, that is, metaphysics as ontotheology. Ontotheology is foundational in that it posits Being as the first ground of beings.[14] This conception of ontotheology contains in fact implicit criticism of Heidegger's early work inasmuch as Heidegger, at that time, tends to determine Being as ground.[15] But the foundational tendency of Heidegger's early work is not limited to this determination of Being. More fundamental than Being is (ecstatico-horizonal) time as "das ursprünglich Ermöglichende, der Ursprung von Möglichkeit selbst."[16] Time, Heidegger says in volume 24, "temporalizes itself as the absolutely earliest. Time is earlier than any possible earlier of whatever sort, because it is the basic condition of an earlier as such."[17] As I understand it, this means that time is the most basic ground not simply in the sense of *ratio cognoscendi*, though that is included too, but, more radical, in the metaphysical sense: Being as *ratio essendi* is grounded in time as—with a Latin neologism—*ratio temporandi*. On the preceding page Heidegger remarks that time as "the absolutely earliest" should not be understood according to the conception of now-time. However, insofar as Heidegger conceives of time as ultimate ground or origin, in other words, insofar as his conception of time is tributary to foundational thinking, the repudiation of traditional now-time is bound to be rather helpless. As foundational thinking presupposes the linear succession of "earlier" and "later," in other words, presupposes the traditional conception of time, the

characteristics of this conception threaten to return in the heart of Heidegger's nontraditional explication of time.

Generally speaking, it is the presupposition of my interpretation that the hold this metaphysical type of foundational thinking has on Heidegger in his early work is the cause of the problems I started with. When the relation of ecstatico-horizonal time and now-time, as well as the relation of ecstatico-horizonal time and *Dasein*, both raise questions pertaining to the notion of foundation. What is meant by "foundation" does not refer to *ratio cognoscendi*, i.e., the order of explication, but to *ratio essendi* and *temporandi*, i.e., the order of Being and time. Though evoked by it, one searches in vain for answers to these questions within the context of *BT*. As I suggested above, it is the account of time in volume 21 that seems to offer at least the beginning of an answer.

THE DOUBLE DEFINITION OF TIME

The account is based on a deconstructive interpretation of Kant's concept of time.[18] In *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant gives a double definition of time: time is the a priori form of intuition, as well as infinite given quantity.[19] Heidegger reformulates the Kantian notion of intuition in phenomenological terms as the allowing of the manifold to be countered.[20] On the basis of this phenomenological definition of intuition, the double definition of time can be reformulated in the following way: on the one hand, time is the condition of the possibility that a manifold can be countered or given at all; on the other hand, time is also the given in a certain way, namely as "the infinite whole of the successive manifold."[21]

The double definition of time is somewhat paradoxical. The first part appears to designate the subject as the source of time, while the second part apparently determines time as objectively given. In other words, in Kant's definition time appears as both subjective and objective. This paradox, far from being a mistake to be corrected, can be understood as the expression of our experience of time. If everyday experience compels us to the assumption that time is an irreversible stream taking us from birth to death, some reflection on our experience will make us wonder on the basis of what we assume that time is, as it were, an independent force. We

perceive processes of change indicating time, but time itself eludes us. Where does our awareness of time come from? We are aware of time because we are capable of perceiving change *as change*. Only a being capable of recollection can perceive change as a process moving from earlier to later because it remembers that before this, there was something else, in short, it can perceive change as a temporal process.

Thus, the paradoxical definition of time as both subjective and objective has its phenomenological justification. Instead of resolving the paradox, Heidegger's interpretation will elaborate on it, thereby deconstructing Kant's subsequent reduction of the paradox, in the Transcendental Deduction of Categories, through the assumption of the transcendental subject as foundation of time.

Heidegger starts with undermining the strict distinction Kant makes between intuition and intellect. While intuition, in Kant, is wholly receptive, intellect is active: it orders, through syntheses, the chaotic manifold of the senses. Heidegger's deconstruction of the distinction resumes the phenomenological reformulation of intuition. Allowing the manifold to be countered, intuition does presuppose a certain activity, namely "the taking aim at something, in virtue of which" the manifold of the senses can be articulated at all as ordered or as lacking order.[22] The activity of "taking aim at" is unthematically implicated in intuition. The next step in Heidegger's interpretation is the crucial one. It connects the phenomenological interpretation of intuition with the double definition of time. According to Heidegger, the "taking aim at" which is unthematically implicated in intuition is time, in Kantian terms: time as a priori form of intuition. But if the "taking aim at" is time, then that at which the aiming is directed is time as well, in Kantian terms: time as infinite given quantity. Heidegger sums up as follows: "Time is pure taking aim at. Time is that itself at which the taking aim is directed."[23]

This reinterpretation of the double definition shows that what I have called subjective and objective time are mutually dependent. Without subjective time, that is, time as "taking aim at," there would not be anything at which the aiming is directed. Thus, there would not be objective time, that is, time as the given, as that at which the aiming is directed. And vice versa, without objective time, there would not be subjective time for the "taking aim at" would not be possible without anything to take aim at.

There are two conclusions to be drawn from this interpretation, conclusions which, in turn, indicate how the above-mentioned problems concerning time in *BT* might be solved. First, the mutual dependence of objective and subjective time not only precludes the reduction of one to the other, it also suggests that subjective time cannot be conceived of as the foundation or the condition of the possibility of objective time and vice versa. Instead, subjective and objective time appear as two interdependent aspects of the "same" time. Second, this interpretation presupposes a certain view of the subject or, in Heidegger's terms, of *Dasein*. If the pure "taking aim at" is itself time, then the Being of the subject, that is, *Dasein*, has to be interpreted as time.

TIME AS ECSTASIS

To interpret, within the context of a reading of Kant, the Being of the subject, that is, *Dasein*, as time, requires a transformative interpretation of the anchorage of Kant's argument with respect to time, i.e., transcendental self-consciousness. In phenomenological terms, the central question of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is the question how phenomena can give themselves at all.[24] Phenomena can give or show themselves insofar as they can be present *to me*, in Kantian terms, insofar as they can be an object for me. According to Kant, this means that the possibility of representations and perceptions lies in the relating of phenomena to the "I think": we can only think, perceive, or represent something if this something can be related to myself, to the "I think."[25] This relation or synthesis Kant calls the transcendental unity of apperception or transcendental self-consciousness. Being the foundation of all other syntheses, that is, the syntheses of what is given in intuition by intellect, including time as the purely given, the transcendental unity of apperception, that is, transcendental self-consciousness, itself is timeless: a self beyond time.[26] Thus, ultimately, time is reduced to transcendental self-consciousness as the timeless ground of time.

Heidegger however, intends to show that and how transcendental self-consciousness is a basic modification of time itself.[27] This requires a radical shift in presuppositions with respect to the Being of the subject, that is, *Dasein*, summed up as follows:

> What is given first, is not an "I think" as the most pure a priori, and then time, and this time as the station that mediates the coming out towards the world, but, on the contrary, the Being of the subject itself qua Dasein is Being-in-the-world, and this Being-in-the-world of Dasein is only possible because the basic structure of its Being is time itself.[28]

From Heidegger's perspective, the Kantian view of the timeless transcendental subject misconstrues the Being of the (transcendental) self as self-identical, that is, as coinciding with itself and therefore enclosed within itself. One of the most important ontological characteristics of *Dasein*, however, is what Heidegger in *BT* calls disclosedness. Disclosedness indicates that, in its Being, *Dasein* always already comports itself toward (the Being of) beings, including the being it is itself. More specifically, disclosedness indicates the hermeneutical structure of *Dasein's* Being: if it always already comports itself toward (the Being of) beings, it is because *Dasein* has some basic understanding of (the Being of) beings. The possibility of understanding entails a self that, far from being enclosed within itself, with beings or objects beyond its border as it were, always already is *outside* of itself, with or alongside beings.[29] This Being-outside-of-itself of the self should be understood in a temporal sense. One of the most suggestive definitions of time in *BT* characterizes primordial time as "*ekstatikon* pure and simple," as "the primordial 'outside-of-itself' in and for itself."[30] Though in *BT* Heidegger does not relate it to *Dasein's* Being as time, this characteristic of time may very well be interpreted that way. It expresses *Dasein's* accomplishment of time: ecstatic, carried away (*entrückt*) from "itself," Dasein is always already "outside-of-itself." As such, that is, as accomplishment of time, *Dasein* never coincides with itself, on the contrary, disclosed, ecstatic, *Dasein* "is" time.

The interpretation of *Dasein's* Being in terms of time as ecstasis suggests that ecstatico-horizonal time and *Dasein* are equiprimordial. It is questionable however, whether equiprimordiality is the correct characterization of the relation of time and *Dasein*. By further explicating the temporal structure of understanding in relation to Heidegger's interpretation of the double definition of time in Kant, I will try to show why this characterization is inadequate.

Heidegger distinguishes two levels or aspects of understanding, i.e.,

intentionality and transcendence.[31] From the perspective of intentionality, understanding is always directed at . . . something. As such, intentional understanding presupposes the presence of that at which it is directed. In order that something can be present transcendence is required. Transcendence is the nonintentional, that is, the unthematic or not objectifying transgression of beings toward Being itself. Because Being itself is not of the order of beings, hence is not "something" that can or cannot be present, in other words, is not "object" of understanding, transcendence is always nonintentional. Thus, understanding has a double structure: while intentional understanding is always thematic, that is, directed at beings in what and how they are, transcendence is the transgression of beings toward the Being itself of beings, a transcending movement that is unthematically implicated in, and enabling, intentional understanding.

The question is how to interpret the double structure of understanding in terms of time. The difficulty here is that Heidegger's explications on this point go in two apparently incompatible directions, reminiscent of the problem concerning the relation of time and *Dasein* in *BT* with which I started. On the one hand he says that the basic structure of Dasein's Being *is time*,[32] which suggests that transcendence and intentionality are to be interpreted as temporal structures. On the other hand, he states that ecstatico-horizonal time is the fundamental condition of the possibility of transcendence,[33] hence ecstatico-horizonal time constitutes transcendence. However, Heidegger's interpretation of the double definition of time in Kant indicates, not only why the two statements have to be taken together, but also how that can be done. They have to be taken together for the following reason. If the basic structure of *Dasein's* Being is to be interpreted as time, this does not, and cannot, imply that time is being reduced to *Dasein*, i.e. that time is merely subjective. Not any more than that time constituting transcendence means that time is some sort of objective force or medium that enables the transgressive movement of transcendence. From the viewpoint of time, intentional understanding refers to time in the mode of the present. Intentional understanding is a presencing (*Gegenwärtigen*), a having present of . . . something.[34] This presencing would not be possible without transcendence, that is, interpreted in temporal terms, the unthematic taking aim at time as the purely given.[35] Heidegger stressed that the unthematic taking aim at is time itself which

means that transcending *Dasein is* time. Referring to *Dasein's* Being-outside-of-itself, transcendence is its accomplishment of time. But transcendence as the unthematic taking aim at does not constitute time as the purely given for, as we have seen, both are mutually dependent. Nor does the latter mean that time and *Dasein* are equiprimordial, originating together, so to speak. If time originated with *Dasein*, time could never be the purely *given*. Rather, the mutual dependence of time and *Dasein* indicates that only insofar as *Dasein*, that is, transcendence, "happens," time can be the purely given. Or, in other words, only insofar as the basic structure of *Dasein's* Being is time, *Dasein* has an awareness of time.

Apart from being still very schematic, this explication of the relation of time and *Dasein* does not say anything, as yet, about the second problem concerning time in *BT*, i.e., the relation of linear now-time and ecstatico-horizonal time. A further explication of the temporal structure of intentionality and transcendence will, I hope, clarify this problem.

TRANSCENDENCE AND INTENTIONALITY: THE LOOP AND THE STRAIGHT LINE

The traditional concept of now-time has two interrelated characteristics, irreversibility and linearity. Time is conceived as a straight line or an arrow pointing toward the future and consisting of measurable units. Because of its currency in both daily life and traditional science,[36] the connection between irreversibility and linearity may appear like a necessary one. Irreversibility however, does not compel us to conceive time as a straight line. To stick to visual metaphors, irreversibility is also compatible with the conception of time as a loop.

Though it is not explicit in *BT*, the concept of ecstatico-horizonal time does suggest a conception of time as circular. Heidegger emphasizes again and again that, instead of the linear succession of past, present, and future, ecstatico-horizonal time temporalizes the three dimensions of time simultaneously. But there does seem to be a certain order in the simultaneous temporalization of present, past, and future. The present is described as issuing from "the future which is in the process of having been"

(*gewesende Zukunft*), that is, from a past that comes toward us from the future.[37] This rather complex movement of time can be visualized as a loop: the circular line of the loop is the movement of the past coming toward us from the future, and the crossing, there where the circular line of the loop comes together, is the present. This visualization of the circular movement of ecstatico-horizonal time highlights the important distinction between this concept of time and now-time that I discussed in the second paragraph. Whereas the latter takes the present as its point of departure, conceiving past and future as the not-anymore-present and the not-yet-present, the former not only reverses this order, taking the "future which is in the process of having been" as the temporal dimension from which the present arises; it also implies that future and past are no longer to be conceived in terms of presence. Instead of a past we remember and a future we expect, hence an absent past and an absent future that can be presenced, the past and future of ecstatico-horizonal time appear to refer to an absence that cannot be presenced.

If the concept of ecstatico-horizonal time implies that the present is dependent upon the absent as such, i.e., an absence that cannot be made present, how can this notion of the present be reconciled with the fact—a fact expressed by the concept of now-time—that we live, continuously, in the grip of the present? "The presencing in which I continuously live"[38] refers to the intentional structure of understanding, i.e., to the having present of something in whatever modification of understanding (thinking, perceiving, acting, talking, etc.). Though there is no escape from the presencing of intentional understanding, this presencing is only a surface phenomenon. The surface structure of intentionality is carried, as it were, by the movement of transcendence which means that the presencing of understanding is a more complex affair than the simple having present of something.

The complexity of the (temporal) structure of understanding is shown by Heidegger's analysis of the circular structure of the "hermeneutic as" in volume 21 (par. 12). The expression "hermeneutic as" refers to the fact that understanding always, though mostly implicitly, is an understanding of something *as* something. Without being aware of it while working on it, I understand this "something" in front of me *as* a computer. Understanding something *as* this or that presupposes that, while presencing, we are

"further" than what is present to us, a "further" or "elsewhere" from which we "come back" to the present.[39] To understand something *as* this or that, understanding has to rely on what is not present, i.e., the context or framework out of which the present is understood. From a temporal viewpoint, this context or framework is what we have "kept" or "filed" since our birth, hence during the time we have been in the world. It is the network of traces of a past that is not present but neither erased. It is, as Heidegger says, the past we *are,* but this past we are is, for the most part, not retrievable. The past we can retrieve through recollection, the past we can make present, is only a fraction of the past we, factually, are. As the "whence" of understanding, the unretrievable past is what carries us unseen, as it were "in" our back (*im Rücken*). Only toward the retrievable past we can turn ourselves: we turn around and we see it happen again in front of our mind's eye. The unretrievable past on the other hand, comes, from behind our back, unwittingly and unseen, toward us from the future. It is this movement that opens the present, enabling understanding to be more than the mere receptive involvement with the given present. The unretrievable past coming toward us from the future, opens understanding such that it can project itself on to a sense that is, and remains, "futural." Though it determines the tendency of understanding—it is the light in which the present appears or, less metaphorical, what lends the present its meaning—the full sense withholds itself from understanding. It remains the beckoning, but ever receding horizon of understanding we can never reach because we cannot stop time. Only if we could stop time could understanding be complete and definite: it would be able to grasp the full sense of what it tries to understand. Thus, understanding can be characterized as insight issuing from blindness, from an absence that cannot be presenced. That is why Heidegger says that every interpretation "has something in the back that, even despite its purest transparency, it cannot reach, for its very transparency stems from the fact that it is not aware of this supposition."[40] Though it guides the projections of understanding, the irretrievable past eludes us.

The temporal structure of understanding implies that the traditional concept of finiteness has to be revised. Instead of being limited by the existence of ascertainable limits, the essence of the finiteness of understanding lies in the "un-limiting" effect of time: in the impossibility of

definitely ascertainable limits. Every horizon we try to delimit as the scope of understanding will be made bereft of its limiting character by the continuation of time. It is the temporal structure of understanding itself that undermines every barrier we put up against the continuation of time. But the "un-limiting" effect of time is not only destructive. It is also, in a certain way, constructive, namely insofar as new and unforeseen horizons keep surfacing from the depth of the past coming toward us from the future. Undermining what we thought to know and to possess, these surfacing horizons constitute the possibility of new projections of the understanding. Without this loop of time, the unforeseen, the new, and chance as well, would not be possible. The future would be restricted to what is conceivable and predictable on the basis of the retrievable past. Instead of the hopeful uncertainty of the new, the unforeseen, the future would only bring the saddening certainty of all things perishing.

In now returning to the question of the relation of linear now-time and ecstatico-horizonal time, we can, I think, infer the following. The concept of linear now-time corresponds with the surface structure of understanding, i.e., intentionality. At the intentional level, we cannot but understand the present within the context of the retrievable not-anymore-now and the conceivable not-yet-now for the presencing of intentionality precludes the absent that cannot be presenced. *As such*, the absent is unthinkable or unconceivable; we only can think (understand) it insofar as it can be presenced in some way. From the perspective of intentionality, time cannot but appear as the linear succession of now-points for the loops connecting the now-points are, as it were, invisible for intentional understanding. The loops make up the temporal depth structure of transcendence that is unthematically implicated in intentional understanding.

Without, of course, pretending that this is anything near a full explication, this interpretation of ecstatico-horizonal time as the depth structure of transcendence does afford some clarification of important aspects of Heidegger's thoughts concerning time and *Dasein*. It explains why, despite its ineluctable grasp, the predominance of the present can be deconstructed in favor of the absent, i.e., the past coming toward us from the future. Lending the present its depth and meaning, the loop of transcendence is, as it were, the core of *Dasein's* hermeneutic Being. If, from the viewpoint of existential experience, the ineluctable grasp of the present

underlies the predominance of inauthentic existence, i.e., the tendency to lose ourselves in the fleeting present, then the elusive depth and transparency of the full, authentic moment reveals *Dasein's* openness with respect to its own Being.[41] Also Heidegger's insistence on the priority of the future and, correspondingly, *Dasein's* potentiality-for-Being, are clarified, I think, by the loop of transcendence. As the dimension of unforeseen possibilities, the future can be neither predictable, nor, simply, nothing, an empty space as it were. Only because it comes toward us from the irretrievable past, can the future carry ever new horizons of understanding.

NOTES

1. Cf. David F. Krell, *Intimations of Mortality; Time, Truth and Finitude in Heidegger's Thinking of Being* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986), chap. 2, n. 3, p. 180.

2. This is the seminar of the 1925–1926 winter semester, published as volume 21 of the *Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 1976). Despite the title, the whole second part of the seminar (*Zweites Hauptstück*, pp.197–415) is devoted to the elaboration of the problem of time, mainly based on an interpretation of Kant.

3. Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time,* John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, trans. (London: SCM Press, 1962), p. 479: "Not only must the now-time be oriented primarely by temporality [i.e., ecstatico-horizonal time—V.V.] in the order of possible interpretation, but it temporalizes itself only in the inauthentic temporality of Dasein; so if one has regard for the way the now-time is derived from temporality, one is justified in considering temporality as the *time which is primordial.*"

In general, Heidegger uses the term "temporality" to refer to ecstatico-horizonal time, that is, primordial time. For the sake of clarity, I will use the terms "ecstatico-horizonal time" and, sometimes, "primordial time."

4. In paragraphs 80 and 81 of *BT* Heidegger outlines the following complex connection. Ecstatico-horizonal time temporalizes "world-time" which in turn constitutes the "Innerzeitigkeit" of present-at-hand and ready-to-hand beings (420). What exactly is meant by "world-time" and how its temporalization should be understood, remains unclear. One gets the impression that "world-time" can be understood as a sort of correlate of our everyday experience of time.

According to Heidegger, the traditional conception of time as a punctilinear row of "nows" is a levelling and deforming interpretation of "world-time" (422), belonging to the everyday, i.e., inauthentic, way of Being of *Dasein* (426). Thus, now-time appears to refer to "world-time" which in turn originates in ecstatico-horizonal time.

5. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 377.

6. Ibid., p. 417.

7. Ibid., p. 374.

8. Cf. ibid., par. 68a.

9. The repudiation of the traditional conception of time, that is, its priority of the present, is consistent with Heidegger's declared intention, in paragraph 6 of *BT*, to deconstruct the history of ontology, in particular the Greek notion of Being as presence (*Anwesenheit*). The aim of this deconstruction is to explicate the "unthought" of the Greek notion of Being, i.e., time in the sense of the present (*Gegenwart*).

10. In par. 7c of *BT*, Heidegger stresses that phenomenology primarily should be concerned with phenomena which, first and foremost, do *not* show themselves, which are hidden though connected to what does show itself (p. 59).

11. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 39.

12. Cf. ibid., p. 416: "Ecstasies are not simply raptures in which one gets carried away. Rather, there belongs to each ecstasis a 'whither' to which one gets carried away. This 'whither' of the ecstasis we call the 'horizonal schema.'"

13. Heidegger's discussion of transcendental schematism and the subsequent interpretation of the three pure (temporal) syntheses in, respectively, par. 22 and 33 of *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (Frankfurt a.M.: V. Klostermann, 1973), confirms the point I'm trying to make here. Heidegger's interest in Kant's theory of schematism is, it seems to me, that this theory enables a notion of time as "reines Bild" which is the "einzige reine Anblicksmöglichkeit der reinen Verstandesbegriffe" (100) and, as such, the "Grund der inneren Möglichkeit der ontologischen Erkenntnis" (104). It is not surprising then that in the explication of the two pure syntheses which correspond to the dimensions of past and future, respectively, the pure synthesis of reproduction and of recognition, both syntheses are described as ways of presenting something, i.e., the horizon of the past and the future. The pure synthesis of reproduction is described as "in den Blick bringen" of the "Horizont des Früher" (176) and the pure synthesis of recogniton as "ursprüngliches Bilden" of the "Horizont von Vorhaltbarkeit überhaupt" (180).

14. Cf. M. Heidegger *Identität und Differenz* (Pfullingen: V. Klostermann, 1978), p. 50–51.

15. Cf. for instance the conclusion of the seminar of 1928: "zum Wesen von Sein überhaupt gehört der Grundcharakter von Grund überhaupt" (*Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*, vol. 26 [Frankfurt a.M.: V. Klostermann, 1978], pp. 282–83). This, according to Heidegger, is the true metaphysical sense of Leibniz's *Satz vom Grunde*, that is, Leibniz's thesis that nothing is without a ground.

16. M. Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, vol. 24 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 325.

17. Ibid.

18. The account of time in volume 21 extends from par. 15 to 37. The interpretation of Kant's concept of time takes place from par. 22 to 36. I will be mainly concerned with par. 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, and 29.

19. Cf. the *Critique of Pure Reason*, paragraph 4, where Kant summarizes his definition of time in five points. This and other paragraphs of the Transcendental Aesthetic are discussed in detail in par. 23 of vol. 21. The "double definition" (*Doppelfassung*, 304) of time becomes relevant in a later stage of Heidegger's interpretation (par. 27 and 28).

20. Cf. vol. 21, p. 275: "Begegnenlassen eines Mannigfaltigen."

21. Ibid., p. 341: "unendliches Ganzes der Mannigfaltigkeit des Nacheinander."

22. Cf. ibid., p. 274: "die Hinblicknahme auf etwas, im Hinblick worauf überhaupt von Ordnung bzw. Unordnung geredet werden kann, im Hinblick worauf also das Sichgebende überhaupt als geordnet bzw. ungeordnet artikuliert ist."

23. Cf. ibid., p. 345 (note): "Zeit ist reines Hinblicknehmen auf.—Zeit ist das Worauf der Hinblicknahme selbst."

24. Ibid., p. 323.

25. Cf. ibid., p. 324 and *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 132.

26. Kant speaks of "the standing and abiding I" (A 123). Actually, in the very complex argumentation of the Transcendental Deduction, this passage is the only clear indication of Kant's presupposition. Kant's main concern in this context is to demonstrate the necessity of the transcendental synthesis of transcendental imagination as condition of the possibility of experience, including experience of time (B 153–57). The possibility of the transcendental synthesis however, presupposes an I removed from time who, as abiding "correlate of all our representations" (A 123), performs, as it were, this synthesis over and over again.

27. Vol. 21, p. 272.

28. Cf. ibid., p. 406: "Nicht ist zunächst gegeben ein Ich denke als das reinste Apriori und dann eine Zeit und diese Zeit als Vermittlungsstation für ein Hinauskommen zu einer Welt, sondern das Sein des Subjekts selbst qua Dasein ist In-der-Welt-sein, und dieses In-der-Welt-sein des Daseins ist nur möglich, weil die Grundstruktur seines Seins die Zeit selbst ist."

29. Cf.: "Das Dasein ist als solches über sich selbst hinaus. . . . Die *Selbstheit* des Daseins *gründet in seiner Transzendenz*, und nicht ist das Dasein zunächst ein Ich-Selbst, das dann irgendwas überschreitet. Im Begriff der Selbstheit liegt das 'Auf-sich-zu' und das 'Von-sich-aus' (vol. 21, p. 425).

30. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 377.

31. The double structure of understanding, in the sense of intentionality and transcendence, is discussed extensively in a variety of contexts throughout the seminars of the twenties, for instance in vol. 24, par. 9c, 18, 22 and in vol. 26, par. 9 and 10.

32. Vol. 21, p. 406.

33. Vol. 24, p. 436.

34. Vol. 21, p. 192.

35. Naturally, this interpretation of the transcending movement toward Being itself in terms of the taking aim at time as the purely given, suggests that Being itself is to be interpreted as time. Though it goes too far to explicate this suggestion further in this context, it should suffice to say that the interpretation of Being itself in terms of time is exactly the explicit purpose of Heidegger's work of the twenties.

36. In *BT*, Heidegger associates the traditional conception of time with daily, inauthentic existence and in volume 21 (par. 24 and 25) he discusses the connection between this conception of time and traditional, Newtonian science.

37. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 374.

38. Vol. 21, p. 192.

39. Ibid., p. 148.

40. Ibid., p. 280.

41. Referring to what Heidegger, in *BT*, calls resoluteness, the authentic moment is elusive in that is indefinite (345).

5

THE YOUNG HEIDEGGER AND FICHTE

Alfred Denker

The genesis of Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time* has become one of the main topics in recent Heidegger studies. It is remarkable that the influence of Johann Gottlieb Fichte was overlooked in spite of all the attention paid to Heidegger's early thought. There are obvious reasons to have a closer look at the philosophical relation between these important thinkers.

First, Heidegger mentions his study of Fichte in the short autobiography he wrote for his habilitation.[1] According to the list of Heidegger's teaching activities that was established by William Richardson Heidegger gave a course titled "Truth and Reality: On Fichte's Doctrine of Science

1794" during the 1916–1917 winter semester.[2] On the ground of new evidence Theodore Kisiel has changed the title of this course to "Basic Questions on Logic."[3] Unfortunately we still know very little about the contents of this course. Whether or not Heidegger gave a course on Fichte is still an open question. For my purposes it suffices that he may have done so. Marion Heinz has shown that Fichte's thought strongly influenced the southwestern school of neo-Kantianism, Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, and Emil Lask.[4] There is no doubt that Heidegger read the writings on Fichte's philosophy by the neo-Kantians. Furthermore Edmund Husserl himself not only gave three talks on "Fichte's Ideal of Humanity" in 1917–1918, he was already reading Fichte intensively in Göttingen. In the summer semesters of 1903, 1915, and 1918 he conducted seminars on Fichte's *The Vocation of Man.* His lecture courses on ethics in 1919, 1920–1921, and 1924 contained sections explicitly dealing with Fichte.[5] Fourth, Kisiel has pointed out that Fichte is the *locus classicus* of the term "facticity."[6] The word "factic" turns up for the first time in Fichte's work in 1799.[7] Fichte uses the term *facticity* as a philosophical concept in his *Presentation of the Doctrine of Science* of 1801.[8] Finally, in Heidegger's early lecture courses there are several references to Fichte.[9] In this chapter I will only discuss Heidegger's war-emergency semester lecture course of 1919, "The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews."

Heidegger's first lecture course after the First World War has become justly famous. Kisiel considers it to be Heidegger's breakthrough to the topic of his path of thinking.[10] The title of Heidegger's course not only reflects the goal of Husserl's program expressed in his *Logos* essay (1911) to further "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science," but also highlights the problem of worldviews. In his lecture course Heidegger takes part in the intense debate on the status of science and worldviews, to which Max Weber's famous talk "Science as Calling" was one of the most important contributions. World War I had left Germany in chaos. Armed gangs ruled the streets and the country was in a state of revolutionary upheaval. In Munich well-meaning writers like Toller and Mühsam founded a soviet republic after several weeks of civil war.[11] They thought the millennium of light, beauty, and reason had finally begun. Politics had to take care of the happiness of the citizens and make it possible for them to lead meaningful lives. The world should any day become a flower bed. Weber offered in his

Munich talk a sober and profound analysis of his time. At first sight his talk seems to be about the scientific *ethos*; in reality he was trying to answer the question about how a meaningful life is possible in the civilization of his time. Weber makes clear that science has to be devoid of value judgments. Science can teach us whether a means can achieve a certain goal. It can also analyze the possible inner contradiction of our goal and examine whether or not it conflicts with other goals we have set ourselves. However, science cannot teach us whether or not it is meaningful to aspire to certain goals.[12] Science cannot bear the responsibility for our value judgments.[13] This is the liberation the Enlightenment has brought us. *Sapere aude*! Human beings should think for themselves and live their own lives. Unfortunately we let slip this freedom, because science has become our fateful destiny. The technical uses of science have changed our life, destroyed the enchantment of our world and proven how destructive they can be in world war.[14] Science has lost all its old illusions. It is no longer "the way to true being, the way to true art, the way to true nature, the way to the true God and the way to true happiness."[15] Science has become meaningless, because it has no answer to the only question that is of the utmost importance to us: "What we should do, how we should live?"[16] As Friedrich Nietzsche would say, we killed God with the rationalization of our world, although we did not know what we were doing.

According to Weber our civilization has become so rationalized that we expect scientific answers to our vital questions. We do not make use of the liberty science leaves us to answer ourselves questions of value and meaning, but we demand the certainty of scientific answers.[17] We hide behind the pseudoscientific worldviews the prophets of the pulpit provide us with and do not accept responsibility for our own lives. These prophets react to the disenchantment of our rationalized world by putting the last true magic left to us, our personality and freedom, in the irons of pseudo-rationality. They create the illusion of science and mislead their readers and listeners. Weber opposes this deceit with a dualism. We must on the one hand approach the world scientifically and on the other hand respect the mystery of the human person.[18] God has disappeared from our disenchanted world. If God still exists somewhere, then he can only exist in the soul of individual human beings. The living faith is not of this world and demands "the sacrifice of the intellect."[19] Weber emancipates personal and

responsible life from the custody of science.[20] As a scientist he factually leaves people to their fate. How should we live, what should we do? To these questions no scientific answer is possible. Heidegger accepts Weber's critique of worldviews, but he does not want to leave us to our fate. He tries to develop a new concept of science that should make scientific answers to our most intimate and important questions possible.[21] Two things follow from this. First of all Heidegger has to develop philosophy as a strict science in such a way that it can provide insight into the facticity of our individual lives. Secondly he has to show that meaningfulness is given with the bare fact of our existence. A reinterpretation of Husserl's phenomenology will enable Heidegger to achieve both these goals in his 1919 lecture course.

A REINTERPRETATION OF HUSSERL

Heidegger does not waste any time in the opening hour of his lecture course on the idea of philosophy and the problem of worldviews.

> The idea of science means for the immediate consciousness of life an intervention that changes it in some way; it involves a transition to a new attitude of consciousness and therewith its own form of movement of life. Undoubtedly this intervention of the idea of science in the context of the natural consciousness of life can only be found in an original, radical way in philosophy as basic science.[22]

Heidegger acknowledges Husserl's project of philosophy as a strict science. Until 1929 he will hold onto the thought that phenomenological philosophy has to be a basic science.[23] Heidegger clearly rejects the influential thesis that every philosophy can only be a worldview. In a worldview the spiritual unrest, which is so characteristic of human life, quiets down in a construction of eternal norms and values. Both the neo-Kantians and the philosophers of life tried to develop such worldviews.

The idea of philosophy is that it is a basic science. Heidegger uses "idea" in the original Kantian meaning and not in the Platonic–neo-Kantian sense. This implies basic science as idea of philosophy is not con-

stitutive for philosophy; it is only regulative and a never-ending task. In his lecture course Heidegger states phenomenology is the investigation of life in itself. In this sense it is the opposite of a worldview.

> Phenomenology is never closed off, it is always provisional in its absolute immersion in life as such. In it no theories are in dispute, but only genuine insights versus the ungenuine. The genuine ones can be obtained only by an honest and unreserved immersion in life itself in its genuineness, and this is ultimately possible only through the genuineness of a personal life.[24]

A personal life is always my life of someone.

Philosophy as basic science is the science of sciences, that is, the doctrine of science. Every science has to presuppose the truth and validity of its principles, because they are the conditions of possibility of the science in question. For this reason the truth and validity of its principles cannot be proven in any given science. Any proof would have to presuppose the truth and validity of these principles. They are the origin and foundation of a science. Because their truth and validity can principally not be proven in the science itself, there should be a science that has scientific principles as its object. This science is philosophy as basic science.[25]

A new problem now confronts Heidegger. If the principles of all sciences have to be proven in philosophy, philosophy as basic science should itself have a principle that cannot be deduced from any higher principle, nor be proven in any other science. It seems Heidegger is unable to avoid a vicious circle. Later we will see how he solves this problem by reinterpreting Husserl's phenomenology and Fichte's doctrine of science. Before retracing Heidegger's steps, it is necessary to take a closer look at Fichte's philosophy.

A SKETCH OF FICHTE'S FIRST THEORY

In the prospectus for his first course at the university of Jena, "Concerning the Concept of the Doctrine of Science, or, of So-called Philosophy," Fichte developed the program of his doctrine of science for the first time.

According to Fichte it is high time philosophy stops being the hobby of knowledge; the time has come to change philosophy into a true science. The first question Fichte has to answer is: what is a science? Every science possesses systematic form. "All propositions of a science are joined together in one principle, in which they unite to become a whole."[26] Within this whole one and not more than one proposition has to be true independent of all other propositions to make it possible for the science in question to be true.[27] According to Fichte, by the simple joining of parts nothing can come into existence that is not contained in one of the parts.[28] To the one proposition that is certainly true, all other propositions and the science as a whole owe their certainty. This one certainly true proposition is the first principle of that science. Every science can have only one principle, because several principles would constitute different sciences. Within a science the truth and certainty of its principle cannot be proven, since every possible demonstration within that science presupposes the certainty and truth of its principle. The possibility of true science stands or falls with the certainty of its first principle. As long as this principle is not certainly true, no scientific judgment can be certainly true. Fichte tries to solve this problem by developing a science of scientific principles, that is, philosophy as the doctrine of science. In the doctrine of science the question is answered how science itself is possible.[29] Only if such a doctrine of science exists can our knowledge have a foundation.

Philosophy is the science of sciences and must itself have a first principle. This highest principle is the foundation of all certainty. Everything that is certain is certain because this principle is certain; and if it is not certain, nothing can be certain. The truth of the first principle can however not be proven in philosophy, since it is the condition of possibility of all knowledge. We would have to presuppose its validity in order to proof its truth.

How can we solve this problem? Fichte comes to the conclusion that the first principle must be self-evident. It cannot be proven in a higher science, nor can it be deduced from a higher principle. This is the first step to a solution of Fichte's problem. The second step is finding the first principle, but where can we find it? Fichte answered the question concerning the possibility of human knowledge in his 1794 doctrine of science. In this lecture course he gathers up the threads of his "invitational work." Fichte needs to find the absolute unconditional first principle of human

knowledge that cannot be proven nor deduced. "It [the first principle, A.D.] should express that Act that is not nor can be found among the empirical determinations of our consciousness. It is rather the foundation of all consciousness and alone makes it possible."[30]

Fichte finds the first principle of his philosophy in an abstracting reflection comparable to the thought experiment of Descartes in his *Meditations*. We have to separate from an arbitrary object of consciousness all the empirical determinations, until only the act of thinking remains, from which no further determination can be separated. The self-evident principle, which is the final result of Fichte's abstracting reflection, is the *Tathandlung* or act. "The I originally posits its own being."[31] This act is earlier than consciousness of which it is the condition of possibility. It is of course comparable to Kant's *I think*, which must be able to accompany all our representations.

The difference between Kant and Fichte is obvious. Kant's transcendental I *can*, but does not have to, accompany any representation; Fichte's I is the condition of possibility of all representations and must therefore accompany every single representation. Until the I posits its own being, nothing can be thought, felt, or experienced. Fichte deduces from this first principle the two other acts of the doctrine of science: "To the I a not-I is simply opposed" and "The I posits in the I the divisible I in opposition to the divisible not-I."[32] Fichte only uncovers the structure of consciousness with the third act. Knowledge is solely possible within this structure.

Fichte shows that knowledge must have a double structure. First, knowing something is always also knowing that we know something. Knowing is reflexive. Second, all our knowledge is knowledge of something that is known and that itself is not this knowledge. Knowing is intentional. The question how self-consciousness can make the double structure of knowing possible becomes of utmost importance, because self-consciousness is the condition of possibility of all our knowing.[33]

Fichte answered this question with the three acts of the doctrine of science. Consciousness can only be a spontaneous act. There can only be consciousness if the I posits its own being. This is the reflexive moment that makes our knowing that we know something possible. Consciousness must also have an intentional structure to make our knowing something that is not this knowing itself possible. Self-consciousness is always being

conscious of something like knowing is always knowing something. According to Fichte that of which we are conscious can impossibly exist independent of our consciousness. He calls Kant's (in)famous thing in itself "a whim, a dream and a non-thought."[34]

The subject-object relation must be founded in a enclosing structure. Fichte developed precisely this structure in his third act. The I posits in itself the divisible I in opposition to the divisible not-I. "The ultimate foundation of consciousness is the interaction of the I with itself through a not-I which has to be considered from different sides."[35] The limit between the divisible I and not-I is always in movement and can be determined by both the I and the not-I. When the divisible I determines the divisible not-I, we are in the field of practical reason. When the other way around the divisible not-I determines the divisible I, we are in the field of theoretical reason. Fichte will later introduce the notion of striving to describe the interaction between the I and the not-I. This interaction is an intentional structure that has to be actualized time and time again!

One very important question still remains. Why does the I posit itself? Why is there consciousness? Why is there knowledge? Fichte gives two different answers to these questions. The first answer is rather obvious. The I posits itself just because it posits itself. Here we can ask no further questions, since the first principle cannot be deduced nor proven. Factually the I posits itself. If the I had not always already posited itself, we could not wonder why the I posits itself. The relation between the divisible I and not-I is meaningful, but the existence of this relation is purely factic. The self-positing I is the condition of possibility of all meaning and consequently in itself is meaningless. Fichte refuses to accept the pure facticity of being.

With his second answer he anticipates the value-philosophy of neo-Kantianism.[36] There can be no cause to explain the self-positing of the I, because this act is the first principle. We cannot speak about that what was before the first act. Therefore we should take Wittgenstein's advice and remain silent about it. Fichte however can still say something about it. Even if there can be no cause of the first act, there can still be a reason for it. The I posits autonomously its own being, because it is unconditional and indeterminable.

According to Kant autonomy is the essence of freedom. The I posits

itself autonomously means the I posits itself out of freedom. We are invited to be free, because the I posits itself out of freedom. The I gives itself freely. This is the reason that in both the philosophies of Kant and Fichte consciousness is first and for most consciousness of the moral law and our duty. Practical reason is, as Fichte says, the root of all reason.[37] "A human being does not act to know, but he knows because he is destined to act."[38] The I posits itself because freedom ought to be. A human being ought to strive for the actualization of freedom, that is autonomy. The goal of this striving is the complete determination of the not-I by the I and a never-ending task. The final word of Fichte's doctrine of science is this: facticly there is the possibility of freedom and therewith the consciousness of our duty.

Before I shall return to Heidegger, I want to mention some interesting points concerning Fichte's doctrine of science. We have to find the first principle of philosophy in an abstracting reflection. This turning inward to free ourselves of all empirical determinations of our consciousness can be compared to the mystic way, which leads to the experience of the silent heart of our souls where the Word of God can be born. In Fichte's philosophy we experience in the letting be of emptiness and silence the act. This act is there, happens without our doing and befalls us. It is a living experience we can only live ourselves. We must submit to it and let it break through into our consciousness.[39]

I have already underlined the fundamental facticity of the first act. It is also remarkable that the first act is an intentional structure. Heidegger could not miss the similarity between Fichte's and Husserl's doctrine of consciousness. Fichte's absolute I mirrors itself in the pure ego of Husserl. They both agree that reality can only be constituted in consciousness. Furthermore, consciousness is a stream, which has to be actualized time and time again.

HEIDEGGER'S VIEW OF FICHTE

In his lecture course on the idea of philosophy and the problem of world-views Heidegger also discusses Fichte's doctrine of being and his answer to the question concerning the possibility of philosophy as a primal science.

This passage is so important it deserves careful study. According to Heidegger Fichte is the first philosopher after the Copernican revolution of Kant who understood the method of philosophy as basic science has to be teleological.[40]

What is the teleological method? Its fundamental principle is this:

> All axioms, all norms proof [*sic*] themselves independent of any special content and of any historical determination, as means to the goal of universal validity. There can be no logic, if not, no matter what the content of the representations in each case may be, certain ways of connecting and ordering are valid as laws of thought. No ethics, if not, independent of the empirical determinations of our motives, certain norms about their relations exist. No esthetics, if not, whatever the content of the individual representations and the feelings caused by them may be, certain rules hold sway over the way they cooperate.[41]

The teleological method implies philosophers have to abstract from our thinking, willing, and feeling the values we try to realize therein. After abstracting these values philosophers have to decide whether or not they are universally valid. Kant, for instance, started from the factual existence of Newtonian physics and asked how synthetic judgments a priori are possible? He posited the conditions of possibility of scientific knowledge, which he discovered in this way, as universally valid norms which all human knowledge must satisfy.

According to Heidegger this is where the shoe pinches, because it does not follow from the simple fact that we strive to satisfy certain norms that these norms are universally valid.[42] Whoever wants to play soccer has to abide by the rules of the game, but where is it written that we ought to play soccer? We will later see that this is the essence of Heidegger's critique of Fichte.[43]

According to Heidegger, Fichte did not scrape together from experience the forms of intuition and thinking, the axioms and fundamental principles of understanding and the ideas of reason. Contrary to Kant he deduced them systematically from a uniform principle and through a uniformly strict method.[44] The result of this deduction was the system of the necessary acts of reason, which sprang from the end of reason itself.

"Reason can and may be understood only from itself. The end of the act is the ought to and this ought to is the foundation of being."[45]

Heidegger enters into the core of Fichte's doctrine of science. Fichte deduced one by one the different conditions of possibility of human knowledge, which Kant had conjured up like a rabbit from a top hat. From the act as highest principle he could deduce the necessary acts of reason, i.e., the conditions of possibility of human knowledge. Fichte considers the being of the act as an ought to be. The ought to be is the foundation of the being of reason. The ideals of reason ought to be actualized and consequently they determine being. The existence of reason is factic, a last undeniable givenness, because freedom ought to be. Being ought to become freedom; the end of reason ought to become the highest ideal. The empirical I ought to strive to become the universal I by annihilating the not-I.[46]

Fichte looked for the end of reason in reason itself. He tried to deduce from the act the multiplicity of the qualitatively differing functions of reason. Fichte's teleological method became a constructive dialectic, because he deduced the acts of reason immediately one from the other. He did not abstract them from experience. Fichte overlooked the fact that the teleological method needs a real and material guideline in which the norms and values of reason have already been actualized. Only after we have stripped these norms and values of their material determination and critically examined them can we bring them into a system under a highest principle.[47] According to Heidegger this generates two major problems.

From the material guideline we have to abstract the ideals of reason. In knowing we try to actualize the ideal of truth, in willing the ideal of the good, in art the ideal of beauty, and in religion the ideal of the holy. The ought to be is the only ideal of reason in Fichte's doctrine of science. This means the difference between the ideals of truth, the good, beauty, and the holy disappears. According to Heidegger and Windelband, the ideal of reason takes shape in different manners depending on the material in which it is actualized. The material guideline already plays an important part in Heidegger's *Habilitation*.[48] The neo-Kantians strived to develop a system of valid values, i.e., the ideals of reason. In this respect Windelband applauded Fichte's obsession with systematic unity.[49]

The second problem is that the material guideline enables us to dis-

cover "forms and norms of thinking," but it does not found their validity.[50] Their validity can only be proven teleologically, i.e., it should be possible to universalize the norms and forms. This Fichte unfortunately did not do. In the background of Windelband's critique stands Kant's categorical imperative; it ought to be possible to think the maxims of our acting as universal moral laws.

In his lecture course Heidegger will later reject the teleological method of the neo-Kantians. The critique of value-philosophy and transcendental idealism is a running theme of his early lecture courses. In this way he not only frees himself from his philosophical past; he also takes a stand in the contemporary debate on the essence and task of philosophy.

Heidegger will defend a hermeneutic phenomenology. His critique of neo-Kantianism is in its essence very simple. In order to be able to discover the norm in the material guideline, we already need to have at our disposal an ideal as a standard for the critical evaluation of the material.[51] However, if we already have the ideal at our disposal, we no longer need to evaluate the material to find the ideal. On the other hand, if we do not have the ideal at our disposal, we will be unable to find it in the material guideline, because we have no standard by which to evaluate the material. The teleological method is only possible if it is superfluous.

In this respect, Fichte cuts a very poor figure. He uses his method in the wrong way; if he had used it in the right way, it would have been useless. We could ask ourselves whether or not Heidegger saw Fichte's real intentions. To answer this question we have to take one step up and one step back.

Heidegger takes over the Fichte-critique of Windelband and shows subsequently that this critique also applies to Windelband's thought. The ideal norms and values, which are universally valid, cannot be abstracted from the material guideline. Windelband's system of values is a castle in the air that floats upon reality in the land of ought to be. From the way Heidegger develops his own idea of philosophy as basic science, we can learn how he overturns the starting point of Fichte's doctrine of science.

HEIDEGGER "OVERTURNS" FICHTE'S DOCTRINE OF SCIENCE

According to Heidegger philosophy is the his basic science in which the principles of all other sciences are founded. This is still Fichte's point of view. The essential difference comes next. As basic science Fichte's doctrine of science has a self-evident principle, i.e., the act. This act is the condition of possibility of all human knowledge and in this regard is pretheoretical. From the act Fichte deduced the positing of a not-I and a divisible I and not-I in the I.

These three acts together constitute the structure that makes consciousness and knowledge possible. This means knowledge and consciousness are only possible after the positing of the third act. The highest act posits its own being, because freedom ought to be. Fichte identifies the pretheoretical and the practical as the word *Tathandlung* alone already suggests. Practical reason is the root of theoretical reason.[52] Theoretically the doctrine of science is a closed system, which is founded in itself. Its first principle is also the final result of the deduction of all its other principles. Practically the doctrine of science is the never-ending task of the actualization of freedom.

Heidegger takes over from Fichte the thought the first principle of philosophy has to be pretheoretical. According to Heidegger this principle cannot be practical. This is the essential difference with Fichte. Heidegger underwrites Aristotle's doctrine of *nous* and *phronèsis*. Theoretical and practical reason are two different faculties.[53] This means practical insight and theoretical knowledge cannot de reduced to each other.

Heidegger can now solve the problem of the founding of all sciences in philosophy. Philosophy only has to show how the theoretical comportment springs from the pretheoretical. Every science is based on a theoretical subject-object relation. The different sciences each have their own object. In every science the subject-object relation remains the same theoretical comportment. Every being studied in science is an object for a knowing subject. Philosophy must be the science of pretheoretical comportment, i.e., *Dasein*, from which theoretical comportment later springs. Heidegger still has to answer two questions. What is the pretheoretical?

How can we prevent that philosophy as primal science theorizes the pretheoretical and turns it into an object?

Heidegger first of all ascertains the pretheoretical has to be factic. We can find no ground and not even a reason for it, because it is the foundation from which everything else springs. It is the basic something.[54] It is the truth as the uncovered and it refers to the dimension of "there is," "it ought to be," "it valids," and "there are values." The basic something is indeterminate as notions like "indifference" and the "not yet" of its potentiality show.[55] The basic something is the region of life wherein nothing has yet been differentiated, and it is indifferent to any particular world and any particular object type. It is "the index for the highest potentiality of life."[56] In its undiminished "vital impetus" it has the intentional moment of "out toward," "into a particular world." In other words it has a motivated tendency to differentiate itself. This basic trait of life to "world out into particular lifeworlds" is its motivated tendency and its tending motivation.[57]

Heidegger takes over from Fichte the structure of the pretheoretical divisible I and not-I that have been posited in the I. The basic something as living experience is the indifference of I and not-I. This original pure living experience can only be accepted in its givenness. It cannot be explained. In Fichte's doctrine of science the pretheoretical is an intentional structure. Heidegger makes use of the movement of this structure. The basic living experience separates out into the three lifeworlds: world-around, with-world, and self-world.[58]

Fichte's highest principle, the act, is self-evident. Heidegger's highest principle, the primal something as living experience, is not self-evident. We have to take it phenomenologically as it shows itself out of itself without any theoretical presuppositions. Fichte deduced his third act, the condition of possibility of consciousness and knowledge, from the auto-positing of the I and identified the pretheoretical and the practical. Heidegger takes the third act as the factic givenness of living experience as primal foundation, *Urgrund*, and holds onto it as the absolutely prior. At the same time he avoids the fateful mistake of Husserl, who identified the pretheoretical and theoretical consciousness.[59]

The basic something is not a thing. Things come only into being when we stop the interaction between the I and not-I by positing an object over against a subject. This interaction is living experience as the

indifference of I and not-I. In living experience it worlds for us. Heidegger discovers in this properizing event the living experience in the full intensive dynamics and "rhythm" of intentional life as "living toward something." In lived experience "I am there 'with it' with my whole I. . . . Living experiences are properizing events, insofar as they live only the proper life and life lives only so, in accord."[60] The properizing event of the world is the appropriating event of my life. Or as Fichte says, "no I without the world, no world without the I."[61]

Kisiel discovers in the "properizing event of active worlding and the appropriating of the I whose differentiation contains an indifference" the guideline of Heidegger's whole path of thinking.[62] In Heidegger's thought the indifference mirrors the encompassing structure of Fichte's I, wherein the divisible I and not-I are posited in opposition. This is the reason why the indifferent differentiation or indeterminate determination can no longer be understood in terms of a dualism like form-matter or subject-object. The primal something is the bottomless foundation and the condition of possibility of all differentiation and every derived duality.[63]

The stream of lived experience is "I-like."[64] The I-like character of lived experience is the forerunner of the particular mineness of *Being and Time* and the heir of Fichte's I that is not a Cartesian substance, but an act, an ever-flowing stream. It is my life, in which I am there in my full historicity. The primal something has always already crystallized into life-worlds before I am there.

This crystallization, "a motivated tendency and a tending motivation," is just as transcendental as Fichte's Act. It is the condition of possibility of the being-there of the world and myself. The fundamental structure of life and lived experience is the self-experience as an appropriating event. Fichte is able to deduce the different ways in which life (reason) crystallizes itself from the acts, because he presupposes the end of the act, i.e., freedom. Heidegger on the other hand holds onto the facticity of lived experience. We can only discover a posteriori what tendencies and motivations life has developed. We cannot inquire into the meaning of lived experience, because lived experience makes all sense and nonsense first possible. Fichte talks about something we can and should remain silent about.

Philosophy is the primal science of the pretheoretical primal some-

thing. This primal something is the matter itself of phenomenology. Heidegger still has to answer the question how a pretheoretical science is possible. Is this not a square circle? How can we approach and articulate a pretheoretical living experience without theoretically affecting it?

In his lecture course Heidegger confronts the ingenious objections against phenomenology of Paul Natorp. Natorp formulates a pair of fundamental objections. First, how is it possible to approach a living experience without interrupting the life stream and so objectifying and unliving the living experience? This is Natorp's objection against the reflective approach of phenomenology.

> For in reflection the life-experiences are no longer lived but looked at. We ex-posit the experiences and so extract them from the immediacy of experience. We as it were dip into the onflowing stream of experiences and scoop out one or more, which means that we "still the stream."[65]

His second objection concerns phenomenology's way of expressing its object. Although phenomenologists claim their descriptions describe only what they see and have nothing to do with explanations, every description generalizes and objectifies living experiences. While "every expression is generalizing" there can be no immediate grasping of the basic something, "which I am myself."[66]

Heidegger points out that the fundamental, methodological problem of phenomenology, the question concerning the possibility of a scientific of lived experience, falls under the first principle of Husserl's phenomenology. "Everything that gives itself to us in intuition originally, . . . should be taken simply as . . . it gives itself." [67]

On the one hand Heidegger appeals to this principle, on the other hand he gives a new turn to it. The principle of Heidegger's phenomenology is

> the basic intention of life in truth, the basic attitude of knowing and living as such; the *sympathy of life*, which is absolutely identical with lived experience itself. . . . This basic attitude is first absolute, when we live in it—and this no system of categories, however large it may be, can achieve, but only phenomenological life in the steady increase of itself.[68]

The basic something should not be described in phenomenology; it should be experienced in life. It is neither an object nor a thing. The basic something is the compartment as such, the intentional structure into which life crystallizes. Life is in itself motivated and has tendency to. We can experience the basic something as living experience, because we ourselves are life. This experience is not intuitive; it is understanding.

On this point Heidegger sides with Dilthey against Husserl. He transforms Husserl's transcendental phenomenology into a phenomenological hermeneutics. We can understand the basic something in a living experience and articulate it, because it is already in itself expressed and articulated.[69]

Understanding should be expressed. If our understanding were inexpressible, no science would be possible. Heidegger solves the problem of intuition and expression, which now confronts him, in the following way. While every living experience has an intentional structure, we can read off the intentional structure of life itself in a hermeneutical intuition.

Phenomenology is original formation of "re-cepts" and "pre-cepts." The re-cept contains the motivation and the pre-cept the tendency. The facticity of life is not irrational. Life itself is motivated and "out toward." The living experience in itself is already the understanding of life. That there is understanding is principally ununderstandable. In the hermeneutical intuition we go about the basic something as living experience that gives itself originally in intuition. We can understand the living experiences of other people, because life itself is always already the understanding of living experiences. Life is familiar with itself and has a certain self-evidence.

Here we find another parallel between Fichte and Heidegger. According to Fichte everything that is, is interaction between I and not-I. According to Heidegger everything that is, is lived experience, interaction between motivation and tendency. Factic life is meaningful and this unexplainable meaningfulness of life is purely factic and finally meaningless. Face to face with the miracle of all miracles, *there is that there is*, about which we can only remain silent in wonderment like Fichte and Heidegger and graciously accept the gift of facticity.

NOTES

1. This autobiography was published by Hugo Ott in his *Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie* (Frankfurt am Main and New York: Campus, 1988), p. 86.

2. William J. Richardson, S.J., *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), p. 663.

3. Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's "Being and Time"* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), p. 461.

4. Marion Heinz, "Die Fichte-Rezeption in der südwestdeutschen Schule des Neukantianismus." To be published in a forthcoming volume of *Fichte-Studien.*

5. James G. Hart, "Husserl and Fichte: Which special regard to Husserl's Lectures on "Fichte's Ideal of humanity."" In *Husserl Studies* 12 (1995): 135.

6. Theodore Kisiel, "Edition und Übersetzung: Unterwegs von Tatsachen zu Gedanken, von Werken zu Wegen." In *Zur philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers*, vol. 3, *Im Spiegel der Welt: Sprache, Übersetzung, Auseinandersetzung*, Dietrich Papenfuss and Otto Pöggeler, eds. (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1992), p. 93.

7. Johann G. Fichte, *Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. 5 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1971), p. 360.

8. Fichte, *Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. 2, pp. 47, 55.

9. Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, pp. 36, 40, 51, 59, 97, 123, 134, 138, 142, 145; *Gesamtausgabe* 59, pp. 59, 95, 96; *Gesamtausgabe* 60, p. 91; *Gesamtausgabe* 61, pp. 7, 173.

10. Kisiel, *Genesis*, pp. 16, 17.

11. Rüdiger Safranski, *Ein Meister aus Deutschland. Heidegger und seine Zeit* (München: Hanser, 1994), p. 113.

12. Max Weber, *Wissenschaft als Beruf / Politik als Beruf* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1994), p. 19.

13. Ibid., p. 20.

14. Ibid., p. 9.

15. Ibid., p. 13.

16. Ibid., p. 13.

17. Ibid., p. 16.

18. Ibid., p. 20.

19. Ibid., p. 22.

20. Ibid., p. 20.

21. In his effort to take philosophy a step beyond the limits Weber had set for science, Heidegger found an unexpected brother in arms in Karl Jaspers.

22. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, pp. 3, 4.

23. Cf. Kisiel, "Edition," p. 106.

24. Kisiel, *Genesis*, p. 17. Cf. also the German edition of this text by Claudius Strube in *Heidegger-Studies* 12 (1996): 13.

25. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 31.

26. Johann G. Fichte, *Early Philosophical Writings*, Daniel Breazeale, trans. and ed. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 101. Johann G. Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1964–), AA I, 2, p. 38.

27. Like Descartes before him Fichte will equate truth and certainty.

28. Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe*, AA I, 2, p. 117.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., p. 255.

31. Ibid., p. 261.

32. Ibid., pp. 266, 272.

33. Ibid., p. 263.

34. Ibid., p. 57.

35. Ibid., p. 413.

36. Cf. the papers by Heinz, Kisiel, and Piché in this volume for Fichte's influence on neo-Kantianism.

37. Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe*, AA I, 2, p. 265.

38. Ibid.

39. Cf. Kisiel, "Edition," 1992, pp. 110–11, on the influence of Lask and Meister Eckhardt.

40. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 37. Heidegger's critique of Fichte has clearly been influenced by Windelband's paper "Genetic or Critical Method?" in *Präludien: Aufsätze und Reden zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte Band II*, by Wilhelm Windelband (Tübingen: Mohr, 5 1915), pp. 126–28); and Husserl's talk on Fichte's ideal of humanity in Edmund Husserl, *Husserliana Bd. XXV, Aufsätze und Vorträge (1911–1921)* (Dordrecht: Kluwer 1987), pp. 275–77.

41. Windelband, "Genetic or Critical Method?" p. 126.

42. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 36.

43. Cf. Kisiel, "Edition," pp. 108, 109, for Heidegger and Fichte. It is notable that Kisiel reads neo-Kantians for Fichte without further commentary. This is also the reason why he missed the decisive influence of Fichte on Heidegger's early thought.

44. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 37.

45. Ibid.

46. Windelband, "Genetic or Critical Method?" p. 127.

47. According to Windelband this highest principle is the holy.

48. The *modus essendi* is "the guide-line of givenness" (Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 1, 321). Almost from the start intentionality is the central concept of Heidegger's analysis.

49. Windelband, "Genetic or Critical Method?" p. 126

50. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 37.

51. Ibid., p. 44.

52. Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe*, AA I, 2, pp. 265, 399.

53. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 59.

54. Ibid., p. 115.

55. Ibid. Cf. Kisiel, *Genesis*, pp. 50, 51.

56. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 115.

57. *Heidegger-Studies* 12 (1996): 11.

58. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 4.

59. Ibid., p. 59.

60. Ibid., p. 75.

61. Fichte, *Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. 2, p. 121.

62. Kisiel, "Edition," 1992, p. 117.

63. This bottomless foundation, the herald of being, is the *mysterium tremendum* of Heidegger's philosophy.

64. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 116.

65. Ibid., pp. 100, 101.

66. Ibid., p. 101.

67. Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch* (Halle: Niemeyer, 1913), p. 43.

68. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, pp. 109, 110.

69. Ibid., pp. 115–17.

6

HEIDEGGER'S TURN TO GERMAN IDEALISM

THE INTERPRETATION OF THE *WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE* OF 1794

Claudius Strube,
translated by Andrew Mitchell

Regarding his lecture course from the summer semester of 1929, Heidegger wrote to Karl Jaspers on June 25, 1929: "At this time I am lecturing on Fichte, Hegel, [and] Schelling for the first time—and once again it opens a world for me; the old experience, that others cannot read for oneself."[1] In fact, as a handwritten remark in his copy of the *Grundlage der gesamten Wisschenschaftslehre* shows, Heidegger had read this for the first time in September–October 1928. The "world" thereby opened up for him is that of *system* philosophy. Like a guiding thread running through his interpretation of the *Wissenschaftslehre*, Heidegger points out that Fichte, in the treatment of the metaphysical problematic, is oriented

toward the idea of the system and of certainty, i.e., on the ideal of unanimous and conclusive proof.

> Fichte attached all importance to the way and the proof and not to that which already is, as such, i.e., upon the thereby closed basic question, *what* this is—the finite I, which already is—and then how it already is. Fichte gives—and this is the basic characteristic of metaphysics as science of knowledge—priority to certainty over the truth.[2]

The self-evident manner with which Heidegger raises this "objection" must be explained by the "phenomenological optimism" to which Heidegger at this time still adhered. An optimism according to which that which is always already shows itself from itself, i.e., withdraws the hiddenness of itself, even if it is not yet expressly guarded against the danger of a new concealment.[3] Instead of strictly following the self-showing of that which is, Fichte shifts his entire energy to the proof, i.e., to the pursuit of the derivability of propositions. "With every step that we advance in our science, we approach the area in which everything can be proved."[4] In this expression as also in the following—"We begin, therefore, with a deduction leading to the task, and proceed with it as far as we can"[5]—Heidegger believes he is following the scent of Fichte's drive to finally reach this region of certainty and stay therein as long as possible. Heidegger's belief allows him to further remark that the unproveable will be taken up, as it were, as the inevitable. If the unprovability, however, is not based upon its concerning itself through these unproveables with a contingent empirical thing, but rather with an unconditioned thing, then there comes to expression here for phenomenological philosophy that something shows itself and that this itself *acquiesces* to the showing. So seen, the limit which Fichte's will to certainty encounters receives a phenomenological significance. With regard to this will, which will be determinative for the entirety of German Idealism, Heidegger can formulate his new manner of reading German Idealism: "In opposition, that which for us is interesting is that which—in Fichte's sense—is not proveable, and upon which at the same time all of Fichte's work of proof is indirectly concentrated."[6]

In the sense of this maxim, Fichte's concept of an "unconditioned decree of reason"[7] becomes the key concept of Heidegger's interpretation.

This concept takes Fichte out of the predicament into which he had fallen with the third principle, in so far as this is conditioned according to its form, i.e., is derivable from the two previous principles, but remains unconditioned according to its content. Consequently, the results which are supposed to be erected through the third principle, to determine the "how" of the activity, can indeed be deduced; but not, however, the solution, i.e., the determination of that which the activity has to do in order to solve this assignment. This solution, says Fichte, "is achieved unconditionally and absolutely by a decree of reason."[8] This concept is surprising; to be sure, in the presentation of the basic principles there has already been much talk of simple positing and unconditioned activity, but not of an unconditioned decree. According to Heidegger, one cannot force the strangeness of this concept to vanish by taking it as an expression for the irrational remainder of logical deduction; on the contrary, one must focus upon this strangeness as decisive for the whole problematic.

Since Fichte allows himself to be led by the Cartesian interpretation of human *Dasein* as I, his presentation of the three basic principles is an interpretation of the essential connections of the finite I. According to his preference for certainty and systematic form, Fichte is not primarily concerned with the determination of the finitude of the I, but rather with how the I can be secured as the point of departure for certain knowledge itself. With this interpretation of the ego, the I first receives the determination of absolute subject. Consequently, the determination of the egoity of the finite I—here and as standard for all of German idealism—must take the form of the problem of becoming finite (*Verendlichung*). And precisely in the context of this problem there emerges the puzzling concept of a decree of reason. Only now, in the third basic principle, are the essential connections of the I brought to completion ("The resources of the unconditioned and absolutely certain are now exhausted,"[9] in so far as there comes to expression what the positing of the I for a finite I can actually and only mean, namely a limited (*einschränkendes*) positing.[10] But that which here comes fully and authentically to expression from egohood shows itself as not deducible.

> What this third basic principle gives in content will not be deduced and attained, but rather is always already presupposed. What is decisive,

> namely how the positing is overall to be understood, as "limitation," rests upon a decree of reason. We can do nothing against this authority, but rather are placed under it, indeed, we appeal to it, recognize ourselves as surrendered [*überantwortet*] to it.[11]

To be sure, what Heidegger means in this context by "presupposition" is not explained. It cannot concern a not yet erected basic principle, because the "absolute first" basic principle of all human knowledge which is established by Fichte is not contested by Heidegger. Further, that it cannot concern a matter of fact not yet seen is shown in that the basic principles of human knowledge bring "acts" [*Tathandlungen*] to expression and not facts [*Tatsachen*]. Still, Heidegger asks himself whether one is indeed able to speak of a certain factuality upon which all the constructions of the science of knowledge remain related. He is encouraged in this by Fichte himself, who indicates—in discussion of the statement, "the I posits itself as determined through the not-I"—the "present possibility of thought, which alone remains standing" as "*a primordial fact occuring in our mind.*"[12] Heidegger himself here notes the following:

> This possibility of thought, shown as unique, proves—in view of the presupposed Being of the I (unanimity!)—the *necessity* of the fact. Decree! (This [fact] can only be brought to *consciousness* through the constructive attempts, but cannot itself be first invented and produced. This means: This dialectic and construction is in ground a clarification of the *facticity* of the I, of the factical being. Within the doctrine of science, however, there can be nothing like a mere appealing to the facts, rather the *proof* is always necessary that facts are facts. Cf. 1, 220!—Therefore the act [*Tathandlung*] truly has a fact-character [*Tatsachen-charakter*], i.e., unclarified and no problem.)[13]

It becomes clear from this note what Heidegger means by "presupposition." It is the "fact" of the *Being* of the finite I, upon which the setting up of the act [*Tathandlung*] still rests. The setting up of the acts [*Tathandlungen*]—as therefore the discussion of the basic principles must also be read—is in reality nothing other than a clarification of the facticity of the I. Correspondingly, the "decree of reason" must be conceived of as a

recognition of the facticity of the I, as previously surrendering the Being of this being over to itself.

Heidegger does not explain the concept of facticity any further; it does not belong to his manner of interpretation to force his own system upon the interpreted text. Nevertheless, it serves for a better understanding of his disposition in the interpretation of the Fichtean presentation of basic principles if it is made clear that here it refers to a "hermeneutic" facticity. Here, facticity does not mean that which is anticipatory and underlying in a state of affairs, which comes to articulated expression in the proposition. For a more original concept of facticity, the relation to the statement is to be severed. From the beginning, the statement has forced itself upon philosophy as the model for cognition [*Erkenntnis*], so that the conception has solidified itself that cognition is universally grounded in the grasping of an *existing* state of affairs, i.e., a fact, be it a discursive-articulative grasping (thought) or—according to a reconstrued elementary reduction of the model—an inarticulate grasping (intuition). Against this, phenomenology has shown that cognition *takes place* more originally as the admission of experience from the respective contexts. Since something can only be understood and determined *as something* from out of these contexts, the authentic cognitive process is interpretation. Cognition is not the ascertainment of the existing; cognition is the constantly self-renewing stepping out to the "assigned" [*"aufgegeben"*] contexts, the entry in the assigned "hermeneutical" circle. In regard to this more original concept of cognition, therefore, facticity means *that* we must *always already have an understanding* of the contexts of which we wish to attain cognition, or understanding. Likewise, Fichte's appeal to the decree of reason may now be construed—following Heidegger's lead to its completion—as knowledge of the *being-assigned* [*Aufgegebensein*] of the *essential connections* of the I, i.e., as the knowledge which before all, i.e., *beyond* all, positing of the being of the finite I, always already must be understood.[14] This signifies once again that the formal toils toward an all-around context of proof of knowledge lead to a type of "surveyance" of the essential connections of the I.

> Here already the character of the Fichtean method is visible, also essential to Hegel. The procession from the antithesis to the synthesis and

> there upon again to the antithesis, is not such that one is formally deduced from out of the other, but rather this deduction is with a constant and preceding view upon the fundamental synthesis, upon which this one rests. Though deductive in the presentation and form of the proof, so truly beforehand seeing and exhibiting, not blindly a chain of suspended [*freischwebenden*] propositions. (Certainly not things, which are touched; also not objects. But indeed the dialectic is intentional, and it sets itself into action in the intentional entanglements, and from there sets the thing itself into motion.)[15]

Statements, propositions, and discursive determinations first of all always shove the character of their "propositional" structure to the fore, i.e., their intention to present facts and states of affairs in a subdivided manner. Just as significant, but thrust aside as at most *cura posterior*, is the character of the reference, i.e., corresponding intention, so presented, which proves itself in the facts and states of affairs. This thrusting aside of the referential character of the statement has its ground in that out of the division of relations of content there results the possibility of connections between statements. If these connections occur without at the same time proof in the state of affairs itself, then there emerges the danger that they form pure constructions, that is, chains of suspended propositions, which ultimately let nothing be seen. The genuine philosophical method preserves from the first the unity of both characters of the predicative determinations.

Whatever the case, one should not suppose that in his Fichte interpretation Heidegger grounded, without further ado, the "principles" of phenomenology. From out of its anticonstructivist ground motifs, phenomenology had truly intensified the prominence of the moment of exhibition. For Heidegger, however, it is obvious that now, conversely, phenomenology likewise has to take into consideration the other moment of the statement.[16] This concerns from here on not only his emphasized agreement to Fichte's demand that we "have to offer proof *that* it is a fact,"[17] but also his defense of Fichte against the critique of a pure intuitionist phenomenology.

> To be sure, it would be a great error to mean that one could now simply reproach Fichte or other philosophers with the claim that they did not

> see the determined connections and, from this view, did not determine them originally, as is usual in the phenomenological critique. Besides, one misunderstands that it is not yet sufficient to see something; indeed, this seeing is overall only possible and guaranteed when the problems are there. only in the power of a problem does a region for view open up; this, conversely, already determines the problem, the two are not to be separated.[18]

In the decree of reason, therefore, is to be seen that moment of the constructing or dialectical reason, through which the character of a genuine philosophical cognition is achieved; and this says that its method is only measurable according to how it brings the thing itself step by step to an exhibition. Since, for Fichte, according to his Cartesian-Kantian fundamental position, ego becomes his exclusive concern, the decree of reason is for him nothing other than "that which the ego as such requires."[19] Independent of this, the decree of reason is nothing which would only be peculiar to Fichte.

> Only through this title does this come to light for Fichte, through determinate conditions, but without he himself drawing out the consequences, and without allowing it at all to affect the determination of the essence of the subject [?]. All philosophy is a making evident, tying together [?], and mediating of a decree of reason.[20]

Only with Fichte and German idealism is this basic sense of a more genuine philosophical method accepted as a decree of *reason*. Over and against this claim to the development of a deductive rational system, reason by its decree again justifies the facticity of the finite I and brings this to expression such that the absolute positing of the I, also required by the thought of the system, serves only for the interpretation of the I's factical finitude.

> Perhaps, therefore, the decisive realization of the science of knowledge is something other than a positing and knowing; all the more since according to Fichte the logical principle of reason esteems nothing from cognition, which it performs in the first sentence of the science of knowledge.[21]

Somewhat more pointedly, one could indicate, as Heidegger himself does, the constructive method of German idealism as an indirect "hermeneutics of facticity."

This insight—that is, that the science of knowledge, taken in its ground, has at its disposal an entirely different concept of cognition than that which is continually emphasized—is evaluated by Heidegger as circumstantial evidence, so to speak, for his own fundamental-ontological charge of the neglect of the question of Being. The necessity of thematizing the Being of the I is directly shown through the insight that cognition is not absorbed in the mere positing of the I, in the positing and derivation out of an absolute certainty, and correspondingly that the I is likewise not absorbed in being knowledge or self-consciousness.

The continual search for argumentative positions and attempts at proof only dims the facticity of the I, i.e., from its *Being*, such that this straightaway does not become a theme. In this way, the science of knowledge is indeed a great grounding [*Grundlegung*] of metaphysics, but such that the question of Being falls more and more into forgetfulness.

> In the mastery of the dialectic within German idealism, the basic conception of the I as absolute subject announces itself, i.e., this is ultimatly conceived *logically*, and this says: this metaphysics severs itself from the basic question which grounds the possibility of all metaphysics: from the question concerning the Being of the human *Dasein*, out of which here and alone the universal and fundamental question concerning Being can at all be posed; i.e., due to a specific regard upon *Dasein* (subject) and due to the question concerning Being overall (oblivion). Being overall is even here, in the most resolute pains of metaphysics, not there![22]

Heidegger seldom undertakes such *ontological* evaluations, although his Fichte interpretation stands naturally in the service of a sharpening of his fundamental-ontological problematic. Nevertheless, he does not force this and concentrates his interpretation of the unfolding of a science of knowledge entirely upon the problem of the finitude of the I. His interpretation of the decree of reason as an indirect hermeneutic of the factical subject allows him to further pursue this, independent of the ontological problematic.

In accordance with this interpretation, Heidegger pursues the decree of reason to places in the system upon which Fichte himself does not speak. One such place which performs, as it were, a constructive link in the system is, in the interpretation of the third basic principle, the question of how A and –A, being and nonbeing, reality and negation can be united without their mutual destruction. Heidegger finds the content of Fichte's answer of just as much interest as the introductory formulation. "We need not expect anyone to answer the question other than as follows: They will mutually *limit* one another."[23] Evidently Fichte calls upon something which is obvious for everyone. Since "obvious," however, is the only appropriate expression for facticity hermeneutically conceived, Heidegger can ask "Is this obviousness [*Selbst-verständlichkeit*] the decree?"[24] Naturally, one must answer this question in line with the start of the interpretation. The question mark alone announces that a question of method is concealed here. Naturally, one cannot methodologically take the obvious as a type of unexamined background knowledge, but rather as a *task*: to bring *explicitly* to understanding that which is always already understandingly opened whenever we determine something predicatively.[25] Actually, regarding the mentioned initiatory question of the possibility of a constitutive unity of being and non-being (which became the historical start of the Hegelian dialectic), Heidegger himself in the lecture explains

> Now Fichte must, so to speak, perform an examination of the decree of reason. He speaks, however, no more about this, but rather states harmlessly: it is not to be expected that someone could answer the question posed by this task otherwise. . . . If we know that obviousness is problematic in philosophy, then here lies the actual problem for our later consideration.[26]

Heidegger overturns this "obviousness" once again when, in respect of the possibility of the basic synthesis between I and not-I, Fichte appeals to a "we": "it is absolutely possible, and we are entitled to it without further grounds of any kind."[27] Heidegger sees even here in this obviousness the indication of a decree of reason.[28] To be sure, the fact that Fichte's solution of the Kantian question concerning the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori is indebted to a decree of reason still does not allow—as

Heidegger adds in his lecture—for a decision as to whether his solution is truly more general and satisfactory than Kant's.[29]

As expected, with Fichte the concept of a decree of reason turns up again, in the concern over how the highest task is to be solved, namely how the I can act immediately upon the not-I and vice versa, when according to his presupposition they are supposed to be complete opposites. The obvious attempt at a solution is to insert a middle term upon which both can act, such that they can still mediately effect one another. This, however, threatens to quickly miscarry, as one discovers that within this middle term itself there must be some one point in which the opposed parties directly encounter one another. The original problem is renewed, and one is compelled to place a new middle term between the opposites. "And so it would go on forever," claims Fichte, "if the knot were not cut, rather than loosed, by an absolute decree of reason, which the philosopher does not pronounce, but merely proclaims."[30] This decree of reason runs: *let there be* no not-I at all.

Heidegger also believes to be able to hear the decree of reason in the solution of the task of unifying the absolute and relative I, i.e., finitude and infinitude. Here also, naturally, the contradiction of the inserted middle term can be postponed for a long time; apparently the conflict can be settled in that the infinite bounds the finite.

> But at length, once the utter impossibility of the attempted union is apparent, finitude itself must be on the whole sublated [*überhaupt aufgehoben werden*]; all bounds must fall away, and the infinite self must alone remain, as one and as all.[31]

Likewise in this "must," in this demand to resume all nonactivity into the absolute activity of the I, the decree makes itself perceptible.

Finally, Heidegger also discovers it in Fichte's illustrative comparison of the relations of an absolute, infinite I and a relative, finite I to those of light and darkness. In the twilight, a middle term is very quickly found. But just as quickly it is shown that this middle term can only postpone the contradiction. Twilight can indeed be represented as a mixture of light and darkness; but if I only want to *think* of one point in this phase of mixture, then it shows itself again as a simultaneity of light and darkness. To remedy

the contradiction, light and darkness cannot be thought of as opposed. The category of quantity, i.e., of quantification or of gradual negation, in the third basic principle presents itself as the appropriate means of thought. Applied to the analogy of light and dark, this appears only as a gradual difference; darkness is thereby merely a lesser quantity of light. And correspondingly the relations of the I and not-I are again to be thought. Here as well, a decree first brings about the solution, nevertheless through recourse to traditional categories.

> In view of this relation of the I and not-I, the available categories draw near in explanation and seek a resort, which renders, with all insufficiency, a solution indeed possible. Otherwise spoken: The relation is not interrogated in itself and then, according to this, the determined characters themselves circumscribed; but rather the reverse. It is circumscribed in the handed down, apparently absolute concepts; in so far as it does not suffice, the decree and that which it demands assist it.[32]

The decree of reason appears here to have an entirely new function. Indeed its use in both the presentation of the third basic principle (§3) and in the grounding of theoretical knowledge (§4) is to mark the inner bounds of the deduction. We proceed with the deduction *as far as we can*, runs the motto of method in §3.[33] This likewise holds now, except that it no longer concerns the objection of *human* reason against the preceding, itself ungrounded, absolute positing of the I. Now the decree of reason appears to directly take aim at the securing and completing of the rational system. Because if reason now explains that there should be no not-I *at all*, or that finitude must be *on the whole* sublated, then this means methodologically nothing other than that there is only permitted to be *one* rational system and that this system has to cover *everything*.

Heidegger does not go into the various functions of the decree of reason. In a corresponding path of thought, the two meanings of the decree and their unity can be made understandable if one develops the concept of finitude—here nevertheless going beyond Fichte and German idealism—not so strongly from out of the present-at-hand (as more or less complete and ranked forces and *capabilities* of the human), but rather from out of the *situation* of the human here *in the world*. That is, if one is guided,

in its *fore-conceptual* formation, by the question of "how a being, that knows about itself, can exist in the midst of other beings."[34] But even this is only possible if the human has always already an understanding of the particular being in its What- and How-being. Only through this being-assigned of the understanding of Being does the human attain *Dasein*. In this "must" of the being-assigned, *Dasein's* factical, not to be outstripped finitude is grounded.[35]

The principle of human Being-in-the-world puts into question, more radically than any view regarding the incompletion of the human, the claim that absolute certainty and proof have any right at all.[36] As a matter of fact, these claims appears as a *departure* into in-finitude.

> "System" and "dialectic": absolute I. Becoming master of finitude, bringing it to disappearance, instead of the reverse, elaborating it.—But, through this, a fundamental insight: the more original the finitude, the more finite, all the more existent. Not, however, the opinion: the more in-finite, all the more genuine.[37]

From this point of view, the entire discrepancy of a decree of reason reveals itself. Inspected more closely, the original decree is truly no actual objection to the jumping over of facticity. The protest against the absolute positing of the I does not bring this in to question, rather it only *limits* it, i.e., through a "degraded positing" the absolute positing is merely *adapted* to the facticity of finitude. It remains decisive that the reason of the decree is likewise indicated as an "I posit."[38] In this way it also allows itself to *reconstruct* the fact of finitude. The converse way would be to make "this fact in its facticity,"[39] i.e., in its Being, a problem.

> Must it begin with "positing"? With I as mere positor? With *Dasein*, yes! With "Being," yes! But indeed not with Kant's transcendental apperception in complete detachment, whereby directly the finitude is lost. Yes, the specific finitude, the oppositional, now becomes the product of an *absolute*; it becomes infinite, a mere performance![40]

As "degraded positing" the original decree of reason participates in the constitution of a system of *human* reason. But as a decree of *reason*, i.e., as

positing, it serves the groundlaying of an absolutely certain knowledge, the overcoming of the original finitude of Being-in-the-world, and the overcoming of its abyssmal uncertainty and inner discrepancy.[41] This statement merely continues the decree of reason through to the grounding of theoretical knowledge. Its discrepancy, however, remains. Indeed, it now expressly serves the completion of the system, but the continuing sublation of finitude is always again threatened by a renewed breaking open of finitude, uncertainty, and discrepancy. The sublation of finitude in the infinite effects a great universalization of the foundations of knowledge; this necessarily more and more far-reaching abstraction nevertheless hollows out the thereby applied concepts. In the end, the decree of reason leads directly, to again formulate it somewhat more pointedly, to an *indirect destruction* of the traditional framing of the problem and its corresponding conceptuality, but there with—according to its original sense—to a bending back upon the factical finitude of philosophizing itself.

It is, before all, this "reading" which Heidegger learned to increasingly appreciate, and which to him—together with the here indicated reading as an "indirect hermeneutic of facticity"—gave the possibility of a positive confrontation with German idealism; a turn which one would not expect from his Kant book. In relation to Hegel as the one who completes of the constructive method, Heidegger is now able even to claim "Kant is basically no match for Hegel, which says nothing about the greatness of the two. The greatness consists directly in the irreplaceability of one by the other."[42]

Heidegger finally named the opposition between Kant and German idealism a *new gigantomachia* regarding Being.[43] But for this reason, he laid much weight upon an exact study of its inauguration in the *Wissenschaftslehre.*

NOTES

The author would like to thank the translator, Andrew Mitchell, for his conscientious efforts in rendering this piece into English.

1. Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers, *Briefwechsel 1920–1963*, Walter Biemel and Hans Saner, eds. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann; München-Zürich: Piper, 1990), p. 123.

2. Martin Heidegger, *Der deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart*, Freiburger Vorlesung SS 1929, Gesamtausgabe Band 28, Claudius Strube, ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997), p. 91. Cf. pp. 74, 126, 247. At other places Heidegger stresses that the characteristic of truth remains mediately constitutive for the idea of the science of knowledge; truth is thematized only "in the passage through the idea of certainty" (p. 183).

3. Heidegger's "objection" that with Fichte certainty holds priority over the truth is not to be mistaken for the later interpretation on the basis of the "history of Being," according to which in modern times, and with a certain necessity, truth is transformed into certainty. In terms of interpretation, the "history of Being" presupposes the corresponding "discovery" that at the heart of unconcealedness there always already lies concealedness.

4. J. G. Fichte, *The Science of Knowledge*, Peter Heath and John Lachs, eds. and trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 105.

5. Ibid., p. 106.

6. Heidegger, *Der deutsche Idealismus*, p. 81.

7. Fichte, *Science of Knowledge*, p. 106.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 110.

10. While the third basic principle shows that through positing the I makes itself finite, the first and second basic principles show that the possibility of its finitude is contained within the I itself.

11. Heidegger, *Der deutsche Idealismus*, p. 91.

12. Fitche, *Science of Knowledge*, pp. 220, 219.

13. Heidegger, *Der deutsche Idealismus*, pp. 145ff. In two postscripts it is said that the sole possibility of the thinkability of the thesis of theoretical philosophy requires a decree of reason. See p. 314.

14. In this sense, Heidegger had already in 1919 required that there must be "a pre-theoretical or over-theoretical, in any case a non-theoretical science, a genuine *original* science [Ur-*wissenschaft*], out of which the theoretical itself takes its origin" (*Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem*, Frühe Freiburger Vorlesung Kriegsnotsemester 1919, in *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, Gesamtausgabe Band 56/57, Bernd Heimbüchel, ed. [Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987], pp. 96f.).

15. Heidegger, *Der deutsche Idealismus*, p. 102. As it emerges from the postscripts, in the lecture, Heidegger himself had starkly emphasized the *appearance* of a context of proof:

> If Fichte so proceeds in the working out of §4 that he unwraps an opposition and then searches for a synthesis, then it appears as if from the highest proposition all the others could be derived. With respect to the ordering of the proof, there is a certain connection there. But with respect to the content of these propositions or to that which gives the actual impulse to the departure of the entire consideration, the determination of the oppositions, he produces this such that he always looks upon that which is contained in the I. What appears to be a deduction out of a proposition is a determination of the essential connections of the I. To be sure, this discussion is incorporated into the dialectical structure. This is important, since the same structure is also found again with Hegel, and one sees there that the dialectic itself always feeds upon the absolute subject. And the mysteriousness of the dialectic rests upon this, that it unrolls this question, that every form of the dialectic in itself is already so formed that it has eyes and sees the essential connections and thus can maintain itself in motion. (Ibid., pp. 299ff.)

16. Phenomenology requires with respect to method that every statement, and every concept introduced in a statement, before all further connection with other concepts and statements, be *directly demonstrated* in the thing, such that every phenomenological investigation has its center of gravity in the *exhibition* of the thing itself. This method is thus: "opposed to all suspended [*freischwebenden*] constructions and accidental findings; it is opposed to taking over any conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated; it is opposed to those pseudo-questions which parade themselves as 'problems,' often for generations at a time" (*Being and Time*, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, trans. [San Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1962] p. 50; H. 27–28; translation modified).

17. Fichte, *Science of Knowledge*, p. 220.

18. Heidegger, *Der deutsche Idealismus*, p. 162.

19. Ibid., p. 161.

20. Ibid. Translator's Note: Bracketed question marks indicate illegibility in Heidegger's transcribed manuscript.

21. Ibid., p. 295. Cf. p. 96.

22. Ibid., pp. 122ff.

23. Immanuel Hermann Fichte, ed., *Fichtes Werke* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyten, 1971), I, p. 108.

24. Heidegger, *Der deutsche Idealismus*, p. 86.

25. Heidegger seeks to indicate this through his use of the hyphen in "*Selbst-verständlichkeit.*"

26. Heidegger, *Der deutsche Idealismus*, p. 292, from a postscript.

27. Fichte, *Fichtes Werke*, I, p. 114.

28. Cf. Heidegger, *Der deutsche Idealismus*, p. 100.

29. Cf. ibid.; pp. 101, 298.

30. Fichte, *Fichtes Werke*, I, p. 144.

31. Ibid.; translation modified.

32. Heidegger, *Der deutsche Idealismus*, p. 162.

33. Cf. Fichte, *Fichtes Werke*, I, p. 106.

34. Heidegger, *Der deutsche Idealismus*, p. 314.

35. To this, cf. the concluding passages of his Kant book, written at this time and according to the model of the Fichte lectures: *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Richard Taft, trans. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), §§ 39–45: pp. 149–68.

36. Cf. Heidegger, *Der deutsche Idealismus*, p. 92. According to Marcuse's postscript, Heidegger had explained it as his conviction "that metaphysics and philosophy can entirely not at all be set upon an exact foundation, that they are impossible in the sense of strong science" (ibid., p. 310). And in respect to the projected connection between the problem of Being and the problem of *Dasein* as temporality, Heidegger even emphasizes: "But here the abyss [*Ab-grund*] of the problem is first raked. But not such that one makes it an object of speech, because then it is not there, it opens itself only in and for a concrete occuring and working problematic" (ibid., pp. 136ff.; cf., 162). Here, likewise, one should not too quickly relate this talk of abyss to the phenomenological problematic of existence, but rather, first of all, to Fichte's limitation of the validity of the logical principle of reason.

37. Heidegger, *Der deutsche Idealismus*, p. 47.

38. "Decree, i.e., a) included into the I, viewed from it (positing!); b) the I itself thereby infinite, only becoming finite [*verendlicht*]!" (ibid., p. 246).

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid., p. 251. Cf. p. 184. The I becomes itself—in its positing itself as its opposite—*degraded* in a lower concept, that of divisibility. . . . This *degrading* positing itself occurs in the absolute unlimited subject, and through this—it makes itself finite, and it must be able to make itself finite, to be itself an absolute subject" (ibid., pp. 124ff.).

41. "The full Being-in-the-world in the plenitude of essential possibilities

and in the severity of the entirely not unanimous characters; not only summative, that nothing lacks, rather the essence and concept of *Dasein* is essentially other, so extreme and formally certain is the Fichtean concept. 'Unanimity'-'formal,' but thereby only a *will-o-the-wisp*" (ibid., p. 183).

42. Ibid., p. 209.
43. Ibid., p. 49.

7

SCHELLING AND HEIDEGGER

THE MYSTICAL LEGACY AND ROMANTIC AFFINITIES

Douglas Hedley

The neo-Romantic elements in Heidegger's thought, particularly after *die Kehre*, invite bitter criticism and even parody. Heidegger's nationalism and regionalism, his critique of modern industrial civilization, his preference for the bucolic and archaic, his love of the Greeks and his contempt for Latin and the Romans are clearly "Romantic" themes, and sometimes are dismissed as such.[1] Yet this may disguise a "Romantic" element in Heidegger which is much more profound, and dare I say, even more interesting: the speculative mystical tradition.

The last chapter of the *Habilitationsschrift* has a motto taken from Novalis:

Wir suchen überall das Unbedingte
und finden immer nur Dinge[2]

The relevance of the motto for Heidegger's *oeuvre* is evident and an interesting monograph by Michael Elsässer entitled *Friedrich Schlegel's Kritik am Ding* pursues in detail the relationship between F. Schlegel and Heidegger.[3]

Heidegger's inaugural lecture has a motto taken from Meister Eckhart.[4] The link between the Romantic and the mystic can be explained quite soberly. The study of the great philosophical mystics, preeminently Meister Eckhart, goes back to the Romantics—in particular to Catholic Romantics in Munich like Franz von Baader.[5] Heidegger concentrated upon the most "Romantic" of the Idealists, F. W. J. Schelling, and the text which reflects most clearly the "mysticism" of the Munich School: *Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* of 1809.

Heidegger's debt to the Romantics lies in the "mystical" vision of "Being." If this is correct, the Romantic legacy in Heidegger is perhaps as important as those currents of thought in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries which one is accustomed to cite as "influences": *Lebensphilosophie*, phenomenology, etc.

It is perhaps worth thinking about Heidegger's own biography in relation to Romanticism and Schelling. Heidegger had an extremely ambivalent relationship to the Roman Catholic Church and its prevailing neoscholasticism. It was his ambition to become a Catholic priest and this was thwarted. This was great blow to a gifted but (indigent?!) Catholic German boy.[6] His academic career was supported by ecclesiastical scholarships, and even determined by broadly neoscholastic interests such as Duns Scotus/Thomas of Erfurt. Even as a young scholar he hoped for the Church's intervention on his behalf for an academic post and was bitterly disappointed when he failed to get a chair for Christian philosophy.[7]

It is in the context of repeatedly bitter disppointments and his own strong sense of rejection by the institution of the Roman Church that we should consider the famous and much quoted "Ohne diese theologische Herkunft wäre ich nie auf den Weg des Denkens gelangt. Herkunft aber bleibt stets Zukunft."[8]

The central problem which interested Heidegger was the relationship between "dem Wort der Heiligen Schrift und dem theologisch-spekula-

tiven Denken." In this context, Speculative means Idealistic, namely those thinkers who were repudiated by Rome. Leo XIII's espousal of Thomas Aquinas as the official philosopher of the Roman Catholic Church and the work of men such as Joseph Kleutgen, S.J., led to official criticism of Idealistic and Romantic thought in favor of a renewed Thomism. This was not just a backlash against secular philosophy generally, but against the rich and potent speculative theology within Catholic circles in Vienna, Munich, and Tübingen. S. T. Coleridge's remark that Schelling was a convert to Catholicism was a false but common rumor, and it reflects the importance of Schelling for nineteenth-century Catholic thought. Although officially repudiated, German Catholic Romantic Idealism continued to influence such individual theologians as Freiburg Professor for Dogmatic Theology Carl Braig.

Heidegger read Braig as a schoolboy, and was influenced as a student by this theologian who was, as he later wrote, "der letzte aus der Überlieferung der Tübinger Schule."[9] The motto of *Vom Sein. Abriß der Ontologie* is taken from Bonaventura on the intelligible symbolic nature of *Light.*[10] As concerns the phrase *Herkunft ist Zukunft*, we can note that even in the *Lichtung*, Heidegger's early, perhaps formative, confrontation with the history of metaphysics was filtered by a Catholic speculative Romanticism, which was deeply endebted to Schelling.

The central concerns of Heidegger's thought, *nihilism* and the question of *Being*, are central to the thought of German Idealism. These topics were brought into the volcanic philosophical debate of post-Kantian German philosophy by F. H. Jacobi, and recent research into this period has shown that Jacobi's influence on the development of Geman Idealism was momentous.[11]

We can note two points of influence: first, Jacobi's thesis that speculative metaphysics leads to "nihilism"; second, Jacobi used the term 'Seyn' for Spinoza's monistic principle, namely substance. The challenge for the entire Idealistic-Romantic school was the development of a theory or more strictly a "system" of "Being" which was not nihilistic. This challenge was intensified by Hegel's system.

In the context of Jacobi's challenge, the mystics provided a source of thinking about Being which seemed more fruitful than the *Schulmetaphysik* (school of metaphysics). This included, at a minimum:

1. The traditional mystical suspicion of a rigorously conceptual theology.
2. The theocentric approach to metaphysical theology.
3. A dynamic or even vitalistic concept of God.

As opposed to any discussion of God as an object the *ens necessarium* or *ens a se* of a *Theologia Naturalis*, the thought of Meister Eckehart or Boehme revolves around the relationship between God and man. It is typical that there are no proofs of the existence of God in the mystics or in the Idealists. The writings of the mystics are in this sense always spiritual exercises rather than academic treatises. Rather than employing inference and analogy from the created to the creator, the mystic starts from the activity of God, e.g., in the *Gottesgeburt* (birth of God) in the soul.

This is the theocentric dimension in mysticism. Whereas the Thomist or the nominalist reflects upon the route of the finite mind to God, the mystic starts with the activity of the Divine, that is, the cutting of the Gordian knot or a Rhodean leap, according to taste. This certainly foreshadows Heidegger's later insistence upon the priority of Being. Finally, the God of the speculative mystics is dynamic rather than static; certainly he is not an abstract essence.

The Idealistic thesis that Being is not an *object* (the *ens* of the metaphysica rationalis) but *subject* and vital process is testimony to the influence of the mystics. All the schwabian Idealists were influenced by the mystical tradition whether through Pietism[12] (Oettinger, Bengel) or through the largely theological-Neoplatonic transmission of Platonic ideas in the eighteenth century (Cudworth, Mosheim, Sovereign, Löffler, etc.).[13] In the case of Schelling this was intensified by the physical proximity of both Jacobi and Franz von Baader in Munich.

The product of the genial confrontation with Jacobi, the leading light of the Counter-Enlightenment, and Baader, the great Catholic *Schwärmer*, was the *Freiheitschrift* of 1809. This is the work which Heidegger calls the peak (*Gipfel*) of German Idealism in which all the essential specifications of this (form of) metaphysic are expressed (*zum Austrag kommen*). Perhaps we should recall that Heidegger had plans to write a book on mysticism. This perhaps explain why Heidegger turns to this particular work, rather than, say, the vision of *Das System des transcendentalen Idealismus* where art

is seen as the "general organon of philosophy," a viewpoint which prima facie seems much more congenial for the author of "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerks."

WHY SCHELLING?

It is worth considering that Heidegger's high opinion of Schelling's work was rather unusual at the time.[14] It was not until Walter Schulz's classic work *Die Vollendung des Deutschen Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie Schellings* (a provocative title!) of 1955 that Schelling was accorded real importance in the history of German Idealism, and Jaspers's book *Schelling: Größe und Verhängnis* (also 1955): "Schelling hat nocht nur keine Ahnung vom Sinn und von den Methoden der modernen Wissenschaft . . . sondern eine Fremdheit gegenüber faßlichen Realitäten überhaupt."[15] For Jaspers, Schelling illegitimately stepped over the boundaries set by Kant and produced a theosophic Gnosticism. He was a fine mind who produced many genial existential insights but a pseudoknowledge. Perhaps Jaspers was thinking not just of the "Weltsysteme und Seinsgeschichten"[16] of Schelling, but the ages of the world in Heidegger's own post-*Kehre* construction. Heidegger's view of Schelling is certainly quite different. We shall argue that it is precisely Schelling's ambition to penetrate the nature of Being which fascinates Heidegger.

Perhaps Hegel is the representative of German Idealism par excellence; but Schelling is the Idealist whom Heidegger really studies with care and productive, creative critique. In the *Beiträge* he writes of German Idealism which prepares for the end of metaphysics. And in its midst, he mentions individual early "strikes" like Schelling's *On Human Freedom* which, however, as the move to the "positive philosophy" show, were not decisive.[17] He also singles out the concept of *Entscheidung* as important.

Schelling's *Freiheitschrift* is an extremely difficult text, and I shall make no attempt to explain Schelling's argument.[18] Nor shall I give an account of Heidegger's particular Schelling interpretation.[19] The task of this essay is simply to suggest how Schelling offered conceptual possibilities which inspired Heidegger at crucial stage of his own philosophical thinking.

VERMITTLUNG AND *UNTERSCHEIDUNG*

The conceptual framework of the *Freiheitschrift* is dominated by Schelling's attempt to produce a concept of freedom which integrates Jacobi's insistence that freedom is *immediate*, a *Tatsache* or *Faktum* which, *per definitionem*, cannot be captured by the *mediating* instrument of reflective thought.

Jacobi was the President of the Munich Academy of Research (Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaft) and Jacobi's presence is heralded by the opening terminology of Schelling's work: Philosophical investigations concerning the essence of human freedom can in part address the correct notion insofar as the fact of freedom is immediately formed in the feeling of the same.[20] The issue of "feeling," which is dismissed by Hegel (whether in opposition to Jacobi or Schleiermacher), is placed at the center of Schelling's project in the *Freiheitschrift*. Heidegger writes that

> Schelling wants to use the example of Spinoza to show that it is not the pantheism, not the theology in him, but the underlying "ontology" which is totally decisive; it is primarily and above all the issue of the correct experience and feeling of the fact of freedom which determines the whole question of freedom.[21]

Furthermore:

> The essence of the metaphysics of German Idealism as modern metaphysics is conceived with the utmost decisiveness in Hegel's *System of Wissenschaft* and more specifically in the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*. . . . [T]he metaphysics of the absolute re-presentation (and that means the will), however, is conceived out of the deepest inner resources of the metaphysical tradition in Schelling's *On Human Freedom*, which is an answer to the *Phenomenology*.[22]

It was in the *Phenomenology* that Hegel (with his characteristically biting humor) referred to the philosophy of the Absolute as the night in which all cows are black. Schelling, a notoriously sensitive man, remained bitter and aggrieved for the rest of his life; especially in the light of Hegel's subsequent success in German academic life.

Heidegger is probably correct to see the *Freiheistschrift* as a response to the *Phenomenology*. Without trying to explain the mechanics of Hegel's *Logik*, let us reflect upon certain key terms in Hegel's thought. I cannot pretend that this will be satisfactory, and the attempt to give a very cursory account of the leading post-Kantian German philosophers usually sounds obscure in German, but worse, peculiar in English.

Hegel's sees his own philosophy as the transformation of reality into the Idea or *Begriff*, i.e., that state in which Thought grasps itself as Thinking. This self-understanding of the Spirit is a process of self-mediation. This very abstract sounding state is fulfilled in the concrete form of the modern state: in political freedom. The central Hegelian concept is mediation, or *Vermittlung*. Whereas Jacobi defines freedom as immediate (*unmittelbar*) Hegel sees freedom as mediation (*Vermittlung*). Freedom for Jacobi is immediate, prerational and supernatural: the link between man and God. Hegel agrees that freedom is the link between human and divine, but as mediated in the dialectical unity of finite and infinite in the rational state. Freedom for Jacobi is brute facticity, a given which cannot be captured by reason without loss. For Hegel freedom is the rational *Praxis* of the Spirit, more precisely a kind of finding of oneself in the other (*bei sich selbst Sein im Anderen*).[23]

Schelling's idea of Freedom can be seen as a response to both Jacobi and Hegel. Against Jacobi, Schelling wants to produce a System of Freedom, that is, precisely what Jacobi diagnoses as the "nihilism" of German Idealism.[24] Yet unlike Hegel's System of Freedom, which is based on the idea of rational mediation, Schelling wishes to preserve Jacobi's insight concerning the pretheoretical *facticity* of freedom. He does this by grounding human freedom ontologically.

Schelling defines freedom as decision for good or evil: *Entscheidung zum Guten oder Bösen*.[25] This *Entscheidung* (decision) is made possible by the *Scheidung* (schism or rupture) in the Divine Being. Evil is not merely the absence of good, but must be rooted in the depths of Being itself. Boehme postulates a dark principle within God which, though not itself evil, provides the possibility of evil without the godhead.

Let us turn to Schelling's conception of the Absolute.

> Because nothing is before or without God, He must have the Ground of His existence in Himself. This is what all philosophers claim, but they speak of this Ground as if it were a mere concept, without seeing it as real and effective. . . . God is more real than simply the moral order, and has a quite different and more vital driving force than the poor subtleties ascribed to Him by the abstract Idealists.[26]

Heidegger notes the following with respect to this passage:

> In the Divine Intellect (*Verstand*) is a system, but God is not a system but life. . . . [W]e are aware of the metaphysical meaning of this designation; it never means just biological-animal-vegetable life for Schelling. His usage here is "polemical." He means, in opposition to the Idealistic conception of God as pure intelligence the following: the will of the Intellect requires the will of the Ground.[27]

Schelling is using a dynamic-vitalistic model of the Absolute as one "Scheidung der Kräfte," as a schism or rupture within the godhead. The polarity within the Absolute is not mediated as in Hegel but remains as a chasm in Being, a difference within Divine identity which is both the possibility of human freedom (*Entscheidung* based on the Divine *Unterscheidung*) and a continual threat. The inseparable principles in the Divine are separate and ruinous in humanity.[28]

Heidegger notes that

> The fact of human freedom has for Schelling its own facticity. Humanity is not a given object which we drape with the modest sentiments of everyday life. Humanity is experienced in the vision of the abyss and peak of Being, with respect to the terrible in the Godhead, the living anxiety of all created being, the sadness of all created creativity, the wickedness and the will of love. On the contrary, humanity experiences that which drives it beyond itself.[29]

SCHELLING AS A PHILOSOPHER OF BEING

The *Freiheitschrift* is the work in which Schelling takes up the vitalistic ontology of the mystics without the adamantly theistic form of the *Spätphilosophie*. Heidegger was evidently reading Schelling at a period when he was working on the third section of *Sein und Zeit* or on the second major *Hauptwerk*. He produced the long and aphoristic book in a manuscript form in 1936 which was published in 1989 with the title *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. This text resounds with the terminology (especially *Entscheidung*) and ideas of the *Freiheitschrift*.[30]

Schelling failed to think consequently about Being as *abgründig* and turned his original antimetaphysical insight into another metaphysical system. Heidegger is impressed by the ontological vitalism, the vision of Being as a Ground which thrusts forth and gathers back—Being as rupture. As Gadamer points out, Heidegger recognized that in his conflict with Hegel Schelling was struggling with the problem which arose out of *Being and Time* and with the attempt to ontologize the pretheoretical, or facticity.[31] Yet Heidegger rejects Schelling's attempt to formulate this insight within a system. For Heidegger the poignancy of Schelling's failure lies in his capacity to try to force his idea of Being as abysmal rupture into the teleological structure of the theodicy of German Idealist metaphysics.

Perhaps it was Schelling's thought about the *Scheidung* in Being in opposition to Hegel's vision of Being as rational *Vermittlung* which helped Heidegger to radicalize or even to "ontologize" the basic insights of *Sein und Zeit* which Heidegger employs against a Cartesian (Husserlian) philosophy of consciousness: the ineluctable and yet intractable facticitiy of the pretheoretical, namely "das sich befinden in-der-Welt." This is a point where one can appreciate Heidegger's genuine concern in *Der Humanismusbrief*. *Dasein* in *Being and Time* is not an autonomous *Entwurf* (project) but is *geworfen* (thrown). The existential analysis starts with the passive component: what *Dasein* "finds" as the parameters of existence. "Humanity is "thrown" into the truth of Being by Being such that it exists and can be the ward of Being. In order that the light of Being of beings qua beings can appear . . . humanity is the shepherd of Being. . . . [But] what is Being?"[32]

For reasons which are not entirely clear, Heidegger came to disown Schelling, and in the lectures of 1941 Schelling becomes one member of those voluntaristic metaphysicians whose thought culminated in Nietzsche and Hitler.[33] From this period onward Heidegger turns to the poets, especially Hölderlin. Dietmar Köhler has argued persuasively that we can see the move as reflecting (albeit indirectly) Heidegger's misgivings about his own political path in the early 1930s.[34] Yet whatever the reason for Heidegger's revisions, it remains a fact that Schelling was of particular importance at the crucial juncture of Heidegger's intellectual biography.

Via Schelling we can see Heidegger as following the path of the mystics in three ways.

1. The traditional mystical suspicion of a conceptual theology, what the Idealists denigrated as mere *Verstand*[35] (Cf. negative philosophy in the later Schelling). Heidegger is even more radical than the Idealists in his avoidance of language of the *Verstandesmetaphysik*.
2. The theocentric approach to metaphysical theology.
3. A dynamic or even vitalistic concept of God. Do we not sense here Das Zeit-raum-hafte der Entscheidung als aufbrechende Klüftung des Seyns selbst, seingeschichtlich zu fassen, nicht *moralisch-anthropoplogisch*.[36]

With the topic of "nihilism" one immediately thinks of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche. Heidegger insisted that his Überwindung der Metaphysik was a response to the problem of Western "Nihilism." In the wake of the *Pantheismusstreit* (which still resounds in the *Freiheitschrift* of 1809), one of the motivating and determining factors in the development of German Idealism is its response to and accomodation of Jacobi, and *especially* in Schelling, was the development of a theory of Being which, contra Jacobi, was not nihilistic. This was the context in which Schelling drew upon the mystical tradition; in the attempt to answer the challenge of nihilism lying behind the overt charge of "pantheism."

CONCLUSION

My point is not so much to criticize Heidegger as a closet theologian, nor do I wish to present his thought as secularized theology (Löwith). The philosopher Heidegger was able to use the philosophical essence of writings within the theological tradition, whether in Augustine, Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard, etc. Schelling's use of mystical ideas in the early Munich period was part of his general sensitivity to the *Rationalitätskritik* of the Counter-Enlightenment embodied in Jacobi, and intensified by direct contact with Jacobi. That means that the recourse to the (unfortunately very obscure) thought of Boehme was part of a genuine philosophical concern with the limits of rationality, and not simply a lapse into Gnosticism (Jaspers).

One of the great Romantic motifs is that of "originality." Heidegger is quite candid about his admiration for Schelling; but he does not quite fit into the notoriously procrustean bed of Heidegger's account of the history of philosophy from Plato to Hegel to Nietzsche, and the corresponding idea of Heidegger's own radically original (cf. Ursprung) approach. Yet perhaps Heidegger was being a little too Romantic in this insistence upon absolute originality. Perhaps Schelling helped Heidegger during the turbulent years of the 1930s to develop the insight concerning the pretheoretical nonetiological determination of human existence formulated in *Sein und Zeit* into a much more explicit and "ontological" account of Being. Heidegger sees that Hegel's system is the "größte und endgültige Abschluß des ersten Ganges des abendländischen Denkens."[37] But the affinity with Schelling's thought after 1809 is much more striking: the attempt to see philosophy as the description, a protocol, of that which reveals *itself* rather than the transformation of reality in the *Begriff*. For Hegel it is the rational polis which reveals the Divine. Schelling, like Heidegger, an un-*political* thinker, thinks it is Being itself rather than the state which is the real object of philosophy. Schelling is consciously a philosophy of Being which cannot be sublimated or identified with the rational state; not in the transparency of the Hegelian absolute but the dark light, dare we say the "Lichtung" of "das Unvordenkliche." Perhaps Heidegger was more of an Idealist, or should we say Romantic, than he cared to admit.

A final thought about southern German intellectual topography. Schelling made a great impression as the young man in Jena and the old man in Berlin. But it was in Munich, in the company of Baader and Jacobi, that Schelling developed the *Freiheitschrift*; and it was Munich which was the real center of German Catholic Romanticism from 1827 through mid-century, when it declined. Munich was to play a central role in Heidegger's career. Heidegger's position in postwar German university life was a highly contentious and acrimonious issue; he started to lecture in the summer semester 1952. His return to the philosophical center stage took place largely outside the university. Hugo Ott notes that Heidegger achieved his real breakthrough with an event presented by the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts with a paper "Über das Ding."[38]

A series of lectures followed, especially "Die Künste im Technischen Zeitalter." Ott notes "Again and Again the Bavarian Academy of Fine Art."[39] Invited by the Generalsekretär Clemens Graf von Podewils,[40] who himself a poet, Heidegger became part of a circle of broadly conservative intellectuals, including Werner Heisenberg, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Friedrich Georg and Ernst Jünger, Emil Preetorius, Wolfgang Schadewaldt, Martin Buber and Carl J. Burckhardt, which met regularly. Podewils describes the situation:

> Heidegger in those conversations pursued the core of each question, leading the way, and pointing beyond. He, who though responding to the others without ever imposing on them, remained—and this could always be sensed—the magnetic center of the group.[41]

In Munich, a city whose intellectual heritage was so influenced by Schelling and his circle, in discussion with great scientists, poets and scholars, Heidegger was a magnetic center.

NOTES

1. See the lucid but caustic T. Rentsch, *Martin Heidegger Das Sein und Der Tod* (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1989), p. 230.

2. Martin Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften* (Frankurt: V. Klostermann,, 1972), p. 341.

3. Michael Elsässer, *Friedrich Schlegel's Kritik am Ding* (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1994), pp. 122–41.

4. Ibid., p. 344.

5. T. O'Meara, *Romantic Idealism and Romantic Catholicism Schelling and the Theologians* (London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982).

6. See Hugo Ott, *Martin Heidegger. Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie* (Munich: Campus Verlag, 1992), p. 59, 96.

7. Ibid., pp. 87ff.

8. Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1985), p. 96.

9. Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften* (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1978), xi.

10. Cf. Rentsch, *Martin Heidegger*, pp. 128, 32–35.

11. D. Henrich, "Die Anfänge der Theorie des Subjekts," in *Zwschenbetrachtungen*, A. Honneth, ed., pp. 117–89. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989), pp. 106ff; D. Henrich, *Konstellationen: Probleme und Debatten am Ursprung der Idealistischen Philosophie 1789-1795* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1991), pp.205–13, 236–44.

12. E. Benz, *Les sources mystiques de la philosophie romantique allemande* (Paris: Vrin, 1967) and *Schellings theologische Geistesahnen* (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1955).

13. For an excellent discussion of much mysterious material see M. Franz, *Schellings Tübingen Platon-Studien* (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1996).

14. Although Tillich and von Hartmann were influenced by Shelling.

15. Karl Jaspers, *Schelling: Größe und Verhängnis* (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1955), p. 249: "Schelling still had no inkling of the meaning and methods of modern science . . . on the contrary a distance from cognizable reality in general."

16. Ibid., p. 343.

17. "Und dazwischen eingesprengt einzelne Vorstöße wie Schellings Freiheitsabhandlung, die allerdings, wie der Übergang zur 'positiven Philosophie' zeigt, zu keiner Entscheidung führen kann." Martin Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, ed. F. W. von Hermann (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1989), p. 204.

18. Cf. the rich account by Siegbert Peetz, *Die Freiheit im Wissen* (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1995).

19. Cf. Michel Vater's extensive essay 'Heidegger and Schelling: The Finitude of Being', *Idealistic Studies* 5, no. 1 (January 1975): 20–58.

20. Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit können teils den richtigen Begriff derselben angehen, indem die Tatsache der Freiheit, so unmittelbar das Gefühl derselben einem jeden eingeprägt ist. . . .

21. Schelling will am Beispiel des Spinozas zeigen, daß nicht so sehr der Pan-

theismus, nicht die Theologie in ihm, sondern die zurücklegende 'Ontologie' alles entscheidet, zuerst und vor allem das für die gesammte Freiheitsfrage grundgebende rechte Erfahren und Erfühlen der Tatsache der Freiheit.

22. Das Wesen der Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus als neuzeitlicher Metaphysik ist mit der vollen Entschiedenheit gedacht in Hegel's 'System der Wissenschaft' und zwar in der Phänomenologie des Geistes . . . Aus der ganzen Wesenstiefe aber ist die Metaphysik des unbedingten Vor-stellens (und d.h. des Willens) gedacht in Schellings Freiheitsabhandlung, die eine Antwort auf die Phänomenologie ist. 231

23. Cf. Peetz on Jacobi's use of *Vermittlung*: "Er prägt damit nicht nur ein *Grundwort* des Idealismus; mit der von ihm gewonnen strikten Scheidung von Absolutem und Endlichem hinsichtlich der Weise der Wißbarkeit exponiert er zugleich dessen *Grundproblem*," in *Freiheit im Wissen*, p. 25.

24. Heidegger, *Der Europäische Nihilismus*, p. 7.

25. Cf Peetz, *Freiheit im Wissen*, pp.193 (Freiheit als 'absolute Entscheidung').

26. Schelling, *Freiheitsschrift* 355/356.

27. "In dem göttlichen Verstand ist ein System, aber Gott selbst ist kein System sondern ein Leben . . . Wir kennen die metaphysische Bedeutung dieses Titels, er bedeutet bei Schelling niemals das nur biologsiche tierisch-pflanzliche Leben. Schelling's Sprachgebrauch ist hier ein 'polemischer'. Er meint gegenüber der idealistischen Fassung des Absoluten als Intelligenz eben dieses, daß der Wille des Verstandes nur ist im Gegenwendigkeit zum Willen des Grundes." Heidegger, *Schellings Abhandlung*, p. 194.

28. "Der Mensch ist auf jenen Gipfel gestellt, wo er die Selbstbewegungsquelle zum Guten und Bösen gleicherweiser in sich hat: das Band der Prinzipien in ihm ist kein notwendiges, sondern ein freies. er steht am Scheidepunkt: was er auch wähle, es wird seine Tat sein, aber er kann nicht in der Unentschiedenheit bleiben, weil Gott notwendig sich offenbaren *Schelling's Abhandlungmuß*." Schelling, *Freiheitschrift* 373/374.

29. "Die Tatsache der menschlichen Freiheit hat für ihn eine eigene Tatsächlichkeit. Der Mensch ist nicht eine vorhandener Beobachtungsgegenstand, den wir dann noch mit kleinen Gefühlen des Alltags behängen, sondern der Mensch wird erfahren im Einblick in die Abgründe und höhen des Seins, im Hinblick auf das Schreckliche der Gottheit, die Lebensangst alles Geschaffenen, die Traurigkeit alles geschaffenen Schaffens, die Bosheit und den Willen der Liebe. Hier wird nicht Gott auf die Ebene des Menschen herabgezogen, sondern umgekehrt: Der Mensch wird in dem Erfahren, was ihn über sich hinaustreibt," pp. 197–98.

30. In a passage in which Heidegger speaks of the danger of misinterpreting Sein und Zeit in a subjectivistic-existentialist manner, he writes: Dann rückt das, was hier Entscheidung genannt ist, in die innerste Wesensmitte des Seyns selbst und hat dann nichts mehr mit dem gemein, was wir das Treffen einer Wahl und dergleichen heißen, sondern sagt: das Auseinandertreten selbst, das scheidet und im Scheide erst in das Spiel kommen läßt die Er-eignung eben dieses im Auseinender *Offenen* als der Lichtung für das Sichverbergende und noch Un-entschiedene, die Zugehörigkeit des Menschen zum Sein als des Gründers seiner Wahrheit und die Zugewiesenheit des Seyns in die Zeit des letzen Gottes." *Freiheitschrift*, p. 88

31. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 3 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1987), p. 306.

32. "Der Mensch ist vielmehr von Sein selbst in die Wahrheit des Seins 'geworfen', daß er, dergestalt ek-sistierend, die Wahrheit des Seins hüte, damit im Lichte des Seins das Seiende als das Seiende, das es ist, erscheine...Der Mensch ist der Hirt des Seins . . . was ist das Sein? Es ist Es selbst." Heidegger, *Brief über den Humanismus* (Frankfurt: V. Kolstermann, 1949), p. 19.

33. See Martin Heidegger, *Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus (Schelling)*, vol. 68 Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1993).

34. See D. Köhler, "Von Schelling zu Hitler? Anmerkungen zu Heidegger's Schelling Interpretation von 1936 und 1941" (unpublished).

35. Cf. negative philosophy in the later Schelling.

36. Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik* p.137.

37. See Ott, *Martin Heidegger. Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1988), pp. 340–41.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Clemens Graf von Podewils, *Die nachbarliche Stämme' Erinnerungen an Martin Heidegger*, G. Neske, ed., pp. 207–13.

41. Ibid., p. 209.

8

HEGEL, HEIDEGGER, AND *WELTANSCHAUUNGS-PHILOSOPHIE*

Tom Rockmore

My interest in this paper will not be philological, but primarily systematic. I will be concerned with the importance of the conception of worldview (*Weltanschauung*) for our normative view of philosophy, in particular for the philosophical conception of knowledge as it concerns Hegel and Heidegger. The conception of worldview emerged in the reaction to Kant's critical philosophy. Roughly from Plato until Kant, and for numerous later thinkers such as Husserl, it is fair to say that to know is to know the independent real as it is, not as it appears, which accordingly precludes the possibility of different conceptual perspectives. In Kant's wake, the idea that there are different possible perspectives quickly became

a central epistemological issue that has evoked commentary from a wide range of later philosophers (e.g., Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Cassirer, and so on).

The idea of a perspectival approach to knowledge evokes very different analyses. Hegel, for instance, distinguishes different conceptual perspectives that are related through what might be called a perspective of all perspectives. Nietzsche, on the contrary, maintains that there are only different perspectives but no possibility of choosing between them.

As concerns epistemology, the conception of a worldview refers to one among other possible cognitive perspectives that are further linked to the social world. I see the debate about the distinction between philosophy and so-called *Weltanschauungsphilosophie*, or philosophy of the worldview, as about whether the traditional idea of philosophy as a theory of a historical truth without perspective can still be maintained or whether, say, after Hegel we need to acknowledge that most, perhaps all, claims to know are not only perspectival but further are related to the historical moment.

HEIDEGGER'S DIALOGUE WITH HEGEL

In discussing the idea of worldview in Heidegger and Hegel, I will be putting them into dialogue, so to speak. A debate with Hegel, although perhaps not this particular debate, is certainly on Heidegger's agenda. There are indications that he regarded this debate as crucial not only for his own theory but even for philosophy itself. In *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* [*Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*], in a reference to Hegel, who is supposed "to have dissolved ontology into logic," Heidegger writes that "Hegel must be overcome by radicalizing the way in which the problem is put; and at the same time he must be appropriated. This overcoming of Hegel is the intrinsically necessary step in the development of Western philosophy which must be made for it to remain at all alive."[1]

Heidegger took steps to carry out this intended dialogue in a number of writings, including §82 of *Being and Time*, which features a comparison between Heidegger's and Hegel's views of time, in articles titled "Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung" and "Hegel und die Griechen," and in the lecture course titled *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Yet although Heidegger's

opinion concerning the importance of the debate with Hegel is clear, it is fair to say that Heidegger's expressed interest in debating with the great philosophers is only partially fulfilled with respect to Hegel.

Certainly, there is no single detailed study of Hegel, similar, say, to Heidegger's study of Kant. Heidegger's different texts on Hegel represent different parts of a dialogue that he was never able to develop in a systematic way. For reasons about which one can only speculate, Heidegger never went beyond a series of comments on various aspects of Hegel's position. If this dialogue is measured by Heidegger's own suggested standard of appropriating and overcoming Hegel, we must say that, since the proposed dialogue was never more than partially elaborated, it was a failure.

Hegel is certainly a difficult thinker to follow, but there are other difficult thinkers in the philosophical tradition to whom Heidegger was attracted and whose thought he was able to penetrate with greater facility. In this respect, we can speculate that his failure is rooted in the nature of Heidegger's position that made it difficult for him to carry out his intention of appropriating and overcoming Hegel.

At a minimum, to carry out Heidegger's announced aim would presuppose a solid grasp of Hegel's dialectical view. Yet Heidegger, whose own position is anything but dialectical, found it very difficult to understand Hegel. As an early letter to Jaspers indicates, Heidegger was simply unable to understand basic aspects of Hegel's theory, for instance the distinction between being and nothing at the beginning of Hegel's *Science of Logic*.[2] He also may not have given sustained attention to a task that he clearly claimed was so crucial for philosophy. Although he devoted a semester to reading Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, there are apparently no indications in the published version of the lecture course that he read further than the fourth chapter of the book.[3]

Since Heidegger failed to carry out his intended dialogue with Hegel, we can understand the idea of *Weltanschauung* as the focus of a possible dialogue with Hegel that Heidegger never carried out. There should be no problem in placing Heidegger and Hegel in dialogue, since this conforms to Heidegger's own intentions. One might, however, object that to question Heidegger concerning a cognitive theme misses the point of his ontological theory. Yet where is it written that a philosopher should only be questioned about what we take to be his own concerns? If Heidegger can

seek to appropriate and to overcome Hegel, who is not centrally concerned with ontology, from an ontological perspective, then there is no reason not to question Heidegger from an epistemological perspective.

WELTANSCHAUUNG AND *WELTANSCHAUUNGSPHILOSOPHIE*

We shall need to define the idea of *Weltanschauung*, or worldview.[4] The German word "*Weltanschauung*" can be informally construed to mean "the way in which a person considers and evaluates the world and its meaning as well as his existence in it."[5] This idea presupposes two others: an idea of the subject, and an idea of perspective. A *Weltanschauung* provides a perspective. Leibniz famously held that each subject, or monad, views the world from its unique perspective, from a point of view whose limits cannot be overcome through a shift in perspective or by somehow going beyond perspective as such.[6] Nietzsche is certainly one of the pioneers of the idea of a worldview, given his dualistic picture of slave morality and those who are beyond morality. The Nazi philosophers made use of a related conception in their discussions of the so-called Nazi worldview.[7] It is merely a short step from the idea that all our ideas are inevitably perspectival to explaining the constitution of perspective through the normal link that cannot be undone between the person and his context.

Kant's claim that experience presupposes a subject of experience[8] is true for a worldview as well. His conception of knowledge rests on a basic distinction between its purely logical conditions, or conditions whatsoever, which he accepted as a correct approach, and a psychological account, as provided, say, in Locke, which he rejected. Although there are numerous anthropological aspects in the critical philosophy, Husserl was correct to insist that Kant's theory as a whole rejects psychologism in any form. Kant's conception of the cognitive subject as the transcendental unity of apperception, the highest concept in the critical philosophy, can be regarded as a restatement of the Cartesian cogito. It is surely no accident that "ich denke" is an exact translation of "cogito." Yet a worldview, which depends on a real human being, for this reason requires a shift to an anthropological plane.

The idea of a worldview that emerges, or rather reemerges, in post-Kantian German philosophy suggests a cognitive perspective that is relative to a given society or form of life. The idea of ideology is also understood in this way, for instance in the Marxist conception of ideology as the reflection of a socially distorted form of society. An ideology typically makes a claim to provide a faithful grasp of the way things are, in the case of Marxism to provide an accurate depiction of the hidden nature of the social context. If that were the case, an ideology would be simply unrevisable.

In opposition to an ideology, a worldview does not claim to present a canonical or unrevisable treatment of a thought, an issue, or the world in general. It rather represents the view of the matter at a given point of time. The concept of a worldview is compatible with widely varying conceptions of philosophy. They include Peirce's idea that claims to know come down to what the informed scientific community thinks we know at a given time,[9] Merleau-Ponty's idea that "evidence is never apodictic nor is thought timeless,"[10] or even the stress of the Vienna Circle thinkers on a scientific conception of the world (*wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung*).[11]

The term "Weltanschauung" is younger than the idea that claims for knowledge are perspectival. The term, which arises in a philosophical sense at the end of the eighteenth century, according to Heidegger for the first time in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*,[12] means different things for different writers. Kant suggests that philosophy is compatible with, in fact is, a worldview. He distinguishes between a so-called scholastic concept of philosophy, possessing logical perfection, and his own concept of philosophy as a *conceptus cosmicus* [*Weltbegriff*], which is supposedly intrinsically relevant to the ends of human being.[13] In his description of the *teleologia rationis humanae*, or the intrinsic teleology of human reason, he emphasizes the practical aspect of theoretical reason.

The idea of a worldview, which in the critical philosophy is synonymous with a theory of pure reason, later takes on the rather different sense of a perspective, or mere perspective, for instance a perspective on the world that, as a direct consequence, abandons the claim for knowledge in the full, or aperspectival sense. Knowledge in the full sense has been and is often still understood as entirely without perspectival or subjective limitations of any kind. If knowledge is taken to mean something like time-

less truth or even truth in a traditional, unlimited sense, then a worldview neither leads to, nor is compatible with, knowledge.

Schelling, who clearly influenced Heidegger's later writings, distinguishes between intelligence as either consciously or unconsciously productive, as in a worldview.[14] Recent writers stress that a worldview is perspectival, subjective, and revisible in order to distinguish between a worldview and the traditional, normative view of philosophy. Husserl,[15] for instance, distinguishes between philosophy and worldview that he links with historicism and so-called subjectivist scepticism. He strongly denies that a worldview is either a source of knowledge or even socially useful. According to Husserl, only "the phenomenological theory of essence," his own name for philosophy, is "capable of providing a foundation for a philosophy of the spirit."[16] With some restrictions, Husserl's view of the matter is generally followed by more recent writers, such as Heidegger and Derrida.[17] Despite severe criticisms of traditional philosophy, even philosophy as such, neither is ready to renounce traditional claims to know in an absolute, aperspectival sense.

HEGEL ON WELTANSCHAUUNG

When Hegel was writing, the term "Weltanschauung" had only recently emerged in philosophy. He uses the term in the ordinary sense to refer to the attitude typical of a given group, as the "moralische Weltanschauung" that, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, refers to a particular attitude toward the world in the wake of the great French Revolution. His utilization of the term "worldview" in this context in part reflects his conviction that the Kantian view of morality exhibits Kant's personal opinions as opposed to universalizable principles that are necesssarily valid for all rational beings.

Hegel nowhere pauses to examine the recent distinction between philosophy and *Weltanschauungsphilosophie*. Nonetheless, if *Weltanschauung* is understood as referring to cognitive perspective, then it is central to his view of cognition in a least two ways, both of which can be illustrated with respect to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. First, it is central to his own theory of knowledge. As I have shown elsewhere, the *Phenomenology* presents a theory of cognition (*Erkennen*) centering around the analysis of a

series of nested perspectives, similar to Chinese boxes. Each lower level is contained within each higher one, and the discussion ends on the level of Absolute Knowing (*absolute Wissen*), which is absolute, in part, because it is the highest and last, hence the ultimate, link in the cognitive chain. The impetus for the transition from level to level is provided by an awareness of one or more ways in which a given cognitive perspective fails to grasp its object. For instance, in the account of consciousness, the analysis of perception breaks down in the inability to demonstrate the unity of the cognitive object, which in turn leads on to consideration of the dualistic efforts deployed by Newton and Kant that Hegel considers in the discussion of force and understanding.[18]

Second, the idea of cognitive perspective that emerges in this work is clearly linked to Hegel's idea of the cognitive subject as real human being situated within the social context. It is certainly not "true" in any simple sense that Descartes invents the idea of the subject or even the modern conception of subjectivity. He rather further elaborates a conception with proximate roots in Montaigne, who strongly influenced the Cartesian theory, and with more distant roots in Augustine. Modern philosophers from Descartes to Kant, and more recently Husserl, tend to understand the cognitive subject as an epistemological posit, that is, as a function of its alleged role in the knowing process. In the wake of the great French Revolution, Fichte innovates in reconceiving the subject as a real human being, an innovation that his students have still not succeeded in digesting. Real human beings are situated in a social context they influence but which also influences them. Hegel follows Fichte in formulating his theory from the immanent perspective of a real, finite human being.

In the *Phenomenology*, we see this in the account of spirit (*Geist*) that follows that of Reason (*Vernunft*), where Hegel analyzes the central Kantian theme. In the discussion of spirit, Hegel presents human beings as self-realizing within a social framework in which ideas are accepted or rejected against the background of the prevailing ethos. In part because of the widespread conviction that epistemology ends with Kant, a theme parenthetically central to Habermas's reading of German philosophy, the epistemic significance of the Hegelian conception of spirit has not been widely understood.

Hegel is clearly concerned with an antifoundationalist approach to

knowledge as early as the *Differenzschrift*, where he rejects Reinhold's foundationalist effort to found and to ground the critical philosophy. Following Fichte, who rehabilitates the circular type of thinking rejected much earlier by Aristotle, Hegel substitutes circularity for the linear thinking typical of foundationalist forms of epistemology, especially in modern forms of foundationalism in Descartes and later thinkers.[19]

Hegel's typically antifoundationalist approach to knowledge is significantly enriched in the *Phenomenology* by the conception of spirit. In contemporary language, through this concept Hegel can be regarded as suggesting that what we call knowledge is justified through a social process, and not otherwise, hence not, say, through the familiar, but unverifiable claim to provide an adequate representation of an independent external world. The idea that justification of claims to know is finally social in character, which can be stated in many ways, mandates a rejection of any form of the familiar correspondence theory of truth. This is widely influential, for instance, in Dewey's view of warranted assertibility, in Peirce's claim that truth is what the community of scientists thinks it is, in Wittgenstein's idea that the limits of our language are the limits of our world, in Kuhn's conception of paradigms, in Sellar's notion of the space of reasons, and so on. In different ways, each of these thinkers can be regarded as maintaining that human beings agree and only agree on claims to know from their location within a social framework. The link between cognitive perspectives and the contextualist conception of the subject as immanent lies in the way that different cognitive perspectives are legitimated or deligitimated, accepted or rejected, on a social basis.

HEIDEGGER ON *WELTANSCHAUUNG*

Heidegger's conception of a worldview is most easily understood against the background of the debate in the early part of this century (between Dilthey, Husserl, and Jaspers) to which he reacts. Husserl's remarks, in his famous *Logos* article, "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft,"[20] are immediately motivated by the publication of Dilthey's article, "Weltanschauung, Philosophie und Religion" in 1910.[21] Throughout his career, Husserl understood phenomenology as providing the means to justify the tradi-

tional philosophical conception of knowledge as unlimited in any way, hence as beyond relativism of all kinds whatsoever. In the *Logos* article, his aim is to counter what he understood as the unacceptable relativistic implications of the Diltheyan view. This view is obviously related to Dilthey's seminal distinction between explanation in the natural sciences and understanding in the human or social sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*). In one passage, Dilthey goes so far as to identify a worldview as a personal attitude toward life.[22] One knowledgable writer differentiates three characteristics in Dilthey's conception of *Weltanschauung*, including a picture of the world, an evaluation of life, and an idea of how to live.[23] Dilthey further distinguishes different kinds of worldview. Yet he devotes less attention to the underlying concept that remains vague in his writings.

In his response, Husserl, who restates a version of the traditional idea of philosophy as science, differentiates between philosophy and a worldview. Philosophy is concerned with knowledge and a worldview is concerned with wisdom. Worldviews are forms, or expressions, of culture, located within time, whereas as science philosophy is a supratemporal source of knowledge.

Jaspers reacted to Husserl in clearly stating a further form of the claim, explicitly rejected by Husserl, that philosophy in general merely offers types of *Weltanschauungen*.[24] Husserl's restatement of the traditional, normative conception of philosophy leaves Jaspers's idea of a worldview unscathed. His discussion of the term "philosophy" fails to demonstrate that it cannot be understood in other ways. Since there are alternative conceptions of the nature of philosophy, it only follows that, say, Jaspers's approach is excluded if one is already committed to the rival model with which Husserl identifies.

Heidegger in turn reacts directly to the conception of *Weltanschauung* proposed by Dilthey, Husserl, Jaspers, Rickert, and other writers in a number of texts, including his very first lecture series in 1919.[25] His reaction is presented in a long review that he worked on for several years and sent to Jaspers but never finished, in his "Aristoteles-Einleitung,"[26] and in the lecture series that later appeared as *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. In his reaction against the idea of a *Weltanschauungsphilosophie*, Heidegger generally follows the Husserlian line of argument, if not his view of philosophy, according to which philosophy is utterly different from, in fact incompatible with, a worldview.

Heidegger's review of Jaspers's book begins with the observation that, from the philosophical perspective, there is as yet no adequate way to respond to Jaspers's study of the psychology of worldviews.[27] In his initial lecture series, Heidegger claims that a worldview represents the immanent task and limit of philosophy, but that philosophy as critical science is not identical with, but different from, a theory of a worldview.[28] In the later lecture series, he argues that if philosophy is only the construction of a worldview, then there is no distinction between them; and he further argues that philosophy is not the formation of a worldview but the science of being.[29]

Heidegger's restatement and embellishment of the generally Husserlian view of philosophy is meant both to define his own theory as well as to refute a philosophical reading of the very idea of a worldview. Heidegger is naturally entitled to define philosophy as he wishes; but so also is anyone else, say, Dilthey or Jaspers. Further, Heidegger's point about the danger of conflating philosophy with a worldview only follows if one is committed, as he was early on, to defending philosophy against any possible "contamination" due to its relation to the historical context. Yet this is only one of the possible normative conceptions of philosophy. Further, no consequences can be drawn about the nature of philosophy on the grounds that if it were a worldview, the distinction between a worldview and philosophy would disappear.

We must further ask if Heidegger is consistent in his refusal of the very idea of a *Weltanschauung*. His unequivocal defense of the generally Husserlian distinction between philosophy and *Weltanschauungsphilosophie* is clearly undermined by his equivocal approach to the concept of truth, which reflects a deep tension in his theory. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger simultaneously defends two irreconcilably different conceptions of truth. On the one hand, he is committed to a form of the Husserlian view of phenomenological truth as transcendental. "Every disclosure of Being as the *transcendens* is *transcendental* knowledge. *Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of Being) is veritas transcendentalis.*"[30] This accounts for the view that through the period of *Being and Time*, up until the so-called turning in his thought, say, until the inaugural lecture, Heidegger was clearly committed to transcendental philosophy.

On the other hand, there is the obviously different, in fact clearly incompatible conception of hermeneutical truth based on his conception

of the subject as *Dasein*, that is, based on human existence as the main clue to the answer to the question of the meaning of being. This view of subjectivity is incompatible with a conception of the transcendental subject outside time and outside history, as in Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, which Heidegger rejects in *Being and Time*.[31] A hermeneutical view of truth, roughly truth through interpretation, is compatible with a grasp of the subject as *Dasein*. Human beings know, to the extent that knowledge is possible at all, through interpretation. Yet interpretation is never transcendental, nor apodictic, nor unrevisable in a Husserlian sense. In a word, interpretation does not and cannot provide claims for transcendental truth, such as the claims that Husserl typically features.

This deep tension in Heidegger's theory, which derives from his simultaneous commitment to two irreconcilably different views of truth in *Being and Time*, is evident on several levels. Hermeneutical truth is perspectival, reflecting, as Heidegger insists, the elaboration of an initial insight, whereas phenomenological, or transcendental, truth is aperspectival. Obviously, it is inconsistent to maintain that truth is both perspectival and aperspectival. It may be one or the other; on pain of contradiction it simply cannot be both. Further, a perspectival, hermeneutical conception of truth is consistent with a contextualist conception of the subject as immanent. Yet an aperspectival, transcendental, phenomenological conception of truth is simply inconsistent with Heidegger's conception of *Dasein* in *Being and Time*.

Heidegger's insistence on phenomenological truth as transcendental truth is incompatible with taking the immanent subject seriously. Human beings do not and cannot be held to know in an apodictic manner, either in the form of transcendental truth or in the form of phenomenological truth in anything like a Husserlian sense. People make mistakes in reasoning, change their minds, hesitate to make up their minds, are unsure of what they think they know, are influenced by their surroundings, including other competing views, are easily distracted, etc., all things that are clearly incompatible with claims to apodictic knowledge. Following others, especially Descartes and Kant, Husserl was correct to talk about the transcendental ego as the phenomenological subject. Yet Heidegger seems unaware of the incompatibility between his conception of the subject as *Dasein* and his claim for phenomenological truth in the Husserlian sense.

I see no easy way (or even any reasonable way) either to deny the difficulties in Heidegger's early theory that derive from his simultaneous commitment to conflicting theories of truth, to their associated forms of subjectivity, etc. I cannot discuss the later evolution of Heidegger's theory here. Suffice it to say that I believe that the difficulties are not alleviated, but rather only aggravated after the mysterious so-called turning in his thought through the comparative eclipse of subjectivity in favor of a new conception of being as self-showing or self-presenting. This later conception of being as self-showing simply conflicts without argument with the early view that *Dasein* is the necessary clue to being.

HEIDEGGER, HEGEL, AND *WELTANSCHAUUNGSPHILOSOPHIE*

For present purposes, I will focus on Heidegger's early view of Dasein, or conception of the subject in a social context (roughly similar to Hegel's conception of human being from the perspective of spirit) that provides an important point of agreement between two very dissimilar philosophers. It is, or at least should be, fairly obvious that if philosophy is not transcendental (and it cannot be if we take seriously the view that the real subject is immanent human being), then an immediate consequence is a shift toward themes Husserl clearly intends to reject, including naturalism, relativism, and historicism.

The question which arises is how the Husserlian distinction could be defended other than by something like simple fiat. To put the issue bluntly, it is clearly one thing to commit oneself to such a distinction in principle and quite something else to show that is viable, for instance by presenting an argument for this point of view. Heidegger, who simply follows the general Husserlian view in this regard, limits his defense of it to the obvious comment that, if the distinction is invalid, philosophy just reduces to *Weltanschauungsphilosophie*. Perhaps. Yet it does not follow from this quasi-transcendental defense that philosophy in his sense is viable. It follows only that the distinction between philosophy and worldview philosophy is a precondition for it to be viable.

Perhaps we do not want simply to collapse the distinction between

philosophy and worldview philosophy. We might, for instance, want to maintain that, although dependent on its historical context, philosophy nonetheless possesses a self-reflexive capacity, hence a type of rigor lacking in the ordinary worldview. Yet the weight of the evidence now seems in favor of those who simply deny that there is any way to draw a strict distinction, such as the one Husserl and then Heidegger defend, between philosophy and *Weltanschauungsphilosophie*. Although it is normal for those still committed to the traditional view of philosophy, after the emergence of the idea of a *Weltanschauung*, to distinguish philosophy from this new conception, it is difficult to defend more than an informal, weak form of this distinction, such as in the form that I have just suggested. Philosophers tyically deny any association between what they do and mere *Weltanschauungen* on the putative grounds that in their theories they propose knowledge in some absolute, extra-historical form. Fair enough. Yet why should we accept this claim unless and until it can be demonstrated that philosophy does in fact offer unrevisable truth and knowledge? Certainly, no one, least of all philosophers, who otherwise agree widely that this is the only acceptable normative conception of knowledge can agree on what this consists of. At a time when philosophy's fortunes seem to be declining steadily, there is at least as much disagreement within philosophy about what philosophers do as there has ever been. It seems entirely possible that philosophers for some two and a half millenia simply became used to routinely invoking a mistaken view of what they were up to.

The issue can be focused through the distinction between two approaches to knowledge as justified either socially or through an adequate representation of the independent external world. Certainly, epistemological foundationalism, the main strategy of modern times, appears to have run out of conceptual steam. To the best of my knowledge, no one, or almost no one, currently still subscribes to the ancient Greek idea that, in Merleau-Ponty's apt phrase, knowledge consists in literally seeing the invisible. Unless some variant of epistemological foundationalism is viable, there seems no way to show that claims to know can be made in independence of the social context in which they arise and must otherwise be justified. Yet this would have to be shown to defend the Husserlian distinction. My suspicion is that in practice philosophy has never been able to make out a clear distinction between itself and its surroundings, since

philosophers, like others, belong to and think on the basis of a wider social world. It certainly does not follow that, merely because a philosopher reflects on this link, he has somehow broken this connection. That is a little like saying that when the anthropologist visits the native village, his awareness that he is doing so somehow frees him from any hint of ethnocentrism.

The idea that certain types of thought, including philosophy, are more or less firmly linked to the historical moment has been strengthened by the nature of numerous recent efforts to defend Heidegger against the fallout of his Nazi turning through insisting on a sharp distinction between Heidegger the ordinary Nazi and Heidegger the important philosopher. This persistent effort is a failure, since the distinction on which it rests cannot be made out. Efforts to separate Heidegger's philosophy and his life can be illustrated through Sluga's suggestion that the very idea that they are one and the same rests on an untested assertion,[32] through Safranski's claim that Heidegger's service to the Nazi state was unrelated to and did not affect his philosophy,[33] or through Grondin's suggestion that Heidegger's politics have no philosophical basis and that his political writings are not philosophical.[34] Yet unless and until the distinction on which they rest can be drawn, and Heidegger himself denies that it can, such efforts will remain unconvincing.

A defense of this kind is self-stultifying. Heidegger's defenders typically adhere to a more traditional conception of philosophy than his own. Efforts to defend Heidegger, say, by invoking a form of transcendental subject, obviously conflict with Heidegger's contextualist view of *Dasein*, so that, in effect, if it succeeds, it fails. It is further utterly implausible to think that because someone is a philosopher, his view is for that reason unrelated to the ongoing discussion or to his social surroundings. Rather like Hegel, Heidegger in effect believed that we always think out of our historical moment.

Elsewhere I have argued that Heidegger's political engagement can only be understood through his philosophy, which is specifically at work in his political writings.[35] Efforts to protect, if not Heidegger the man, at least his philosophical theories, from any political contamination frequently take either one of two forms. Either it is argued that the evolution of his position can and must be grasped on wholly immanent philo-

sophical grounds, or it it is argued that he was not more than distantly aware of his historical moment which could not then have played a significant role in his theorizing.

With respect to the first point, suffice it to say that none of the interpretations that have so far been proposed has successfully explained the evolution of his later position on merely immanent philosophical grounds. In fact, that cannot be done if his later theories depend on his reaction to Nazism, to the failure of his rectorate, to his perception of the progress of the German war effort, and so on; in short, a series of explanatory factors that cannot be brought into the discussion if one merely brackets his Nazism.

Philosophers are sometimes believed to live in a kind of conceptual fog, surrounded only by their thoughts. Suggestions that Heidegger was only distantly aware of the times in which he lived are contradicted by many specific counterexamples in his writings. Heidegger's reaction to his philosophical moment, for instance in his rejection of contemporary German neo-Kantianism, is better known than his reaction to his historical surroundings. Yet when his texts are read with care, they show amply that he was not functioning in the mythical, Olympian philosophical fashion, supposedly typical of philosophers, but was closely aware of and deeply concerned by his historical moment. Examples are plentiful, for instance, in the 1940 lecture series on European nihilism,[36] hence after Heidegger had supposedly broken with National Socialism, where he is concerned with the English attack on the French fleet in Oran (264f.), with the "Sicherung des >Lebensraums<" not as the end, but as "Mittel zur Lebensteigerung" (p. 141), his suggestion that what he calls the "blonde Bestie" (p. 275) is the model for the new man, etc.[37]

PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS AGAIN

We still do not know how to relate philosophy to its historical moment. What we do know is that philosophy is not independent of, but in some inexplicable manner is linked to, its historical moment.

Hegel's critics have often attempted to turn the idea that philosophy depends on its historical context against his later position. He is almost

routinely regarded as having changed his theory to conform to the Prussia of his times. The objection that he was unable to distance himself sufficiently from his historical moment is misguided. The alleged changes in his theory cannot be demonstrated in his texts. His earlier enthusiasm about the real possibilities for change in the wake of the French Revolution were later tempered during the period of the restoration of the monarchy in France. It is certainly incorrect to maintain that his youthful liberalism later gave way to a reactionary political attitude.[38] Yet his position clearly depends on the historical moment in which it emerged.

Hegel's relation to his historical period explains, for instance, his enthusiasm for constitutional monarchy, which, at the time, appeared better than any alternative political approach. If he were alive today, one can speculate that Hegel might not favor monarchy in any form. The period in which he wrote further explains his concern with the rampant poverty that did not disappear and seemed destined not even to be alleviated through the industrial revolution.

Like Hegel, in fact like everyone else, Heidegger's theory obviously also depends on the period in which he lived and worked, as witness the fantastic reception of the theory that, in the waning days of the Weimar Republic, seemed to many of its readers to speak directly to their existential concerns. In certain instances, the categories that Heidegger builds into his early theory are obviously suggested or chosen to evoke such concrete issues of daily life in this period as authenticity, idle talk, fate, the hero, and resoluteness.

The problem of the proper role of philosophy with respect to politics received an early answer in Plato's claim that philosophy is independent of, but also indispensable for, politics. In the Rektoratsrede and more generally in his period as the Führer of the University of Freiburg (1933–1934), Heidegger seemed to be depending on a version of the ancient view that philosophy should replace political science. What Jaspers usefully called "den Führer führen" finally comes down to a Nazi form of Platonism. Hegel, who was more cautious than either Heidegger or Marx, thought that philosophy should strive to understand, but not directly to interfere in, politics. His famous remark that theory is more important than practice should be understood as suggesting that in formulating philosophical concepts philosophers provide real possibilities for the future.

According to Hegel, a philosopher should prescind from direct political action while acting through ideas elaborated from within the social context that exert an influence on its future evolution. There are indications that Heidegger turned to politics more on the basis of his theory than on the basis of a coherent analysis of the relation of philosophy and politics.[39] With respect to politics, around the time that he entered the political arena Heidegger seems to have been a Platonist, concerned to play a direct political role. This interpretation of Heidegger's relation to his times is bolstered in his own remark in a letter to Elisabeth Blochmann. According to Heidegger, "Wirklich bleibende Philosophie kann nur die werden, die wahrhaft Philosophie ihrer Zeit, d. h. aber ihrer Zeit mächtig ist"[40] from a position that finally surpasses its own historical moment.[41]

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Heidegger misunderstood the lesson of his own conception of *Dasein* in trying, as says, to spring over our own time. If we take the subject seriously, then we cannot spring over our own time that, at best, we can only hope to grasp through thought. Yet if we can only grasp our world from an immanent perspective, then a transcendental perspective that surpasses its own time is no more than a regulative idea that can never be constitutive.

CONCLUSION

The idea of aperspectival knowledge has been under attack recently as part of the anti-Cartesian backlash. This backlash concerns a number of closely interrelated themes, including foundationalism, the nature of the cognitive subject, the very idea of epistemological justification, etc. The conception of *Weltanschauung* suggests that claims to know are not only perspectival but also ultimately reflect the historical moment in which they are formulated. This conception has correctly been seen as threatening a traditional, normative view of philosophy as aperspectival, hence as ahistorical, between time and place, widely present in the philosophical discussion from Plato through Descartes and Kant to Husserl.

This paper has discussed the distinction between philosophy and *Weltanschauungsphilosophie* in Hegel and Heidegger. The conception of *Weltanschauung* ultimately comes down to claims about cognitive perspec-

tive, particularly historical perspective. I have argued that Hegel is committed to a kind of historical relativism. I have further argued that, despite his concern with history, Heidegger remains committed to an inconsistent view of knowledge as both perspectival and aperspectival.

The deep anticontextualism dominating the philosophical tradition can be illustrated by Russell's statement that

> The free intellect will see as God might see, without a here and now, without hopes and fears, without the trammels of customary beliefs and traditional prejudices, calmly, dispassionately, in the sole and exclusive desire of knowledge—knowledge as impersonal, as purely contemplative, as it is possible for man to attain.[42]

Yet as concerns anticontextualism, this statement offers no more than a regulative idea. Despite claims to the contrary, we never show that our ideas adequately correspond to the way the independent external world is, since foundationalism in all its forms, including transcendental philosophical arguments, cannot be made out. Hence, we are forced in practice to fall back on social justifications of knowledge. Hence, if we are to avoid skepticism, the only alternative is some type of contextualist approach to knowledge, defined as justification through accepting the standards of an epistemic community.[43]

It would be a mistake to collapse philosophy into a mere worldview, equivalent, say, to any untutored, or folk, view of the matter. Yet the distinction is at best relative since it is not possible to make out a more than relative distinction between philosophy and a worldview. Heidegger inconsistently tries to maintain an absolute distinction between philosophy as intrinsically aperspectival and a mere perspective, a distinction that he himself calls into question in his view of *Dasein*. Hegel has often been misread as maintaining a claim for absolute knowledge, which is very different from a claim about absolute knowing. Yet in the final analysis, every philosopher thinks out of the historical moment. The deeper import of the idea of *Weltanschaung* lies in the suggestion that not only human beings, but also thought, knowledge, and claims to truth are finally revealed as historical. Although it is possible to disagree about the precise relation between philosophy and *Weltanschauung*, I believe that it is no

longer possible to defend the idea that philosophy is suprahistorical, or the claim that truth that appears in time is somehow beyond time. Once the idea that knowledge is historical emerges through the conception of *Weltanschauung*, there is no turning back.

NOTES

1. Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Alfred Hofstadter, trans. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 178. "Diese Überwindung Hegels ist der innerlich notwendige Schritt in der Entwicklung der abendländischen Philsophie, der gemacht werden muß, wenn sie überhaupt noch am Leben bleiben soll." *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, p. 254.

2. See Martin Heidegger/Karl Jaspers, *Briefwechsel 1920–1963*, Walter Biemel and Hans Saner, eds. (Frankfurt a. M. and München: Vittorio Klostermann/Piper, 1990), p. 57.

3. See Martin Heidegger, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, trans. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980).

4. For discussion, see Heinrich Gomperz, *Weltanschauungslehre* (Jena and Leipzig: Diderichs, 1905).

5. For this definition, see Gerhard Wahrig, *Deutsches Wörterbuch* (Berlin: Bertelmanns Verlag, 1975), p. 4119.

6. See Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, "Monadology, §§56, 57," *Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays*, Paul Schrecker and Anne Martin Schrecker, trans. (Indianapolis: LLA, 1965).

7. See, e.g., Monika Leske, *Philosophen im 'Dritten Reich'. Studie zu Hochschul-und Philosophiebetrieb im faschistischen Deutschland* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1990).

8. See "The Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception" in Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Norman Kemp Smith, trans. (London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's, 1962), B 131–36, pp. 152–55.

9. This idea recurs frequently in Peirce. See, e.g., "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man," in *Values in a Universe of Chance: Selected Writings of Charles S. Peirce*, Philip P. Wiener, ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1958), p. 17.

10. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences," in *The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays on Phenom-*

enological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics, James M. Edie, ed. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 13.

11. See the programmatic brochure *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis* (Vienna: A. Wolf, 1929).

12. See Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p. 4.

13. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 867, pp. 655–56.

14. See F. W. J. Schelling, *Einleitung zu dem Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie* [1799], *Ausgewählte Schriften* (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1985), I, p. 339.

15. See Rudolf Eucken, *Grundlinien einer Neuen Lebensanschauung* (Leipzig: Veit, 1907). Husserl was evidently very familiar with Eucken's view.

16. Edmund Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, Quentin Lauer, trans. (New York: Harper, 1965), p. 129.

17. See Jacques Derrida, *L'origine de la géométrie* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1974), p. 45.

18. See Tom Rockmore, *Cognition: An Introduction to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

19. See Tom Rockmore, *Hegel's Circular Epistemology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986).

20. See Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, p. 133, fn i.

21. See Dilthey, "Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit der Renaissance und Reformation," in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 3 (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1960), pp. 528ff.

22. See Wilhelm Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 8, p. 98.

23. See Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Sciences* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 349–50.

24. See Karl Jaspers, *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1919).

25. See Martin Heidegger, "Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem," in *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, Bernd Heimbüchel, ed. (Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987).

26. See Martin Heidegger, "Aristoteles-Einleitung," in *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht 1989), vol. 6, pp. 228–74. On the conception of *Weltanschauung* see Rudolf A. Makkreel, "The Genesis of Heidegger's Phenomenological Hermeneutics and the Rediscovered 'Aristotle Introduction' of 1922," in *Man and World* 23 (1990) pp. 305–20, especially pp. 306, 311.

27. "Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers 'Psychologie der Weltanschauungen,'" in Martin Heidegger, *Wegmarken*, F.-W. von Hermann, ed. *Heidegger-Gesamtausgabe*, (Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), p. 1.

28. See Heidegger, *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, p. 9.

29. See Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, §2, pp. 4–11.

30. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), §7, p. 62.

31. See ibid., p. 184.

32. See Hans Sluga, *Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 8.

33. See Rüdiger Safranski, *Ein Meister aus Deutschland, Heidegger und seine Zeit* (Hamburg: Carl Hansa Verlag, 1994).

34. See Jean Grondin *Sources of Hermeneutics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 80.

35. See Tom Rockmore, *On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

36. See Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Der europäische Nihilismus*, Petra Jaeger, ed. (Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1986).

37. See Martha Zapata Galindo, *Triumph des Willens zur Macht, Zur Nietzsche-Rezeption im NS-Staat* (Hamburg: Argument, 1995), chapter 6.2, "Heideggers Metaphysik des Krieges," pp. 158–63.

38. See "Hegel and the Social Function of Reason," in Tom Rockmore, *On Hegel's Epistemology and Contemporary Philosophy* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1996), pp. 215–41 (ch. 9).

39. See Rockmore, *On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy.*

40. See Heidegger's letter of May 10, 1930 to Elisabeth Blochmann, cited in Safranksi, *Ein Meister aus Deutschland, Heidegger und seine Zeit*, p. 250.

41. ". . . im echten Rückgang in die Geschichte nehmen wir den Abstand von der Gegenwart, der uns erst den Zwischenraum schafft für den Anlauf, der notwendig ist, um über unsere eigene Gegenwart hinauszuspringen, d. h. sie als das zu nehmen, als was genommen zu werden jede Gengewart einzig verdient: daß sie überwunden werden soll ..." Martin Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet*, GA 34, Hermann Mörchen, ed. (Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1988), p. 10.

42. Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 160.

43. See Susan Haack, *Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 20.

9

HEIDEGGER AND THE NEO-KANTIAN READING OF KANT

Claude Piché

In his series of lectures on Kant in the winter term of 1927–1928, Heidegger begins his discussion of the Transcendental Aesthetic with the following comment:

> The phenomenological interpretation of Kant is fundamentally opposed to that of the Marburg School, but we cannot get into a debate with them here; what is now important is to lay a solid basis for the phenomenological interpretation itself. We should stress, however, that the radical one-sidedness of the Marburg School has done more to further the interpretation of Kant than have all the more moderate approaches that

never even considered it necessary to deal with the central problematic of the " Critique."[1]

The confrontation with the neo-Kantianism of the Marburg School that Heidegger here postpones to a later date was never to take place. Strange as it may seem, Heidegger nowhere enters into a detailed discussion of the Marburg School's, or at least not of Cohen's and Natorp's, interpretation of Kant.[2] The text of the Davos debate between Heidegger and Cassirer takes the form of minutes of a free discussion and deals only indirectly with Cohen, whom Heidegger places in the dock alongside the other suspects: Windelband, Rickert, Erdmann, and Riehl. And while his interlocutor, Cassirer, may have been the titular heir of the Marburg School, Heidegger's own philosophy of symbolic forms gives an original bent to the movement which originally centered on the theory of knowledge.[3]

Yet if any of the neo-Kantians deserved Heidegger's attention, Cohen and Natorp did. Were they not, as he himself said, "shrewd researchers" (*sachliche Forscher*) who produced "the most profound and significant interpretation of Kant in the nineteenth century"?[4] While he did not hesitate to emphasize the one-sidedness of their approach, he appreciated their radicalism. And while he noted in passing the "violence" (*Gewaltsamkeit*[5]) of their reading of Kant, to anyone familiar with the hermeneutical precepts at work in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, this need not be seen as a rebuke. On the contrary, Heidegger could not but have discovered his affinity with these neo-Kantians who, like him, claimed to understand Kant better than Kant had understood himself.[6] Cohen and Natorp tried no less than to bridge the yawning gap that separates sensibility from understanding in *Critique of Pure Reason*. The mere fact of inquiring into a common ground for the Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Logic in order to demonstrate their unity is the sign of an "authentic philosophical motivation."[7] However different the results of this motivation, it was certainly something that Heidegger had to recognize that he shared with them.

Nonetheless, Heidegger time and again attacks the results of the neo-Kantian reading, and his many allusions to the Marburg School are generally negative. They are only allusions, though, and while they may furnish

clues to the clash of ideas, they should be supplemented by a rigorous comparison of the two sides. Heidegger's polemical comments tend to reduce the question to one of the opposition between ontology and epistemology or, in other words, to the difference between a ground-laying project in metaphysics and a project for a philosophy in the service of modern science. Now, this question obscures a number of others, upon which it might prove useful to cast some light. It is, of course, impossible here to present an exhaustive reconstruction of the debate that might have taken place between Heidegger and the Marburg neo-Kantians. So our study will be restricted to interpretations of the *Critique of Pure Reason* by Heidegger and Hermann Cohen and focus on the two areas of comparison that seem to us most likely to indicate what a full-fledged *Auseinandersetzung* might have looked like.

The first is the now-famous theme of the "common root" of sensibility and understanding. Even though, unlike Heidegger, Cohen does not use the unfathomable common root to orient his reading of Kant, we can use it to delineate clearly the two approaches and establish certain parallels between them. We shall accordingly examine Cohen's epistemological reading and Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation by reviewing their respective positions on psychologism, the status of the a priori and the "fact of science."

The second area of comparison revolves around the two authors' approach to Transcendental Deduction. Understandably we can only try to clarify their line of attack and cannot deal here with the details of their reconstruction of this chapter of the *Critique*. To this end we shall study more specifically one of the themes that sums up the issues and results of the deduction, the "Supreme Principle of all Synthetic Judgments."

At the end of our survey we shall be in a position to discern a measure of convergence between the two readings, a convergence that Heidegger's criticisms of Cohen tend to obscure. We shall thus come to share Cassirer's opinion. We recall that in his review of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* he deplores Heidegger's failure to do justice to the interpretation of his teacher, Cohen.[8] In the final analysis Cohen and Heidegger agree in that both emphasize the "transcendental" dimension of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. As a result of our undertaking we shall be better able to understand why the reevaluation of transcendentalism had to take a dif-

ferent form in the two cases. It is, after all, commonly acknowledged that for Cohen the interpretation of the *Critique* is based on the Analytic of Principles, and particularly on the principle of intensive magnitudes as the principle of the production of reality. On the other hand, in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger sees the heart of the *Critique* in Transcendental Schematism as the generator of ontological knowledge.

THE COMMON ROOT

Hermann Cohen

Heidegger adopts as his own Kant's metaphor of the common root of sensibility and understanding because it indicates to him the route to follow in order to refashion the unity of the *Critique*. Now, it is noteworthy that in *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung* Cohen makes an explicit and extremely significant reference to this same metaphor. While he does not use it as a direct guideline for his own work, he considers it very suggestive in that it allows one to point, in contrast, to another route, to the one that he intends to follow. In the following passage, drawn from a discussion of Locke's empiricism, Cohen is concerned that an approach founded solely on the faculties of the soul might divert philosophy into the realm of psychology.

> For those who in Kant's psychology see the various faculties of the soul as necessary principles, it must be evident that even the broadest of the generic concepts among these faculties, namely sensibility and understanding "stem perhaps from a common root unknown to us" (KrV B 29). In the soul such a root could easily have become accessible to knowing. But Kant founds the link he seeks on scientific knowledge. No analysis focused on the "genesis" of experience rather than on "content" is transcendental, but is on the contrary "subjective."[9]

While Cohen thus does not deny that Kant's analyses include a psychological dimension, he insists on the fact that Kant does not use psychology to resolve fundamental issues, even though he might "easily" have resorted to the subterfuge of an inherent faculty. The unity he seeks is not

to be found on the level of faculties but rather in what they make possible, in the "scientific knowledge" that is a clear indicator of the combination of cognitive faculties with a common task in view. Sensibility and understanding must be considered as distinct faculties before one can be in a position to determine with any precision what their role in knowing may be. "The distinction between sensibility and thought [must be] determined on the basis of the difference in their respective contributions to *science* and truth, and not, for example, on the basis of their psychological origin in the human soul."[10] Clearly, unity here comes in the shape of a synthesis which can be apprehended in the finished product, mathematical physics. Science thus becomes the route par excellence to the primary and irreducible elements of knowledge. The refusal to resort to the theme of the "common root" of sensibility and understanding is very revealing of Cohen's project, but should not lead one, in reaction, to label Heidegger's interpretation, which we shall return to later, as "psychologism." Yet Cohen's stand against the primacy of the psychological in the theory of knowledge is symptomatic of the context in which the Marburg interpretation developed; it was a matter of dismissing any approach which, like psychologism, gave more prominence to the concrete genesis (*Entstehung*) of knowledge over its content (*Bestand*), and this content is accessible, at least in terms of its a priori, only through scientific discourse.

The Spectre of Psychologism

Cohen wrote *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung* in reaction to the psychologism which dominated Kantian interpretation at the time. When the work first appeared in 1871, Trendelenburg, Herbart, Fries, Bona Meyer, and Steinthal held center stage. They maintained that any valid lessons the *Critique of Pure Reason* might still hold would have to be recast in psychological terms. In these circumstances, Cohen was not so much calling for a return to Kant—for this was already well underway—but rather for a return to the text of the *Critique*, a text which revealed to anyone who knew how to read something quite different from what others were trying to make it say. Kantian argumentation certainly often slides into the realm of psychology, but if one understands the spirit of the argument one sees that it is far from advocating that philosophy become a subset of some pos-

itive science or other. Thus Cohen applied himself to restoring Kant's specificity: the *Critique* is a form of transcendental discourse, which is irreducible to an empirical discipline.

It should be noted that when Cohen criticizes psychologism he knows exactly what he is talking about. He was himself a student of Trendelenburg and Steinthal and over the course of his education followed this fashion of approaching all human productions, even the most sublime, from the point of view of psychology. Thus in 1867 he published a paper with the suggestive title of "The Platonic Theory of Ideas Developed from a Psychological Standpoint" in the *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*. There he maintained that however great and noble they may be, the productions of the mind comprise a psychological dimension whose mechanism can be revealed by positive science through the application of rigorous laws: "if we had more than an aesthetic appreciation of all the creations of genius, all the productions of art in the broad sense in which the thinker and the poet are at one, if we understood the process of productions of the mind, we could see clearly that a common psychological law comprises all the mind produces, whether great or small."[11] In this context nothing can be excluded from genetic explication, not even the theories of Plato. Now, it is against this attitude that *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung* rebels. It sought to separate philosophy from the ambient positivism and restore it to prominence and, in order to accomplish this task, to develop a new approach to the a priori.

The Doctrine of the A Priori

Kants Theorie der Erfhrung basically represents a theory of the a priori. Indeed any philosopher must operate on the level that Cohen, following Kant, calls "metaphysical" if he wishes to avoid empirical explanations of the generation of representations of consciousness and to define the *Bestand*, the component of consciousness which raises in it a claim to necessity and universality. The point is not to deny the psychological moment but to demonstrate its limits.

> In analysing facts of consciousness that produce knowledge there must, however, be an internal differentiation of the methodical attitude.

> Because of this differentiation, Kant characterizes the preliminary process of the transcendental method by using the accepted term," metaphysics." And this metaphysical precondition at the same time corrects the psychological bias. One must first bring the psychologist to take note of the fact that there are *limits* to his analysis, limits that he must recognize—thus demonstrating his critical maturity—and which critical interest requires be established.[12]

While Cohen affirms that the metaphysical viewpoint can counter the psychological bias, he takes care to point out here that this viewpoint is merely provisional. It is only a "precondition." Why is this so? Because despite this act of discriminating among the facts of consciousness, thanks to which the a priori may be distinguished from the a posteriori, critical analysis remains confined to the sphere of subjectivity. The metaphysical a priori is still only a "subjective" a priori.[13] Thus for example the *metaphysical* deduction of pure concepts of understanding may bring out a set of concepts from forms of judgment. Kant designates these concepts as *notions*, which are *given* concepts in the knowing subject and independent of all empirical experience. This deduction then constitutes a "preliminary process" which aims at distinguishing the metaphysical a priori from all other concepts of empirical origin. But this a priori only achieves true legitimacy when one resorts to this transcendental deduction. Then and only then do the necessity and universality of this a priori find the sphere in which it can be applied. In accordance with Kant's well-known definition, the term "transcendental" refers not so much to objects as to our manner of knowing objects, so far as this may be possible a priori.[14] The critical process, in its transcendental aspect, does not transform the subjective *a priori* into objects; it simply shows, according to Cohen, to what extent it is a part of all knowledge of objects. One should note here that thanks to Cohen's redefinition of the concept of "experience" there is nothing empirical about the knowledge in question. Strictly speaking, for Cohen experience means "mathematical physics" as pure science. It is only on this condition that the "transcendental method" can claim to find its moorings in "experience."

The Fact of Science

We have seen that Cohen was not interested in directing his interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* toward a search for the "common root" and contended that this option would simply lead philosophy back down the trail into psychologism. But the mere development of a metaphysical a priori cannot by itself constitute a satisfactory solution. This interpretation, like psychologism before it, tends to give greater importance to the sphere of subjective immanence, and favoring the subject in this manner runs the risk of again falling into the rut of Fichte's "subjective idealism."

Now, what is fundamentally at stake in the interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is not only the proper appreciation of historic Kantianism, or as Heidegger would say, the proper apprehension of Kant *an sich*;[15] it is rather a matter of knowing whether Kant finally remained a significant figure for nineteenth-century philosophy which, in the wake of the rapid development of the positive sciences, was left in search of a domain specific to itself. The question is therefore the following: To which field should philosophy be linked? What should be its point of departure? Cohen's answer is unequivocal: "The fact of science is the fundamental supposition from which philosophy stems and without which it cannot begin."[16] It is worth taking a closer look at this thesis which may well serve to justify the label of "theory of knowledge" that Heidegger attached to Cohen's project.

We know that the "science" in question is modern science, which Cohen immediately identifies with the Kantian concept of "experience."[17] Now, the universality and necessity characteristic of the a priori are most clearly expressed in the laws of Newtonian physics (conceived as a *physica pura*). So much so, that for Cohen mathematical physics, because it provides favored access to the a priori of knowledge, must serve as the point of departure for the philosophical endeavor. In this Cohen meant to remain faithful to Kant, and he even went so far as to maintain that Kant proceeded no differently when he built his own system. According to Cohen, the *Critique of Pure Reason* gives only a partial picture of the real work of philosophical analysis. The a priori constituents of experience, which the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements presents progressively and in succession, were really elicited by a regressive analysis of the science of nature. The process adopted in the *Prolegomena* is thus preferable to that in

the *Critique* because the former gets right to the question: "How is a pure science of nature possible?" One can thus advance to an explicit analysis of the various a priori constituents of science. The process adopted in the *Critique* on the other hand, because it is synthetic and progressive, forces one to move *in abstracto* to a metaphysical exposition of pure space and time and to a metaphysical deduction of concepts of understanding. Only then can it illustrate their contribution to transcendental synthesis. One must therefore read the *Critique of Pure Reason* in the light of the *Prolegomena* in order to understand the provisional status of those elements of consciousness, the metaphysical a priori. Through his application of the "transcendental method" to the *Critique*, Cohen shows that the metaphysical level of consciousness can be true only on the transcendental plane.

> Only the transcendental method can achieve a confirmation whose principle and norm consist simply in the following idea: certain elements of knowledge are elements of cognitive consciousness which are necessary and sufficient to founding and ensuring the fact of science.[18]

This citation sheds light on the status that Cohen assigns to the "fact of science," which needs to be founded on and consolidated by the transcendental method. Thus while the so-called fact of science must be the point of departure for philosophical discourse, it does not for all that provide it with a firm foundation. For the purely factual character of science is the hallmark of its contingency. Cohen has not forgotten Kant's allusion to the fact that experience is "something quite contingent." This contingency calls for research into the causes or, more accurately, the conditions of possibility. The task of philosophy is thus henceforth to draw out from scientific discourse the pure elements which serve as its foundation;[19] the scientist lacks adequate theoretical tools and cannot himself accomplish this task. It is thus made clear that the fact of science cannot be "dogmatically accepted" by the philosopher without further ado but rather constitutes a "methodological presupposition." On the one hand it is in no wise an empirical fact; on the other, the simply factual character of the necessity and universality of scientific law compels one to attribute to it nothing more than a claim to validity (*erhobener Wertanspruch*[20]) which needs to be justified.

Martin Heidegger

Psychologism: An Ancient Victory

In 1914, when Heidegger presented his doctoral dissertation, *The Theory of Judgment in Psychologism*, the struggle against psychologism was already being conducted on a number of fronts and was no longer so significant an issue as when *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung was published.* Indeed Heidegger, in joining the chorus of critics of psychologism, highlighted right in his introduction Cohen's role in the battle between the "psychological and transcendental methods." As far as the interpretation of Kant is concerned, the outcome of the debate had been "well and truly settled"[21] since Cohen's "logico-transcendental conception" had in the meantime gained the upper hand. Heidegger's conclusion, after his examination of psychologically oriented logical theories, was thus predictable. "Psychologism is not only a false manner of posing the question regarding the object of logic, it knows absolutely nothing about *logical* 'reality' (*Wirklichkeit*)."[22] Yet in contrast to Windelband and Husserl, who are also mentioned in the introduction, Heidegger did not cast his critique of psychologism in the form of a self-criticism.[23] Since he intervened in the debate late enough to draw on the lessons of his predecessors, he hardly had to.

In certain respects, his doctoral thesis foreshadows some elements of Heidegger's later work. Thus there arises the famous *Frage nach dem "Sinn des Seins."*[24] Naturally, the question here is that of the being of judgment, and Heidegger's answer is far from original. Like Cohen, Windelband, and Husserl before him, Heidegger turned for a solution to Lotze who characterized the ideal being of judgment as validity (*Geltung*).[25] The response to psychologism is therefore the following: beyond the concrete (psychic and physical) act of enunciation, each judgment has a never-changing propositional content which eludes the empirical reality of the conditions of enunciation and whose ontological status is designated as *Geltung.* But young *Doktorand* Heidegger was already pondering the hypostasis of this ideal being of the true proposition as well as its relation to empirical reality. "How is one to characterize the relation between psychic reality and the content of valid judgment? Will we ever be able to arrive at a more profound solution of this problem? The question remains open."[26]

In point of fact, Heidegger would quickly show his dissatisfaction in the face of the flight from time and history that the ideal being of the proposition represents. During his early years as a lecturer at Freiburg and Marburg, he would be very cutting in his criticisms of Lotze, Windelband, and Rickert in this regard.[27] There was no question of reverting to a dogmatic Platonism in the form, for example, of a philosophy of values. Not that Heidegger condemns all forms of ideality. *Sein und Zeit* too would stress that a "phenomenologically based" variant of it exists. On the other hand, returning to the question he had shelved in his dissertation, Heidegger in his masterwork challenged the *separation* of the ideal and the real for not being "ontologically clarified." At least in certain respects he would even make common cause with psychologism. "Is not psychologism correct in holding out against this separation, even if it neither clarifies ontologically the kind of Being which belongs to the thinking of that which is thought, nor is even so much as acquainted with it as a problem?"[28] This question illustrates the extent to which Heidegger was primarily preoccupied with the problem of the participation of reality in the idea, with the problem of *methexis*.

The A Priori and the Metaphysics of Presence

Heidegger devoted his *Kantbuch* to the "problem of metaphysics" not because he wanted to have done with metaphysics on the grounds that he thought it had become outmoded or had been superseded. His use of Kant as the main theme in his work is on the contrary an attempt to rehabilitate metaphysics so that one could once again take up the question of the a priori, that is, in the final analysis, the question of being. Heidegger has nothing against defining metaphysics as first philosophy so long as the term is properly understood: the entire enterprise of *Being and Time* draws its inspiration from a priorism, the only level of theory suitable to the task of philosophy.[29] If Heidegger proposes, in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, to surpass Kant, he intends to do so by deepening rather than rejecting the critical philosophy. He wants to isolate those elements in the *Critique* that would provide a foundation for metaphysics. Indeed he claims to have bridged the gap that prevented Kant from following up on his project of theoretical foundation, namely the lack of specific research

on the subjectivity of the subject and its entanglement in time. The basic ontology of *Being and Time* had already supplied the outline for a critique of Cartesian subjectivity by examining the *sum* of the subject, which tends to conceive of itself along the same lines as its vis-à-vis, the mundane object, the *res*. If metaphysics as the science of the a priori poses a problem for Kant, it is precisely to the extent that the a priori finds its foundation in a subject whose ontological status has not been elucidated.

The truth is that for Heidegger, the Kantian conception of the a priori, by resorting to Cartesian subjectivity, only serves to sanction the domination of the metaphysics of presence. It is not only the subject as thinking thing, but the a priori that belongs to it, that assumes the guise of a permanent object (*res*).

> *A priori: that which belongs to the subject*, that which is in the mind, that which can be met in the mind before going out towards objects. *A priori*: that which can be met with from the outset in the pure sphere of the subject. *Now Kant extends this fundamental question of the a priori to pure concepts of understanding*: they belong to actions of the subject, they are so to speak at hand [*vorhanden*] in the subject and only in the subject.[30]

In stressing the isolation of the a priori in the sphere of the subject, what Heidegger deplores is the absence, at least at the outset, of any relation with the object. The a priori is first conceived in its massive presence within a subjectivity turned in upon itself and cut off from any relation with the world. We know that *Being and Time* challenges this isolation by at once setting up *Dasein* as a Being-in-the-world. In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger tried, with the theoretical means supplied by Kant, to isolate the a priori at its origin at the moment that the transcendental imagination produces its synthesis. He tried to show that the a priori arises only when it is brought into play in ontological knowledge. The a priori is a modality of the transcendence of *Dasein* which opens itself up to entities through transcendental schematism.

One might well ask whether Cohen's transcendental method, even though it resorts to a different strategy, does not draw its motivation from a similar critique of Kant. In fact, like Heidegger, Cohen gives only provisional status to the metaphysical deduction of categories insofar as these

categories are only a priori, "given" independently of their intervention in knowing. How would he have reacted to Heidegger's critiques of Kant with relation to the "*a priori* as resting (*liegenden*) in the isolated subject... prior to any relation to the object"?[31] We might perhaps find the answer to this question in a passage of *Kants Begründung der Ethik* which presents certain striking analogies with Heidegger's position on the formulation of the problem and even on the outline of a solution.

> It is not as forms of human intuition and of our human synthesis that these permanent human factors are endowed with the value of *a priori*, but on the contrary because they condition the real actuality of our scientific knowledge, because Mathematics and the pure science of nature may thus be considered as themselves resting in our mind. —It is only by virtue of this transposition that one can say, according to the strict sense of the transcendental *a priori*: the *a priori rests (liege)* in our mind, it is the shape of the mind.[32]

As one might have expected, Cohen looked for a solution to the problem of metaphysical a priori in actual scientific knowledge rather than in productive imagination.[33] For him, the a priori's transcendental status is confirmed when its necessary contribution to the finished product of mathematical physics is recognized. For Heidegger, the a priori is revealed in transcendental schematism as an instance indispensable to meeting with entities. In both cases, however, it is the operative and productive dimension of the a priori that is advanced to the detriment of its metaphysical essence. Thus it is that both Cohen and Heidegger place the emphasis on transcendentalism.

The Facticity of Dasein

From the beginning of his *Kantbuch*, Heidegger takes great care to point up his differences with neo-Kantianism in all its forms, and most especially with the "fact of science" that was characteristic of Cohen's transcendental method.

> Nothing can be presupposed on behalf of the problematic of the possibility for original, ontological truth, least of all the *factum* of the truth of the positive sciences. On the contrary, the ground-laying must pursue the *a priori* synthesis exclusively in itself.[34]

Heidegger continues by citing the passage from Kant's *Prolegomena* which states that philosophy cannot rely on any fact but only on reason itself. In this sense, the course on Kant in the winter of 1927–1928 sought only to go deeper, beyond the letter of Kantianism, into the subjectivity of the subject through an "a priori phenomenology of the transcendental constitution of the subject." Heidegger makes it clear that if one has to start from a fact in order to carry such an enterprise through to a successful conclusion, this fact can only be *Dasein* itself. It is a "fact in the sense of the essential ontological core of *Dasein*, of the transcendental constitution of the subject."[35] In bringing the subject back to *Dasein*, Heidegger indicates clearly the direction in which he wants to take this enterprise. It is here out of the question to reach the "idealized absolute subject" that *Being and Time* points to. On the contrary, the referral back to the facticity of *Dasein* is a reminder that what is involved is contingency at its most radical. The Being-in-the-world is a thrown being, thrown into existence. There is nothing absolute in *Dasein*, apart from the "absolute" (*unbezüglich*) character of death as an ontological sign of finitude.[36] This then is the only fact admissible at the starting point of philosophical discourse.

Heidegger is, however, on the wrong track in his condemnation of Cohen's *Faktum der Wissenschaft* in that, as Geert Edel points out in his excellent commentary on Cohen's critique of knowledge,[37] his understanding of the import of that fact underestimates the task assigned to the transcendental method. We did not comment earlier on the tendentious manner in which, in the passage cited above, Heidegger views the point upon which Cohen begins his analysis. Heidegger interprets it here as the fact of the "truth" of science and elsewhere as the fact of its "validity."[38] Now, this is a total misunderstanding of the transcendental method. This method seeks precisely to examine and justify the validity of the pure science of nature, insofar as it is for the time being only considered to be a *claim* resting on still-latent foundations, at least with regard to the a priori that need to be revealed. It is, therefore, necessary to see this "fact" as a "problem"[39] that stimulates the philosopher rather than as a secure point of departure. Before the intervention of the transcendental method, the value of science could only be assumed (*angenommen*).[40]

Up to this point in our discussion, the contrast of Cohen's epistemological reading and Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation has

allowed us to conclude that Cohen opposes psychologism in order to safeguard the autonomy of philosophical discourse in the face of the onslaught of the empirical sciences. Heidegger, for all that he shares this preoccupation, is, on the other hand, principally concerned with avoiding the hypostasis of the metaphysical a priori in a subjectivity turned in upon itself. Heidegger rejects an a priori that is transcendent with respect to the world. To this end he redefines transcendence on the basis of his existential analytic: transcendence is henceforth viewed as the fact of *Dasein*, which is thus clearly open to the world. Solipsistic Cartesian subjectivity, from which Kant cannot dissociate himself completely, is thus corrected thanks to the conception of *Dasein* as Being-in-the-world. On the other hand, Cohen, who is also wary of an immanent metaphysical a priori of consciousness, tries to locate it in the crystallization point that is modern science. That being the case, however, as we have just seen, philosophical analysis is not confined to extracting the *a priori* from scientific discourse; it sees itself as a *Geltungsanalyse*[41] in that it examines the validity of the claims of science to universality and necessity.

Perhaps the classification presented by Fichte in his *First Introduction to the Doctrine of Science* best enables us to characterize these two attitudes toward transcendental philosophy. Fichte distinguishes two diametrically opposed ways of developing critical idealism. The philosopher either elicits the "fundamental laws of intellect" while confining himself to this intellect itself and nothing more, or he "may conceive these laws as already and immediately applied to objects."[42] In the latter case he must abstract the a priori from "experience" or even from "logic." Fichte indicates that, for his part, he opts for the first approach. Kant, on the other hand, would opt for the second, as we can see from the allusion to the metaphysical deduction of categories on the basis of the (logical) table of judgments. It is evident that Cohen, for whom the reference to scientific knowledge is essential, also belongs to the second group. As for Heidegger, he lines up on Fichte's side, at least in terms of the general outline of the process he undertakes. Does he not also try, through a more profound subjectivity, to recover the "unfathomable root" abandoned by Kant?[43] Evidently Heidegger rejects out of hand "absolute subjectivity" conceived as pure autoactivity and opts instead for a radically finite *Dasein* which sees itself ontologically as pure temporalization. It is nonetheless true that the clas-

sification Fichte introduced is a good reflection of the later fundamental divergence in attitude that we have discerned between Heidegger and Cohen. However, the astonishing part of all this is that, as we shall see, this divergence of approach in no way precludes a degree of convergence with regard to the interpretation of transcendental deduction, despite the case Heidegger raises against Cohen's transcendental method.

TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION

Martin Heidegger

Heidegger's dissatisfaction with the transcendental deduction of pure concepts of understanding is made evident from the start: he prefers schematism, which allows ontological knowledge to appear very clearly as it is engendered. Indeed, he considers the section on transcendental deduction the most "fatal" passage (*das fatalste Lehrstück*) in the *Critique*. Neo-Kantianism, on the other hand, as Heidegger stresses, has made this topic its hobby-horse even though it might divert attention completely from real problems. In the pages of *Phänomenologische Interpretation* that deal with deduction, Heidegger laces into the neo-Kantians who referred to the section on transcendental deduction with such "incredible naïveté" that they came up with the "crudest misinterpretations" of it. We shall here try to see whether this is true in Cohen's case.

Heidegger is prepared to recognize that Kant himself is somewhat to blame for the misinterpretations in that two problematics overlap in his discussion. The quest to lay the groundwork for ontological knowledge is in fact coupled with a polemic against dogmatic metaphysics. The confusion of these two motivations in the text on deduction renders the latter, as Heidegger puts it, "almost totally untenable."[44] In fact, the formulation of the problem in terms of legal deduction and of the *quaestio juris* is dictated by the polemical dimension of the enterprise to the detriment of what is principally at stake: laying the foundation for metaphysics. Now *quid juris* has absolutely nothing to do with this project. One changes the emphasis of the problem by formulating it in legal terms and asking: how can nonempirical concepts claim to refer to an object? The critical force

of such a question (by what right?) is clearly aimed at metaphysics, whose transcendent discourse, constructed with the aid of a priori concepts, is not immediately concerned with conditions of objectivity. What is at stake is the reality of this discourse, the possibility of it entering into relation to an object and of attaining truth. Posing the problem in these terms, however, reveals an incoherence in the very process Kant is engaged in. There is, Heidegger says, something absurd in wanting, on the one hand, to build a bridge between a subjective, metaphysical a priori and an object that confers reality on them and, on the other, to prove that any object is in itself possible thanks only to the intervention of these same a priori in the shape of categories. To avoid a paradox only this latter aspect should have been the object of deduction.

> And that means that it is absurd to begin by setting out categories and then inquiring as to their valid application to objects. For this application "to objects," this objective relation as such, is in fact constituted by these categories. Their objective reality consists precisely in their generally constituting the objectivity that is the presupposition required for empirical determinations to relate to an object. The categories are not concepts about the essence of which we should decide only afterwards by establishing what pertains to the bases of making possible an experience in general.[45]

Heidegger clearly has it in for this "afterward" character of the proof which stems from the architectonics of the *Critique*. Metaphysical deduction is what led to this inadequate formulation of the task of transcendental deduction. When one has discovered in the mind concepts whose origin is not empirical, one must ponder the area in which they are used and the conditions of their "objective reality." There is thus good reason for the Heideggerian critique of Kant's approach to revolve around this concept of "objective reality"; as we shall see, Heidegger will himself have to try to reduce the semantic field of this concept.

In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, when Heidegger begins his discussion of the transcendental deduction he comes up against the expression "possible experience" which is crucial to deduction. To define the phrase he refers to a passage from the following section of the *Critique*, a section

entitled "Of the Supreme Principle of All Synthetic Judgments." Here Kant established the link between the ultimate criterion for synthetic judgments, namely the "possibility of experience," on the one hand, and the concept of "objective reality," on the other. "The *possibility of experience* is, then, what gives objective reality to all our *a priori* modes of knowledge."[46]

This sentence, which Heidegger quotes in full, focuses the question on our knowledge a priori and indicates that such knowledge has objective reality only in relation to possible experience. But what does the "possibility of experience" mean in this context? Here, as in the *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, Heidegger considers that it must be understood in the sense of "making possible," so that the categories, for example, have objective reality only insofar as they contribute to "making possible" (*ermöglichen*)[47] experience.

Now, this reading is a deliberately restrictive one on Heidegger's part. In fact, this question of objective reality (which Kant also calls "objective validity" quite indifferently) is a little more complex that it appears at first blush. First (1), there is the sense the expression assumes when applied to simple empirical phenomena which, in order to attain objectivity, objective reality, must submit to the conditions of an a priori possibility of experience. Moreover (2), the expression "objective reality" may also apply to a priori knowledge. This second usage is the one referred to by Heidegger who, as we have seen, reduces the relation between a priori concepts and possible experience to that of "making possible" (2a) experience through pure concepts. In other words, it is the capacity of pure concepts to make experience possible which endows them with objective reality. However, the Kantian concept of objective reality, applied to the a priori of knowledge, conceals another motivation directly linked to the polemical dimension of the deduction: to avoid lapsing into dogmatism, the *Critique* must ensure that its pure concepts do indeed relate to real objects and are—at least potentially—accessible in a possible experience. In short, it is necessary that an empirical object might be *given* to a pure concept, for only the former can guarantee the objective reality of the latter. In this case (2b), *possible* experience signifies something other than "making possible"; it refers to the fact that an object can be given, whether actually or virtually. Pure concepts must be able to make contact with "phenomena" which provide them with empirical matter (*Stoff*) and thus

ensure their reality. If this contact cannot be made, metaphysics is condemned to having to do with nothing but "fancies" (*Hirngespinste*). For Kant, reality can be guaranteed only by "sensation."[48] Heidegger is fully aware of the facts when he dismisses this second reading (2b) of the concept of objective reality in the case of the a priori elements of knowledge; he retains only the second element of the expression "objective reality," that is, the contribution of the a priori to the constitution of "objectivity"(2a). In the meantime, he drops the first element, namely the requirement of reality that falls upon all a priori knowledge (2b). In his view, this interpretation of objective reality, which subordinates pure knowledge to the empirical giving of the object in a possible experience, can only be due to a slavish reading of the legal problematic of the deduction, a reading he attributes to the neo-Kantians and which consists in the belief that proof of the reality of an a priori concept is the same as relating it to an existing object (*Wirklichkeit*).[49] We shall now turn to see what Cohen, who along with Natorp is most often taken to task by Heidegger, actually thinks about this subject.

Hermann Cohen

Let us consider the fate that Cohen reserves for the "Supreme Principle of All Synthetic Judgments." Many commentators have stressed that at the outset Cohen interprets "objective reality," against all expectations, in the first sense (1) indicated above.[50] It is not primarily pure concepts of understanding which lack objective reality, but rather phenomena, those "half-ripe objects," which are in such great need of attaining objectivity. Phenomena, indeterminate objects of empirical intuition, must therefore attain experience in order to participate in the necessity and universality of objective knowledge. This interpretation stands out clearly from the following passage in *Kants Begründung der Ethik*.

> In accordance with the meaning of the word "transcendental," the supreme principle of all synthetic judgments is the principle of transcendental apperception. Phenomena must, if they wish to claim the value of objective reality or even of objective validity, be seen in relation to laws, must express laws as special cases. This is the meaning of tran-

> scendental apperception, of the unity of consciousness as supreme transcendental principle.[51]

Thus it is pure elements of knowledge, synthesized as laws, which ensure the reality of phenomena. In fact, a priori knowledge is so much the "guarantee" of the objective validity of empirical objects that Cohen does not really bother to ask about the "objective reality" of such knowledge itself.

This is very revealing, most especially of his reading of the Transcendental Deduction. It goes without saying that in his sustained commentary on the Transcendental Analytic, Cohen is forced to mention Kant's own formulation of what is at stake in deduction, namely the demonstration of the "objective validity of categories."[52] But Cohen also adopts a course of conduct not unlike Heidegger's and even uses the same term as Heidegger to restrict the domain of the expression "possible experience": the a priori is related to possible experience only insofar as it contains the conditions of its possibility. In short, the a priori makes possible (*ermöglichend*)(2a)! For Cohen, then, it is out of the question to require that the a priori of knowledge be confronted with the empirical givens in a possible experience in order to ensure their reality (2b). The transcendental a priori can never be measured against the empirical. The accusation Heidegger levels at the neo-Kantians thus certainly does not apply to Cohen; the latter tends to say nothing at all about the Kantian requirement of demonstrating the objective reality of the a priori and is sometimes even tempted in his reconstruction of the *Critique* to change the meaning of the texts. Here, for example is how, immediately after quoting the "Supreme Principle of All Synthetic Judgments," he explains its content:

> Kant thus formulates his supreme principle in the following manner: "The conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and thus have objective validity in a synthetic judgment a priori."
>
> The Copernican conception of the transcendental thus achieves its definitive and appropriate expression.
>
> First: objects are possible only through the possibility of experience.
>
> Second: objects, made possible by experience, have an objective reality.[53]

It should be noted that the last words of the citation ("have an objective reality"), quite obviously drawn from Kant's own formulation, are, clearly through misinterpretation, assigned to the "object." While for Kant it is the "conditions of the possibility of experience" which "thus" have an objective reality, for Cohen, it is suddenly the object that acquires this reality by virtue of the supreme principle. As with Heidegger, it seems here that the a priori, conceived from the outset in its constitutive dimension, that is understood as transcendental a priori, is in no way bound to refer "afterwards" to an object which it engendered in the first place, at least in terms of its objectivity. It is thus out of the question for a priori knowledge to be assigned to phenomena, those still indeterminate objects of empirical intuition, in order to confer upon them an objective "reality." Cohen seems no more able than Heidegger to consider that the a priori concept or intuition might gain anything from contact with the empirical given, which is, however, in Kant's view the only thing likely to procure reality for them.

CONCLUSION

In the final analysis we must admit that neither Cohen nor Heidegger accords any special significance to the Transcendental Deduction in their respective interpretations of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. We have here been concerned with the supreme principle of all synthetic judgments, which is first formulated in the section on transcendental deduction, mainly in order to highlight the convergence in Cohen and Heidegger's conception of transcendentalism. If the purpose of deduction is to prove the objective reality of categories, the task is not so much, as we have seen, to show that the a priori can receive "reality" only from the empirical object, but to prove that the metaphysical a priori is constitutive of the "objectivity" of the object and that it can thus be considered a transcendental a priori. Now, neither Cohen nor Heidegger focuses primarily on the deduction for the exposition of the constitutive dimension of a priori for experience, that specifically transcendental moment of the Kantian critique. For Cohen, the paradigmatic manifestation of the role of a priori in knowledge is found in the Analytic of Transcendental Principles. For Heidegger, the constitutive

dimension of the a priori as a condition of possibility of encountering entities becomes evident in transcendental schematism. For both of them it is only at these later stages of the critical process that these heterogeneous forms of a priori, illustrated by the metaphysical exposition of space and time and by the metaphysical deduction of categories, are combined and thus attain their truth. But then if, for Kant, the "transcendental" is by definition opposed to the "empirical," does the overstated transcendentalism of both Cohen and Heidegger entail a devaluation of the empirical dimension, or of what Kant calls the material conditions of experience?

In Cohen's case this is indeed so. The strategy he adopts to overcome Kant's dichotomy of intuition and thought consists in integrating the whole intuitive dimension of knowledge into thought. This assimilation is carried out in two steps. It is first necessary to reappropriate intuition in order, as much as possible, to marginalize sensation, the material condition of existence. Thus, to start with, since pure space and time are the conditions of possibility of geometry and arithmetic, their true basis in the critical system can only be the table of principles, more particularly the Axioms of Intuition. Aesthetics is thus absorbed by logic. Next this means that one can redefine the role of sensation even if it means once more running counter to the strict letter of Kantianism. The preface to the second edition of *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung* does in effect draw the reader's attention to the two principles of the table which constitute the center of gravity of the new interpretation Cohen is proposing. And these two principles, one should not be surprised to learn, deal explicitly with "sensation": the Anticipations of Perception and the Second Postulate of Empirical Thought.[54] We know how important the Principle of Intensive Magnitudes is to Cohen: it does not simply serve to demonstrate the engendering of the magnitude of sensation but rather the engendering of reality as such (*realitas*). Similarly, the Postulate of Existence no longer relies first, as it does with Kant, on sensation, but rather on the relation that must be established between an object and the totality of experience on the basis of universal laws. Under these conditions sensation, as a psychological moment, is to all intents and purposes, separated from experience; at best it represents the "opportunity" for setting in motion the process of engendering the objectivity of the object in science. That is why for Cohen, as we have seen, it is the phenomenon that must first attain objective reality.

As we know, the situation is quite different for Heidegger. His rereading of the *Critique of Pure Reason* can be described as a negation of Cohen's and seems to want to take the opposing view. Indeed is it not now intuition that is highlighted to the detriment of thought? Is not knowledge henceforth first of all an act of intuition (*Erkennen ist primär Anschauung*)?[55] Prudence is nonetheless in order here; Heidegger's position is not the symmetrical opposite of Cohen's. There is no one-sided reliance on intuition here; Heidegger in point of fact so radicalizes the spontaneous dimension of receptivity that he claims to reach the nodal point of intuition and thought. The stress on schematism and productive imagination eventually allows him to overcome that dualism at its roots. On this very point, Heidegger's approach is similar to Cohen's, since both of them aim to surpass Kantian dualism by stressing the transcendental dimension of the *Critique* as a process of production.[56] While, however, the principle of intensive magnitudes represents for Cohen the "triumph of thought," the discovery of the fundamentally temporal essence of original subjectivity leads Heidegger to the observation of a radical finitude.

In accentuating the transcendental moment in Kant in this way, Heidegger still does not show us the full magnitude of the critical problem. We have seen how he limits the objective reality of categories to possible experience, in the sense of "making possible," leaving aside the role of empirical conditions of experience. Now, such empirical conditions, sensation in this case, pose for Kant a problem of contingency whose full impact must be considered. In the final sections of *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung* Cohen manages to neutralize the contingency of physical phenomena and natural forms by subsuming them in the concept of unconditioned necessity, as embodied in Kant's "transcendental idea." Heidegger, however, rejects this amalgam of elements drawn from the first and third *Critiques*. He does not try to overcome the problem of contingency, but he so highlights the facticity of *Dasein* that it casts into shadow every other form of contingency, like the contingency of the existence of phenomena or even of the concrete configuration of entities; just so many questions that elude transcendental schematism. From this standpoint Cassirer is no doubt right to deplore the fact that Heidegger does not refer to the *Critique of Judgment* in his reading of Kant, for this third *Critique* provides the ground most conducive to the discussion of questions of contingency.

Kant, with the concept of formal purposiveness (i.e., the problem of beauty: subjective purposiveness, and of natural teleology: objective purposiveness), raises issues which do not fit into the theoretical structure of *Being and Time*. So it is hardly surprising that in the 1930s Heidegger should begin to display a marked interest in Hölderlin. This interest is characterized by the fact that he no longer touches on poetry, as he had for example in §34 of *Being and Time*, simply in order to illustrate an existential situation of *Dasein*. He now would use it to demonstrate the poet's function of inaugurating a historical period. Nor is it surprising that at the same time Heidegger should consider art, as it depicts the battle engaged in by the earth and the world, as one of the ways that truth comes to us. Finally, it is perhaps no coincidence that, during this same period of the 1930s, he should tackle the Greek concept of nature (*physis*) in order to draw from it an original form of *poiesis*. Can this mean that Heidegger, while following in Kant's footsteps and delving deeper into transcendentalism, as he had already begun to do in *Being and Time*, might have been led to see the limits of the enterprise and to take a new turning toward the truth of being?[57]

NOTES

1. Martin Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Gesamtausgabe*, 25, (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977), p. 79.

2. On this topic see E. W. Orth, "Heidegger und der Neukantismus," *Man and World*, 25 (1992), p. 432.

3. Cf. "Davoser Disputation zwischen Ernst Cassirer und Martin Heidegger" [1929], published as an addendum in *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1973), pp. 247–48; English trans. Richard Taft, "Davos Disputation between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger," addendum in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 4th ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. 171–85. See also A. Philonenko, "Cassirer lecteur et interprète de Kant," in *Ernst Cassirer. De Marbourg à New York*, J. Seidengart, ed. (Paris: Cerf, 1990), pp. 43–54.

4. Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, pp. 67, 77.

5. Martin Heidegger, *Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, Gesamtausgabe* 21 (Frankfurt: Klosterman, 1977), p. 271.

6. Hermann Cohen, *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung*, 3d ed.(Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1918), p. 346; Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, p. 3.

7. Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, p. 78. See also Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, p. 140; Eng. trans., pp. 99–100.

8. Ernst Cassirer, "Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Bemerkungen zu Martin Heideggers Kant-Interpretation," *Kant-Studien* 36 (1931): 5.

9. Cohen, *Kants Theorie*, p. 445; cf. p. 453.

10. Ibid., p. 19.

11. Hermann Cohen, "Die platonische Ideenlehre psychologisch entwickelt," *Schriften zur Philosophie und Zeitgeschichte*, I (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1928), pp. 30–31.

12. Cohen, *Kants Theorie*, p. 102.

13. Ibid., p. 178.

14. Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1976), B 25.

15. Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysic* 5th ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1991), 5th ed., "Anhang," p. 249.

16. Cohen, *Kants Theorie*, p.41. On Fichte's subjective idealism, see ibid., pp.397-399.

17. Cf. Hermann Cohen, *Kants Begründung der Ethik* 2d ed. (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1910), p. 12.

18. Cohen, *Kants Theorie*, p. 108.

19. Ibid., p. 637; cf. p. 628: "The transcendental method first assumes a given experience, considers it as science, that is as comprising the value of necessity, and seeks to reconstruct it according to its possibility."

20. Ibid., pp. 41, 179.

21. Martin Heidegger, *Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus*, in *Frühe Schriften* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1972), p. 5.

22. Ibid., p. 103.

23. For psychological motifs in the work of the young Windelband, see *Ueber die Gewissheit der Erkenntnis* (Leipzig, 1873). On Windelband's shift to idealism, one might profitably consult the study by Klaus-Christian Köhnke, *Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986), pp. 404–31. The work that earned Husserl Frege's rebuke for psychologism is, as we know, *Philosophie der Arithmetik* [1891], *Husserliana* 12 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970).

24. Heidegger, *Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus*, p. 120.

25. Lotze was Windelband's teacher. As to Lotze's influence on Husserl, it

becomes manifest in the 1903 review of the article by Melchior Palágyi, "Der Streit der Psychologisten und Formalisten in der modernen Logik," *Husserliana* 22, pp. 156ff. The issue of Lotze's influence on Cohen is more problematic; cf. Geert Edel, *Von der Vernunftkritik zur Erkenntnislogik. Die Entwicklung der theoretischen Philosophie Hermann Cohens* (Freiburg and Munich: Alber, 1988), pp. 216–17,. n. 16. See too Ernst Cassirer, "Hermann Cohen und die Erneuerung der Kantischen Philosophie," *Kant-Studien*, XVII (1912), p. 268. On all this see my article, "Hermann Cohen et la genèse du néo-kantisme," *Études Philosophiques*, forthcoming.

26. Heidegger, *Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus*, p. 117.

27. Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie* [course given in the summer term of 1919], *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, pp. 121–201. *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* [course given in the summer term of 1925], *Gesamtausgabe* 20, pp.41–46. *Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit* [course given in the winter term 1925–1926], *Gesamtausgabe* 21, pp. 60–88.

28. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1972), §44, pp. 229, 217; Eng. trans., John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, *Being and Time* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 272, 259–60.

29. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §§10 and 44, pp. 50, 229; Eng. trans., pp. 75, 272.

30. Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, p. 314.

31. Ibid., p. 315.

32. Cohen, *Kants Theorie*, p. 34.

33. Ibid., p. 747.

34. Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysic*, p.17; Eng. trans., pp. 11–12.

35. Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, pp. 332, 330.

36. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, pp. 229, 263; Eng. trans., pp. 271–72, 307–308.

37. Geert Edel, *Von der Vernunftkritik zur Erkenntnislogik*, p. 121, n. 11.

38. Cf. Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, p. 44. See also, Heidegger, *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, p. 84.

39. Cohen, *Kants Theorie*, p. 187.

40. Hermann Cohen, *Das Prinzip der Infinitesimalmethode und seine Geschichte. Ein Kapitel zur Grundlegung der Erkenntniskritik* (1883; Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968), pp. 48, 50.

41. We have borrowed this expression from Edel, *Von der Vernunftkritik*, p. 105.

42. J. G. Fichte, *Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre*, *Fichte Werkes* I, p. 442.

43. Cf. J. G. Fichte, *Vorlesung über Logik und Metaphysik* [course given in the summer term of 1797], *GA* IV.1, 200. On the possible relation between Heidegger and Fichte, see Dieter Henrich,"Über die Einheit der Subjektivität," *Philosophische Rundschau* 3 (1955): 31, 55–57. See also Daniel Dahlstrom, "Heidegger's Kant-Courses at Marburg" in *Reading Heidegger from the Start. Essays in his Earliest Thought*, T. Kisiel and J. van Buren, eds. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 300, n. 7.

44. Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, pp. 309, 303, 305.

45. Ibid., p. 400.

46. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* A 156/B 195.

47. Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, p. 113 (Eng. trans., pp.79–80); *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, p. 328.

48. Cf. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* A 157/B 196, A 223/B 270:

> [These] are concepts the possibility of which is altogether groundless, as they cannot be based on experience and its known laws; and without such confirmation they are arbitrary combinations of thoughts, which, although indeed free from contradiction, can make no claim to objective reality, and none, therefore, as to the possibility of an object such as we here profess to think. As regards reality, we obviously cannot think it *in concreto*, without calling experience to our aid. For reality is bound up with sensation, the matter of experience, not with that form of relation in regard to which we can, if we so choose, resort to a playful inventiveness.

49. Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation*, p. 156:

> The neo-Kantian interpretation of the "Critique" as a theory of knowledge has totally missed the meaning of reality, which it has assimilated to "objective reality," that is with the objectively real. . . . Kantian "objective reality" was then interpreted in the following manner: Kant had in mind the constitution of objective knowledge as an internal process of thought, a process that would cause to appear, so to speak, knowledge that is objectively valid, in the sense of effective [*vom Wirklichen*], for the real entity. Which is nothing but pure phantasmagoria. Cf. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* §33, p. 156; Eng. trans., p. 198.

50. Helmut Holzhey, "Einführung," *Erkenntnistheorie und Logik im Neukantismus*, W. Flach and H. Holzhey, eds. (Hildesheim: Gerstenberg, 1979), p. 21; Edel, *Von der Vernunftkritik*, pp. 112–13. It has well been noted by Jacques Rivelaygue that the neo-Kantians had a tendency to minimize the "intervention of phenomena," cf. Jacques Rivelaygue, *Leçons de métaphysique allemande,* II, *Kant, Heidegger, Habermas* (Paris: Grasset, 1992), p. 183.

51. Cohen, *Kants Theorie*, pp. 58, 29, 31:

> In the area of method, there is no other way to objectify [objektivieren] than by deducing from the conditions of the scientific experiment. Proving objective reality means deducing it from the concept of the possibility of experience, from the conditions upon which the possibility of experience rests. It is the possibility of experience upon which the possibility of experience is founded; *and which guarantees them.* That is the strict meaning of the "supreme principle of all synthetic judgments" or of all synthetic principles.

Cf. Cohen, *Kants Theorie*, p. 386.

52. Cohen, *Kants Theorie*, pp. 406, 420.

53. Ibid., pp. 190–91.

54. Ibid., p. XVI. Cf. Geert Edel, "Einleitung" to the 5th ed. of *Kants Theorie*, in Hermann Cohen, *Werke*, vol.1.1 (Hildesheim: Olms, 1987), p. 35.

55. This is still valid for *Die Frage nach dem Ding* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1975), pp. 114–15.

56. Cf. Daniel Dahlstrom, "Heidegger's Kantian Turn: Notes to His Commentary on the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft," Review of Metaphysics* 45 (1991): pp. 349–50.

57. In a marginal note in his copy of the *Kantbuch*, Heidegger points out the limits of his enterprise: "*ganz rückfällig in die transzendentale Fragestellung.*" Quoted in H.-G. Gadamer, "Der Weg in die Kehre," *Heideggers Wege* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1983), p. 111. Evidently this remark could be made only from the point of view of the *turning*. However, as early as the summer of 1928, that is at the precise point in the course in which the theme of the *Kehre* first appears, Heidegger ponders the limited scope of a fundamental ontology conducted in a transcendental manner, and he feels the need to supplement it with a *metontology* directed towards entities in their totality:

> In other words, the possibility that being might become a theme for understanding presupposes the factical [*faktisch*] existence of *Dasein*, and this, in its turn, the factual [*faktisch*] presence of nature. It is precisely in the perspective of the radically-posed problem of being that it becomes evident that all this can become visible and be understood only when the possible totality of entities *is already there*."

Martin Heidegger, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik, Gesamtausgabe* 26 (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1978), p. 199 (emphasis added). This concern with entities as such certainly constitutes a "new questioning" for Heidegger, but the problem of the status of entities, although not thematic, was already showing through the surface in *Being and Time*, when for example he discusses the truth of Newton's laws of physics: "Through Newton the laws became true; and with them, entities became accessible in themselves to *Dasein*. Once entities have been uncovered, they show themselves precisely as entities which *beforehand already were*." *Sein und Zeit*, §44c, p. 227; Eng. trans., p. 269 (emphasis added). These few references suffice to prove the extent to which the problem of the contingency of entities gradually emerged for Heidegger so that he was forced to recast the question of being. I would like here to express my gratitude to Claudius Strube and Theodore Kisiel for their valuable hints in this direction.

10

PHILOSOPHY AND WORLDVIEW

HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE BADEN SCHOOL OF NEO-KANTIANISM

Marion Heinz

Already in his first published Freiburg lecture series[1] in the 1919 War Emergency Semester Heidegger energetically attempts to reach a concept of philosophy. He elaborates his own position by means of a critical confrontation with doctrines of his time. Of particular significance is Heidegger's critical discussion of Baden neo-Kantianism. This preoccupation of the earlier Heidegger is easily identifiable by the fact that more than a quarter of the semester's lectures are directed to this theme. The seminars of the next semester are devoted exclusively to a phenomenological critique of the philosophy of value.[2]

The great significance of this theme for Heidegger's philosophical devel-

opment is already discernable against his biographical-historical background. During his years as a young scholar, Heidegger had been in considerable agreement with the position of Heinrich Rickert. He was, as Rickert noticed[3] and as Heidegger himself knew, in fact greatly influenced by Emil Lask. In his 1913 dissertion, "The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism: A Critical and Positive Essay on Logic," Heidegger referred positively to Rickert's and Lask's doctrine of judgment.[4] Heidegger's 1915 *Habilitation*, "The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus," written under Rickert's supervision, was dedicated to Heinrich Rickert "in gratitude and admiration." In the preface, Heidegger elaborates on his dedication:

> A dedication is an expression of indebted gratitude; it is, however, simultaneously to express the conviction, in keeping with one's own standpoint, that philosophy of value, with its world-view character and awareness of problems, is summoned to a decisive forward movement and deepening of philosophical procedure. Its intellectual-historical orientation provides a fertile ground for creatively shaping the problems out of a strong, personal experience.[5]

In this regard, Emil Lask, "to whom at this point a word of grateful, respectful remembrance is sent to his distant soldier's grave,"[6] is exemplary for Heidegger. As will be shown in the following, the way in which Heidegger realizes his intentions is already apparent in the first published series of Freiburg lectures. The characteristic connection between philosophy and worldview that one finds in Rickert's philosophy of value is indeed, as a program, given up. It is given up, however, just as personal lived experience since the ground of a creative reorganization of philosophical problems in fact becomes the kernel of Heidegger's new conception of philosophy.[7] Heidegger's approach is described in the foreword to his *Habilitation* as motivated by an encounter with neo-Kantianism. The significance of Rickert for the young Heidegger is underlined in the end by the *curriculum vitae* prepared during the time he was working on the *Habilitation*. After the break with his theological studies, Heidegger began to study mathematics in the winter semester of 1911–1912. Rickert's influence on Heidegger's further philosophical development is stressed by Heidegger in two places:

> My philosophical interest was not diminished by studying mathematics. On the contrary, since I no longer had to abide by the prescribed seminars in philosophy, I was able to attend a more extended selection of philosophy lectures, and above all I could participate in Herr Geheimrat Rickert's seminars. It was in the new school that I first became acquainted with philosophical problems and gained insight into the essence of logic, a philosophical discipline which thus far interests me the most.[8]

Last, but not least, it is through the thorough preoccupation with Rickert's *Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung* that Heidegger's aversion to history, nurtured by his preference for mathematics, is fundamentally destroyed. In this way, Heidegger recognizes that philosphy cannot orient itelf solely by mathematics nor solely by history.[9] In his second published series of Freiburg lectures, in the summer semester of 1919, Heidegger dates the beginning of his critical confrontation with Rickert to the period after his dissertation:

> The basic direction of the critical reflections was already pursued in critical seminar papers presented in 1913 in Rickert's seminar during discussions of the Laskian "*Lehre vom Urteil.*" Here I encountered great opposition, which however—and this remark is really superfluous—in no way strained my personal relationship to Rickert.[10]

Of course, it is well-known that in the meantime Rickert was very disappointed in Heidegger's meager regard for his philosophy after Rickert himself left Freiburg in 1915 to assume Windelband's chair in Heidelberg, vacant because of his death; it appeared as if Heidegger was increasingly turning to Husserl, who in 1916 became successor to Rickert in Freiburg.[11]

As one can already recognize in the title of the 1919 War Emergency Semester lecture, *Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem* (The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview), Heidegger works his critical confrontation with Rickert's philosophy into the context of the contemporary debate over the relationship between philosophy and worldview. Dilthey, Husserl, Rickert, Jaspers, and Spranger had expressed

themselves on this theme, partly through sharp, critical references to one another. And so Dilthey's conception of life-philosophy became the target of Husserl's famous *Logos* essay of 1910, *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* (Philosophy as Strict Science) while Jaspers's *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* (The Psychology of Worldviews) was contested by Rickert.[12]

Criticizing life-philosophy as well as neo-Kantian philosophy, existence-philosophy as well as the phenomenological view, Heidegger cannot come to terms with any of the representative positions. It is perhaps no coincidence that Heidegger dealt with this theme in his first seminar immediately upon his return from the war, for an awareness of an epochal crisis was, from the beginning, already articulated in this set of questions concerning the relationship of philosophy and worldview, a crisis that in particular was dramatically named by the otherwise sober Husserl: "The spiritual affliction of our time has in fact become unbearable. . . . It is rather the most radical affliction of life, from which we suffer, an affliction that at no point in our life ceases."[13]

The achievements of the nineteenth century—the intensification of science and industrialization—resulted in the loss of a unified world picture and, with that, the loss of a self-evident orientation for leading one's life. The experience of the World War I must have hightened the awareness of a crisis and it must have cast doubt on the attempt at a resolution, which still in the empire appeared acceptable as a possibility and which also served to justify academic philosophy within this community.[14] The fact that Heidegger takes up this discussion indicates that he is also aware of a crisis in culture and in philosophy, and that means that his new conception of philosophy is also to be understood, in this context, as a response.

For Heidegger, the problem of the relationship between philosophy and worldview presents itself at first as a conflict between two positions. The first maintains that every great philosophy culminates in a worldview; this approach is synonymous with the notion that philosophy, in its innermost tendency, is metaphysics. Philosophy is, in other words, only the conclusion and completion of the reconciliation of opposites—itself a tendency inherent in life—in a unified, justified whole.[15]

It is not difficult to recognize Dilthey's conception here. According to Dilthey, worldviews are objectifications of life. They are interpretations, meaningful indications of the world, "spiritual shapes," in which the cog-

nition of the world and the appreciation of life are so related to one another that life ideals arise out of them. The moments of knowing, feeling, and willing, moments constituting the structure of all mental life, are brought to expression in world-picture, life experience, and ideal.

Dilthey's "Main Proposition of the Doctrine of Worldview" reads as follows:

> World-views are not "products of thinking." They do not emerge out of the mere will of the understanding. The conception of reality is an important moment in their formation, but only one. World-views emerge out of an attitude and experience of life, out of the structure of our psychic totality. The elevation of life to consciousness in the cognition of reality, the appreciation of life, and the performance of the will is the slow and difficult work achieved by humanity in the development of lifeviews.[16]

Worldviews do not only come from life; they, in turn, affect life. Because worldviews of higher, more complete forms develop themselves out of a basic, vegetative stratum of infinite, particular worldviews, they can for their part counter what is restless, contingent, and particular with repose, steadfastness, and universality.

Dilthey delimits three of these higher forms of worldview: the religious, the aesthetic, and the philosophical.[17] (Cf. Bd. 8, S.87 ff.) A worldview *problem* arises with regard to the philosophical type. As opposed to the religious type of worldview, the philosophical worldview is universal and universally valid. As to the poetic type of worldview, the philosophical worldview reforms life. According to Dilthey, metaphysics is a type of worldview that is grasped conceptually and justified, hence raised to the level of universal validity. The problem is whether the claim to a scientific worldview ever reaches its goal, that is, whether the other religious and aesthetic forms can be transposed into a philosophical worldview, and whether, and on what basis, it is possible to choose a superior type among the historical variety of metaphysical shapes.

It is obvious that the thought of the scientific nature of the worldview contradicts the thought of the worldview's rootedness in the *totality* of mental life, to which feeling and value also belong. Dilthey's conclusion is

that it is impossible to establish worldviews in the strict sense of scientific metaphysics: individuality, circumstances, nationhood, and the "day and age" are factors that, for poets as well as for philosophers, give rise to unavoidable singularities in a world-vision. However, this insight into the irreducible relativity of worldview can nonetheless be superseded:

> The relativity of every world-view, which runs through spirit, does not have the last word on spirit. Rather, the sovereignty of spirit, spirit as opposed to each single world-view and simultaneously positive consciousness of it, is never the one reality there for us in spirit's various modes of comportment.[18]

In opposition to this position, Heidegger turns to Baden neo-Kantianism: within the rubric of the critical premises of Kantian provenance, philosophy abdicates the claim to metaphysics, that is, the claim to a universally valid worldview, but philosophy likewise holds onto philosophy's relatedness to worldviews. On the basis of a critical theory of knowledge, philosophy establishes itself as a univeral philosophy of value and consequently creates the scientific foundation upon which

> accrues a possible world-view congruent to this foundation, accordingly itself a scientific world-view. It is a world-view that wants to be nothing other than the interpretation of the meaning of human Dasein and of culture with regard to the system of what is absolutely valid, with regard to the true, the good, the beautiful, and the holy—values shaped into valid norms in the course of the humanity's development.[19]

It is not difficult to recognize Rickert's position in this presention, which, briefly sketched, is as follows. In all definitions of philosophy, it is indisputable for Rickert that philosophy, other than any regional science, "inquires into the 'All' and eventually has to reach what we call a 'world-view,' a word difficult to dispense with."[20] According to each underlying concept of world, two different paths at first offer themselves:

> the entirety of the world may be conceived from out of an object and a unity is arrived at by the fact that the subject, as it were, has been pulled

into the objective world, or conversely, the subject provides the ground for and finds the objects in an all-embracing world-subject."[21]

If, however, worldview implies that the meaning of life or the significance of the I should become intelligible in the world, then objectivism does not lead us anywhere: world is understood as the causally ordered whole and that means for Rickert that all personal life, freedom, and responsibility is destroyed.[22] But the chasm between life and science is also not to be bridged by a pure subjectivism: if, namely, the aims and purposes of the subject are themselves worthless, they cannot give *Dasein* any meaning. It is only when the starting point is a doctrine of value that the problem of worldview can be solved. Values form a realm unto themselves; they do not exist but are effective (*gelten*). The world is accordingly to be conceived as the unity of the real and of values.

They are the object of philosophy, and all regional sciences are held responsible to the knowledge of the real alone. But how can philosophy, which has its starting point in a pure doctrine of value, do justice to the claim that it interprets the meaning of life? In other words, how can a worldview as the unity of reality and value be reached?[23] Values are not to be formulated platonically as transcendent value-realities in the sense of an absolute measure, nor can the unity of value and reality be conceived in the sense of a life-philosophy as a merely intuitively accessible lived experience.

Positively put, of course, values must be transferred from the Platonic heaven of ideas to this side, to the reality of life. But the dualism between value and reality cannot be dissolved in the immanence of pure lived experience. For if the claim were posited as such, the conception of the meaning of life would become itself untenable. The only viable way for Rickert to escape from this difficulty lies in the nonobjectifying contemplation of acts, which grasps the meaning of these acts as a posturing (*Verhalten*) and positioning (*Stellungnehmen*) with respect to values.[24]

More precisely, this means that from out of the experience of acts, the formation of concepts can be carried out in three different directions. Lived experience can be understood as pure reality connected to other realities; reality can be "faded out" in favor of the contemplation of the assessed values in their validity. Yet in the end we cannot

> bring either direction to fruition and still, or rather exactly for this reason, unite them. It so happens that we think of the act only as a statement (*Stellungnahme*) with respect to values, but we leave the lived experience of acts, to the extent that it is at all possible, in its lived originality and immediacy. Then if we accordingly presuppose a concept of value and use it only to complete the mere attempt at formulating a concept, which is found in the lived experience of an act, we nonetheless maintain a concept, and this concept then contains the connection we seek between value and evaluation.[25]

Rickert comprehends this way of formulating concepts, which in itself applies neither to reality nor to values, as an interpretation of meaning.[26]

> The interpretation of meaning is . . . neither an assessment of being nor a mere understanding of value, but is rather the comprehension of a subjective act with consideration for the way it signifies value, for its comprehension as a statement with respect to what is valid.[27]

This understanding of philosophy as the interpretion of meaning can do justice to the richness of life: it is rooted in the experience of historical life, a life in which historical, cultural goods manifest themselves; philosophy brings about an awareness of these cultural goods and develops the aims of the future as a guideline (*Vorgabe*) for what is to be reached through cultural work.[28]

Historically seen, the die is cast, according to Heidegger, in favor of the second "Rickertian" position. Still a third possibility must however be contemplated, if merely for the sake of systematic completion, namely the possibility that between philosophy and worldview there is no connection at all.[29] If, however, philosophy until now either was, as metaphysics, itself a worldview, or as scientific philosophy, it necessarily tended toward a worldview, then the radical separation of philosophy from worldview must lead to a "catastrophe" of all philosophy hitherto.[30] That means that philosophy itself becomes a problem.

Heidegger notices a paradox: The dissolution of the relationship between philosophy and worldview would not only rob philosophy of its

"royal, superior calling" to attend to the ultimate questions concerning humanity. At the same time philosophy as science would disappear. For the critical science of values also "has in its system a final, necessary tendency towards worldview."[31] The paradox, then, is that the emancipation of philosophy from something that is not itself science shatters philosophy as science.

The exposition of the problem already shows, furthermore, that Heidegger cannot side with Husserl's radical critique of all worldview philosophy. In his essay *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* (Philosophy as Rigorous Science), Husserl departs sharply from Dilthey's philosophical project with respect to so-called worldview philosophy. This type of philosophy has lost its entitlement with the constitution of a transtemporal *universitas* of strict science.[32] If philosophy is to serve practical aims to be realized in time, then philosophy as rigorous science is obligated to a transtemporal idea of science. Yet the mixture of these opposing endeavors is fundamentally inadmissable.[33]

Only philosophy as pure science is able to respond to the need (*Not*) of the times: that life presents itself as a mere unintelligible jumble of facts, void of ideas, is the result of mere superstition. This superstition is common to both naturalism and historicism.[34] The phenomenon of a crisis, conjured up by this type of superstition, can only be effectively counteracted on the basis of a concept of philosophy as an eidetic science.

If the paradox in question constitutes for Heidegger the genuine problem of philosophy, then the solution cannot be sought along the path pursued by Husserl, that is, a path on which the scientific nature of philosophy is saved through the strict division of philosophy and worldview.[35] Heidegger's concept of philosophy as primal science rather aims at demonstrating the unphilosophical character of worldview *and* simultaneously at absolutely breaking with the "general dominance of the *theoretical*."[36]

In order to develop this new idea of philosophy as primal science, Heidegger critically examines, as a first step, one of the "most significant philosophical directions of the present day,"[37] the position of Baden neo-Kantianism. For this position claims to validate philosophy as a fundamentally primal science.

The most important theorems are as follows. Philosophy is to be formulation as only a theory of knowledge. The object of philosophy is not

the realm of reality but rather that of values. The necessity and undeniable validity of values can be demonstrated only by a doctrine of judgment. When the validity of values is philosophically justified, then philosophy is simultaneously established as primal science. The reason is that, according to Windelband, values also function as axioms for the type of knowledge found in the regional sciences.[38]

Now when Heidegger tests this approach for its suitability as a primal science,[39] there arise two completely different questions. On the one hand, one should test whether the claim formulated within the theory was realized. On the other hand, ond must ask whether the intended definition of philosophy as primal science is at all adequate.

The first question, which concerns the method of critique, is not yet fully thought through in the lectures from the 1919 War Emergency Semester. Here it is only briefly mentioned:

> How do we decide, with respect to the critical-teleological method, whether it achieves what is expected of it, or whether it fails? The only possibility we have is to demonstrate the suitability, or rather non-suitability of the critical-teleological method as a primal science *from out of itself*, and indeed, through an analysis of its structure. Other criteria to which this analysis may be answerable cannot be made available for a primal-scientific phenomenon.[40]

These succint remarks make it clear that any claim to primordiality cannot be criticized externally. It can can only be tested by showing the implicit presuppositions of a given structure. On the other hand, the teleological method should be treated as a primal-scientific phenomenon, that is, from the outset as the object of the idea of philosophy as primal science in Heidegger's sense, which is not yet developed by him here. It is thus already hinted that the new conception of philosophy as a primal science is not to be understood as a merely another alternative, but rather as a theory prior to other philosophical forms.

The first clue concerning the correct interpretation of this "structural analytic," understood as a method for a primal-scientific critical confrontation with a historically existing form of philosophy, is revealed as early as the first step of Heidegger's discussion.

> The structural analytic of the critical-teleological method must at first follow the *essential transformation*—more exactly: its final motive—which the method has experienced in contemporary transcendental philosophy as opposed to its form in the system of absolute idealism by Fichte.[41]

As it becomes more clear in the 1919 summer semester lectures, which already speak from the standpoint of primal science, the critical confrontation with historical forms of philosophy is carried out as a "*phenomenological critique*" comprising two tasks: first, to understand the historically humanistic motivation actually shaping a type of philosophy, and, second, to understand this type as such.[42]

The division of the historical and systematic modes of examination is declared by Heidegger to be false. For this "originary method of phenomenological research"[43] presupposes that philosophy is grounded in life, which is essentially historical.[44] Under this condition, the historical motives which can be shown by the method of genetic phenomenology are no longer to be understood in opposition to grounds. If philosophy is not an autonomous, theoretical project, but rather as "sympathy for life"[45] must grasp intuitively the movement of historical life itself, then subjective and objective motivations are identical. Genuine and originary character of motivations form, under these premisses, the standard of the critique.

> Phenomenological critique is not dis-proving, it does not wield counterevidence, but the proposition to be criticized is understood in terms of where, according to its meaning, it comes from. Critique is a positive hearing from out the genuine motivation.[46]

In order to test whether a philosophy of value satisfies the claim to the idea of philosophy as primal science, Heidegger begins with its method, which he, following Windelband, characterizes as a critical-teleological method.[47] Heidegger further follows Windelband in appreciating Fichte's contribution to the elaboration of this method, although he likewise gives credence to the transformation of this method through the philosophy of his time.

Like Windelband[48] and later Lask, Heidegger criticizes Fichte's dialec-

tical method, through which all forms of thought and intuition, all laws and norms should be derivable from the I *qua* act. Such a constructive dialectic is, according to Heidegger, internally impossible. For either the opposites cannot be brought into position from out of themselves, or they unfold themselves onto the "basis of a material givenness—or at least there is the presupposition of this givenness—that is inexpessible and not methodological, therefore contingent."[49]

The motive for the transformation of the teleological method introduced by Fichte lies for Heidegger in the rejection of such a "speculating away from any care for the matter,"[50] namely a rejection conditioned by the ideal of science in the nineteenth century. In place of an attempt at a deductive dialectic as a method for gaining and justifying norms, the insight into the reliance upon a material pregivenness now comes on the scene, more precisely a givenness from which the laws and norms of reason can be shown. "Psychology and history eliminate the basic flaw of the dialectical method through *the methodological function of material pregivenness*."[51]

If norms and axioms are not dialectically deduced but are rather shown by virtue of a methodologically ordered material pregivenness—without, however, these norms being established as norms through the material—then the all-decisive problem of the giving of ideals arises. This is the problem from which Heidegger begins his "destruction" of philosophy of value.

The exposition of this problem is executed in three steps. In the first step, Heidegger raises the objection of a *petitio principii*: that which is supposed to be discerned through this method, or truth as value, is always already presupposed. In the second step, Heidegger shows the relationship among value, ought, and validity to be a problem. From this discussion, Heidegger draws the debilitating consequence that truth is not at all to be primordially conceived as value.

With respect to the first point, philosophy, according to Rickert, is only justified as a theory of knowledge. There is truth only in judgment. From the perspective of Windelband's distinction between representation and judgment, Rickert shows that judging is not an act of mere detached observation. It is rather always a positioning with respect to a value. Knowledge is therefore to be conceived of as an act that is the free recog-

nition of a value. The transcendent value is not the object of knowledge, but is rather valid. Truth as value is the undeniable presupposition of all knowledge, for any challenge to the notion of truth as value likewise itself presupposes its recognition.[52]

Heidegger's attempt to demonstrate a *petitio principii* with respect to the critical-teleological method takes its departure from Rickert's subjective, transcendental-psychological path.[53] The teleological method "wants to be the very methodological means that explicitly raises to consciousness the norms and forms themselves and as such, norms that comply with natural thinking; it wants itself to know thinking and knowing."[54] The teleogical method, consequently, must bring the ideal of thinking to consciousness. It becomes clear, however, that it cannot accomplish this. As knowledge of knowledge, this method already presupposes a consciousness of ideals for its execution. Indeed, knowledge at the second level, viewed psychologically, could take place without consciousness of this ideal. Without knowing, however, the nature of knowledge—not as a psychic process but rather as an accomplishment—theory of knowledge cannot define the region of its object. As such, from the examination of psychic processes, it cannot know but rather always already presupposes the determination of the ideal, in order to be able to know knowing. Thus, "the structural analytic of the teleological-critical method reveals the following: this method presupposes in itself, according to its innermost meaning as a condition for its own possibility, that which it, first and foremost, is supposed to achieve."[55]

This result does not seem very exciting, in view of the fact that Rickert himself concedes the inevitability of such a *petitio principii* in relation to the subjective path.[56] "If we were not certain of a transcendent object before the examination of an immanent criterium for truth, we would never see anything more than the psychical in the psychic content."[57] Heidegger's and Rickert's assessment of this *petitio principii* diverge from one another in a characteristic way. While Rickert remains focussed on formulating a *transcendent* object, Heidegger stresses that the teleological method must always already presuppose the objective content (*Sachgehalt*)—the content (*Inhalt*) or "what" of the purpose, more specifically the ideal, even though the method professes to determine this objective content first through the teleological method.[58]

This accentuation refers to Lask's approach, more exactly to his two-element doctrine and to the so-called *Stockwerktheorie*.[59] The ideal is the form of the material and simultaneously the structure of material and form. Heidegger consequently interprets the ideal implicitly as the authentic object of philosophy. The nonsensual form, truth, becomes itself a known material that, for its part, is determined by a form. Heidegger's concerns in the second step regarding the givenness of the ought confirms the influence of Lask. These discussions no longer deal with the "what" of the giving of ideals, with the material, but rather with its form, which for Lask consists of validity with respect to nonsensual objects.

With respect to the second point, by applying the Husserlian method of the analysis of consitution, Heidegger exposes multiple confusions with respect to the relation between value, ought, and validity. The teleological method certainly presupposes something like a givenness of an ought. But how does this givenness, which is fundamentally distinct from the givenness of a theoretically known Being, become accessible at all?[60] It is *noesis* that is inquired into, a *noesis* that, *qua* the givenness of an ought, is a correlate to the *noema*.

> As long as the directionality of the original lived experience of the givenness of the ought is not emphasized, that is, the giving of the ought and the taking of the ought, the core of this method, problematic in itself, remains in darkness.[61]

Left unclear is not only the mode of the act of lived experience, which functions as a subject-correlate to the ought, but further how certainty is possible through this act. "Does the ought identify itself as itself, and on what basis does it do so?"[62] In the end, the relationship between value and ought shows itself to be insufficiently differentiated. For not every value is given as an ought; there are many lived experiences of values not connected to an ought, for example that of the delightful.[63] Thus,

> where the ought as a philosophical concept is used without even the most miniscule concern, because one is blind to the host of problems caught up in the phenomenon of the ought, one carries on unscientific idle talk without ennobling this ought to a cornerstone of the whole system.[64]

This brusque judgement is "tamed," however, as Heidegger detects a sign of the existence of a genuine motive in the "firm grasp of the ought." Indeed, Heidegger rejects Rickert's doctrine of the primacy of practical reason. But the formulation of the ought as a nontheoretical object indicates that knowledge, which depends on the theoretical sphere, is not grounded on itself. It rather requires a nontheoretical foundation, which according to Heidegger, does not reside in practical reason but rather in the pretheoretical sphere of life.

With respect to the third point, What consequences result from this critique of the giving of ideals, a methodological element central to the Rickertian theory of knowledge—the doctrine of truth as value—which in fact constitutes the basis of the entire conception of philosophy as a doctrine of value? Heidegger attacks this theorem, not because he refutes truth as a value, but because he is attempting to prove that this thought can be correctly taken to be an axiom of philosophy—a first, primordial, unqualified foundation. In addition to this, Heidegger makes use of the distinction between value-taking and value-explaining. This distinction derives neither from Rickert nor from Lask, but rather from Heidegger's own conception of philosophy as primal science.

Value-taking, "constituting life in and for itself," is divorced from everything theoretical.[65] Value-explaining, on the other hand, is a "derivative phenomenon founded in the theoretical sphere, which is itself theoretical."[66] Value-taking is therefore understood as positing a value of something in light of which something appears valuable. Accordingly, this phenomenon will be excluded by Heidegger from the sphere of practical reason and transported into the pretheoretical sphere.[67]

On the basis of this distinction between value-taking and value-explaining, there is evidence, according to Heidegger, that a true proposition that is valid is not to be found as such in a value-taking.[68] This evidence demonstrates for Heidegger that no judgment entails a "yes"—or rather—"no" as a genuine correlate to validity. Furthermore, value-taking, and (as Heidegger says) truth-taking reveal themselves as structurally different concerning the relation to the I. "The 'it values' does something to me, forces its way into me." I ascertain that the being-true remains, so to speak, outside.[69]

There are, consequently, no phenomenologically identifiable clues for

conceiving, within the rubric of value-taking, the truth-status of a proposition in the same way as the delightful as such.[70] Yet even if a phenomenological analysis shows that there is no evidence for Rickert's doctrine, namely that judgments take a position with respect to value, still the notion that truth is not at all to be thought of as value is not yet disproved. What is, however, revealed—and this matters a great deal to Heidegger—is that truth as value shows itself to be, not an originary, but rather a derivative phenomenon.

If the theoretical comportment as such does not at all betray a relation to values, and if this reference to values belongs more to the pretheoretical sphere of the constitution of life in and for itself, then the conception of truth as value can explain value only belatedly "on the basis of a broad, presupposed context of meaning."[71] Analogically, Heidegger explains that being valid is not an originary phenomenon: "Being valid, in the end, is an objectively constituted phenomenon presupposing intersubjectivity and furthermore historical consciousness."[72] Heidegger's critique, therefore, is directed equally against Rickert's doctrine of truth as value as well as against Lask's concept of being-valid as a form of the nonsensual.

With this, Heidegger has reached his goal of testing the claim of philosophy of value to be a primal science. The asserted primordiality, with the allusion to necessity, of formulating truth as value, and of having arrived at an epistemological foundation for philosophy, has proved itself to be groundless. This beginning is not a real beginning; it presupposes not only the sphere of life but also the sphere derived from this originary sphere, or the sphere of the theoretical, which first makes possible the explanation of truth as value.

The "intrinsic impossibility" of the teleological method has already been demonstrated through this critique of the giving of ideals as its core element. Heidegger continues the analysis of the method with the intention of clarifying the genuine primal-scientific problem, the axiomatic problem. This new step focuses on the relation between elements earlier treated as separate, which are located between the givenness of matter and the giving of ideals. Here the issue is how real, psychic being and the ideal ought can be related to one another if, as Rickert maintains, they are separated by a gulf.[73]

The interconnection of value and reality is defined by Rickert as a

third realm of meaning. Heidegger argues that the critical-teleological assessment presupposes not only the positive, content-related relations of matter, which reside under the norm, and the norm as a norm for matter. He further argues that that the character of this relation is already determined. In this way, Heidegger moves closer to Lask, whose theory suggests the differentiation of meaning through matter and the way in which the form gives validity.[74]

Without differentiating between the position of Rickert and Lask, Heidegger objects that the presuppositions so far considered have not been sufficiently thought through.

> The champions of the teleological method are, so to speak, fascinated with the radical cut between being and value and do not notice that they have theoretically only broken off the bridges between both spheres and now stand helpless at the river bank.[75]

Heidegger shows, starting with the givenness of content, that this flaw in the teleological method does not betray a subjective failing, but rather an objectively insurmountable difficulty. The giving of content must, if it is to meet its purpose in presenting unconditionally necessary, relevant moments seen from the norm, present the content in its "complete characterization" without gaps.[76] To the extent that the issue concerns an empirical science, psychology, which provides the content, the processes of knowledge, shows itself to be incapable of fulfilling this requirement. The contents made available by a science of experience necessarily remain provisional, hypothetical, and relative. For first of all, new facts can always be discovered and, through epistemological progress, present themselves to the already known facts otherwise than as before. As such, the teleological method is in the end dismissed as unsuitable for a primal science: if the foundation of critical judgement continually sways, so sways the house of philosophy built upon it.[77]

The structural analytic of the teleological method, then, leads by and large to the result that the giving of ideals neither grounds itself as elemental, nor can the ideals or norms be recognized with the claimed absolute certainty, if one starts with the psychic processes as content pregiven by psychology. The alleged progress of the critical-teleological

method over against the Fichtian dialectic shows itself, when looked at more closely, to be a dead end.

If one looks back at the structural analytic as a whole, one can see the decisive influence of Lask's philosophy: that Heidegger formulates the teleological method as existing out of the rudimentary givennes of matter and giving of ideals, and that he furthermore conceives the ideal itself as the unity of content and form, shows that the whole formulation of the analysis is taken from Lask's two-element theory and from his *Stockwerk-theorie*. If, accordingly, Lask's theory is taken as a basis from which Windelband and Rickert are criticized, without it being explicitly discussed as such, it remains to be asked whether this basis for a primal-scientific methodological discussion does not determine the subsequent course of the investigation.

First it must be realized that in the Laskian perspective one can find what Heidegger considers a positive result of the structural analytic and what he determines as the point of departure for the further clarification of primal science: the insight into the "fragility of the fact and of knowledge of the fact, of the '*faktum*.'"[78] In the *Logik der Philosophie*, Lask not only saw, aside from the complex constructions of form and matter, the givenness of a "logically naked matter" only accessible in immediate lived experience,[79] he also showed, in his Fichte book, in opposition to Rickert and Kant, that the method of comprehending historical individuality, taken from Fichte, is not possible as a logical, i.e., conceptual method provided that the analytic logic is principally not in the position to grasp the individual as such.[80] Only a nonconceptual, immediate representation, a feeling in the broadest sense, can represent the individual as such. One can see Lask's thought in the background, given that Heidegger continues his investigation at all through an expanded contemplation of content, and given that he furthermore calls for a new mode of contemplating content, one that is independent of the giving of ideals and does not include something like an object, something theoretically grasped.

In order to verify Heidegger's opening thesis—that his idea of philosophy as primal science resolves the worldview problem by showing the unphilosophical character of all worldviews together with the nontheorectical character of philosophy—the most important elements of this conception of philosophy can be presented in outline. The basis for all fur-

ther reflections is the distinction between two kinds of lived experience: process and event, which distinguish themselves roughly by the following features.[81] The subject of the lived experience qua process is the impersonal I in general; the subject of the lived experience is each time the historical singular I. While the lived experience qua event is "placed" (*verortet*) in the world around us, the lived experience qua process is worldless; world is extinquished. The decisive distinction, however, is found in the following: lived experiences are in a way reflexively self-referential. The way of having lived experiences is, with regard to events and processes, fundamentally different.

> We characterize the objectified happening, the happening as something objective, known, as a process; it simply goes by us, goes before my knowing I and this emptied reference to the I, reduced to the minimal lived-experience, is only related to this I as being-known.[82]

The lived experience *qua* event, on the other hand, is distinquished by having or seeing the lived experience itself in a lived experience. "The lived experience or being in-life (*Er-leben*) does not go by me, like something I make out to be an object, but I myself appropriate it for me, and it appropriates itself according to its essence."[83] It is clear that the following is meant: the lived experience (*Er-leben*) *qua* event, e.g., experiencing a sunset, is a living toward something (*auf etwas zu*) in the sense that the "full, historical I" discloses this sunset for itself as a historical I. The justification for this, that this mode of self-reference is that of a lived experience, is found in a form of identity theory: because the historical I experiences the sunset transitively, the self-appropriation of the lived experience is according to its essence itself a lived experience, for its essence is precisely to be actively experienced by the I.

On the basis of these heterogenous modes of content, Heidegger develops his conception of philosophy as primal science. If what is specifically characteristic of this content should ever be scientifically conceived, a fundamental problem arises with respect to lived experiences as events. The problem concerns whether scientific thematizing does not necessarily, inevitably rob lived experiences as events of their genuine nonobjective character.[84] In order to solve this problem, Heidegger distinguishes several

modes[85] of "something" which serve as a point of departure for different modes of thematizing.[86]

The relationship of these modes of "something" is formally determined. The modes of the theoretical something are conditioned by the modes of the pretheoretical something. Within the theoretical and pretheoretical something are submodes respectively differentiated as determinable or determined. Both points of differentiation combine in the following manner: the determinable mode of the pretheoretical founds the determinable mode of the theoretical something, and this is likewise the case for the determined.[87]

It is, however, important to consider that the determinable and the determined modes, at each level, form moments for themselves of a whole, so that here, it should be noted, the determinable mode additionally presents the originary moment.

The decisive categories for the idea of philosophy as primal science are the preworldly and formal-logical something. The concept of the preworldly something is an ontological concept, through which the fundamental character of life is determined:

> *the "something-character" belongs to life absolutely.* This is the phenomenological something. It extends to the sphere of life, to life in which nothing world-laden is yet differentiated: the phenomenological something-character is preworldly. The primal character of the "something at all" is the fundamental character of life at all—that it, life, is motivated in itself and tends toward itself; motivating tendency, tending motivation: to "world out" (*auszuwelten*) into determinate worlds of lived experience, the fundamental character of life—living toward something (*zu etwas hin*).[88]

If the preworldly something marks the fundamental character of life, this does not only mean that it marks its essential, determining ground but rather its character as ground. Life is the ground of determined life, i.e., life is considered as a dynamic universal explicating and differentiating itself. Life is the determinable tending toward determination, and what is determined is as such simultaneously motivated in life itself.

The concept of the formal-logical something marks the kind of concept adequate to the ontological sphere of life; this concept of the form-

logical something is thus "placed" (*verortet*) in the sphere of theory and that of the logical. Heidegger emphasizes a correspondence between the logical and ontological in relation to the indeterminacy or universality of both modes of something: "*Anything that can be experienced at all is a possible something, irregardless* [sic] *of its genuine world-character.*"[89]

This universality of the formal-logical something corresponds, consequently, to the potentiality of life that has not yet "broken out" into determinate worlds. Of primary importance for Heidegger, however, is not to establish a correspondence; the issue concerns rather the knowledge that the logical is grounded in the ontological. The universality of the formal-logical something is according to Heidegger an indication of its groundedness in life as such.

> This pretheoretical, preworldly "something" is as such the fundamental motive for the formal-logical something of objectivity at all. Its universality is grounded in the universality of the pretheoretical primal something.[90]

It is only suggested as to how this motivation of the logical something is to be thought through life: according to Heidegger, the tendency of life to break out into worlds can "be theoretically deflected" before the moulding of determinate worlds.[91] The formal-logical something, motivated in the potentiality of life as such, is the basis for philosophical concepts, the object of which is life. What Heidegger wants to guarantee through the characterization of the formal-logical something is the possibility of a theory not constructed at a level divested of life, which does not depart from an innerworldly experience. Such a theory would namely not be capable of grasping life as ground, i.e., as the origin there in advance of all that is determinate. Because the formal-logical something is motivated immediately by the "in-itself of the streaming lived experience of life,"[92] the basic character of corresponding philosophical concepts would be a universality tending from the indeterminate to the determining, i.e., they themselves come from the mode of life:

> The preworldly and worldly functions of signification express what is essential in their character as event, i.e., they accompany (experiencing

> and experiencing the experienced) lived experience, they live in life itself, and as accompanying, they are simultaneously approaching and bearing the approach in themselves.[93]

This means that philosophical concepts are not only grounded in life but that they live in accordance with life. They themselves release possibilities, as Heidegger later says, or in the terminology of 1919, they themselves have the character of lived experience so that through these philosophical concepts, the historical I "appropriates" for itself life and world. The basic methodological problem of a primal science of life understood as the indeterminate origin of all determinacy, which as this condition of all objects could be thematized in a nonreified manner, is clarified in the following formulation: the primal-scientific concepts made possible by the formal-logical something do not objectify and do not establish; motivated in life, they come from the mode of life, i.e., above all, an analogous dynamic or movement comes to them.

On the basis of this outline, if one once again considers the suspicion, gathered from Heidegger's critical confrontation with Rickert, that Lask's philosophy remains a determining influence for the idea of philosophy as primal science, one can depict the similarities and differences between them with greater precision.

The distinction between two kinds of lived experience, process and event, is the departure point for developing the idea of philosophy as primal science. Both kinds of lived experience are conceived by Heidegger, drawing on Lask, as complex constructions of content and form; the same content, something like a sunset, can be experienced in different ways. Philosophy is involved with lived experiences qua events, i.e., with contents whose form is lived experience determined by the identity of subject and object. This form of individual lived experience is the content for the objects of philosophy; the form of these objects is the formal-objective something. Seen in this way, Heidegger's schema seems to be a preparation for a doctrine of categories following Lask's *Logic of Philosophy*.

One cannot overlook the fact, however, that Heidegger's intention in attempting to realize a basis for a philosophy of life is different than Lask's intention. What ensues from this difference is first of all shown by the position of the concept of lived experience, which deviates from Lask's:

where with Lask, lived experience correlates fundamentally with the content of an object, Heidegger's version of lived experience surfaces as the form of the object in the first and second *Stockwerk*.

Heidegger characterizes the hermeneutic intuition indeed as an "experience of experience."[94] But if it is considered further that for Heidegger the logical is grounded in the ontological, i.e., that the formal-logical something is motivated by the preworldly something of life, then it becomes clear how radically this turn in life-philosophy transforms the Laskian formulation. The structural parallel between life and philosophical concepts means the following for a philosophical doctrine of categories: the structure of life, its fundamental character, is not only the content of philosophical concepts, i.e., what is to be understood. The concept as concept—as one finds in Lask—is nothing other than something merely determined along with this matter, apart from its being thought in a form different from matter. The concept as concept, i.e., as form of the mode of life, is thought much more thought—living in life, as Heidegger says.

If one could already detect in Lask's theory of material differentiaton the intention to deprive the sphere of logic of its power,[95] so Heidegger pushes this development to the extreme. The concept in no way resembles an independent, autonomous function detached from life. The thought of the transcendence of truth is given up—the Rickertian as well as the Laskian conception (as value, or as form). Truth is immanent in life.

It is clear that Heidegger's life-philosophical theory of the philosophical concept renders senseless Lask's terminology of form and matter as the basis of a philosophical doctrine of categories. That Lask's formulation and intention nonetheless remain determinative can be seen not only in the sketched elaboration of Heidegger's idea of philosophy as primal science. The concepts of the determinable and the determined, thus content and form, underlie the schema linking modes of something and the concept of an idea of philosophy as primal science.

Still to be examined is how these concepts of Heidegger's, laid out in paragraph 2a of the lecture, structure anew a life-philosophical version of a "Logic of Philosophy." Heidegger strictly rejects the natural assumption that his idea of philosophy as a primal science of life grounding itself in life is particularly suited to account for the need of a worldview. The expectation that this new idea of philosophy could accomplish, in the then

current style of philosophy, the clarification and justification of the meaning of life underestimates its radicality.

Heidegger's radical departure from all Platonism completely counters the need, underlying the worldview problem, for assessment and orientation of dynamic life by means of firm, stable standards. The unphilosophical character of any form of worldview asserted at the beginning of the lecture now becomes comprehensible on the basis of Heidegger's new idea of philosophy. If philosophy distinguishes itself from other theoretical forms in that it takes form as theory in the way suggested above, then a worldview's way of objectifying and absolutizing life, the way in which it brings life to a standstill, conflicts with philosophy as primal science. In a worldview, there is no self-immersion in life but rather a "standstill" outside of life.[96] The reference to worldview is fundamentally untenable for philosophy as primal science.

To what extent the separation of philosophy from a worldview is to be understood as a response to the supposedly epochal crisis-consciousness found at the beginning of the twentieth century becomes discernible in the 1920 summer semester course *Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks*.[97] I will here merely highlight two decisive points.

First, the prior self-understanding of philosophy as science is based in, and solidifies, the distinction between the transtemporal universal and the temporal-historical particular. When philosophy is placed in the transtemporal realm, philosophy and life are ripped apart from one another, and philosophy is prevented from unfolding and taking root in *Dasein*'s self-knowledge, i.e., from "giving" *Dasein* understood in its factical, ever-historical truth. This is what is meant in the last of the early Freiburg lectures, *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*:

> As such, it is not philosophy's task to care for universal humanity and culture, or to relieve future generations once and for all of the trouble of questioning, or additionally to interfere via topsy-turvy claims to validity. Philosophy is what it can be, only as a philosophy of its "time."[98]

The problem of relativism, sharpened by historical consciousness, is to be solved, according to Heidegger, by overcoming the last remains of Platonism, of every kind of absolutism. In place of the appeal to a

"chimerical in-itself" and to a pretention to the absolute, there will be the assumption of responsibility for factical, historical *Dasein.*

Second, given that philosophy as science objectifies life, in a certain way it first creates the problems that it promises subsequently to solve. The meaning of life arises from Dasein's self-concern and cannot be externally tacked on to it. "All reality contains its primordial meaning through the concern of the self."[99]

The dilemma determined by Husserl between temporal agency conditioned by dubitable, challenged norms and the idea of philosophy as a strict science is circumvented by the concept of philosophy as primal science. Philosophy positions itself within the sphere of life. The renunciation of a superior position is the simultaneous relinquishment of false claims. It is only from this new perspective that life can be validated as the primordial, constitutive sphere of value and meaning. This is Heidegger's early, radical alternative—an alternative already begun by Nietzsche—to Rickert's Platonic attempt at grounding a philosophy and a worldview in transcendent values.

NOTES

1. Cf. M. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* vol. 56/57, B. Heimbüchel, ed. (Frankfurt: 1987). I am indebted to Amy Morgenstern for the English translation.

2. Cf. ibid, pp. 121–20.

3. H. Rickert, "Gutachten über die Habilitionsschrift des Herrn Dr. Heidegger," in "Heidegger's Lehrjahre," by Thomas Sheehan, in *The Collegium Phaenomenologicum. The First Ten Years*, J. Sallis, G. Moneta, and J. Taminiaux, eds. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), pp. 77-137. Cf. p. 118.

4. Cf. M. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 1, F. W. von Hermann, ed. (Frankfurt: 1978) pp. 59-188, in particular pp. 176ff; cf. the 1914 review of Charles Sentroul, *Kant und Aristoteles*, ibid., pp. 49-53, in particular pp. 52ff.

5. Cf. ibid. pp. 189-411, here p. 191.

6. Ibid.

7. The 1984 habilitation by Claudius Strube already showed the essential features of the history of the development of *Sein und Zeit* before the documentation of the *Denkweg* was given through the *Gesamtausgabe* of Heidegger's work.

Here Heidegger's critical confrontation with neo-Kantianism is granted particular relevance. Cf. C. Strube, *Zur Vorgeschichte der hermeneutischen Phänomenologie* (Würzburg: 1993). Thomas Kisiel, on the basis of extensive material disclosed partly through his own research, pursues this theme in *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

8. Martin Heidegger, "Lebenslauf (1915)," in Sheehan, "Heidegger's Lehrjahre," p. 116.

9. Cf. ibid., p. 117.

10. Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe 56/57, pp. 180ff.

11. Cf. J. A. Barash, *Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Meaning* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988) p. 146.

12. Cf. W. Dilthey, *Das Wesen der Philosophie* (1907), in *Gesammelte Schriften* 5, G. Misch, ed. (Leipzig and Berlin: 1924); W. Dilthey, *Zur Weltanschauungslehre. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, 8, B. Groethuysen, ed. (Leipzig and Berlin: 1931); E. Husserl, *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* (1910/1911), ed. W. Szilasi, ed. (Frankfurt a. M. 1965); H. Rickert, "Vom Begriff der Philosophie" *Logos* 1 (1910/1911): 1–34; H. Rickert, "Vom System der Werte" *Logos* 4 (1913): 295–327; H. Rickert, "Psychologie der Weltanschauungen und Philosopie der Werte" (1920) in *Karl Jaspers in der Diskussion*, H. Saner, ed. (München: 1973), pp. 35-69; K. Jaspers, *Psychologie der Weltanschauung* (1919; München: 1994); M. Heidegger, "Anmerkungen zu K. Jaspers Psychologie der Weltanschauungen" in Saner, *Karl Jaspers in der Diskussion*, pp. 70–100; cf. H. Meier, "Weltanschauung," Studien zu einer Geschichte und Theorie des Begriffs, diss. (Münster: 1967).

13. Husserl, *Philosophie als Strenge Wissenschaft*, p. 65.

14. On this cf. K. C. Köhnke, *Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus. Die deutsche Universitätsphilosophie zwischen Idealismus und Positivismus* (Frankfurt: , 1983), in particular pp. 404ff.

15. Cf. Heidegger, *Gesamstausgabe*, vol. 5.56, p. 8.

16. Bd. 8, S. 86.

17. Cf. Bd 8, S. 87ff.

18. Bd. 5, S. 406.

19. Bd. 56/57, 9.

20. Rickert, "Vom Begriff der Philosophie," p. 2.

21. Ibid.

22. Cf. ibid., p. 7.

23. Cf. ibid., p. 19.

24. Cf. ibid., p. 24.
25. Ibid., p. 25.
26. Cf. ibid., pp. 26ff.
27. Ibid., p. 27.
28. Cf. ibid., p. 28.
29. Cf. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 11.
30. Cf. ibid., p. 12.
31. Ibid.
32. Cf. Husserl, *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*, p. 61.
33. Cf. ibid.
34. Cf. ibid., p. 66.
35. Cf. also Rickert's self-defense in response to Husserl in *Vom System der Werte*, pp. 324ff.
36. Cf. Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe 56/57, pp. 12., 86. Regarding the literature on the early Freiburg lectures, in addition to the monograph of Kisiel already mentioned (in particular pp. 38–58), cf. Kisiel's "Das Kriegsnotsemester 1919: Heidegger's Durchbruch in die hermeneutische Phänomenologie," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 99, no. 1 (1982): 105–22; "Das Entstehen des Begriffsfeldes 'Faktizität' im Frühwerk Heideggers," *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften* 4 (1986/87): 91–120; Thomas Kisiel/J. v. Buren, eds., *Reading Heidegger from the Start. Essays on His Earliest Thought* (New York: 1994); in this in particular J. M. Fehér, "Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, Lebensphilosophie: Heidegger's Confrontation with Husserl, Dilthey, and Jaspers," pp. 73-90 and G. Kovacs, "Philosophy as Primordial Science in Heidegger's Courses of 1919," pp. 91-110. Cf. also J. H. Barash, "Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Meaning," ch. 3.
37. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 128.
38. Cf. W. Windelband, "Kritische oder genetische Methode?" (1883) in *Präludien. Aufsätze zur Philosophie und ihrer* Geschichte, vol. 5 (extended edition Tübingen: 1915), p. 107.
39. Cf. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 52.
40. Ibid., pp. 39ff.
41. Ibid., p. 40.
42. Ibid., p. 125.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., p. 21.
45. Ibid., p. 110.

46. Ibid., p. 126.

47. Cf. Windelband, pp. 126ff. "Kritische oder genetische Methode?"

48. Cf. ibid.

49. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 40.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid., p. 41. Cf. H. Rickert, *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis* (Freiburg: 1892), pp. 66ff, in particular pp. 70–72.

52. Cf. H. Rickert, "Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie. Transzendentalpsychologie und Transzendentallogik," in *Kant-Studien* 14 (1909): 169–228.

53. Cf. Rickert, *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis* (Tübingen 1928), p. 245ff; in the first edition, Rickert realizes the existence of a circle. Cf. p. 64.

54. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 40.

55. Ibid., p. 44.

56. Ibid., 6th ed., p 247.

57. Cf. E. Lask, *Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre*, (Tübingen: 1923), pp. 45ff, 92ff.

58. Cf. Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe 56/57, p. 44.

59. In his essay, "Lebenswerte und Kulturwerte" (*Logos* 2, [1911/1912]: 131–66), Rickert among other things criticized *Lebensphilosophie* for being the fashionable philosophy of his time. His decisive objection was that one could not gather values from life itself (cf. p. 153); it is only through reason and philosophy as a science that it is possible to show the validity of independent values resting in themselves. Heidegger's distinction between taking a value and explaining a value takes part, against Rickert, in a kind of *Lebensphilosophie*. If life itself posits values, then this points to Nietzsche. Regarding the relation between practical reason and the pretheorectical sphere of life, cf. vol. 56/57, p. 59.

60. Cf. Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe 56/57, p. 44.

61. Ibid., p. 45.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., p. 46.

64. Ibid., p. 45.

65. Ibid., p. 48.

66. Ibid.

67. Cf. Lask, *Die Logik der Philosophie*, pp. 58ff.

68. Cf. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 51.

69. Ibid., p. 49.

70. Cf. ibid.

71. Ibid., p. 51.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid., p. 54.
74. Cf. Lask, *Die Logik der Philosophie*, pp. 73ff.
75. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 55.
76. Cf. ibid., p. 57.
77. Cf. ibid., p. 58.
78. Ibid.
79. Lask, "Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte," *Gesammelte Schriften*, E. Herrigel, ed., vol. 7 (Tübingen: 1923), pp. 152ff. See also M. Heinz, "Die Fichte-Rezeption in der südwestdeutschen Schule des Neukantianismus," forthcoming.
80. See also M. Heinz, "Die Fichte-Rezeption in der südwestdeutschen Schule des Neukantianismus," forthcoming.
81. Cf. Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe 56/57, par. 15.
82. Ibid., p. 74.
83. Ibid.
84. Cf. ibid., pp. 111ff.
85. Naturally this is not, terminologically, about genus and species.
86. Regarding the following, cf. *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, par. 20 as well as the excerpt from Brecht's postscript to this lecture, edited by C. Strube in *Heidegger-Studien* 11 (1996): 9–14.
87. Regarding the concepts determinable and determined, cf. *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, par. 2a.
88. Transcript 11.
89. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 115.
90. Transcript 11.
91. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 56/57, p. 116.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid., p. 117.
94. Ibid.
95. Cf. K. Hobe, *Emil Lask: Eine Untersuchung seines Denkens* (Ph.D. diss, Freie-Universität, Berlin, 1968), p. 100.
96. Cf. Transcript 13.
97. Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 59, C. Strube, ed. (Frankfurt a. M.: V. Klostermann, 1993); see in particular par. 19.
98. Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 63, K. Bröcker-Ottmanns, ed., p. 18.
99. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* 59, p. 173.

11

HEIDEGGER—LASK—FICHTE

Theodore Kisiel

Martin Heidegger's (1889–1976) lifelong expression of gratitude to Emil Lask (1875–1915), his repeated acknowledgements of Lask's influence upon him into his later years, still remain by and large incomprehensible to us. We must still ask why students of Heidegger will have to read Emil Lask, why they should retrieve Lask's works from their present oblivion.[1] Why should we, on the verge of a new millenium, revisit these somewhat arcane chapters of the philosophies of the first decades of the twentieth century? What bearing does this "hermeneutic situation" antedating the world wars and calamities of our century have on our present premillenial situation? Responses to this question of import and

importance can range from the strictly philosophical to the political to the personal idiosyncracies of a thinker who gradually invested himself with the mantle of precursor to a new millenium of occidental thought. The following essay, by way of an in-depth record of the actual and implicit dialogue between Lask and Heidegger, seeks to lay the basis for an educated response to all of these questions. The record indicates that the neo-Fichtean Lask prompted the young Heidegger to a reading of the the middle and late works of the more positivist, less idealist Fichte in a way that bore immediate fruit in finding the starting point to his own lifelong topic of thought, which the early Heidegger called, partly in Fichte's terms, a "hermeneutics of facticity." The essay thus concludes with a brief venture into the question of what the later Heidegger, distanced from the overpowering spell of Lask's "violent" interpretation, eventually comes to see in the later, "less" idealist Fichte.

TESTIMONIES OF GRATITUDE AND INFLUENCE

Already in the published foreword (1916) to his habilitation on Duns Scotus, after the obligatory acknowledgement of his *Doktorvater*, Heinrich Rickert, Heidegger likewise recalls Emil Lask "in his distant soldier's grave" in grateful tribute to "the philosophical achievement" of the now fallen hero.[2] Rickert himself, in his final report on the *Habilitation*, notes the high degree to which Heidegger is obligated to Lask "for his philosophical orientation as well as for his philosophical terminology . . . perhaps more than he was himself conscious of."[3] Heidegger had footnoted Lask's works barely a half-dozen times in the dissertation.

In his summer 1919 lecture course on "Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Value," in which Heidegger officially breaks with his youthful upbringing in the Southwest German School of neo-Kantianism, Lask alone of this group continues to receive positive treatment:

> Emil Lask, to whose investigations I personally am very much obligated, fell in the fighting in Galicia in May 1915. His body was never recovered. He was one of the most powerful philosophical personalities of our

> time, a profound man who in my view was on the way to phenomenology. His writings abound in exciting and suggestive insights, though they are not to be read only for this reason.[4]

In *Sein und Zeit* (1927), Heidegger notes that Lask, "the only one outside of phenomenological research who took up Husserl's *Logical Investigations* in a positive manner," was especially influenced by the Sixth Investigation, where his *Logik der Philosophie* (1911) takes up from its sixth chapter, "Sense and Categorial Intuitions," and his *Lehre vom Urteil* (1912) from the fifth, "Evidence and Truth."[5] In a summary of the "influences" on his work that he sketches out at the end of 1927 for an encyclopedia article, Heidegger adds that his methodology is "guided by the idea of a scientific philosophy as it has been grounded by Husserl, not without the influence of the logical investigations and philosophy of science of H. Rickert and E. Lask."[6]

Decades later, the old Heidegger will recall that he came to know Lask's writings as a student in Rickert's seminars in 1912–1914. Lask, Rickert's student, became for him a mediator between Rickert and Husserl who at the same time "also sought to listen to the Greek thinkers."[7] The early Heidegger had already observed that he had ventured various critical remarks on neo-Kantianism in seminar reports on Lask's writings and had "encountered great resistance" from Rickert.[8] He also observes that Lask "went beyond Rickert under the guidance of insights from the *Logical Investigations*, without however taking the step into phenomenology," even though he was well along on the way toward it.[9]

Lask himself was from the start quite conscious of the debt that he owed to Husserl's *Logical Investigations* for his own insights. In transmitting his work on transcendental logic to Husserl, he attempts to delineate their common ground in the "detachability of meaning from the acts" of consciousness:

> I believe that my decade-long preoccupation with your major book, by no means yet over, has contributed decisively toward determining all of my views on the subject-object relation and how the subject is directed toward objective meaning. . . . When I spoke of your influence upon my understanding of the subject-object relationship, I perhaps should have

> formulated this by indicating that I substitute the kind of intentionality that you represent for all concepts of a consciousness in general. Because of this, I am accused by my teacher Rickert of abandoning Kant and of a reactionary regression to antiquity.[10]

Lask's premature death was accordingly much regretted also in the circle of phenomenologists. Adolf Reinach, who would soon meet the same fate, writes Husserl from the Western front, "I was very much disturbed by Lask's death. He was truly one of the best."[11] In expressing his concern over "the tremendous waste of intellectual talent that this wretched war brings with it," Husserl recalls Lask in particular: "The death of this extraordinary man who, as all of his writings demonstrate, was striving for the highest philosophical goals, has also left me deeply shaken. One of the greatest hopes of German philosophy has passed away with him." Worthy of mention is also the eulogy written in 1918 by Lask's Hungarian student, Georg Lukács, who likewise underscores Lask's phenomenological connections.[12]

The converging tendencies of phenomenology and neo-Kantianism which, in the first two decades of the century, in their mutual critique nevertheless held each other in high esteem, degenerated into highly charged polemic only after the appearance of *Sein und Zeit* in 1927. But one remarkable aspect of the Davos Disputation with Ernst Cassirer in early 1929 is that Heidegger, when asked what he meant by neo-Kantianism, "that scapegoat of the new philosophy," includes neither Lask nor Paul Natorp.[13] I would guess that for Heidegger, both broke ranks with the neo-Kantians when they, each in his own penetrating way, began to explore the Fichtean problem of facticity and the purported "irrationality" of the transcendental ego, which Cassirer himself underscores in the debate as the Kantian problem of the "inconceivability of freedom."[14]

The scope and parameters of this problem at that time is very nicely brought out by the perceptive and highly instructive reading of the "hermeneutic situation" of the "actual tendencies of German philosophy" in 1930, when the supercession of neo-Kantianism by phenomenology was still in full swing, that we get from the French Fichtean scholar, Georges Gurvitch.[15] Following Lask's dissertation on *Fichte's Idealism and History*, Gurvitch takes his vantagepoint on the emerging phenomenolog-

ical literature from what the middle Fichte calls the *hiatus irrationalis* or transcendental abyss that opens between the various polar pairings of the empirical and the transcendental, the individual and the universal, intuition and concept, a posteriori and a priori, *quid facti* and *quid juris*, and finally, in Fichte's new coinage, between facticity and logicity or lawfulness. Gurvitch finds the irrational hiatus manifesting itself in Husserl's "positivism" of material essences that as separated "pure givens" are ineluctably irreducible to one another,[16] in Scheler's emotional intuition of value essences,[17] in Lask's moment of logical nudity even of logical (categorial) forms,[18] in the alogical dispersion of forms through their matter, thereby making forms themselves opaque to one another.[19] All of these currents, and more, fuse in Heidegger's hermeneutics of existence,[20] for example, in the irreducible equiprimordiality of existential categories and in the thrownness of emotive disposition, especially in the uncanniness of *Angst*. "Anguish is the sentiment of the abyss, of the impenetrable and opaque *hiatus irrationalis* into which human existence is plunged,"[21] of the "Nothing" out of which the finitude of its radical temporality is disclosed.[22] This for Gurvitch is the strongest indication of Heidegger's regress to the German tradition of the later Fichte and Schelling, as mediated to him by Lask and Kierkegaard.[23]

The "transcendental abyss" of the *hiatus irrationalis* is, in Kant's language, precisely the domain of spatio-temporal schematization lying between the abstract universal and the sensory individual, that now becomes the location or "home" of the transcendental logic that Lask and the youthful Heidegger seek to develop. In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger clearly underscores the primacy—"the third that is first"— of this "mysterious" middle realm of the schematism of the transcendental imagination that Kant discovered but from which he eventually "shrank back" in a "horror before the abyss." Lask calls this realm the prejudicative "supra-oppositional panarchy of the logos," an a priori categorized realm of intentionally structured meaning (intelligibility, truth) that becomes the matter of judgment. The young Heidegger calls it a facticity that is through and through hermeneutical, soon to become his lifelong topic under the rubric of *Dasein*. "*Facticität*" is a term coined by Fichte in his middle "positivist" phase circa 1800, which was mediated to Heidegger by way of the neo-Fichtean Lask's 1902 dissertation, *Fichte's Idealism and*

History.[24] As a term then current among fin-de-siècle neo-Kantians, "facticity" of meaning as Lask portrays it will eventually turn into allusions to the odd hybrid of a "transcendental fact" in the phenomenological school, once again recalling the Kantian middle realm of the transcendental schematism. It also recalls another historical difference in the two schools of "neo-Kantianism" at the turn of the century, namely, the neo-Fichtean tendency of the southwest German school and the more neo-Hegelian thrust of Marburg, especially with Natorp and Cassirer. Lask's "panarchy of the logos," which categorically forms and structures a multiplicity of "irrational" matter, is coined in explicit contrast to the panlogicism of the Hegelian school.[25] It is also the source of the recurring charge of "irrationalism" against this direction of thought by more formally minded thinkers like Carnap.[26]

The revival and repeated recall of this tradition of facticity from Fichte through Lask to Heidegger is accordingly the main goal of this study. That the full scope of this tradition has lapsed into scholarly oblivion is indicated by a remark made by Ludwig Landgrebe in his otherwise brilliant book entitled *Facticity and Individuation* on the primal matter (*Ur-Sache*) of phenomenology. Landgrebe had attended Heidegger's course of summer 1923 titled "Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity" and so speaks as a witness of the time when he asserts that "in the tradition of philosophical usage, the abstract term 'facticity' is not to be found earlier" than Heidegger's use of it.[27] Yet Landgrebe was not unaware that his question takes us to the very heart of the tradition of modernity from Descartes to Husserl, which finds its starting point in the "regress to the fact of the I-think" (118, 110) understood as the irreducible limit of reflection "behind which one cannot go any further" (*unhintergehbare Grenze*). Among the "facts of consciousness" in the transcendental I, even the early Fichte found not only the logical principle of identity but also what Kant early in the second *Critique* announced as "the sole fact of pure reason," namely, the fact of the moral law, or of pure practical reason itself, in the form of a feeling of obligation or a moral demand. Fact here "means for Kant a datum or given that cannot be questioned any further [*hinterfragende*] and that can no longer be accounted for by way of a reason or ground."[28] Does Heidegger find something more in "being's throw" of the facticity "that I am and have to be," of the facticity of the can-be that distinguishes itself from the

mere factuality of the *factum brutum*, the mere "that it is"? Landgrebe's book demonstrates the need to reevaluate not only the self-understanding of the entire modern tradition but also that of phenomenology's understanding of its maxim of getting "back to the things themselves," each now understood as a return to the "transcendental fact."The phenomenological critique of the neo-Kantian starting point in the "fact of science" is but an early witness to this concern.

Heidegger's courses on German idealism in the 1930s bear witness to his fascination with this sense of the "transcendental fact" that precedents his own sense of facticity. The summer 1930 course returns again and again to the single Kantian fact of freedom and the moral law,[29] and the 1936 course on Schelling to the facticity of the "feeling" of freedom. The later Heidegger after the "turn" and self-placement of his own initiative within an epochal "history of being" will seek to distance himself from such comparisons with German idealism.

> [T]he thought in *Being and Time* is not just "realistic" in contrast to the unconditioned "egoistic" idealism of Fichte. . . . According to Fichte it is the ego that throws the world. But according to *Being and Time*, the ego does not first throw the world; it is rather the Da-sein, essentially presencing before all humanity, that is thrown.[30]

Nevertheless, the comparison between the two, between the Fichtean I understood in its "irrational facticity"[31] and "brutality of its reality,"[32] and the thrown *Dasein* in the "facticity of its being delivered over," in finding itself always displaced into its "that it is and has to be,"[33] is inevitable, even fruitful in illuminating a fateful vein of the German philosophical tradition of the last two hundred years. We will thus take our starting point in the mediating and catalytic role of Lask's first book, *Fichte's Idealism and History* (1902), in the development of the young Heidegger's choice of problems in his student years, and then turn our attention to Lask's second book, *Logic of Philosophy* (1911), and the dominant role that it plays in Heidegger's habilitation of 1915.

SITUATING TRANSCENDENTAL (MATERIAL) LOGIC BY DEFINING ITS TOPIC

Fichte distinguishes two extremes of facticity: on the one hand, the minimal epistemological sense of individuation that starts from the multiplicity of "bare" sense data, the starting facts of the natural sciences; on the other, the fuller cultural sense of the factic individual in history. Paradigms of the historically individual in its fullest manifestation of humanity include Kant's "genius," the hero, artist, scientist, saint, in short, those who "have had a decisive impact on the progress of humankind."[34] Thus, the starting category of the "idiographic" historical sciences for Lask is the rich fact of "value individuality." Its precedent is to be found in Kant's second *Critique*, which declares freedom and its correlative of the moral law to be "the sole *fact* of pure reason," ergo a transcendental fact. At the end of the historical series of individual manifestations of freedom and value stand the deeds of the Divine intervening in history in an "irrational" revelation, like the Word made flesh in the person of Jesus. Such acts of God's grace constitute a "breakthrough" of absolute values and a unique "influx into history of the ever fresh and new."[35] All of these surcharged manifestations of "irrationality" mark the entry into human history of the unexplainably new, unprecedented, and creative.

The trailmarkers of the still neo-Fichtean young Heidegger's swelling interest in this higher level of facticity of "the historical in its individuality"[36] are clearly recorded, especially in his formal test lecture on "The Concept of Time in Historical Science"[37] in July 1915 and the 1916 conclusion to his *Habilitation*, which calls for history, as the arena of value formation and worldview, to become a meaning-determining element (i.e., a form-differentiating matter) for the category problem. The most striking example out of the test lecture may suffice here, namely, the mention of an especially significant unique Event (*Ereignis*), like the founding of Rome, the birth of Christ, or the Hegira, to exemplify the value-ladenness manifesting itself uniquely in qualitatively selective moments of historical time.[38] It will take several years and a world war before Heidegger deconstructs these neo-Kantian progressivist assumptions of value and

backtracks to the sheer "happening" of the "historical I" (the first precursor to *Dasein*), that happens first by "properizing" (*Es er-eignet sich!*), thereby giving the historical I its proper name and unique situational meaning.

The facticity (matter) of the historically individual thereby becomes for Heidegger the privileged place (location, home) for his own hermeneutical logic. Ever since the student Heidegger reviewed Lask's *Logik der Philosophie* in a 1912 journal article,[39] logic for him meant philosophical logic. Called "a logic of logic" in the Scotus dissertation, for the neo-Kantian Lask it is a transcendental logic. The 1912 review already notes Lask's aversion to the "bogey of psychologism"[40] in refusing to situate such a logic in the mind, subject, consciousness, or psyche. Nor, for that matter, in either one of the two worlds of entities inherited from philosophy, whether physical or metaphysical, but rather in a nonentitative Third Reich variously called validity, meaning, sense, and logos. Here we have the first appearance in Heidegger, as early as 1912 by way of Lask, not only of the theme of the ontological difference between being and beings, but also of its oblivion by way of the metaphysical "in the entire course of the history of philosophy." For, as Lask notes, this difference had since Plato been repeatedly obscured by the "hypostatizing of the logical into metaphysical entities." The distinction expressed in Hermann Lotze's famous one-liner from the nineteenth century, "Es 'ist' nicht, sondern es gilt: It 'is' not, rather it holds, validates, empowers," must, insist both Lask and Heidegger, be understood non-Platonically and, more generally, non-metaphysically. What and where is this empowering *it* of *Es gilt* that holds, validates, carries weight, yields sense, which in our present context is to be the seat of logic? Is *it* knowledge or is *it* life, or perhaps neither, but rather some other, more impersonal realm? Out of the tradition of neo-Kantianism and the "treasure-store [thesaurus]" of the German language, Heidegger will over a long career respond with a veritable litany of dynamic impersonal sentences after the model of *es gilt*, which attempt to name the sheer activity of being's dynamic in giving meaning: "Es wertet, Es weltet, Es ereignet sich, Es gibt, Es zeitigt, Es schickt, Es reicht," etc. etc. But never "It is" (Parmenides' estiv), an impersonal that belongs properly to a being, and never to its being.[41]

The transcendental logic that Heidegger is after is thus an ontological

logic. Beginning with winter semester 1925–26, in a series of courses taught by Heidegger entitled simply "Logik," it is portrayed as an original logic (hence a "logic of origins") whose first function is to "produce" the fundamental concepts that articulate the ground of all of reality as well as of its different domains. In Heidegger's first explicit venture into such a "productive" logic of philosophical concept formation, the fundamental concepts articulating the "ways to be" that course across the historical human situation called *Dasein*, are first called *Temporalien*, tensors, before they become the *Existenzialien*, existentials, those tradition-breaking categories of *Being and Time* intended to displace both the Aristotelian and Kantian categories of traditional substance metaphysics.

This logical development is in fact first launched in the Scotus dissertation of 1915. Its topic is a medieval version of philosophical logic aiming to "produce" the transcendentals of *ens, unum, verum, et bonum* around what Scotus calls *haecceitas* (thisness), the very form of individuality that invests each individual with its own "this-here-now." Heidegger's stated purpose is to approach this medieval logic through the resources of modern philosophical logic, especially those of Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and the various transcendental logics of the neo-Kantians. It is in this early work that the massive influence of Lask is to be found, as his dissertation director, Heinrich Rickert, Heidegger's *Doktorvater*, observes in his final report, at once remarking, "perhaps more than [Heidegger] himself is conscious of."[42] Out of the dense jungle of the habilitation, out of this "melting pot" fusing scholasticism, neo-Kantianism, and phenomenology, I wish now to specifically single out the elements of Lask's thought that work their way into Heidegger's thought. These elements bring together two logical extremes that are also to be found in the work of Duns Scotus, who was, according to Dilthey, "the sharpest of all scholastics." For Scotus demonstrated his mastery not only over the fine formalities of the "gray on gray" of philosophy. He in turn developed "a greater and more refined proximity to real life (*haecceitas*), its multiplicity and possibility of tension than the scholastics before him."[43] Shortly after *Sein und Zeit* appeared, Heidegger commented on the basic impulse of the Scotus book: "I first had to go all out after the *factic* in order to make *facticity* itself into a problem. Formal indication, critique of the usual doctrine of the apriori, formalization, and the like, all of that is still there [in *Sein und Zeit*] for me,

even if I do not talk about them now."[44] If we read the habilitation in its filigree with this guiding clue in mind, we should be able to trace the initial steps that Heidegger takes toward his formally indicative hermeneutics of facticity, developed by way of Scotus and the Fichtean Lask.

WHAT DID THE YOUNG HEIDEGGER FIND IN EMIL LASK?

A. Back to Matter

The all-out drive toward facticity in the still hylomorphic elements of the habilitation is evident especially in the recurring tendency to get back to the "matter" of things.

1. PMDF

The first element is the repeated application of what Heidegger calls the "principle of the material determination of form" (PMDF), which in language and content is clearly an outgrowth of Lask's "doctrine of the differentiation of meaning." "Form receives its meaning from matter."[45] It accommodates ("tailors"[46]) itself to a particular matter such that it is itself particularized by meaning. Meaning is thus the particular fruit of the union of form and matter. Meaning is that very union, which is why the ultimate answer to the question "whence sense?" cannot simply be "matter" but rather "by way of matter," "relatedness to matter." The "moment of meaning" is the "relatedness of the validlike to the outside."[47] Such an answer is perhaps not surprising, in view of the operative concept of intentionality that governs Lask's *Hingeltung*, "validition of . . . ," where the German particle "hin" first announces the "enclitic" character, the intrinsic need of valid forms for *fulfillment* in a matter. From the standpoint of "pure" form and validity, meaning is an "excess" arising from its reference "to a something lying outside of it." Lask, as a closet Plotinian, views this inescapable "reference" to matter as a kind of fall of pure form from the realm of "pure" validity into a "lower" realm mediating the univocal homogeneity of the logical realm[48] with the "multiplicity of all that is alien

to validity," with the "opaqueness, impenetrability, incomprehensibility" and "irrationality of matter."[49] Form accommodating itself to the multiplicity of matter yields the "impure" middle realm of meaning. The "moment of meaning" is accordingly the "principle of individuation" which particularizes and differentiates forms, the "principle of plurality in the [otherwise homogeneous] sphere of validity,"[50] multiplying forms as it specifies them. Form "burdened" with meaning thus becomes the fuller and more "specific" constitutive form, "the categorial determination called for by non-validating matter," which "lets the essence of matter shine through, as it were."[51] The constitutive form is accordingly an intrinsic "reflection of material determination."[52]

Phenomenology in its very maxim has a less hesitant and devious, a more direct and confident statement of PMDF: "Away with theories and books, back to the matters themselves!" Back to facticities, back to *haecceitas*. To the questions, How do we know that there are different domains of reality? How are such domains articulated?, the young Heidegger responds in a paragon expression of the basic phenomenological conviction in the possibility of direct description: Such differentiations can only be "read off" (*abgelesen*) from the reality itself.[53] "Facticities can only be pointed out,"[54] indicated, simply apprehended, and not deduced by a priori means from valid sentences, as in Kant's metaphysical deduction. When irreducible ultimates are invoked, our only recourse is to direct acquaintance, to something like Husserl's intuitive seeing (*Hinsehen*), what the scholastics called simple apprehension, and Lask *Hingabe*, immersion in the subject matter. Thus, Rickert's "transcendental empiricism" reluctantly "borrows" from psychology the *material* distinction of psychic functions into thinking, willing, and feeling, in order to "deduce" the articulation on the normative level, respectively, of the *forms* into the true, the good, and the beautiful, for the domains of the scientific, ethical, and aesthetic, to which it then adds the value of the holy to cover the more holistic domain of the religious. But beyond the matter of the psyche, the young Heidegger, still speaking like a neo-Kantian philosopher of value, looks to the matter of "history and its teleological interpretation along the lines of a philosophy of culture to become a meaning-determining element [i.e., a form-differentiating matter, a reality principle] for the category problem."[55]

2. Material Truth

Lask's hylomorphic theory of meaning also involves the shift in the locus of truth in the prejudgmental direction of the transcendental *verum*, being as knowable or intelligible. This is not the truth of judgment, truth as validity, but the prior truth of simple apprehension, scholasticism's first "act of the mind," truth as meaning, that of the simple encounter at the interface of the orders of knowing and being, "the essential union of the object of knowledge and the knowledge of the object,"[56] intentionality at its most direct. It is the truth of simply having an object as "a meaning independent of judicative characterizing. . . . The truth is consummated in givenness and does not extend beyond it."[57] Material givenness, and not judicative forming, plays the major role at this rudimentary level of truth, where the categorial forms of thought are dependent on the matter of being for their meaning. Not an ideal and theoretical realm of validity, but still a "transcendental" realm of pretheoretical meaning flowing from and through life itself as the original setting of the human being. Lask calls it a "panarchy of the logos"[58] in which I already "live in truth" (i.e., intelligibility, meaning). This theme of already "living in the truth" taken from Lask's aletheiology will be repeated in *Being and Time*[59] for the even broader sense of truth that Heidegger finds in the total human situation, ἀλήθεια as self-discovery and the comprehensive process of unconcealment. Notably absent in the phenomenologist Heidegger's naive intuitionism of 1915 flavored with Aristotelian and scholastic realism, however, is any allusion whatsoever to the equiprimordial "living in untruth," of the concealment inherent in being-here, *Dasein*.

3. World

Even Heidegger's discovery in *Kriegsnotsemester* 1919 of a preobjective, pretheoretical world (I.B of the *Kriegsnotsemester*-Schema, Fig. 1) as the meaningful context for things may have been suggested by Lask's hylomorphic way of describing the intentional relation. Since we live immediately in the form in order to know the matter mediately, we, as it were, live in categories as in contexts through which we experience the things included within them. The relation of form to its matter is thus one of

"environment" (*Umgebung*). Matter is encompassed, embraced (*umgriffen*), surrounded or environed (*umgeben*), horizoned or bordered (*verbrämt*) by the form; it is enveloped (*umhüllt*), enclosed (*umschlossen*) in the form.[60] Lask's exploratory metaphors here may have been one of the lines of suggestion that prompted the early Heidegger to make the leap from category to world, more specifically to the environing world (*Umwelt*) as signifying element, a central thrust of his hermeneutic breakthrough in *Kriegsnotsemester* 1919. One indication of such a neo-Kantian "world" connection: Heidegger at this time manifests a peculiar penchant to use the Husserlian term "lifeworld" in the plural, typically in reference to the aesthetic, ethical, religious, and scientific lifeworlds, matching the fourfold division of normative forms that he learned from his teachers in the Southwest German school of neo-Kantianism. Another indication that Lask's "panarchy of the logos" is ultimately experienced as a world comes to us from Heidegger's own admission in the opening hour of Heidegger's survey of neo-Kantianism in summer semester 1919: "Lask discovered in the ought and in value, as in an experienced ultimate, *the world*, which was non-thinglike, non-sensorily metaphysical, as well as not unthinglike, not extravagantly speculative, but rather was factic."[61]

But even more subtly telling is Heidegger's use of Lask's alternative word for form, *Bewandtnis* (pertinence, relevance, intentional nexus), which refers specifically to its relation of befittingness to its matter. In *Being and Time*, *Bewandtnis* is identified as the being of a tool, articulated in terms of its prepositional nexus of "with, in, for, in order to, for the sake of." This structure of relations, this totality of relevances, articulates and defines the meaningful whole that we simply call the environing world. On the basis of Laskian connections like these that can be traced into *Being and Time* (1927), Crowell goes so far as to find the home of logic, its original level of logos, in the practical worlds of making and acting.[62] In terms of the Aristotelian practical paradigms that govern the two Divisions of *Being and Time*, this would be the techné of poiesis of the First division and the phronesis of praxis of the Second, which together are found to be governed by the "lighted clearing" of original temporality, in marked contrast to the eternal illuminations of *nous* in Greek philosophy that traditionally undergird the "timeless realm of logical validity."

B. Lask's Reflexive Category

Lask's distinction between the *constitutive* categories generated by the differentiation of the domains of reality according to different matters, and the more formal and so "empty" *reflexive* categories oriented toward the unification of the comprehensive field of being, has in fact already guided our discussion of the Laskian harbingers of a hermeneutics of facticity in the *Habilitation*. So far, we have only outlined Heidegger's effort "to go all out after the factic in order to make fact*icity* into a problem," especially in relation to the transcendental *verum* (the true), where the extrovertive (noematic) side of the relationship of truth first leads to the discovery of the "principle of the material determination of form" specifically in the constitutive category. On the other hand, the first stirrings of the method of "formal indication," central to Heidegger's hermeneutical method, occur in the discussion of the transcendental *unum* (the one), at the point where Lask's reflexive category is related to the medieval doctrine of the analogy of being and its extremities of univocity and equivocity. Lask's distinction in categories thus plays a catalytic function in both components of Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity, his lifetime topic (facticity) and how to approach it (a formally indicating hermeneutics). It is time to say a bit about the second of these two basic terminological interchanges in the translation template "Heidegger—medieval transcendentals—Lask," which has been guiding our discussion of what Heidegger found in Lask:

1. facticity—*verum*—constitutive matter.
2. formal indication—*unum*—reflexive forms.

Lask not only contributes to a new sense of facticity, but also to the question of how to express this precognitive realm of lived meaning in the special language that Heidegger will soon call "formal indication." In this vein, Lask's treatment of the reflexive category appears in the habilitation text expressly in the section on the medieval doctrine of speech significations. But it had already appeared unannounced in the earlier section on the transcendental *unum*. While the constitutive category plays a central role in the differentiation of the domains of reality, their regionalization into various material logics, the role of the reflexive category is that of

their unification, in a logic tending toward the most general and formal of considerations. Its utter generality suggests that it is the emptiest and most *abstract* of categories. But Lask's account of its genesis at the very outskirts between knowing and being, in the very first stirrings of taking thought and reflecting upon an initially amorphous absorption (*Hingabe*) in a homogeneous experience, suggests instead a proximity to the *concrete whole* of being itself.[63] Thus, Heidegger in *Kriegsnotsemester* 1919 can say that the formal objective "anything whatsoever."[64] of the reflexive category is "motivated" in the undifferentiation of the primal something of "life in and for itself,"[65] the basic isomorphism of the *Kriegsnotsemester*-Schema.

The medieval discussion of the categories express this primal indifference in the concept of *ens commune*, about which one can indifferently say, "it is." "*Aliquid indifferens concipimus*," we first conceive the something indifferently.[66] If this indifference is thought to its extremity, "the 'general' here loses all meaning,"[67] and *ens commune* can no longer be made subject to predicative subsumption according to the hierarchy of genera and species.[68] Because it is beyond such hierarchical generalization and has its own unique universality, being is called a "transcendental." In the language of neo-Kantianism, something in general, "anything whatsoever," the object pure and simple, is not an object at all but rather a homogeneous continuum. This "indifference of the on-hand [*Vorhandenheit*]" surfaces in a surprising number of places in *Being and Time*, along with a parallel limit-experience, that of the indifference of everyday absorption in the environing world.

The reflexive category first arises at the utter limit between the indifference and difference of being. For the starting stuff of the reflexive category is this "something in general,"[69] and its initial form is the "there is" (*es gibt*). Put otherwise, the very first reflexive category is "persistent being" (*Bestand*), sheer presence. This indifferent identity then gives rise to the categorial pair of identity *and* difference, which belong together in the relation of heterothesis (Rickert's term for it) or the transcendental *unum*. It is only at this point that an object clearly becomes an object. "There is [*es gibt*] no object, no object is given, when the One *and* the Other is not given."[70] "Why is the something a something, one something? Because it is not an other. It is a something and in being-something it is not-the-other."[71] Being an object at all means being identical with itself *and* being

different from anything else. These two elements are "equally primordial" (*gleich ursprünglich*;[72] this is a key structural term in *Being and Time* that can also be traced back to Fichte). It is the very first use of this important Fichtean term in Heidegger's thought, here associated with the "convertibility" of the transcendentals *ens* and *unum,* being and one.[73] In the proximity of the primal indifference, basic terms tend to converge. What this basic convergence yields is the most minimal order (form, determination) necessary to apprehend an object at all; Rickert would add, necessary for anything whatsoever to be thought at all: For a pure monism without opposites cannot even be thought. The apparent tautology *ens est* necessarily already involves a heterology. In an account of the difference in function between the noun *ens* and verb *esse* in this sentence, which already calls to mind his later reflection on the ontological difference between being and beings, the young Heidegger writes: "Equally primordial as the object in general is the object's state of affairs; with every object there is an 'intentional nexus' [i.e. *Bewandtnis*], even if it be merely that it is identical with itself and different from another."[74] Thus, in *Being and Time,* the crucial term "equiprimordial" first appears in conjunction with the formal indication of the self-other relation in *Dasein.*[75]

The ordinary-language examples from the young Heidegger's account of a speculative grammar (Scotus) or a priori logical grammar (Husserl) illustrate what the reflexive order of categories promises for him: logical insight into the structural resources of a living language which would abet especially the "logic of philosophy." In today's jargon, one might even call it a "gramma(on)tology." Lask too alludes to this connection between logic and language. At one point in his defense of the seemingly ethereal and remote reflexive categories (persistent being, identity and difference, unity, multiplicity, plurality, etc.), he poses the rhetorical question What would we do with a language without words like "and," "or," "one," "other," "not"?[76] Accordingly, such hyperreflective categorial artifices, which buy transparency at the price of depleting the constitutive categorial forms upon which they are parasitical,[77] still have their concretion. For the reflexive categories draw their moment of meaning-differentiation from the subject-object duplicity rather than from the form-matter relation.[78] In its own way, therefore, the reflexive category constitutes a formal skeletal structure of the *intentional* structure of life itself. Lask thus describes his

panarchy of the logos as a "bundle of rays of relations."[79] The reflexive object is the pure object as such; in relation to subjectivity, it is a "standing over against" (*Entgegenstehendes*).[80] Its being "is stripped down to the bare reflexive being of the shadowy anything whatsoever, to the naked something of the 'there it is.' "[81]

> A something stands as logically naked and preobjective only before the immediate," unreflected and theoretically untouched dedication and surrender [*Hingabe*: I.A. in the *Kriegsnotsemester*-Schema]. By contrast, it always confronts reflection as an object, standing over against us. . . . Of course, only a minimum of objectivity need be involved in such reflecting [II.A]. In such a case, the matter needs to be legitimized theoretically merely as a "something" which "is given" or "is there" ["es gibt"]. It remains to be seen what the precise relevance [*Bewandtnis*] of this bare "reflexive" category of merely "being there" ["*Es-Geben*"] may be.[82]

The young Heidegger sees the need to supplement Lask's terms here and finds that the medieval theory of speech acts and their contents already "manifests a sensitive and sure disposition of attunement to the immediate life of the subjectivity and its immanent contexts of meaning,"[83] especially in sorting out the signifying functions of univocity, equivocity, and analogy, "which originate in the use of expressions in living thinking and knowing."[84] In the same vein, Heidegger tantalizingly suggests that the variety of domains in any category system, even though they are differentiated primarily in objective accordance with the actual domains themselves, at least to some extent receive their identity-difference relations from the "subjective side" which finds expression in the reflexive categories.[85] This side is at least partly met by the concerns of medieval speech theory for privations, fictions and other nonentities or "beings of reason."[86] In coping with such articulations, linguistic forms, in contrast to empirically oriented constitutive categories and much like the reflexive categories, develop a peculiar dilution and indeterminateness which make them amenable to "anything whatsoever" (*Etwas überhaupt*[87]), the very matter of reflexive categories.[88]

It is precisely these resources of a living language which philosophical discourse must draw upon in order to perform its comprehensive tasks; in

short, not so much upon empirical metaphors but more upon structural considerations already latent in the comprehension of being by language. Heidegger's lifelong penchant toward the impersonal sentence, double genitive, middle-voiced infinitives, reflexives, etc., exemplifies this quasi-structuralist grammatical sense of language. The perennial embarrassment of philosophical language to attain its goals might well be lessened by a fuller explication of the formal-reflexive schematization of intentionality already operative in our extant language. This accounts for the importance of Lask's distinction between the reflexive and the constitutive category. It coincides with the medieval distinction between the unique universality of being[89] and the stepwise hierarchical generality of beings,[90] Husserl's distinction (*Ideen I*, §13) between formalization and generalization, and the one in the *Kriegsnotsemester*-Schema between two kinds of the "theoretical something." In *Kriegsnotsemester* 1919, in the face of phenomenology's embarrassment to express the primal something of life, this distinction will yield the method of "formal indication" as a way of approaching a subject matter that traditionally borders on ineffability: "*individuum est ineffabile.*" The expanse opened up by the reflexive category between the extremes of homogeneity and heterogeneity, indifference and difference, will serve as Heidegger's initial space of articulation of that purportedly ineffable domain of immediacy.

CONCLUSION: THE *KRIEGSNOTSEMESTER*-SCHEMA

A final overview of the *Kriegsnotsemester*-Schema that concludes the course of *Kriegsnotsemester* 1919 (published in *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*) will serve to summarize Heidegger's phenomenological transformation of the neo-Kantian structure and terminology of Lask so much in evidence in the young Heidegger up to 1919, especially in the isomorphisms of the generalization of constitutive categories (B–B) and the formalization of reflexive categories (A–A).

A final objection posed at the end of *Kriegsnotsemester* 1919 serves to test our understanding of the crucial role played by intentionality in the diagram. Phenomenological seeing is always a *Verhalten zu etwas*,[91] a com-

portment relating itself to something. It therefore always involves at the very minimum a "something" that "gives itself." Is not this sheerest something the something in general that represents the very epitome of "unliving" ensuing from the process of objectifying theoretization? Up to now, this has been *formaliter* the case in Heidegger's account. But now, a fundamental division must be made within the theoretical, which in turn will lead to the exposition of an analogous two-part division in the pretheoretical realm; ergo, the four-part "something" and double isomorphism of the *Kriegsnotsemester*-Schema (A–A, B–B) already outlined above in anticipation of this moment. The objection is answered by first distinguishing the content-laden universals, derived stepwise and typewise from the various worlds of experience[92] and developing a hierarchy of ever increasing subsumption of species under genera.[93] This is contrasted with the formally empty universal "anything whatsoever"[94] derived in one fell swoop from the primal something of experience.[95] At bottom, the sheer contentless "anything whatsoever" of knowability,[96] or "something in general," and the primal something of experiencability[97] share the common "matter" of *ens communis*. Both turn on its initial moment of indifference on the verge of differentiation. Both have in common a differentiation arising from the initial absorption of indifference that characterizes the global immediacy of the whole. And this incipient differentiating indifference in both cases undercuts the old-fashioned schema of forms superimposed on matter.

But logical formality is still theoretical, while phenomenological formality seeks to be pretheoretical, if phenomenology is to be the "pretheoretical primal science of origins." Phenomenology must therefore catch the differentiation of life experience at its vital *pre*objective incipience, before it becomes an object standing over against a subject, the latter being the ultimate intentional structure of logical formality and its formal ontology (à la Leibniz). How is phenomenology to avoid every vestige of the theoretical infringement already embodied in categories like "object" and even "givenness"? Once again, the guiding clue of intentionality, itself understood as a formal schematism, provides the answer. The undifferentiated primal something of life, which is not yet differentiated and not yet worldly,[98] nevertheless, in that very "not yet," contains within itself the "index [indication!] for the highest potentiality of life."[99] This potentiality

is the basic trait or "pull" (*Zug*) of life, to live "out toward" something, in the *Kriegsnotsemester*-Schema to "world out" (*auszuwelten*) into particular lifeworlds.[100] And this *Es weltet* is "the basic moment of life as such."[101] The schema serves to divide the event of worlding into its two pretheoretical divisions, giving primacy to the active suffix, to the structuring, articulating, thus meaning-giving dynamism of life in and for itself. The primal something, thus singled out as a dynamic center, may be a "not yet," but this undifferentiated "not" contains within itself the power to differentiate worlds. It is a differentiating indifference or, in more Kantian language, a determinable indetermination. The indifference can do something. And this potency is the primal something. How to conceptualize and define this "deed" (replacing Fichte's *Tathandlung*!)? For the Kantians, all concepts have the function of determining. According to our already established precautions, this is to be a purely formal determination rather than the hierarchical determination of genera and species. Heidegger finds such a formal determination in the schematism of intentionality itself. Within the undifferentiated dynamism of the primal something, in its undiminished "vital impetus," there is the bare intentional moment of "out toward," "in the direction of," "into a (determinate) world,"[102] the tendency to "world out" (*auszuwelten*) into particular lifeworlds. Put in another way, this dynamic of being toward something is "life in its motivated tendency and tending motivation."[103] The primal something may be undifferentiated and unformed, but it is not Rickert's "amorphous irrational X" of brute facticity. For it contains within itself the tendency toward differentiation and determination and so has an intrinsic directional sense.

With this positive development of the undifferentiation of life, we can see how Heidegger answers the final objection against a pretheoretical science, namely, the objection that an objectifying diremption between knowledge and its object always remains, since every intuitive comportment is inescapably a comportive "relation to *something*." The answer of Heidegger's phenomenology is ingeniously simple: When it comes to the original something, the *Ur-etwas*, the "something" is the comporting relation (*Verhalten*) itself, without any prior determination as to who or what is doing the comporting or is being comported. *It* is not an object at all but instead the sheer intentional movement of "out toward," what Heidegger two semesters later will structurally distinguish as the relational

sense (*Bezugssinn*) of intentionality. All formally indicative concepts aim, strictly speaking, to express only the pure "out toward" without specifying any content or ontic fulfillment. From the relational sense of "out toward," accordingly, the formal indication of "object in general" becomes the pure "toward which" (*das Worauf*), in opposition to Lask's more *reflexive* formulation of "standing over against" (*Entgegenstehendes*[104]), which takes the object more from the side of its content sense, and so is still too objectively formulated. And *das Worauf* in *Kriegsnotsemester* is clearly the conceptual predecessor of "das Woraufhin des primären Entwurfs,"[105] "the toward-which according-to-which of the primary project" of *Dasein* which in *Being and Time* is formally defined as its "sense" (*Sinn*), and is in turn transformed into the very temporality of *Dasein*.

Thus, formal *objectification*, even though "motivated" in the primal something, is still not near enough to life's origin, to its "primal leap" (*Ursprung*, Natorp's favorite play on the word "origin"), for Heidegger's formally indicative concepts. In the end, formal objectification is still an unliving in its rigid duality of subject over against object, which must be dismantled and revivified by the more unified relation of motive to tendency, which is at the "heart" of the intentional movement here. The conceptual pair motive-tendency, destined to be replaced by the pair passion-action in 1924 and by thrownness-projection in *Being and Time*, in each case to be understood as a single movement and as equiprimordial, is therefore not a duality, but rather the "motivated tendency or tending motivation"[106] in which "outworlding" life expresses itself. Expression, articulation, differentiation arises out of a matrix of undifferentiation focused in a single thrust of intentionality, no longer to be understood in terms of subject-object, form-matter, or any other duality. What remains of the old objectification is the indifferent continuum of the toward-which on the noematic end, and the tending motivation on the noetic.

In the next decade, Heidegger will rename his formal schematism of intentionality in different ways in order to "logically" guide him to generate new and different conceptual schemes incorporating new intentional nuances, one after another in close succession. But every one of these supplemental formal indications always bears the mark of intentionality as the middle-voiced "sich richten nach," being directed toward/directing itself toward, at the core of human experience: a triple-vectored intentionality

according to its sense of relation, content, and fulfillment that integrate into a comprehensive temporal sense (1920–1922), *Dasein* (1923), being-in-the-world (1924), (having)-to-be (*Zu-sein*: 1925), existence (1926), and transcendence (1927–1929). The best known of these transcendental-logical exercises in philosophical concept formation is *Being and Time*, guided by the formal indication of existence to generate the cluster of existential categories that permits the articulation of an ek-static temporality, in contrast to a static temporality of constant presence. One striking feature of this concept-forming method of formal indication is its schematizing power, its power to prefigure the structures that underlie an original life-phenomenon, exposing its vectorial web that weaves the fabric of time. Thus, blackboard diagrams of the conceptual schemes of one or another philosopher, as well as his own, abound in Heidegger's early lecture courses. Even the reading of a text in Heidegger's own idiosyncratic terms more often than not prompts one to want to sketch out and outline its peculiar logic, rhetoric, and grammar diagrammatically, in the form of a schematism or diagram.

ADDENDUM: FICHTE ON THE TRANSCENDENTAL FACT

The only direct evidence that we have of the influence of Lask's *Fichte's Idealism and History* on Heidegger comes to us by way of one of the more notorious errors in the editions of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe*. In Heidegger's introductory outline of his "critique" (i.e., destruction) of the system of transcendental idealism in the summer 1919 course, we read in parentheses "Dilthey's decisive distinction, which influences Windelband's *Rektoratsrede*, Rickert, Lask, Fichte."[107] Dilthey influencing Fichte, who had died some thirty years before Dilthey was born?! We need only to put scare-quotes around "Fichte" in order to turn it into a reference to Lask's Fichte book of 1902 in this initial survey of the literature of transcendental philosophy of value on the opening day of the course. In consulting the autograph of the course in Marbach's Heidegger Archive, we find that Heidegger at this point even refers to a specific chapter in the book: "The Thing in Itself and the Irrationality of the Individual."[108] Lask is here in the middle of his effort, following the tradition of Windelband and Rickert,

of developing the basic category for the idiographic historical sciences, namely, the historically individual as "value individuality," Lask's own unique hybridization of value and fact situated in the by now familiar middle ground of the Kantian field of experience.

The first clear signs of a "transcendental empiricism" of a "positivistic" Fichte occur around 1797. But Lask finds hints of it in the idealistic *Wissenschaftslehre* of 1794, even an initial acknowledgement of an irrational cleft between the I and non-I, in the theoretical incomprehensibility of the empirical "collision" (*Anstoss*, check) which speculation can override only in the practical realm. A complete and full conceivability is thus seen as a task, an infinite idea. By way of this admission of irrationality, the absolute I or the totality of knowledge is grasped no longer as a principle but as an idea.[109]

Indeed, in the "Second Introduction to the *Wissenschaftslehre*" of 1797, Fichte himself accuses his first readers of "the remarkable confusion of the I of intellectual intuition, from which the *Wissenschaftslehre* starts, with the I as idea, where it concludes."[110] The I as intellectual intuition is merely the form of I-hood and self-reverting action, the form which is only for the philosophers. The I as idea is instead present for the I itself, which the philosopher then beholds. The I as idea holds the actual material of the I, which itself can be thought only by thinking of a world.[111] This opposition of form and matter is itself a sign of human limits. The idea of idealism, as an unattainable reality and the overcoming of limits in infinity, is a rejection of absolute rationalism and assumption of a "critical anti-rationalism."[112] Philosophy becomes an infinite series of acts of conceiving the inconceivable.

> The fact of the hiatus is the constant reference to an infinite progress of knowledge which cannot be actualized except in a never finished "system of becoming." Hegel's polemic against "infinite progress" and "bad infinity" thus again clearly manifests the great divide between panlogicism and the *Wissenschaftslehre*.[113]

In this regard, the concrete realization of knowledge displays an "infinite facticity of individual knowing" (a first use of *Facticität* in Fichte),[114] the individual displays an infinite in its particulars, an "infinite manifold" or "into an infinite manifold."[115]

The fact of the *hiatus irrationalis*, of the abyss, itself assumes a manifold of forms: finite knowing and infinite progress, the universal I and the individual I-concentration, the conceiving of form and the inconceivability of matter, the metaphysical and the empirical, philosophy and life, *quid juris* and *quid facti*, and so on. The inability to fill the factic cleft is the encounter with incalculable facticity, accident, the "brutality of reality."[116]

> Brutality is the "law" of reality, the sole and absolute law. Brutality has the further consequence that reality can only be awaited and accepted, must always be "new" and surprising. This sudden breaking of all threads of speculation in the fact of brutal reality is what Fichte calls the absolute hiatus, which cannot be filled by any reflection but which itself constitutes the ultimate that is unattainable by knowledge. . . . Absolute "facticity" is itself the highest and sole law, i.e., it is the violent breaking of all laws. Facticity as brutality of reality is pure and simple lawlessness itself.[117]

Underivable facticity is the "principle of infinity, of eternal coming to be and passing away."[118] It is the material principle of the absolute over against the formal principle of the absolute I in its formal identity, the I as intellectual intuition. Taken together, they constitute the ultimate doubling that grounds the overall process of knowledge and life.[119]

A doctrine of life first emerges with the positivistic Fichte. Fichte the *Wissenschaftslehrer* now becomes Fichte the philosopher of culture and history. Here we have the first appearance of the theoretically unfathomable value-individuality, of the I-concentration in a historical context of value. "Instead of cold reflection, immediate feeling, beholding, experiencing, and being moved is now demanded of philosophy."[120] This return to life is most clearly expressed in the "Lucid Report Clear as Day" (1801).[121] The really real is "the true fact of your present experiencing and living, what you really live and experience,"[122] the "actually real occurrence of your life,"[123] "the truly factic, the flowing moments filling your life,"[124] forgetting yourself and being immersed, given over to the devout abandon (*Hingabe*) of sheer beholding. This is life at ground level with its ground determinations, life at the first power (*Potenz*)[125] "the immersing of your consciousness in its lowest power."[126] This lowest power yields an impenetrable mass which is "the actual footing and rooting of all other life."[127] "We also call

what resides in this sphere the privileged first reality, fact of consciousness. We also call it experience."[128] Not at all a "sphere of things in and for themselves," these facts are given to consciousness. "We only have to give ourselves over and surrender to them . . . and let yourself be gripped by them, in order to appropriate them to yourself and make them into your real life."[129] Thus is life itself given to us. The realism of the "life *of consciousness*" here is still tied to the consistent standpoint of idealistic immanence.[130]

But in the *Wissenschaftslehre* of 1804, Fichte suggests—I am now going beyond Lask's account—that the consciousness itself is a fact, i.e., that the expression "fact *of* consciousness" is in fact a double genitive. "In such an idealistic system, if the consciousness were itself a fact, and the consciousness is the absolute, then the absolute would be a fact."[131] "The primal fact and the source of everything factic is the consciousness."[132] But the absolute in the *Wissenschaftslehre* is a "deed-action" (*Tathandlung*), which Fichte in this lecture course of 1804 had already called "genesis."

> Accordingly, facticity and genesis here completely collapse into one another. The immediate facticity of knowing is absolute genesis. And the absolute genesis *is*—it exists as a sheer fact—without any further possible ground outside of itself. . . . Fact is genesis and genesis fact.[133]

But such a synthesis is possible only for the *transcendental* fact, as the fact *of* consciousness, like the fact of the "I think" and of the moral law that Kant regarded as "the sole fact of pure reason." It is a "lawgiving" fact, a *factum fiens* and not a *factum brutum*, the empirical fact ("Tatsachen des Bewußtseins," 1813).[134] It seems that the Heidegger of 1941 is right, and not the Lask of 1902. The self-positing absolute I of Fichte still does not feel its thrownness, it rather posits and "throws the world." The absolute I is a pure *factum fiens* without the brutality of the world, the world that was to blow Lask to smithereens on the Eastern front.

NOTES

1. Theodore Kisiel, "Why Students of Heidegger will have to Read Emil Lask," *Man and World* 28 (1995): 197-240. This essay was first drafted in 1988.

2. Martin Heidegger, *Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus* (1915-1916), cited from the first edition of Heidegger's *Frühe Schriften* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1972), p. 133.

3. Heinrich Rickert, "Gutachten über die Habilitationsschrift des Herrn Dr. Heidegger" (July 19, 1915), is to be found in Appendix IV of Thomas Sheehan, "Heidegger's Lehrjahre," J.C. Sallis, G. Moneta, and J. Taminiaux, eds., *The Collegium Phaenomenologicum: The First Ten Years*, Phaenomenologica Vol. 105 (Dordrecht/Boston: Kluwer, 1994), p. 118.

4. Martin Heidegger, *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, Gesamtausgabe* vol. 56/57 (three lecture courses of 1919) Bernd Heimbüchel, ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1987), p. 180. The first is the postwar course of *Kriegsnotsemester* 1919, the other two are of summer semester 1919.

5. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1927, 1953), p. 218 n.

6. Heidegger to Rudolf Bultmann, December 31, 1927. Bultmann incorporated this portion of the letter virtually verbatim into an encyclopedia article on "Heidegger, Martin," *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Handwörterbuch für Theologie und Religionswissenschaft* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1928), pp. 1687ff.

7. Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften*, p. x.

8. Heidegger, *Zur Bestimung der Philosophie*, pp. 180ff.

9. Ibid., pp. 177, 180.

10. Lask's letter to Edmund Husserl, December 24, 1911. Edmund Husserl, *Briefwechsel*, Husserliana Dokumente, vol. 5, Karl Schuhmann in conjunction with Elisabeth Schuhmann, eds. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), pp. 33ff.

11. Adolf Reinach to Edmund Husserl, August 21, 1915. Husserl, *Briefwechsel*, vol. 2, p. 199.

12. Husserl to Heinrich Rickert, November 5, 1915. Husserl, *Briefwechsel*, vol. 5, p. 176.

13. Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1929, 1973), p. 246.

14. Ibid., pp. 248, 257.

15. Georges Gurvitch, *Les Tendances actuelles de la philosophie allemande: E. Husserl—M. Scheler—E. Lask—M. Heidegger* (Paris: Vrin, 1930, 1949). Cited pagination is from the 1949 edition.

16. Ibid., p. 65.

17. Ibid., pp. 67, 144, 151.

18. Ibid., pp. 164ff.

19. Ibid., p. 169; Emil Lask, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2. ed. Eugen Herrigel (Tübingen: Mohr, 1923), p. 63.

20. Gurvitch, *Les Tendances*, p. 210.

21. Ibid., pp. 215ff.

22. Ibid., p. 229.

23. Ibid., pp. 229, 234.

24. Lask, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 1. Lask's dissertation, *Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte* (1902), is on pp. 1–274. It shall be cited according to the posthumous Herrigel edition.

The earliest instances of the term "Facticität" in Fichte that I am aware of occur in his "Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre" of 1801. See Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Sämmtliche Werke*, Immanuel Hermann Fichte, ed. (Berlin: Viet und Comp, 1845), vol. 2, pp. 47, 55, 132, 162.

25. Emil Lask, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, p. 133. Lask's major work, *Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre* (1911), is on pp. 1–282.

26. Michael Friedman, "Overcoming Metaphysics: Carnap and Heidegger," in R. Giere and A. Richardson, eds., *Origins of Logical Empiricism*, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 16 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 45–79.

27. Ludwig Landgrebe, *Faktizität und Individuation. Studien zu den Grundfragen der Phänomenologie* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1982), pp. 109, 117.

28. Ludwig Siep, "Methodische und systematische Probleme in Fichtes 'Grundlage des Naturrechts,'" *Der transzendentale Gedanke. Die gegenwärtige Darstellung de Philosophie Fichtes*, Klaus Hammacher, ed. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1981), p. 292.

29. The course of summer 1930 is published as Heidegger *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 31, *Von Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie*, Hartmut Tietjen, ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1982, 1994).

30. Martin Heidegger, *Schellings Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809)*, Hildegard Feick, ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1971), pp. 227ff. English translation by Joan Stambaugh, *Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985), pp. 187ff. Citation is from the Appendix of notes for a Schelling seminar in summer 1941. Reference to the facticity (*Tatsächlichkeit*) of the feeling of freedom in summer 1936 are to be found on Stambaugh edition pages 15, 20, 38, 82–85, et passim. The text of the course of summer 1936 upon which this book of 1971 is based is now published as *Gesamtausgabe,* vol. 42, Ingeborg Schüssler, ed. under the title *Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809)* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1988).

31. Lask, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 1, p. 238.
32. Ibid., pp. 172ff, 284.
33. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 135.
34. Fichte, *Fichtes Werke*, vol. 1, pp. 17, 196, 206.
35. Ibid., pp. 226ff, 240ff.
36. Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften*, p. 204.
37. Ibid., pp. 357–75.
38. Much of what follows is treated in far more detail in chapter 1 of Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's BEING AND TIME* (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: The University of California Press, 1993). See also "Why Students of Heidegger will have to Read Emil Lask," n. 1 above. An earlier essay of pertinence, which includes a history of "facticity" from Fichte to Natorp, is Theodore Kisiel, "Das Entstehen des Begriffsfeldes 'Faktizität' im Frühwerk Heideggers," *Dilthey-Jahrbuch* 4 (1986–87): 91–120.
39. "Neuere Forschungen über Logik (1912)," in Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften (1912–1916), Gesamtausgabe,* vol. 1, F.-W. von Herrmann, ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978), pp. 17-43.
40. Lask's theme of a "home" for both formal and transcendental logic is pursued especially in Steven Galt Crowell, "Lask, Heidegger, and the Homelessness of Logic," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 23, no. 3 (October 1992): 222–39. See also Crowell's dissertation, *Truth and Reflection: The Development of Transcendental Logic in Lask, Husserl, and Heidegger* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1981). Also Steven Galt Crowell, "Husserl, Lask, and the Idea of Transcendental Logic," in Robert Sokolowski, ed., *Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological Tradition: Essays in Phenomenology* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1988), pp. 63-85.
41. Cf. the *Kriegsnotsemester*-Schema, fig. 1. Here I breach chronology and present this blackboard diagram of *Kriegsnotsemester* 1919 first, as a comprehensive way of keeping tabs on the young Heidegger's gradual adoption and transformation of this now forgotten terminology drawn from neo-Kantianism in general and Lask in particular. The course of *Kriegsnotsemester* 1919, "Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem," is published in Martin Heidegger, *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, Gesamtausgabe,* vol. 56/57, Bernd Heimbüchel, ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1987), pp. 1–117. The diagram, which I call the "KNS-Schema," was however omitted in this edition of the course and for some time was available only in Kisiel, *Genesis of Being and Time*, p. 22. A recent publication of Oskar Becker's transcript of the last two hours of this course now presents a

somewhat error-ridden version of this diagram: see *Heidegger Studies* 12 (1996): 9-14, esp. p. 11.

42. See n. 3 above.

43. Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften*, p. 145.

44. So in a letter from Heidegger to Karl Löwith on August 20, 1927, where he at once associates the tendency toward facticity operative in his habilitation work with a concurrent development of the formal indication. Preceding what has been cited is the following sentence: "That I was constantly concerned with Duns Scotus and the Middle Ages and then back to Aristotle, is by no means a matter of chance." See *Zur philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers*, Dietrich Papenfuss and Otto Pöggeler, eds., vol. 2, *Im Gespräch der Zeit* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1990), pp. 36ff.

45. Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften*, p. 193.

46. Lask, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, p. 59.

47. Ibid., p. 170.

48. Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften*, p. 224.

49. Lask, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, pp. 59–61, 77.

50. Ibid., p. 61.

51. Ibid., pp. 172, 103.

52. Ibid., p. 65.

53. Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften*, pp. 197, 257, 263, 346.

54. Ibid., p. 155.

55. Ibid., pp. 349ff.

56. Ibid., pp. 344, 208.

57. Ibid., p. 210.

58. Lask, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, p. 133.

59. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 221.

60. Lask, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, pp. 75ff.

61. Heidegger, *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, p. 122.

62. Crowell, *Truth and Reflection*, p. 235.

63. Lask, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, pp. 129ff.

64. II.A.

65. I.A.

66. Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften*, p. 156.

67. Ibid., p. 159.

68. II.B.

69. II.A.

70. Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften*, p. 173, citing Heinrich Rickert, "Das Eine, die Einheit und die Eins," *Logos* 1 (1911).
71. Ibid., p. 160.
72. Ibid., pp. 172, 323; also pp. 158, 166.
73. Ibid., p. 160.
74. Ibid., p. 323.
75. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 114.
76. Lask, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, p. 164.
77. Ibid., pp. 158, 163, 68.
78. Ibid., p. 137.
79. Ibid., p. 372.
80. Ibid., pp. 72ff.
81. Ibid., p. 229.
82. Ibid., pp. 129ff.
83. Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften*, p. 343.
84. Ibid., p. 277.
85. Ibid., p. 346.
86. Ibid., pp. 254ff.
87. II.A.
88. Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften*, pp. 256ff.
89. II.A.
90. II.B., cf. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 2.
91. Heidegger, *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, p. 112.
92. I.B.
93. II.B.
94. II.A.
95. I.A.
96. II.A.
97. I.A.
98. I.A.
99. Heidegger, *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, p. 115.
100. I.B.
101. I.A.
102. Heidegger, *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, p. 115.
103. Ibid., p. 117.
104. Lask, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, pp. 72ff.
105. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 324.

106. Heidegger, *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, p. 117.
107. Ibid., p. 123.
108. Lask, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 1, pp. 127–38.
109. Ibid., pp. 92ff.
110. Fichte, *Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. 1, p. 515.
111. Ibid., p. 516.
112. Lask, Gesammelte Schriften, p. 103.
113. Ibid., p. 114.
114. Fichte, *Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. 2, p. 55.
115. Lask, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 7, pp. 178ff.
116. Ibid., p. 172.
117. Ibid., pp. 172ff.
118. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Nachgelassene Werke*, Immanuel Hermann Fichte, ed. (Bonn: bei Adolph Marcus, 1834), vol. 3, p. 384.
119. Lask, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 1, pp. 188, 116.
120. Ibid., p. 198.
121. Cf. ibid., p. 148.
122. Fichte, *Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. 2, p. 335.
123. Ibid., p. 336.
124. Ibid., p. 339.
125. Ibid., p. 344.
126. Ibid., p. 400.
127. Ibid., p. 345.
128. Ibid.
129. Ibid., p. 344.
130. Lask, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 1, p. 149.
131. Fichte, *Nachgelassene Werke*, vol. 2, p. 194.
132. Ibid., p. 195.
133. Ibid., pp. 268, 308.
134. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 538.

12

DILTHEY AND HEIDEGGER

A HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE

Ben Vedder

The focus of this essay is the difference between Wilhelm Dilthey's and Martin Heidegger's concepts of historicality. Some observers emphasize the influence of Dilthey on Heidegger, while others conscientiously trace the way in which Heidegger refers to Dilthey in his earlier works. There are, of course, also publications which only note the kinship between these two German thinkers.[1] I will be interested in this systematic difference in relation to the subject of historicality. This difference will be sought in the concept of provisionality (*vorlaufen und vorläufigkeit*) which is very important in Heidegger's *Being and Time*[2] and which is, in a different way, present in Dilthey's philosophy.

DILTHEY'S ENDLESS ENDEAVORS

In the first part of this essay, I will discuss Dilthey's philosophy. At first sight, he seems to reject metaphysics, because in the consciousness of the nineteenth century, humanity is aware of the historicality of thinking. Historicality of thinking and metaphysics are incompatible. After it is shown that hermeneutics, introspection as self-contemplation, and worldview are involved in an endless process, the reason for this endlessness is discussed. I hope to demonstrate that the metaphysical feeling in man is directed toward the infiniteness of the universe which cannot be expressed in words, reflection, and worldviews. Every attempt to grasp the whole of life must necessarily fail because of the primary position of the infinite universe, which was Dilthey's foremost concern throughout his life.

It is well known that Dilthey rejected metaphysics as an outmoded way of thinking. Metaphysics is considered to be directed at an independent objective reality which is not related to human subjectivity and which exists without any relation to historicity. It seems as if the ideal of knowing reality as an objective totality which has its own validity does not exist for Dilthey. According to Dilthey, what is left is a metaphysical mood. This basic metaphysical feeling depends on the immeasurability of the universe and is a symbol for the infinity which is experienced in a metaphysical mood. This feeling, however, is not capable of proving the validity of its truth claims. Metaphysics as a "logical" system falls silent.[3]

For Dilthey, however, pointing out a mood as a remnant of metaphysics is not a depreciation; just by pointing out the metaphysical mood, the relationship with the totality of life and reality is kept alive. It is important for Dilthey to see in the mood the point of departure for which the totality of life and world form a unity. According to Dilthey, the worldview is carried by the mood: "Als lebendiges Ganze, als Schöpfung einer Person, in welche diese Alles, ihre Begriffe wie ihre Ideale ergießt, ist es von einer Gemütsverfassung, einer Grundstimmung getragen."[4] What is left, after abstract and substantial essences as a ground for a metaphysics disappears, is the mood from which every ego forms a unity with his world.

After the loss of metaphysics, Dilthey poses a new question. How is scientific knowledge of individuals possible? How do we achieve it?[5] For

Dilthey, the question of the possibility of understanding the individual is the key problem of hermeneutics; it is a question relevant to the whole of the humanities.

The possibility of a general valid interpretation can be deduced from the nature of life. There the interpreter and the author are not unfamiliar to each other, since both have formed themselves on the basis of general human nature. From this general human nature, the understanding of the other is made possible, and understanding of the human as such is made possible. This, however, according to Dilthey, does not result in a final complete understanding. My question is, why is there incomplete understanding? After all, from a few words and their connection in sentences, the whole work should be understood. This means that the whole is not definitively determined because one has not yet grasped it. In a similar way, the individual is not capable of expressing himself totally in and through self-made signs.[6] "Theoretisch trift man hier auf die Grenzen aller Auslegung, sie vollzieht ihre Aufgabe immer nur bis zu einem bestimmten Grade: so bleibt alles verstehen immer nur relativ und kann nie vollendet werden. Individuum est ineffabile."[7] Because of the unspeakable individuality, in the end hermeneutics does not succeed.

In understanding, one goes from an external to an internal phenomenon. This internal phenomenon is recognized by the reader or the interpreter in himself.[8] Therefore Dilthey speaks of philosophical hermeneutics as a process of self-reflection, which ultimately takes the form of a biography. Writing the history of countries, people, cultural systems, organizations, eras, and, finally, the universal history is a biography of mankind.[9] In the humanities and hermeneutics, one is always absorbed in a process of self-reflection in accordance with the model of biography. However, the question is whether a definitive self-knowledge is possible, since understanding of another individual is definitively impossible. After all, nobody can finish his own biography.

Life, experience of life, and the humanities have, through this process of self-reflection, an inner connection and interaction. Life understands life. Also, building concepts of the humanities in history and social science is determined by life itself.[10] However, the immediate relationship between life and the humanities leads to a struggle between the tendencies of life and the scientific goal that characterizes the scholarly life. The scholar is

always surrounded by his own historical time and place; at the same time he strives for universality. Because of this, he has to approach his subject more and more critically.[11] Understanding penetrates newer depths of life. In this way, Dilthey sees the humanities absorbed in a process of self-reflection of the historical man. He sets himself the task of working out the objectivity of the humanities more critically and rigorously.[12]

With his emphasis on self-knowledge and self-reflection, Dilthey does not repeat what Hegel has said. In Hegelian philosophy, external and objective life is a moment in the development of the spirit between the subjective and the absolute spirit. This transcends his temporality and historicality in the end in the self-understanding of the absolute spirit. According to Dilthey, Hegel constructs understanding from a universal reasonable will. Dilthey, however, sees his point of departure in the reality of life. He is therefore confronted with feelings of weakness and inadequacy. He is not confronted with a reasonable will, but with the power of dark and obscure drives and suffering. By darkness and illusions, the finiteness of all that is living, even where the highest level of reason originates from life, life is invincible. Finiteness appears in the endless process of understanding, from which it appears that man cannot gain a clear understanding to his life and life in general.[13]

In reflection on man, which is based on the humanities, we see, as in the unreachable individuality, a circular movement which leads to an endless task. In its orientation toward a unique event, self-reflection works through the humanities to the whole of reflection on man. In the orientation toward the whole, there is the interaction between the universal and the particular.[14] This is an interaction without end; a complete and total self-understanding of mankind remains an ideal beyond reach. It seems that the interpreter, in his knowledge of the other individuality as well as in the process of self-reflection, does not make progress in the end.

The most important reason why Dilthey rejects metaphysics is that behind the metaphysical system lies the historical consciousness. This historical consciousness objectifies the actual existing contrasts of the metaphysical systems. This historical consciousness sees that one has not progressed toward a balanced system. The contradictions of the systems are ultimately based on life and the experience of life. In a historical survey, different types of worldviews become visible. In this survey, experience of

life is now seen as the result of positions which one has in relation to life, in relation to birth and to death. For Dilthey, birth and death are aspects of life for which one has a position. This position opens up certain aspects of life. Historical research shows us the coherence of life with the worldview. The point of departure is that every philosopher unravels the mystery of life from a certain point.[15] Life is always the beginning and end of the thought process; thought arises from and returns to life, which it tries to understand. Just as life is given as the first and last presumption, beyond which one cannot go, and as the whole of life is never expressed in one single worldview, we are caught up in an endless task.

In the preceding pages I have referred to the endlessness of hermeneutics, self-reflection, and worldviews. The question now is how can we understand this endlessness as a continuing endeavor. After Dilthey had eliminated universal truth claims in metaphysics and had made hermeneutics the central entrance to life, metaphysics was just one interpretation of life and its problems. Metaphysics disappeared in a historical anarchy. But efforts to come to understanding and self-reflection, and to conceive a worldview are, according to Dilthey, not abandoned, because of the eternal metaphysical in man.[16] What is the place of the eternal metaphysical in man, of which Dilthey speaks, in relation to self-understanding? Dilthey points out the metaphysical in man in a number of places in his work: "Aber das Meta-Physische unseres Lebens als persönliche Erfahrung d.h. als moralisch-religiöse Wahrheit bleibt übrig."[17] After the loss of the independence of metaphysics, the metaphysical in life is regarded as a personal experience from which it gets personal and historical expression. "Wenn aber diese unhaltbar geworden ist, wird es in der Selbstbesinnung in seinem Kerne erkannt. Diese ist nur das Grab der veräußerlichenden Metaphysik: das innere metaphysische Bewußtsein ist unsterblich."[18]

This eternal metaphysical, however, is never represented as an idea, symbol, or image in history. However, it is this which as the whole of life has to be expressed. Dilthey is aware of having presented a problem which he could not solve himself, because it is unsolvable. This insight is understood by Dilthey as belonging to—and peculiar to—man who tries to come to self-understanding in hermeneutics. Traces of this are his continued efforts to end the criticism of historical reason. His project has an incompleteness which follows from the nature of his presuppositions.

Hermeneutics as a process of appropriation in self-reflection and interpretation of life remains unfinished in relation to the whole of life.

Dilthey has seen this incompleteness; this appears obvious from his letters to Count Yorck. He writes: "Wir arbeiten alle in gewissem Sinne pro nihilo."[19] Dilthey always had the impression that the subject he wanted to understand was endless. To express this, he used the image of the sea; he talks about a "See von Folianten,"[20] his head is completely submerged in a "See von Arbeit."[21] Therefore it is not surprising that he envies the lumberjack "daß er jeden Tag, jede Woche sieht, was er getan hat."[22] He doubts "erheblich sichere Ergebnisse aufs Trockene zu bringen."[23] He expresses his project very strikingly as a result of a dream he once had. He sketches how he, in the dream, looks at a picture from Rafael's school in Athens. The figures, old and modern philosophers, suddenly came to life. During the discussion, they formed themselves into little groups in the way Dilthey had described their relationship in his philosophy of worldviews. Nevertheless, Dilthey was sorry that in his dream the groups were separated: "Mich überfiel eine seltsame Angst, daß die Philosophie dreimal oder vielleicht noch mehrere male da zu sein schien—die Einheit meines eigenen Wesens schien zu zerreißen, da ich sehnsüchtiger bald zu dieser, bald zu jener Gruppe hingezogen ward, und ich strebte an, sie zu behaupten."[24] As Dilthey awakened and saw the stars through the window and was struck by the immeasurability and impenetrability of the universe, he remembered the anarchy of thinking resulting from the historical determinations of the systems, but he also experienced a feeling of freedom. Worldviews are based on the nature of the universe and on the relationship of the understanding spirit to this universe.

> So drückt jede derselben in unseren Denkgrenzen eine Seite des Universums aus. Jede ist hierin wahr. Jede aber ist einseitig. Es ist uns versagt, diese Seiten zusammenzuschauen. Das reine Licht der Wahrheit ist nur in verschieden gebrochenem Strahl für uns zu erblicken."[25]

Dilthey's understanding of human finiteness and the finiteness of hermeneutics has to be understood in the light of the inexpressibility of what is beyond history: the eternal universe. A single whole life can manifest itself historically in many different ways, in fragments and streaks.

This concept of finiteness, however, is dependent on Dilthey's ideal of the unity of the universe and life, which finally had to be understood. The finiteness of man is understood in terms of the infinite universe. The reason for the eternity of the metaphysical consciousness comes from the unity of life, which is experienced in a mood as a unity, but is presented only in a limited and incomplete way. The ambition to overcome finiteness arises from the consciousness of the eternal metaphysical in which the totality of the universe is contemplated. This is why Dilthey, on his seventieth birthday, said:

> An der Auflösung der Probleme, welche an dieses sich in langer Reihe anschließen, habe ich mein Leben lang gearbeitet. Das Ziel sehe ich. Wenn ich auf dem Wege liegen bleibe—so hoffe ich, werden ihn meine jungen Weggenossen, meine Schüler zu Ende gehen.[26]

In other words, Dilthey, who is motivated by the infiniteness of the universe—the ideal of knowledge of classical metaphysics—has to move to the endlessness of hermeneutics, self-reflection, and worldview, because of the temporary and provisional inaccessibility of the infinite universe. But those who come after me will do the job.

HEIDEGGER'S RECEPTION OF DILTHEY

Max Scheler, on reading *Being and Time* in 1927, emphasized Heidegger's dependence on Dilthey's philosophy of life. In the margin at the end of section 77 he wrote the word "Endziel," final goal. It is not my intention to present Scheler's interpretation of *Being and Time*; but Scheler interpreted Heidegger's *Being and Time* as a complete document on the philosophy of life. He made this Heideggerian philosophy of life a part of his own metaphysics.[27]

Now that we have some insight into "the genesis of *Being and Time*," we also see in Heidegger's lectures and talks from 1919 to 1927 that he seems to link up with Dilthey. In the summer of 1919, Heidegger mentions Dilthey in relation to the difference between science and human science.[28] He appreciates the notion of self-reflection (*Selbstbesinnung*) of the

spirit. Only in self-reflection can we find the unity of life and its continuity. From there, according to Heidegger, we can find principles and opinions which are the basis for the construction of the historical world in human science. Here Heidegger notices that Dilthey was not able to formulate the final motives of the principles and the radical purity and newness of the method: ". . . die er aber doch nicht in den letzten Urmotiven der Prinzipien und der radikalen Reinheit und Neuartigkeit der Methodik erreichen konnte."[29] Nevertheless, Dilthey saw the meaning of the singularity and uniqueness in historical reality; he was aware of its other meaning in human science in relation to science. From the beginning, Heidegger claimed that Dilthey was not radical enough.

In "Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie" (winter of 1919–1920) Heidegger writes:

> Ganz vereinzelt, seiner geistigen Herkunft nach—jeder wissenschaftliche Forscher hat eine solche—im deutschen Idealismus verwurzelt, zwar nicht in dessen toten Begriffen, sondern lebendigen Tendenzen—vor allem Schleiermacher und Hegel—, wirkte Wilhelm Dilthey (gest.1911). Er hat kein System geschaffen, wirkt aber umso lebendiger auf die philosophische Forschumg und wird wirken in den nächsten Jahrzehnten. Dilthey eröffnete, sowenig er noch bis zum Ursprung vordrang, einen neuen aspekt der Geistesgeschichte. . . .[30]

Dilthey opened a new aspect of human science, but he didn't penetrate the origin.

Heidegger was not that enthusiastic about Dilthey. In "Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks" (1920), he also refers to Dilthey. He points out that Dilthey was not a systematic philosopher, but this is not an inability, he was diffident (*scheu*) about conceptual violence.[31] But here again Heidegger asks: "wir müssen sehen, . . . wie weit seine Begriffe einheitlich durchherscht sind, oder ob sie vielleicht nicht nur unverbunden stehen neben dem lebendigen Gefühl dessen, was er gesehen hat."[32] He concludes: "Dilthey ist sich selbst unklar über das Neue, worauf er hinstrebt. Er sieht nicht, daß nur ein alle Begriffe fraglich machender Radikalismus weiterführen kann."[33]

In "Ontologie, Hermeneutik der Faktizität" (1923), Heidegger notes

that he does not understand hermeneutics the way it was presented by Dilthey.[34] In his lecture "Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs" in 1925, Heidegger refers to Dilthey as one of the first to recognize the impossibility of applying the scientific method to human science. He saw the possibility of seeing life itself as the basis for the reality of history. Decisive in Dilthey's question is the tendency to see the reality of history. But here again, according to Heidegger, he didn't question radically enough: "Freilich hat er diese Frage nicht so radikal gestellt."[35] He was too concerned with the theory of science.

Heidegger shows that he was familiar with many of Dilthey's works as well as with his "Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften."[36] He recognizes Dilthey's merits. His work was directed toward developing a new psychology, a science of man, in order to understand how he functions as an actor in history.[37]

In "Die Kassler Vorträge" from 1925, Heidegger emphasizes that Dilthey's goal is to portray the historical being of human life. Here again Heidegger asks: ". . . ob er das Problem gelöst hat, ob seine philosophischen mittel überhaupt so waren, daß er es lösen konnte?"[38] Heidegger also mentions that Dilthey did not finish his work. "Wir sahen, alle Arbeiten Diltheys sind unabgeschlossen."[39] With this observation Heidegger refers to the historicality of the historian. In this "Unabgeschlossenheit" appears, according to Heidegger, the historicality of history, which was not questioned radically enough by Dilthey. However he doesn't question historicality itself: "Dilthey hat gezeigt und betont, daß der Grundcharakter sei: Geschichtlich-Sein. Er ließ es bei dieser Feststellung bewenden, er hat nicht gefragt, was Geschichtlich-Sein sei, noch gezeigt, inwiefern Leben geschichtlich ist."[40]

In *Being and Time*, section 10, Heidegger writes:

> if we understand it rightly, in any serious and scientifically-minded "philosophy of life" (this expression says about as much as "the botany of plants") there lies an unexpressed tendency towards an understanding of Dasein's Being. What is conspicuous in such a philosophy (and here it is defective in principle) is that here "life" itself as a kind of Being does not become ontologically a problem.[41]

In relation to the question of ontology and reality, Heidegger emphasizes that Dilthey interpreted "life" as ontologically undifferentiated; and of course "life" is something which one cannot go "behind." But to interpret *Dasein* ontologically does not mean that we must return ontically to some other entity, to "life" for example. According to Heidegger,

> Life in its own right is a kind of Being; but essentially it is accessible only in Dasein. The ontology of life is accomplished by way of a privative Interpretation; it determines what must be the case if there can be anything like mere-aliveness (Nur-noch-leben). Life is not a mere Being-present-at-hand, nor is it Dasein. In turn, Dasein is never to be defined ontologically by regarding it as life (in an ontologically indefinite manner) plus something else.[42]

"Its philosophical relevance," Heidegger writes, "however, is to be sought in the fact that in all this he was, above all, on his way towards the question of life."[43]

If we look back, we see the following: Heidegger is touched by Dilthey's fervent search for man as a historical being. But at the same time, he reproaches Dilthey for not going deep enough into the ontological question of history. Dilthey was not radical enough. An enumeration of historical facts does not define historicality, which is what Heidegger was looking for. Heidegger tried to develop a notion of historicality in order to understand historical description and historical research. He does this in chapter 5 of the second part of *Being and Time*.

DILTHEY IN *BEING AND TIME*

Chapter 5 of Heidegger's *Being and Time*, in a certain sense, is a discussion with Dilthey. In the beginning of section 77, Heidegger writes, "The analysis of the problem of history which we have just carried through has arisen in the process of appropriating the labours of Dilthey."[44] He finishes this section by saying "Thus it becomes plain in what sense the preparatory existential-temporal analytic of Dasein is resolved to foster the spirit of Count Yorck in the service of Dilthey's work." According to Heidegger,

"the formulation of the question needs to be radicalized in principle."[45] The more radical approach is taken by Heidegger in this chapter. If Heidegger reproaches Dilthey for not developing the notion of historicality, this chapter is his answer.

It is Heidegger's intention to show the link between history and the temporality of *Dasein*. Therefore history has to be approached from an existential-ontological perspective (§ 72). Heidegger starts where we left Dilthey: with the question of the whole of life. He focuses on the Diltheyan concept "connectedness of life" (*Zusammenhang des Lebens*). He writes with his familiar irony, "What seems simpler than to characterize the 'connectedness of life' between birth and death? It consists of a sequence of Experiences 'in time.' . . . Thus it is said that Dasein is 'temporal.'"[46] In this ironic sentence we see allusions to Diltheyan concepts.

In contrast to this, Heidegger proposes his own vision: "Dasein does not exist as the sum of the momentary actualities of Experiences which come along successively and disappear." *Dasein* is not something present-at-hand in time; as long as one uses these ontological assumptions, an ontological characterization of the Being "between" birth and death will fail.

> Factical Dasein exists as born; and, as born, it is already dying, in the sense of Being-towards-death. As long as Dasein factically exists, both the "ends" and their "between" are, . . . Thrownness and that Being toward death . . . form a unity; and in this unity birth and death are "connected" in a manner characteristic of Dasein. As care, Dasein is the "between."[47]

This "between" is understandable in terms of temporality; it is a stretching along, a movement.

In Dilthey, birth and death are events in relation to which humanity has to determine its position, because the limitation of our existence by death is always decisive for our understanding and appreciation of life. My opinion in relation to birth and death determines my appreciation of life. This implies a position of the "I" and "me" outside life. The historicality of the I isn't thought of in a radical way. For Heidegger, *Dasein* is a movement. The specific movement in which *Dasein* is stretched along and stretches itself along, Heidegger calls "historizing" (*Geschehen des Daseins*).[48]

Interpreting and disclosing belong essentially to Dasein's "historizing" (*geschehen*). Existing historically and interpreting allows us to disclose history explicitly and grasp it. "The fact that we can make history our theme (that we can study history)—that is to say, disclose it historiologically,—is the presupposition of the possibility of the way one 'builds up the historical world in the humane sciences.'"[49] We would not be able to discover how the historical world is constructed (Dilthey's task), without history as our theme. We can make history our theme and have it within our grasp because *Dasein* exists historically. Existing historically is called historizing (*Geschehen des Daseins*). Disclosing and interpreting belongs to a Being which exists in this way. *Dasein* exists historically only because it is temporal at the very basis of its Being. This is, in short, what Heidegger argues in chapter 5. The discussion with Dilthey continues in the following sections of this chapter. He ends section 72 by saying, "The researches of Dilthey were, for their part, pioneering work; but today's generation has not yet made them its own. In the following analysis the issue is solely one of furthering their adoption."

Heidegger starts with the ordinary notion of history and shows that the dominant notion of history is determined by the past. The past, however, is part of the world and *Dasein*. A *Dasein* which no longer exists is not past, in the strict ontological sense, but "having been there" (*dagewesen*).[50] *Dasein* has been there as something futural which is making present (*gewesen als gegenwärtigendes-zukünfiges*). In this, *Dasein* temporalizes its temporality.

Now the interpretation of *Dasein*'s historicality (*Geschichtlichkeit*) will prove to be a more concrete extension of temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*). For this we must refer back to Heidegger's analyses of authenticity and thrownness (*Geworfenheit*). He asks where *Dasein* finds the possibilities upon which it factically projects itself. *Dasein* takes this from its thrown basis. In section 58, where he talks about guilt, he writes:

> And how is this Dasein this thrown basis? Only in that it projects itself upon possibilities into which it has been thrown. The Self, which as such has to lay the basis for itself, can never get that basis into its power; and yet as existing, it must take over Being-a-basis. . . . In being a basis—that is, in existing as thrown—Dasein constantly lags behind its possibilities.

> It is never existent before its basis, but only from it and as this basis. Thus "Being-a-basis" means never to have power over one's ownmost Being from the ground up.[51]

This means that a complete self-understanding is impossible.

The thrown basis of *Dasein*'s authentic existence discloses current factical possibilities and discloses them in terms of heritage (*Erbe*). In returning resolutely to one's thrownness, the thrown possibilities appear as possibilities which have come down to me.[52] The possibilities which are disclosed for *Dasein* in the resoluteness are a heritage, which is foundation and which *Dasein* can never cancel out or undo. *Dasein* as a basis can never assume power over, though it can take it over.

In the authentic situation *Dasein* assumes its possibilities as a heritage; with this, every accidental and "provisional" possibility is driven out.

> Only Being free for death, gives Dasein its goal outright and pushes existence into its finitude. Once one has grasped the finitude of one's existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities . . . —and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate (*Schicksal*)[53]

The possibilities are no longer provisional in the sense that *Dasein* has to wait for all possibilities, which it can survey. These chosen inherited possibilities are its fate, and with that, *Dasein* gets its finitude. In the essence of its Being, *Dasein* is fate.

It is not necessary that in the authentic situation one should explicitly know the origin of the possibilities upon which it projects itself. The origin of the possibilities which are given in the heritage has no relevance if one is ready to take over its thrownness; after all, we are not studying history but are in the fate of *Dasein*. If *Dasein* hands over its possibilities to itself, Heidegger speaks of repetition (*Wiederholung*). "Repeating is handing down (*überlieferung*) explicitly—that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there."[54] Repeating means an attempt to go back to the possibilities of the heritage which are handed down to us. It is not a restoration or recovery of the past, looking for the origin of some utterances, or a summary of experiences of a life between birth and death as in a biography. We do not see in the inherited elements

of the past, unmovable petrified or fossilized things, but possibilities which are handed down to us.

The reason why the past, as the having-been, has a privileged position in determining the historical arises from the privileged position of the heritage and the fate. This means that the past is seen as a possibility, not as something present-at-hand.

> Dasein doesn't first become historical in repetition; but because it is historical as temporal (*zeitlich*), it can take itself over in its history by repeating. For this, no historiology (research, science and collecting of facts) is as yet needed.[55]

This undermines Dilthey's attempt at self-reflection in a biography of mankind on the basis of historiology. In that case, the awareness of historicality results from the survey of historical research. Heidegger doesn't need this for his notion of authentic historicality which he derives from temporality (*zeitlichkeit*) wherein the having-been is seen from the future.

The notion of "self-reflection" and "connectedness of life" presupposes the inauthentic existence of *Dasein*. In the everyday world, *Dasein* has been dispersed into many kinds of things which "come to pass" daily. In so doing, it is driven by its "affairs." If it wants to realize itself through self-reflection, it must first pull itself together from the dispersion and disconnectedness of the very things that have "come to pass." This is why in inauthentic historicality the connectedness of life is constructed from the Experiences of a subject; experiences which are "also" present-at-hand.[56] In Dilthey we saw that man can find his position in the dispersion and disconnectedness; human beings have to pull themselves together afterward, in Dilthey's view. Dilthey's man has lost himself in the world. That is the source of the question of the connectedness of life of a man in the sense that he asks for the connectedness of his experiences between birth and death. This gathering of experiences happens in the biography. Therefore, from Heidegger's point of view, the question of the "connectedness of life" is this: In what kind of Being does *Dasein* lose itself so that it must, as it were, only subsequently pull itself together out of its dispersal, and think up a unity for itself in which that "together" is embraced? It is from the lostness in the "they" and in the world-historical as present-at-hand.[57]

Dasein is, at a primordial level, not something that has to gather itself, it is outstretched. It is thus in the repetition that "birth" becomes an element of the heritage in such a way that *Dasein* may accept the throwness of its own "there," free of illusions.

Heidegger bases the possibility of historical research on *Dasein's* temporality. Historiology as a science must be projected in terms of *Dasein's* historicality. If we assign the task of disclosing the "past" to historiology, the historiological thematizing of history is possible only if the "past" has, in each case, already been disclosed, and this is primary in the *Dasein* of the historian.

> Our going back to "the past" does not first get its start from the acquisition, sifting and securing of old materials; these activities presuppose historical Being towards the Dasein that has-been-there [*das geschichtliche Sein zum dagewesenen Dasein*]—that is to say, they presuppose the historicality of the historian's existence. This is the existential foundation for historiology as a science.[58]

We can only go back to the past, as historians, because of the historicality of the historian's existence. Heidegger does not start with the reconstruction of historical connections to try to get a survey of that which-has-been. He points out the way of appropriation of one's own historicality as a presupposition of historiology.

In historiology the historian should be aware of that which has been a possibility; this is only possible for a historian who lives from his own authentic historicality in the repetition. In this way, historiology is linked with historicality as its presupposition. "The 'selection' of what is to become a possible object for historiology has already been met with in the factical existentiell choice of Dasein's historicality, in which historiology arises, and in which alone it is."[59] It is from the heritage chosen in the repetition that the themes of historiology appear.

Heidegger ends this section with a reference to Dilthey:

> But since the basic concepts of the historiological sciences . . . are concepts of existence, the theory of the humane science presupposes an existential Interpretation which has as its theme the historicality of

> Dasein. Such an Interpretation is the constant goal to which the researches of Wilhelm Dilthey seek to bring us closer, and which gets illumined in a more penetrating fashion by the ideas of Count Yorck von Wartenburg.[60]

In section 77, which is entitled "The connection of the Foregoing Exposition of the Problem of Historicality with the Researches of Wilhelm Dilthey and the Ideas of Count Yorck," Heidegger does not add anything new to what he has already said. He continues to criticize Dilthey, not with his own words but with the words of Count Yorck. This complete section is a quotation of letters from Count Yorck to show that Dilthey did not work out the notion of historicality and that he did not question the notion of self-reflection or self-consideration enough: The notion of self-consideration or self-reflection, according to Heidegger, in the words of Count Yorck, needs to convey that the consideration which comes back to the Self is not an abstract "I," but a historically determined "I." Dilthey does not seem to see this. Dilthey's I, as a philosopher, a historian, or a biographer was not a historical I.

In the words of Count Yorck, Heidegger's opinion is that Dilthey puts too little stress on differentiation generically between the ontical and the historical.[61] At the end of this section, Heidegger repeats this demand:

> If one has an interest in understanding historicality, one is brought to the task of working out a generic differentiation between the ontical and the Historical. The fundamental aim of the "philosophy of life" is tied up with this. Nevertheless, the formulation of the question needs to be radicalized in principle."[62]

In this section, I conclude, Heidegger has finished with Dilthey, under the motto do not speak ill of the dead. In a certain sense, section 77 is superfluous in *Being and Time*. All Heidegger says about Dilthey was presented in other sections—not to agree with him but to criticize him.

PROVISIONALITY

In Dilthey we saw that every effort to interpret and understand another was temporary, because it is seen from the perspective of the totality of life, not yet expressed in the realized interpretation or understanding. Every interpretation in that respect is provisional. Heidegger also mentioned that Dilthey's works were not finished; they were fragmented. Every work seems to be no more than a sketchy presentation of the whole. But this notion of the temporary character or provisionality in Dilthey has to do with his concept of the whole of life which will someday be understood. The notion of totality determines Dilthey's concept of the temporary.

In Heidegger, however, the notion of provisionality is also very important, but in another way, which is typical of the difference between Dilthey and Heidegger. As early as winter of 1923, Heidegger talked about this provisionality:

> Ich meinerseits vermute, wenn diese persönliche Bemerkung verstattet ist, daß die Hermeneutik gar nicht Philosophie, sondern etwas recht Vorläufiges ist, mit dem es allerdings seine eigenste Bewandtnis hat: Es kommt nicht darauf an, möglichst schnell damit fertig zu werden, sondern möglichst lange darin auszuhalten.[63]

This remark, which Heidegger made more or less indirectly, is very strange. To the usual way of thinking this must be incomprehensible; it means staying with something temporary, instead of leaving the temporary as soon as possible. Therefore hermeneutics has to remain for a long time in the temporary; how does it do that?

The unfolding of the question of being happens on the basis of an understanding of being already given in the *Dasein*. Therefore the analysis of *Dasein* precedes the elaboration of the question of being.[64] However, the understanding of being is still indeterminate. This indeterminateness of understanding has its origin in the possibility of death, which is not to be outstripped. Because of this, the indeterminateness becomes something which belongs to temporality. The moment of death is indeterminate. Therefore the analysis of *Dasein* which is explained in terms of its under-

standing of being is always a provisional concept. "Dieses Seiende soll vorläufig genauer gewonnen werden."[65] Interpretation and hermeneutics always happen in anticipation of a horizon which is given as indeterminate and which precedes every explicit formulation.

Explaining and interpreting always happen through anticipation, a running ahead of things. Heidegger said this in his lecture "Der Begriff der Zeit." It is a running ahead of *Dasein* toward its bygone (*Vorbei*). "Der Vorlauf ist, sofern er die äußerste Möglichkeit des Daseins ihm vorhält, der Grundvollzug der Daseinsauslegung."[66] This running ahead toward its bygone is *Dasein*'s rootedness in its own historicality, the historicality of its own understanding. That is the first principle of hermeneutics.[67] This provisionality not only means that interpretation runs ahead or anticipates what comes before, but also that the interpretation is temporary, in other words, transitory. These characteristics of hermeneutics were evident in Heidegger's later concept of thinking.[68] *Dasein* is temporary in its running ahead; only in anticipation (*vorlaufen*) is it passing (*vorläufig*), without that it would not be historical.[69]

We have seen that Heidegger considers historiology as rooted in the historicality of *Dasein*. This analysis "will serve to prepare us for the clarification of the task of destroying the history of philosophy historiologically."[70] With this, Heidegger does not eliminate history, but rejects any approach to *Dasein*'s historicality that would get its start in the present.[71] Authentic historiology becomes a way in which the "today" gets deprived of its character as present; in other words, it becomes a way of painfully detaching oneself from the falling publicness of the "today." As authentic, the historiology is necessarily a critique of the "Present."[72] Repetition of the possibilities which have been means a destruction of today's opinions about the past. The possibilities of *Dasein* which have been, shouldn't be actualized again; but repetition is a rejoinder or an answer to these possibilities. As rejoinder and answer, it is simultaneously a revocation, a taking back and a retracting of that which in the "today" is working itself out as the "past."[73] This means that every interpretation of the past is provisional (*vorläufig*). When Heidegger speaks later on about a thinking dialogue with others from the past, we understand the background.[74]

In *Being and Time* Heidegger shows that every understanding and interpretation, including understanding and interpretation of texts, is

always done in a hermeneutical situation. Understanding is always an anticipation of a meaning which announces itself as a possibility. This anticipation develops in the interpretation; without this "running ahead," reading as a way of interpreting would not be possible. The reader and the historian are part of the whole of the hermeneutic situation. The historian is related to a meaning which announces itself from the future, a future which the historian cannot survey and which he does not control. Therefore the thinking dialogue with the text will never end, because history is never a surveyable totality. This means that every insight into the text is provisional, in the double meaning of "running ahead" (*vorlaufen*) and "passing" (*vorläufig*); as an anticipating interpretation, it is transitory.

If we see the whole as a closed totality in principle, which can be surveyed in the end, as is the case with Dilthey and other idealistic philosophers, then an exhaustive interpretation is possible. Such an understanding of the whole is rejected by Heidegger, because the reader, the historian, and the interpreter are always temporal.

What are the consequences of these differences between Heidegger and Dilthey? I will now add a couple of words in which I will not only describe the difference between the two views, but also assess the importance of this difference. The questions are the following: Has Heidegger gone beyond Dilthey or does he in fact fall short of the level already attained in Dilthey's theory? Is Heidegger correct in claiming that any interpretation is always provisional? Is Dilthey's personal view a possible one? To answer these questions it is useful to note that Heidegger and Dilthey are in fact doing different things.

It is important to see that, according to Heidegger, Dilthey does not think radically enough about historicality. Heidegger aims to show that history, as a human science, has its roots in the historicality of man. "If Dasein's Being is in principle historical, then every factical science is always manifestly in the grip of this historizing. But historiology still has Dasein's historicality as its presupposition in its own quite special way."[75] In Heidegger's view, this historicality can never be conquered. In all his acts, man is determined by historicality. The historian, the philologist, and the interpreter as well are limited by their historicality. But normally they are not aware of this. In not being aware of his own historicality, the historian

takes over the opinions and the prejudices of his time, not only with respect to current questions, but also to texts, to the past, and to history as such. He also has certain opinions about objectivity, truth, and science which are not subject to discussion.

Therefore Heidegger emphasizes that, in interpreting a text, it is important to get rid of current ideas, opinions, and prejudices. In this respect Heidegger talks of "destruction"; this destruction is especially directed at current opinions, as we have seen. The current array of opinions is a hindrance to looking at the past as a proposal. Current prejudices with which people are familiar provide a hindrance to entering into a dialogue with the past. Therefore it is a painful process for the historian to abstract from current views and opinions: "in other words, it becomes a way of painfully detaching oneself from the falling publicness of the 'today.'"[76] By this "destruction" Heidegger tries to create a possibility of understanding the philosophical text from the past as a text which has something to say to us, and with which we can enter into a dialogue.

Dilthey, however, emphasizes the importance of the scientific method in history and philology to come to an objective and total overview of the history of mankind. Dilthey is directed toward the whole, in spite of the impossibility of reaching it. Dilthey's biography of Schleiermacher provides a good example of his way of working. This biography is an almost complete enumeration of all aspects of Schleiermacher's life. This kind of work has its merits; it offers a great deal of historical information. But there is no philosophical dialogue between Dilthey and Schleiermacher. In regard to this biographical information about philosophers, it is typical of Heidegger that he started a lecture on Aristotle with the biographical note that he was born, worked, and died. Heidegger was not interested in historical facts; his mind was focused on a dialogue with other philosophers. Nevertheless, this dialogue is possible only if one has a correct and readable text. This means that philological research is necessary to create the possibility of a philosophical dialogue, while philological research as such is not philosophy.

If one sees the whole as a closed totality, which one can survey in the final analysis, as is proposed by Dilthey, then an exhaustive interpretation is supposed to be possible. This kind of understanding of the whole is rejected by Heidegger, because the understanding of the reader and the

historian is absorbed in temporality. Therefore, a complete and closed interpretation is problematic, because a closed and surveyed totality is impossible. Do I need to decide now which of the two is correct? Do I have an overview of what is correct when I read a text? The only thing I can say is that both approaches need each other: the philosopher who likes to read historical texts needs the philologist; and the philologist needs the philosopher who likes the dialogue with other thinkers, since otherwise his philological work has no object.

NOTES

1. See R. Makkreel, "The Genesis of Heidegger's Phenomenological Hermeneutics and the Rediscovered 'Aristotle Introduction' of 1922," in *Man and World* 23 (1990): 307–308; F. Rodi, "Die Bedeutung Diltheys für die Konzeption von Sein und Zeit. Zum Umfeld von Heideggers Kasseler Vorträgen (1925)," in *Dilthey-Jahrbuch, für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften*, Band 4 (1986–1987): 161–77 (reprinted in F. Rodi, *Erkenntnis des Erkannten, Zur Hermeneutik des 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990], pp. 102–22.)

2. See also Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), especially with regard to the notion of "vorläufige Anzeige."

3. Wilhelm Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften* (Gottingen: Vandenhoek and Ruprecht), vol. 1, p. 364.

4. Ibid., vol. 8, p. 33.

5. Ibid., vol. 5, p. 317.

6. Cfr. J. C. Maraldo, *Der hermeneutische Zirkel, Untersuchungen zu Schleiermacher, Dilthey und Heidegger*, (Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber, 1974), p. 74.

7. Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 5, p. 330.

8. Ibid., vol. 7, p. 85.

9. Ibid., p. 250.

10. Ibid., p. 136.

11. Ibid., p. 137.

12. Ibid., p. 138.

13. Ibid., pp. 150–51.

14. Ibid., p. 146.

15. Ibid., vol. 8, p. 99.

16. See also Th. Nenon, "Systematic Assumptions in Dilthey's Critique of Metaphysics," *International Studies in Philosophy, a Yearbook of General Philosophical Inquiry*, 22 (1990): 3, 41-57.

17. Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 1, p. 384.

18. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 498.

19. *Briefwechsel zwischen Wilhelm Dilthey und dem Grafen Paul Yorck v. Wartenburg 1877-1897* (Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1923), pp. 72, 146.

20. Ibid., p. 147.

21. Ibid., p. 170.

22. Ibid., p. 39.

23. Ibid., p. 181.

24. Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 8, p. 221.

25. Ibid., p. 224.

26. Ibid., vol. 5, p. 9.

27. See M. Scheler, *Späte Schriften*, in *Gesammelte Werke*, Band 9, M. Frings, ed., (Bern/München: Francke Verlag, 1976), p. 340.

28. Martin Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 56/57 (...), p. 164.

29. Ibid., vol. 56/57, p. 165.

30. Ibid., vol. 58, p. 9.

31. Ibid., vol. 59, p. 153.

32. Ibid., p. 163.

33. Ibid., p. 168.

34. Ibid., vol. 63, p. 14.

35. Ibid., vol. 20, p. 19.

36. It is sometimes noted (as in Rodi, *Erkenntnis des Erkannten*, p. 120) that Heidegger shouldn't have known this last work, but *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 20, p. 164 shows otherwise. There he refers to the first publication of the "Aufbau" in 1910.

37. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 20, p. 163.

38. Martin Heidegger, "Die Kassler Vorträge," *Dilthey-Jahrbuch* Band 8 (1992–1993), herausg. v. F. Rodi as "Wilhelm Diltheys Forschungsarbeit und der gegenwärtige Kampf um eine historische Weltanschauung." p. 143–77.

39. Ibid., p. 150.

40. Ibid., p. 173.

41. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 72.

42. Ibid., p. 75.

43. Ibid., p. 72.
44. Ibid., p. 449.
45. Ibid., p. 455.
46. Ibid., p. 425.
47. Ibid., pp. 426–27.
48. Ibid., p. 427.
49. Ibid., p. 428. Here Heidegger refers explicitly, without mentioning his name, to Dilthey's work "construction (or building) of the historical world in the human sciences" (*Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften*). It is possible that this association is lost in the English translations, where it is translated as a verb: "one builds up the historical world in the humane sciences." Heidegger used this title already as a phrase in 1919; for this and the way Heidegger made references to Dilthey, see Makkreel, "The Genesis of Heidegger's Phenomenelogical Hermeneutics," p. 307.
50. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 432.
51. Ibid., p. 330.
52. Ibid., p. 435.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid., p. 437.
55. Ibid., p. 438.
56. Ibid., p. 442.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., p. 446.
59. Ibid., p. 447.
60. Ibid., p. 449.
61. Ibid., p. 451.
62. Ibid., p. 455.
63. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 63, p. 20.
64. Ibid., vol. 20, pp. 201–202.
65. Ibid., p. 199.
66. M. Heidegger, *Der Begriff der Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1989), p. 18.
67. Will McNeill, "The First Principle of Hermeneutics," in *Reading Heidegger from the Start*, Th. Kisiel and J. van Buren, eds. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 407.
68. M. Heidegger, *Was heisst Denken?* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1971), p. 161.

69. See also Ben Vedder, "Die Faktizität der Hermeneutik: Ein Vorschlag," *Heidegger Studies* 12 (1996): 95–107.

70. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 444.

71. See R. Bernasconi, "Repetition and Tradition," in *Reading Heidegger from the Start*, Th. Kisiel and J. van Buren, eds. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 133–34.

72. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 449.

73. Ibid., p. 438.

74. M. Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 1965), pp. 7–8.

75. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 444.

76. Ibid., p. 449.